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
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


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INTRODUCTION TO
CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY.

APOLOGETICS.

TWO VOLUMES IN ONE.

BY

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NEW YORK :
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1893.

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PREFACE.

THE two parts of this book have heretofore been published separately, *The Introduction* in 1883, and *Apologetics* in 1882. Professor Smith's lectures on Natural Theology and the Evidences of Christianity (contained in *The Introduction*) were prepared from 1855 to 1860 for delivery to his classes in Union Theological Seminary. The Lectures on Apologetics were prepared and delivered in the years 1874-5 and 1875-6. As the two works properly belong together, it has been thought advisable to publish them as one volume, giving the author's complete survey of the field, as well as his earlier and later treatment of some of the subjects. In "*The Introduction*" will be found the two divisions of Apologetics not treated in the latter course of lectures, viz.: "*Historical Apologetics*" and "*Philosophical Apologetics*." Although the Chapter on Natural Theology is to some extent the same as given in the latter course as "*Fundamental Apologetics*," yet in almost every case the argument is presented in different language.

INTRODUCTION TO CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY.

COMPRISING

I. A GENERAL INTRODUCTION.

II. THE SPECIAL INTRODUCTION; OR, THE PROLEGOMENA
OF SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.


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NEW YORK:

A. C. ARMSTRONG & SON,

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INTRODUCTORY NOTE.

IT has been thought best to issue this General and Special Introduction to Theology by itself. The way is thus cleared for the publication of the system in one volume. Then, too, this book may be read to advantage by some who might not care to possess a system of theology. Not a few perhaps may be willing to hear this brief and earnest plea for a theology centring in Christ as the highest attainment of human thought and the most salutary influence for our land and times. A chief hope in regard to the book is, that it may gain the attention of students in our colleges. It is to these that the first chapter is especially addressed. The remainder of the book, too, might be read with profit by any who are considering whether they will give themselves to the Christian ministry. If they do not become Christian ministers, they can act more efficiently as Christian men through their knowledge of a work which exhibits the grounds and proofs, and gives an outline of the sum of Christian truth; and if they do enter the ministry, the perusal of such a work in college will be helpful in the proper theological course.

The editor may be permitted to speak a word in testimony of his sense of Professor Smith's services to theology and to our times. In a conversation which I had with him not long before his death, I asked how it was that in his oration on Faith and Philosophy,* spoken nearly thirty years before, he had succeeded in divining so accurately all the coming movements of anti-Christian and half-Christian thought, and in meeting them so fully. He laughed at my enthusiasm, but afterward said that in point of fact he did not seem to have got much beyond that address in his subsequent study and thinking. My feeling, as I rise from a new and minute examination of his papers, is, that it will be long before any one gets beyond his best work. Like Pascal, he has consummate skill in finding the impregnable positions. I knew him first when I was a student in Amherst College. For many of us in the college, the fascinations of that veiled Pantheism which was then rising in New England were destroyed, once for all, by his expositions of the glory of our Lord. Following him to the seminary, I found that there was no position in the course of history or

* First article in the volume, *Faith and Philosophy*, edited by Professor Prentiss. The oration, as it is better known, must come to be viewed as one of the noblest pieces of English prose which our country has produced.

of philosophic thought from which he did not seem able to exhibit Christ in his royal dignity and beauty. And this perhaps may be stated as his chief aim and the great service which he rendered in his laborious life, to prepare for bringing in the time "when the system of Christian theology shall be seen by the eye of science as well as by the eye of faith, to be rooted and grounded in Him, [and when thus] it shall be redeemed from neglect, and elevated again to its true position, as the queen of the sciences, their sacred port."^p*

HARTFORD THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY, *December, 1882.*

* Faith and Philosophy, p. 165.



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INTRODUCTION TO CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY.

GENERAL INTRODUCTION.

CHAPTER I.

HAS THEOLOGY A VALID CLAIM TO THE DEVOTION OF OUR YOUNG MEN?

As society has shaped itself in Christian states and nations, there are three professions which have been found essential to its proper growth and its well-being—viz.: Theology, Law, and Medicine. Medicine has to do chiefly with our physical nature and needs; law is designed to establish justice and external morality; theology is devoted to man's highest spiritual necessities, both in time and eternity, in the service of Christ and his Church.

All these three are still vigorous, and society has need of them; but in later times law and medicine have thriven and advanced, on the whole, perhaps more than theology. And besides these, there has also grown up another large competing body, not yet precisely organized as a profession, but acquiring strength every day, which may be called the Literary

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and Scientific Class ; the former including the writers in the various branches of periodical literature, and the latter the expounders of all the physical sciences. To a certain extent this new profession—for it may be so termed—has come into competition and conflict with the work of the Christian ministry more than either law or medicine. In the growth of this class—in connection with the general progress of society—some premature prophets are inclined to find the means and men for taking the place which the Christian ministry now occupies.

Under these circumstances a brief survey of the scene into which the young men of our time and land are entering, may be of use to the theological student, in the way of reassuring him as to the nature and the need of the profession which he proposes to adopt.

It may be said that five great powers are now at work in the construction of modern society: the humanitarian, the scientific, the speculative, the ritualistic, and the evangelical. The humanitarian comprehends both the democratic and social tendencies, asserting that the true progress of man lies only in the line of the development and adjustment of his earthly relations; the scientific has for its great aim the subjugation of nature, first to the thought and then to the use of man, tending perpetually to bring what is above nature—the supernatural—under the dominion of human thought, and so uniting with the speculative which strives to render a purely rational account of man's nature and destiny; ritualism, within the sphere of Christianity, insists upon

the external organization and rites; while evangelism is instinct with the power of the Christian system.

Three of these form a natural alliance with each other, viz.: the social, the scientific, and the speculative tendencies. They have, if not a natural, yet at present, a real tendency toward the pantheistic scheme; they are aiming, more or less consciously, at the realization of a social state in which man's natural rights shall all be conceded, the subjugation of nature made complete, and the supremacy of speculation as the highest good for man be forever established.

Meanwhile ritualism, in its Roman Catholic form, is striving for the organization of society under the Bishop of Rome, as a visible and consolidated power, and evangelical Christianity for the dominion of Christ and his kingdom, confiding in the unseen, yet mighty power, in the real spiritual grace that comes from him, and at the same time acknowledging and appropriating what is true in the humanitarian, scientific, and speculative views of man and nature.

Amidst these contesting forces, Christian theology has come to be represented by many as but a subordinate pursuit for inferior minds—as something which neither meets the intellect nor the heart of the present age.*

* This representation was most vigorously made in Carlyle's "Life of John Sterling," which exhibits, or rather betrays, the estimate of the ministry which has prevailed ever since in what has been deemed the most "earnest" school of modern thought. And if one had no other sense of what Christian theology and the Christian ministry really are than what seems to be understood by this school of England's literature—if it were a thing of rote in formulas and administration—if in its practice it were but a means of position and livelihood—if it in-

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If, however, it remains true that Christian theology is an exposition of the realities of a divine revelation, that it has to do with the permanent interests of man, and that it gives us a system of the highest practical efficiency—no philosophical speculation or social scheme or literary fulmination will be of any avail against it.

I. The theological student may, then, remind himself, first, that Christian theology, in the true idea of it, *is an exposition of the facts and realities* of a divine revelation.

In God's universe, under the most general distribution of its parts, there may be said to be two great kingdoms: the one called the kingdom of nature; the other, of grace. In each of them man's first office is to learn. The natural sciences are an exposition of the principles and laws of the kingdom of nature; the naturalist, if true to his vocation, must divest himself of mere opinion and fancy, and find out and expound what *is*, ever resting on and recurring to the broad basis of external fact and reality. As the naturalist is "the minister and interpreter of nature," so

volved simply the skill of so presenting admitted truth as to awaken an agreeable popular assent, and not to disturb a conventional commonplace in life and thought and morals—if it were to have an intoned harmony of voice, broken by occasional force of gesture—if it were the facility of social sympathy, the felicities of popular address, the mastery of the transient moods, the smiles or tears of a mixed audience—if Christian theology were not to the preacher a vital thing, the grand reality for him and all men—then, in the very name and spirit of Christ, one must bid the student go and seek for that which *is* living and eternal, and die content with only seeking, if he might but still believe that it could and must be found.

is the Christian theologian primarily the minister and interpreter of a different volume of divine revelation. His system does indeed touch, and must of course be adjusted with, human thoughts and aims at more points, and at points more vital, than does that of the explorer of the visible creation ; but it rests ultimately on a basis which is equally independent of him in its origin and in its processes.*

If the expression be duly guarded, it is useful to say that there is a Christian realism† which is absolutely fundamental in Christian theology. That is: there is a grand series of facts, constituting the very

* While Christian theology is thus analogous to the natural sciences in resting ultimately on this broad basis of its appropriate facts, it is like the science of jurisprudence, or the science of government in another characteristic, viz. : that it has essentially to do, not with an abstract system, but with a real, instituted, organized society. Much of the strength of the Roman Catholic system is seen in its holding this point up clearly and emphatically ; while its weakness and anti-Christian character are disclosed in its making the See of Rome, the episcopal hierarchy, and the continuity of sacramental grace, essential points in the organization of this kingdom.

† The expression may be used also to mark the antagonism with that spirit which denies (or implies the denial) that there is an inherent, an absolute, a vital significance in those great words which tell us the things of God's spiritual kingdom. There is a tendency in abstract theologizing to lead us to consider words as the great realities, or at least to substitute them for the reality. But all theological terms are mere "*flatus vocis*," "breathings of the voice," unless we receive them as standing for and conveying to us the great objective realities of the kingdom of God. The realism, which was the basis of the Scholastic movement, was after all a species of Nominalism. It assumed that for the general conceptions framed by the Christian mind there must be precise corresponding realities. It did not first recognize the realities which exist independent of all conceptions, and to which all conceptions are inadequate, while we see through a glass darkly.

life of the Christian system, which have an objective reality and validity, and without which the whole of Christian theology is, in principle, no better than a merely philosophical system.*

Here is the hiding-place of the strength of our theology. There is vast power in an all-absorbing selfishness, uniting foresight, impulse, purpose, and energy of will ; there is vast power in a worldly spirit, unscrupulous, watchful, and patient, fearless of danger, with undimmed hope subduing nature, and making its locked-up treasures to become the glory and power of man. But infinitely more exalted is that heroic power, as the annals of our race attest, which, resting with sublime confidence in the invisible realities of God's kingdom, for the sake of its merciful ends counts all things but loss, and is willing to spend and be spent, bearing all things because believing all things, mighty because humble, victorious because faithful to that abasing yet inspiring word :

* When Christian theology has cut loose from the idea of the kingdom of God, it becomes, by an inevitable logical necessity, a form of ethics or of psychology. Regeneration becomes an act of human choice, instead of being the result of the agency of a life-giving spirit ; the atonement is a well-contrived plan instead of a real sacrifice for sins ; justification is an internal state of peace, instead of the application to the soul of the vital, justifying grace that is in Christ Jesus ; union with Christ is resolved into a figure, and then into a figment ; original sin is ignored, and redemption is deemed to have reference only to the consequences of actual transgression ; the Church of Christ is an association of individuals instead of being the body of which he is the Head ; its sacraments become mere signs, despoiled of their vitality ; and thus, the objective reality and validity of the Christian system being undermined, we might as well have a system of philosophy or of ethics as the hope and strength of the human race.

"Not by might nor by power, but by my Spirit, saith the Lord."

An immense practical power is given to the Christian revelation by its resting in such quietness and strength on those central, integral facts, the grandest in the annals of the race—that God has established in this world a real kingdom, centering in the person and work of our gracious Lord, who for us became incarnate and suffered and died; and that he sent forth his Spirit to renew, teach, and sanctify his chosen ones; and that this kingdom is to go on doing its mighty work until all the elect of the Lord are gathered in; and that all that it gives to man here only foreshadows that full measure of blessedness and glory which is to be the consummation of that same kingdom in the unnumbered ages of eternity. Men say that the volume of divine revelation is a "popular book." But it is a real book—a book of divine realities, and it makes men feel and know their power.

In point of fact, the method of the Bible is the method best befitting a revelation of divine facts and realities. It depicts, it describes, it announces, it reveals. It would be a weakness if it also speculated and systematized. If it gave us the perfect system in a purely scientific form, we probably could not understand it, so long as we see through a glass darkly. It leaves us, just as nature* leaves us, to systematize, according to our best lights, its marvel-

* There is that behind and within all the processes and laws and forces of nature, which we can see must be there, but of which we can render no account, over which all our skill has not the slightest mas-

ous realities: it leaves to us also the natural inference, that the intellectual or the speculative form is not the highest form of truth and being, that to get to the reality of theology we are to go back to its living centers and forces; it leaves us just as nature leaves us, to feel that if we cannot circumscribe and define the Incarnation, the Atonement, the problem of sin and the regenerating influences of the Spirit, this is no valid objection to their reality.*

II. A second main consideration which the theological student should keep in view is, that the facts of that divine revelation which is at the basis of all theology *concern the highest and most permanent wants of the human race.*

Christian theology has to do with the supreme and abiding interests of the human family. If any other object can propose a higher good or undertake to

tery, the whole region, viz., of its ultimate forces or atoms. Man can neither create nor construct them.

* This principle has its wide applications and lessons in respect to the whole of theological science. It leaves ample room for philosophy in its independent investigations as to the preliminaries and the validity of a revelation, as also in showing the harmony between faith and philosophy, while it takes the essential and peculiar facts and truths of the Christian system out of the sphere of mere reason as the last arbiter in matters of faith. It ensures to the Biblical revelation its fitting and needed priority, making it both the source and the test of all true knowledge of divine things. It may illustrate the relative position of the intellect and the feelings in respect to a system of theology, showing that while both have their provinces, there is that in Christianity which is above them both, and that neither is safe excepting as conformed to the independent realities of the faith, which are adapted both to intellect and feeling, but which receive their laws not from the one nor yet from the other.

meet loftier or more pressing interests, that is then superior to Christian theology in its claims.

All that is said in depreciation of Christian theology does, in fact, run back upon a feeling or a conviction that something is to come which is higher and better for man, which concerns him more intimately, which can shape his destiny more wisely than the Christian faith. With most, this is a vague feeling; with some, it is a strong conviction. It is favored by the whole spirit of the world; it meets with acclaim from all who bound the sphere of man's vision and hopes by the seen and temporal; it is enforced, whether covertly or openly, by all who look to a perfect social state here on earth as the highest good, or by such as see in literature, in art, in the subjugation of nature, in positive science, or in abstract philosophy, the end or ends for which man was made.*

Theology answers the questions, Whence is the human race? for what was it made? It meets the problem of human evil and sin. As a redemptive system, it shows how sin may be abolished; it points beyond this shifting scene of things to a final kingdom in which God and man are reconciled. It also lends its authority and gives its sanction to those principles without which society cannot prosper, which are at the foundation of the family, of government, and

* The question between us and opponents here is really the question, What is the true philosophy of history? The central question in the philosophy of history is, What is the chief end of man—what is the destiny of the human race?—or, in yet other words, What are the highest and permanent interests of mankind?

of the right intercourse of life; those which are needful for the moral reform and social elevation of mankind—making all inferior, temporal, and social ends subordinate parts and scenes in that great drama, whose closing act and consummation are to be in an eternal state.

Any system which sets itself in opposition to the Christian must show that it meets the questions of human fate with a higher argument, or gives a better solution. It must either say there is no sin, or else say that it solves the problem of sin in a higher and better way; it must either say there is no future state, or else give a better view of the bearings of the present upon the future; it must either say that the world was made and is governed by no personal and supreme author, or else give a more rational and consistent view of the government of rational creatures.*

Men in their closets may persuade themselves that humanity is all, and that there is no divinity; that

* The applauded schemes of infidelity meet these momentous inquiries—or rather set them aside—in the most superficial manner. They assume that the age of theology is past, while theological questions are stirring the warmest life-blood of the times. Their own want of faith they transfer to the race—ignoring or explaining away (not explaining) all opposing facts. They give what they call a philosophical sense to the Christian doctrines, turning realities into fictions, and destroying all in Christianity that has been the source of its life and power. They set up some abstract principle as containing a valid explanation of historical facts; *e. g.*, the idea of freedom or of humanity—as if abstract principles and laws could make and order, could guide and govern, a world. Some make science the great end—as if science had any sense apart from the real system of things of which it gives us the laws.

nature is all, and that there is nothing supernatural ; but, meanwhile, history in all its course is telling us that, even to the human race, humanity is not all ; that what to the superficial theorist seems most adapted to man is precisely that which will not work among men ; that the great and permanent interests of the race must be contained in that unseen, yet irresistible kingdom, whose records run from the beginning until now, and for whose completion the whole creation groaneth and travaileth in pain.

If the consent of history be necessary to a philosophy of history,* there is but one system which man has yet known which will bear the test. There is but one pillar of fire that has led the hosts of our race in all its course, though there may be many a flicker-

* Whether a philosophy of history be possible is a question which we do not here discuss ; but this is to be affirmed with all confidence, that if such philosophy be possible, it must be an induction from the facts of history, and not an imagination of even the wisest of our kind. It must be a philosophy whose principles and laws can be traced in the ebb and flow of human history from the beginning until now. It must recognize the validity of those moral wants and spiritual necessities which form the very woof in the web that Providence has woven. It must somewhere posit wisdom enough and power enough to make the plan, ordain the instruments, and regulate the whole historic course. It must look forward to a consummation which shall be full enough and grand enough to be the issue of all that has been done and suffered and contested by man's myriad tribes, from the fall in the paradise of Eden to the restitution of all things in the paradise of God. It must show the bearing of the past on the present, and of the present on the future, of this world upon that immortal existence, the belief in which has never wholly passed away from the prophetic longing of mankind ; and there it must gather together in one all the interests of humanity, reconciling man with God, and earth with heaven.

ing and fantastic light glancing about, around, and in the rear of the encampments.

III. Not only has Christian theology to do with the facts of a divine revelation and with the highest interests of man, but it has also *a real, practical power*, even the highest moral efficiency, *so that he who would spend his strength for that which is really influential, and always abiding in its influence, can best spend it in the service of Christian theology.*

The Christian system has had a practical efficiency upon the whole the subtlest and strongest in history, not excepting the power even of selfishness and worldliness. And it owes this influence to those characteristics which prove that it is not a superannuated or ephemeral, but a permanent power in the affairs of men.

That has working power, and will always have it, which meets man's highest wants, both as an individual and as a member of society. And here the practical efficiency of the Christian system is seen to be as great as is its theoretical grandeur. It awakes and then calms the sense of sin. It arouses hope of the good and fear of the evil. It is strongest where all philosophy fails; for it gives the soul comfort and peace, in view of sin and of eternity. Where severe ethics leaves us to despair or to stoical indifference, it clothes us with the garments of immortal praise. It touches the tenderest chords of the human soul, in the sense of forgiveness, and at the same time opens the fountains of an undying love to gladden the spirit. It gives strength and symmetry to all our social ties, imparting to them not only a present

blessedness, but also the hope of permanency. It relieves our untold sorrows, while it imparts those hidden joys which no tongue can tell.

And it is precisely in THOSE TRUTHS OF THE CHRISTIAN SYSTEM WHICH ARE PECULIAR TO IT that its highest virtue is found. It is in connection with the truths of the Incarnation, the Atonement, and the regenerate life, that the full measure of its efficacy is seen. Where it is theoretically the grandest, it is practically most powerful, as well as needed in its power. It is neither an exclusively theoretical nor an exclusively practical system, but the union of the two, and this is its greatness; precisely because the grand facts in the revelation are the identical ones whereby the human soul is most moved. Objective in the highest sense in its institution and authority, it is subjective in the most efficient manner in its workings and application. It has the severest metaphysical basis, as also the greatest and most needed ethical influence and spiritual power. Its real truths are the instruments of that quickening energy whereby it renews and sanctifies the soul. And this is the very ideal of a real and efficient system, of one made to work.*

* It might be added, that the efficacy of Christian theology is also illustrated in the fact that it not only meets the usual wants of man, but awakens the soul to new wants, even to a sense of the highest capacities, and shows itself mighty to satisfy these wants. A mere moral system might approximate towards evoking the ideal of a perfect life, but could not generate the powers which are needed to realize the ideal, whether in the individual or in society. Christianity holds out the ideal, high and clear before us, and then bestows the inward strength to press forward towards it.

In point of fact, the great end of Christian theology is the employment of practical power to the highest ends and on the widest scale ; it is the transmutation of the Christian faith into the Christian life—first in the individual, intermediately in the church, ultimately through the church, in society at large.* This transmutation, when accomplished, is the realization of the kingdom of God. The faith without the life is barren ; the life without the faith is shrivelled ; the faith in the life is the great end. The faith shows us what the life is to be ; the life is the faith in its perfected form.

The Christian faith, moreover, when it is a reality in the individual or in society, becomes a source of power within† them as well as upon them. It puts them into such relations with all things else, that they can work efficiently in and by them all. He who is brought into harmony with all moral influences and moral beings by the living power of the Christian faith, draws from each and all the nutriment he needs for his own growth and spiritual excellence ; that which encircles him is attempted to

* Here is the true philosopher's stone, the Christian alchemy. That universal solvent which would turn all to gold is realized in the spiritual world, and not exposed to the objection lying against the imaginary material solvent—that if found it could never be retained, since by its very nature it must dissolve whatever should be used to preserve it ; but the Christian solvent, the pure and ardent love which is given by the renewing Spirit, lives in souls immortal as itself, binding all the moral universe together in holy joy and spiritual concord.

† " He that believeth on me, out of his belly shall flow rivers of living water."—John vii. 38. Spoken of the Spirit, but it is the prerogative of the Spirit to turn all natural circumstances and relations into means of spiritual growth and influence.

his strength* and makes him also strong; its influence becomes to him a means of influence; and his influence is for that kingdom into which grace has received him; it is his highest influence exerted for those objects which in their own nature are immortal.

Working in harmony with what is eternal, he can work with patience. God is patient because he is eternal; living in unison with all things, he is indifferent to no real good—even, as it has also been said, that the Christian is indifferent to nothing, because he loves all things; living for an eternal kingdom, the pomps and vanities of time have ceased to enthrall him; he is living and acting for the highest end, and in harmony with the highest good, and in the knowledge of the highest truth, though he himself be humble, meek, despised.

Thus the full benignity of the Christian system, its best influence, is seen in the formation of a holy mind, a loving heart, an humble child of God.

When literature and philosophy and science and art can achieve this end in the human soul, can put it into harmony with all that is good and make it strong against all that is evil, can make the humblest and most debased of earth's sons to be a lovely child of our heavenly Father; when they can give the pardon we need, and the reconciliation without which

* As each plant is placed in vital sympathy with the chemical and magnetic forces with which it is surrounded, taking from these what it needs in due proportions, so that the very sun and dew, the heat and rain, are all by its felicitous instinct attempered to its wants, so with the man who is brought into vital connections with the moral and spiritual elements which meet him in the kingdom of God.

we are lost, then, and not till then, may they say that the day of Christianity is past, and the hour of their supremacy is drawing nigh.

The student may thus perceive that the depreciation of Christian theology arises from a false view of its nature. It is to be removed by showing, first, the authoritative and permanent basis on which theology rests; in the second place, by exhibiting it as meeting the highest and permanent wants of man; and in the third place, by regarding its efficiency, its stores of the best power employed for the highest ends.

This general argument for the study of theology may be still further substantiated and enforced by considering the special needs of our times and country.

Among those five powers of which we have spoken as giving shape and character to modern life, neither the scientific nor the purely philosophical can be said in our country to have either the character or the hope of preponderance. But the other three—the evangelical, the ritualistic, and the social—are all vigorous, practically efficient, and possessed of popular power and force.

Of these, the evangelical is unquestionably now the predominant and animating influence in religion, society, and life through the length and breadth of the land. The other two* are both opposed to each other, and opposed to the true evangelical spirit, and also in many respects to our predominant

* It will be best to call these, for our present object, the Roman Catholic and the Humanitarian, rather than the ritualistic and the social influences.

national spirit. The one is anti-Protestant in nature, the other retains of Protestantism only the outer garment, its political and human side. The Roman Catholic body is strong, by reason of the vast immigration which has transferred millions of its most devoted adherents to this soil, and also through the circumstance that the men and the times of disorder, of change, of diversity, are the men and the times in which the inflexible front and dogmatic assurance of Romanism may gather strength and increase.* The humanitarian tendency has, until recently, wrought more diffusively and vaguely. It has gained applause in the field of popular authorship and lectures. From its highest representatives we have had graceful and studied essays, having a philosophical tone rather than a philosophical method, pervaded by a vague sense of inspiration, in which the inner soul of the writer is made the measure of the height and depth of all things, where the idea of humanity and general culture is the sea in which everything else is floating, and where a certain symmetry and beauty of individual character in communion with the soul of nature and the genius of man appears to be the great ideal. The real influence of such essays has been to throw doubt and discredit upon whatever is positive in Christianity, and to substitute an ideal, human, artistic perfection for the person of Christ.

But there are bolder and more energetic representa-

* The late O. A. Brownson was a conspicuous example of the power of the haughty inflexibility of the ultramontane theory to bow in awe the fiery souls that can obtain no mastery for themselves over their own forces.

tives of this humanitarian tendency whose influence has of late forced itself upon the public attention in startling ways. These are ardent preachers of the rights of man, men of popular sympathies, radical and disorganizing, inflaming passion in order to secure right. These contain within their ranks numbers of men who from the height of democracy have passed into the advocacy of those social theories, which are as strenuous for organism as democracy is for individualism; men virulent against both Church and State, disdaining the rights of property and often the sacredness of domestic ties, recognizing Christianity only as a democratic and leveling influence, and Christ only in the aspect of a reformer; men to whom all past history teaches only one lesson, and that is the absolute necessity of a new social state as the end for which the race was made.

It may be added that both of these tendencies have been and are fed chiefly from foreign sources; each is opposed to the other; each contains exclusive principles; both will contend against us and with each other for the mastery. The one is strong in its reliance on the past, the other in its reliance on the future; the one in its assumption of a divine tradition, the other in its alliance with human sympathies. The one would merge our republican fabric in a social despotism, the other in a religious; society is the idol of the one, the subordination of the State to the Church the instinct and aim of the other. Equal human rights is the watchword of the former, a traditional divine authority is inscribed on the banners of the latter. Both claim infallibility—the one, of

human reason ; the other, of a tradition through men. Philosophy is the idol of the humanitarian ; the voice of Rome, the oracle of his opponent. Both insist upon compact organizations as essential—organizations embracing the whole ground of human activity, the one in the name of God, the other in the name of man. Both have great mastery over the popular mind, inflaming all its passions, appealing to the senses and the popular imagination—one in the name of human nature, the other on the basis of our religious wants.*

Let the two now be compared with evangelical Christianity. The strength of Rome is in tradition ; the strength of humanitarianism is in philosophy ; the former is refuted by philosophy, the latter by history, and both by the true Christian philosophy of history.† The one knows only divine and sacerdotal rights ; the other, only the rights of man ; and neither seeks, as does evangelism, for the harmony of the human and the divine, retaining the integrity of each. The former is a sacramental system ; the latter is a naturalistic system ; and both are inferior to a system which insists upon a grace that is not magical, having all natural powers as its channels and instruments. The one has its headship in the chair of St. Peter ;

* Both have grown to an unusual vigor during the conflicts of the past twenty-five years in Europe ; both from Europe have come to our shores ; men of different races, the one chiefly of the Celtic, and the other of the Teutonic stock. The ultimate principle of the one is contained in the word Papacy ; the ultimate principle of the other is concentrated in the word pantheism, with aberrations toward nihilism or materialism.

† See pp. 11, 173, in this volume.

the other knows no headship but an ideal humanity, while in the sole and supreme headship of the God-man, Christ Jesus, real Christianity has what is more definite than the latter, and an omniscient and omnipresent guide, such as the church needs, and as the former claims, but such as no man, be he called king or pope, can, without blasphemy, say he is. The first of these is bound with an iron hand by the decrees of Trent; the second knows no supreme authority but human reason; the third, in the Scriptures, has a law and code, which is ever old and ever new, freer than the one and more definite than the other. On the one side is an exclusively dogmatic system, most dogmatic in what is most uncertain; on the other is an annihilating philosophic creed, most annihilating to all that has been received with the largest consent; while between and above them is that body in which the respective rights of faith and reason, of God and man, have been most sincerely loved, most truly combined, and most diligently ensured.*

* Each of these powers is gathering strength for its work; and when the decision shall have come, their pent-up energies, after the analogy of material forces and the past example, too, of moral powers, will acquire, as in a night, such volume and energy as the drop of water receives from the expansive power of heat. They will act more freely or decisively from the fact that here their conflict and their victories must be on the theater of open discussion, without mixture of personal restraint. The only other victory than a peaceful one which we can know in religious things, would be the forcible suppression of those who would annul our birthright—the legacy our fathers left us, though not the heritage they had from theirs, this large and unexampled Christian freedom. May God avert that hour when, in freedom's very land, for freedom's very being, a people used to long forbearance, must strike a last decisive blow, striking, like the Olym-

What, then, is the inference to be derived from the whole argument, that drawn from the needs of our country and of our times, as well as that deduced from the idea and effects of Christian theology?

It is, that the momentous questions of our land, questions which concern the best interests of our race, and its very destiny, are to be studied and lived for, as they ought to be, not in the sphere of politics, not in the pursuits of natural science, not in the study and practice of the law—worthy and admirable as are all these—but in the precincts of theology, and in the direct service of the Church of Christ.

pian Jove, but once! As the alternative to this, how absorbing should be our hope that the evangelical faith shall subdue the one adversary, in the name of the Lord, while attracting it by human sympathies, and shall be victorious over the other, in the name of humanity, while drawing its elect ones to itself by the bonds of a living faith; that the Christian faith shall thus show by its high example that there is that which is mightier than any hierarchy; that there is that which is more fitted to man than any merely social organization; that there is a form of Christianity consistent both with human rights and divine law, and that the last and best word for the human race is not the name of any pope, nor the ideal of any pantheism, but the name of our great High Priest, the captain of our salvation, the head of the church, to whom this land was consecrated by the prayers of our sires

Thus far we have imparted our natural conviction that all contests for the mastery over men's thoughts must be on the field of open discussion, without personal coercion, to all who have come to us. And thus far, all of every creed have repeated the lesson, whether from policy or conviction. It is to be hoped and expected that either policy or conviction will continue to maintain unanimity on this point. The abiding separation of Church and State will be a fact whose vast consequences on the growth and character of the church, the most sagacious among us do but dimly appreciate, having no lights in the past to aid us.

The political sphere is the only one which in its general influence can be compared with this, and it is also here the highest sphere of ambition. But in our land the great political sphere * barely touches the widest, the deepest, the most permanent, the most solemn interests of those that dwell within its borders. Education, morality, and religion underlie our whole political fabric. Our General Government takes for granted that men and States already exist, our State governments take for granted that churches and morals already thrive, and leave the highest educational interests and the highest moral influences to voluntary organizations. Something else shapes the character and makes the man, and gives him his moral and religious culture, and then the State and politics may do the rest.

What is that something else? It is the Christian Church, or its opponents.

And thus the very nature of our government favors and enforces the same position as that deduced from all the signs of the times. As the latter tell us that here in the moral, the religious, and the ecclesiastical sphere the deepest undercurrents are moving, and the highest interests of the race advancing, and the great contending powers which must ultimately decide our own and others' destiny are concentrating for decisive action, so does the very

* Dr. Johnson's lines have a peculiar application with us :

"How small, of all that human hearts endure,
The part that kings or courts can cause or cure !"

It is literally true of us what Tacitus tells of the old Germans :

"Plus ibi boni mores valent, quam alibi bonæ leges."

structure of our government make it certain that the moral and religious sphere of action must be the highest sphere for the best minds.

If, then, one would live for the highest objects in the best way; if he would live for his race, for his Redeemer, he should live and strive to infuse into men's minds that greatest idea which man can know and live for—the idea of the kingdom of God as a living and palpable reality. For this is the vision and the prophecy which is given to the race of man. That kingdom of God in Christ now calls for the very flower of our youth, that it may bear the ripest fruit. If one will put his very soul, his life, into it, it shall give life to him, and he shall give it to others.

If ever the service of the ministry was a mere routine, now it is no longer such. There is no research of scholarship, no philological skill, no power of historical investigation, no mastery in philosophy, no largeness of imagination, no grace of life and character, no practical self-denial, no gift of eloquence to man by the written or the spoken word, no energy of character, no practical sagacity, no polemical acuteness, no wisdom of counsel, no ready sympathy with the outcasts and abandoned, no zeal for real human rights and against all social wrongs, no living faith, and no large charity, which may not, through the length and breadth of our land, find the fullest employment, and which are not needed by the Christian Church. It wants its men of fire, its men of piety, its men of large discourse, its laborers in our streets and lanes, its minds of calm philosophy, its heroes and its saints. It needs its trained bands—and

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needs them in this our country especially—to meet both Pope and pagan. With men whose souls are full of Christ, the deeds and virtues of our faith's earliest prime may be renewed on these Western shores; yea, and greater deeds than these, as we draw nearer to the consummation of Christ's work.

CHAPTER II.

THE SPIRIT THAT SHOULD ANIMATE A TRUE STUDENT OF THEOLOGY.

I. HE should, first of all, be spiritually minded. Only the spiritual mind can rightly discern spiritual things. They are cold, if not dead, to him whose vision is unilluminated by the spirit of all grace. They are living realities to him who is truly born of the Spirit.

By spiritual mindedness is not to be understood a mere abstract knowledge of spiritual things; it is not philosophical discernment; it is not a merely intellectual act, though the intellect be concerned in it. There is a so-called spiritual philosophy which is as utter a foe of the authentic spiritual mind as is even a gross materialism.

Nor is spiritual mindedness a mere vague, indefinite love of being in the abstract, a general sentiment of good-will towards all that exists, though this is also included in it. There is no true spiritual mindedness without both an intellectual and an emotional energy, but neither the intellect nor the heart can alone or conjointly make up the truly spiritual discernment.

But the spiritual mindedness which should characterize, and, by a living power, control the true student of theology, is in its inmost nature an expression

—a living sense—of the reality of God's kingdom, as centering in the person and work of Jesus Christ.

There are two great realms, that of nature and that of grace. The natural mind dwells in the one, the spiritual mind has its home in the other. Just as in the investigation of nature a consideration of the reality of the natural world is at the basis of all our researches, so, in the study of Christian theology, a living sense of the reality of a divine revelation is at the foundation of all right studies. If there be not this inmost sense of the reality of spiritual things, all theological study is nothing but a play of words, a trick of definitions, a process of merely philosophical argumentation. What is, or can be, Christian theology when you have cut it loose from the idea of the kingdom of God in Christ?—when you have lost a living sense of the reality of the power of the world to come? It becomes, by an inevitable logical necessity, a bare system of ethics or of psychology.

Christian theology has to do with a real system and order of things as much as have the natural sciences. And the being spiritually minded is grasping this order of things, holding it fast, believing in it, for it is with this primarily that Christian theology has to do.

There is ever to be maintained a Christian realism in distinction from that nominalism which makes the whole of Christian theology to be a dispute about words and names.*

* Der Realismus : in Deutsche Zeitschrift, 3 nos., July, 1860 ; on the basis of Herbart and against Pantheism.

II. Another characteristic should be a spirit of reverential humility.*

Such humility is not to be confounded with abasement before dogmatism; that is the mark, not of a humble, but of a cowering spirit. It is, however, the opposite of self-sufficiency, of that temper which is engendered by the belief that, like the spider—to use the old illustration—we can spin all truth out of our own bowels.

In respect to humility and reverence, the theological student should be like “the minister and interpreter of nature;” the astronomer, for example, who is filled with a sense that he is to receive the voices which come down to the listening ear from the silent orbs, that he is to hear and learn the music of the spheres, that he is but

“To unwind the eternal dances of the skies.”

Even so must it be with the theologian, in view of God's grander revelation in his word and kingdom, and by his Son.

He cannot be a true divine who is not awe-struck and reverential, a humble learner, before the mysteries of the Incarnation and of the Atonement, who does not feel and know that in these grand facts there is that which calls upon him to put off his shoes from off his feet; who has not the conviction that here is holy ground.

And from the very nature of the Christian revelation, this precept of reverential humility has its most

* Rothe: “Alas for me, if Christianity be not more than my system.”

direct application in respect to the attitude of the student towards the Bible, as containing the written and inspired record of the divine revelation. The Bible, by its very nature and position, has the same relation to the system of theology that the book of nature has to the natural sciences. Man is to employ his powers, and all his powers, especially his reason, in relation to both. In the one, as in the other, the facts and substance are given; before the facts man is to be reverential; the majesty of fact is never to be offended.*

III. The third characteristic of the theological inquirer should be, an honest love of the truth for its own sake.

"There appears to me," said Dr. Arnold, "in all English divines a want of believing or disbelieving anything, because it is true or false."† This pointed satire cannot be maintained against our American divines. One of their ruling characteristics has ever been an honest love of the truth, and this has given to our theology much of its earnestness and power.

As with virtue, so with truth; both are good in and of themselves, and are to be loved and pursued for their own sake. There cannot be a real, enthusiastic study in any science, still less in theology, without an unfeigned love of the truth. Truth is not truth to me unless it express my own convictions. My

* "As to perfection or completeness in Divinity, it is not to be sought; for he that will reduce a knowledge into an art will make it round and uniform; but in Divinity many things must be left abrupt."

—*Bacon Adv. Learning.*

† *Life*, p. 296. Butler and Hooker are named as shining exceptions.

utterance of the truth will not be truth to others unless it be felt that I am convinced of its reality, and am filled with an inspiring love thereof. It is a fine remark of Augustine, "that no truth is perfectly known which is not perfectly loved;" and no truth, it may also be said, is perfectly known which is not loved for itself alone.

Many men love the truth for the sake of their party; some for the sake of their church; the plurality of mankind, perhaps, from personal interests; others because they cannot or will not unlearn what they have learned; but the preacher should love and preach the truth, because it is the truth.*

IV. As a fourth characteristic which a student of theology should possess, there may be named a trustful spirit; in other words, a belief that, under the illumination of God's Spirit, the truth which is the substance of theology may be found. And as the illumination of that Spirit is promised and vouchsafed to all who commit themselves to his guidance, they may confidently expect that they shall come to know, if they be faithful, whatever is needful to be known in order that they may do their Master's work here on earth.

One of the feelings most apt to oppress the man

* Needful as is this direction, it is one which is liable to perversion and abuse, chiefly because it is insisted on so much by those who assail Christianity, and especially Christian orthodoxy. It should be borne in mind, however, that the sense of the direction is not to love truth because it is mine (thus fostering a false subjectivity), but to love it because it has an objective value which one has come to see for himself.

who is just beginning the study of so wide a science as theology, in view of the endless parties and disputes, is, that entire certainty is unattainable.* This feeling is both true and false ; true in form and false in substance.

There may be entire certainty, as the result of patient study and honest love of the truth, under the guidance of the Spirit, on the great central facts and doctrines of the Bible, as against all objections, while on points of philosophical minuteness and of purely sectarian zeal there may be uncertainty. There may be entire certainty as to particular facts and doctrines, while there may be uncertainty as to the relation and harmony of these facts and doctrines with other facts and doctrines.† There may be absolute certainty in respect to any given doctrine that it is a fact, while as to the mode, the *how*, there may be doubt.‡ And whatever doubts may rest on here and there a point, this much at least may be said, that so far as Christian theology answers its great end—the forming of a true spiritual character, building one up in the knowledge and love of the Gospel—just so far will there, and must there be, certainty—settled, deep-wrought conviction ; not the certainty of the head, but the assurance of the whole soul, looking unto Jesus.

* Porson studied for the church, but could not make up his mind to enter it. He said to Mr. Maltby : “ I found that I should require fifty years to make myself thoroughly acquainted with divinity—to satisfy my mind on all points, and therefore I gave it up.”—*Life*, by Watson, p. 56.

† *E. g.*, the divine sovereignty and human freedom.

‡ *E. g.*, the human and divine natures in Christ.

A mere intellectual certainty is but a slight thing when compared with this moral, faithful assurance of the reality of the truth. This it is, which the Spirit eminently gives, when He takes of the things of Christ and shows *them* unto us. This is the truth in its fulness, life, and power, become marrow to the bones and life to the blood, vitalizing, energizing, inspiring the whole man. And such a living, vital certainty, which is the soul of the preacher, may he have, and will he have who submits his whole spirit to the teaching of the divine Spirit in willing humility.*

V. The student of theology should *have a professional zeal*.

Every man is a debtor of his soul to his profession. If his heart is not in it, his head will be somewhere else, and the energy of his will will be dissipated. The eminent men in all professions, lawyers, doctors, politicians, merchants, are most earnest in their professional work. So should be the student of theology.

Such an one will not understand me as implying that he is to carry his theological talk into all companies, or assume theological attitudes anywhere. But that he is to feel and live, day by day, and week by week, as if theology was his proper and beloved work, giving to it his best time and his most earnest powers, and his patient labor.

* What is the true place of doubt in a system of truth, philosophical or theological? Many think it shows keenness to doubt. But doubt is not the principle of any philosophy, nor can it be; it is merely the beginning and stimulus of a philosophical process in the individual, waking up to thought.

He cannot learn all theology here, or in this country, nor yet in Germany, nor even in this life; but every one can begin to be and do something heartily, serenely, steadfastly. He can feel that he has chosen his profession—the noblest of them all—for Christ's sake, and that he is willing to spend and be spent therein. The theological student owes it to his profession, he owes it to himself, he owes it to his Master, to pursue his studies with a consuming professional zeal.

All his scholarship, his refinement, his subtle thought, his large acquirements, his living conviction of the reality, and the power, and the necessity of the Christian faith, are needed by the student who expects to preach the gospel of Christ to the men of our day and generation. He needs to make it his daily prayer that he may put on the whole armor of God, and be clad with zeal as with a cloak.*

It may be added that the natural result of such zeal in theological study will be the formation of what has happily been called "the theological character."† There may be *character* in theology, as in business, and there may be no character, also. And a steadfast character is especially needed in times of fluctuation and conflict.‡ Without such a character we cannot act on others; as one has well said, "only he who has a stamp of his own can give a stamp to

* See in *N. Brit. Rev.*, Nov., 1854, a spirited exhibition of the claims of theology upon the best thought and service of our times.

† By Ullmann, in an excellent essay in the *Stud. u. Kritik*, 1844.

‡ "The union of the theologian and clergyman makes a Father of the Church."—Schleierm. *Encyclopedia*.

others." All character is made up of two elements : individuality and steadfast conviction. So a theological character will be made up of two, the personal and the theological grown into each other. Thought and will—the truth and moral power in holding and enforcing it, are both needed. Such a character is to be contrasted with both a man who has much will and little knowledge, and one who has great knowledge and slight personal convictions. The union of the two, the attainments and the will, is what constitutes the real, abiding, vigorous character.

VI. The student should aim to become a *fearless and well-grounded theologian*. "Meditate upon these things, give thyself wholly to them, that thy profiting may appear unto all."* The Christian minister is called to the very highest position, as respects the solid and essential teaching of the human race. He must keep the highest place, or he will not be able to keep any. And he can keep that place only as he grasps the all-commanding subject which he is set to teach. He must be a theologian, or he will be nothing.

Christian theology is a science—the science of divine things ; and it cannot be mastered without profound study by day and by night, and through many years ; it never will be fully learned here on earth. And a minister is bound to study this science. If he does not, there will come times when sagacious men will say : "his profession is but a name—he is not fit for a crisis—he cannot answer an objection—he does

* 1 Tim., iv. 15.

not really understand what he is preaching about—he is a workman that needeth to be ashamed ;” and they will go to somebody else in important cases and questions, when they need the best advice.

And whether a man has really mastered his profession or not, will be soon found out. Some ministers are not very eloquent, or plausible, or social—they may be even shy and awkward—rhetoricians shrug their shoulders at them, and those who go to church for the sake of sensations may call them tedious ; but there they stand and stay, year in and year out, for half a century. They have mastered their work, and men honor them for it. They are the wise leaders and counsellors in trying times, and people know that they can be leaned on. When a solid piece of work is to be done, they do it. When the times demand leaders, the very instinct of the church turns to them—and turns away from mere sensational preachers, who amuse vain and giddy people by talking against the clear, sharp, scientific statements of the doctrines of our faith.

Vigorous thinking men in the pews cannot thoroughly respect a minister who does not magnify his profession. They may tolerate him ; they may say he does well enough for the young people ; they may support him as their minister ; but, meanwhile, being no longer babes, they are not content with milk (even sincere) ; they sometimes crave strong meat.

The ablest historian of the Greek philosophy* says that Christianity gave to human thought a new

* Zeller, *Einleitung*, p. 46.

idea—the idea of *Orthodoxy*—of right thinking, which even its opponents cannot forget. Even the heterodox now think they are right ; and, of course, *may be* wrong. There is Truth and Error—there are true doctrines and false doctrines. By casting loose from the creed, you do not escape from doctrinal relations. You must be a theologian to good purpose or to bad. It should be your life-long labor to know the true doctrine and to proclaim it. The assertion so frequently made that Christianity is feeling or sentiment merely and not strong truth, should never be echoed by the student of theology.*

VII. It follows from the foregoing proposition, and, indeed, from the sum of what has been said, that the true student of theology need have no occasion to concede the term *liberal* to those who make an exclusive claim to it. His whole attitude of mind and temper of heart will repel the insinuation that a theologian is a bigot, a blind and narrow-minded partisan. He will be in a position to illustrate the true liberality, that which springs from Christian charity and not from religious indifference, which comes from a heart full of love to God and his truth, and the highest welfare of men, and not that which arises from neglect of God's truth, or from consulting the mere humanities of social life.

* What would people say of a lawyer who declaimed against jurisprudence, or of a physician who was in the habit of decrying the science of medicine ? Just what they ought to say of a minister who belittles theology (partly, perhaps, because he has never studied it)—that he is simply dishonoring his profession.

CHAPTER III.

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF A SYSTEM OF THEOLOGY ADAPTED TO OUR TIMES.

WE do not here speak of the general traits of theology viewed as a system, but only of such as are impressed upon it by the peculiarities of any given period. Every system of theology has its universal characteristics, which fit it for all times; and its special, such as fit it for the times and circumstances in which it is to have its principal use. No system of theology can be of much worth in any particular times which is not fitted specially for those times.

(1.) We need a definite system on the points *now chiefly controverted*.

By this two things are meant: first, that in his personal convictions each one should strive for the most definite modes of statement—should strive to get at those expressions, those forms of words, which best express the truth, so far as he has learned it. Vague, indefinite statements, on questions which are hotly debated, are among the great evils and hindrances in our theological systems and men. Each one should know whereof he affirms. And even on those points where, either from the limitation of the human powers, or his own insufficient studies, he is not ready to make a final and formal statement, he should at least be able to know and state how far he

is in doubt, between what two or more forms of statement he is hesitating, how far the evidence in the case seems to him insufficient to warrant a dogmatic assertion *pro* or *con*. It is not to be expected that we should on all points at once attain entire conviction; but this at least may be expected, that we should know the boundaries to which we have come, the lines we have drawn, the rock which we have found to be solid to our feet. *Qui bene distinguit, bene intelligit* (or *docet*).

The second aspect of the definiteness under consideration is that which stands in contrast with the position, that in the high matters of theology we cannot trust in human language and its utterances; that language is not able to express the results of theological inquiry in a definite and satisfactory form; and that when we have given it a definite form we have killed its life by logical and unnatural processes.

This objection, drawn from the general nature of language, against theological systems, is one which goes further and cuts deeper than it seems to do at first. For it is just as true of philosophy as of theology; there is no more reason for applying it to the one than to the other.

The objection derives its plausibility from two sources. The vastness and remoteness of much that concerns God, and the varied use of human language. Neither of these two points proves the position. Very much respecting God may be unknown—and is; but all we claim is this: that so far as he has revealed himself, so far we may, by careful study, state what

and wherein he has revealed himself. Some men and systems may attempt much more; but that is their fault and not the fault of language. And words, too, have different senses. Language grows up from sense to reason. It assumes different significations as it grows.

But when it is fully grown, we may have a definite sense from it. And the same word may be used in different senses by different writers; but it is possible for any definite writer to use his words in such a sense that men who are of the proper culture can surely know what he means. Some men never use language definitely. It all resolves itself into this: Does a man think definitely? If he does, he may express himself so.*

(2.) The theological system adapted to the times should be wrought out in each student through the *medium of free discussion*.

By some the office of a teacher of theology is limited to the mere explanation of a system, and the office of the student to the mere reception of the explanation. This is at war with the best good of both; it makes the teacher dogmatic, and the student passive first and dogmatic afterwards, when not rebellious.† A teacher ought, indeed, to have his

* The point is dwelt upon because, if the objection is true, we might as well stop all scientific discussion, as well as all attempts at theology. Language grows and changes; but, *at each stage of its growth*, it may be possible for any one so to use its terms that he shall be definite to others.

† In the class-room, the limits to questions and answers should be controlled only by good sense and courtesy.

definite system, and teach it. But what is teaching? So imparting that the student may understand and receive what is taught into a *willing* mind. For this, free discussion is necessary.* *Prudens interrogatio est dimidium scientiae.*

(3.) Such a system of theology as is needed in our times should strive to be *a mediating system between the conflicting parties of the times.*

Reference is made here to the theological conflicts in the bodies with which most of us are more immediately connected. Between the old and new school bodies points of theological difference are pressed now, as in former times, to a degree which neither reason nor Christian charity can defend. The extremes systematically, even when honest, misrepresent each other. They accuse each other of holding opinions which each party is as eager to disown, or of holding words and phrases in a sense in which they are expressly repudiated.†

The true position is that of mediating:

(a) Not by slurring over the differences; for the opposing opinions (even if not held by any one) should be strongly put.

* "The only way to make a man's notion his own, is to communicate and discourse about it, and submit it to examination; so that those that are most profitable are most profited, and by communicating themselves they are most improved."—*Whichcote's Aphorisms*, No. 59, cited in Cambridge i. 17 cent. 2, p. 82.

† *E. g.* Imputation, as meaning transfer of personal qualities, charged upon the old school; and Justification, as meaning only pardon, upon the new.

(b) Not by taking an indefinite middle ; *

But

(c) By distinguishing between the doctrine held and the philosophical explanation of it ; and

(d) By striving for that position in which the relative rights of the two opinions (when not contradictory) may be seen—a position, if possible, above.

In point of fact, a right system of theology is, to a considerable extent, the mediate between two antagonisms.† It is not true that the whole of theology is to be settled by an either—or; there is a higher unity. “It is better,” says Augustine, “to be

* “Neuters, in their middle way of steering,
Are neither flesh, nor fish, nor good red herring ;
Nor Whigs, nor Tories they ; nor this, nor that ;
Nor birds, nor beasts ; but just a kind of bat.”

—*Dryden's Epilogue to the Duke of Guise.*

† Martensen (Dogmatik) thus states some of the antagonisms which are to be reconciled in a system of theology :

The incomprehensibility and the knowledge of God.

The freedom and necessity of creation.

The glory of God and the good of creatures as the end of creation.

Cosmogony and creation as the origin of the world.

God's knowledge as from eternity and embracing events in time.

Traducianism and Creationism.

Supra and infra-lapsarianism.

The personal Satan and the evil principle.

The humility and glory of Christ.

The Church as visible and invisible.

The Church as fallible and infallible.

Regeneration as self-determined and determined from eternity.

Future existence, depending and not depending on the body.

Eternal condemnation and the ἀποκατάστασις.

Cf. Studien & Kritiken, 1852 s. 405.

ignorant about secret things than to contend about uncertain things."

This reconciliation of historical theology and philosophy is the same thing, under another form of statement, as the reconciliation of philosophy and faith, which is the grand problem of scientific theology. The true attitude of the Christian student, of him whose soul is filled with a living sense of the worth and reality of truth, is this—that there cannot be any irreconcilable difference between that manifestation of truth which is given in human reason, and that revelation of truth which is given in the redemptive system. No sane mind can doubt the ultimate verities of reason, attested by the universal consciousness, having the attributes of universality and necessity. And no Christian mind, illuminated and instructed by the Divine Spirit, can doubt the reality of those fundamental facts and truths revealed in the person and work of Jesus Christ our Lord. Whether we can fully see and clearly state the union and unity of these two may be a question, but there should be no question about the fact of their union and unity. As in respect to the union and harmonious action of soul and body, that it is real we know, though the mode thereof we may not be able to discern.

With every truly scientific theologian the problem of scientific theology resolves itself into this—the union and the harmony of Philosophy and Faith. This is to be shown at each point of the system, and is to be its luminous result.

(4.) In order to such a mediation between these interests, there is also necessary in the right theo-

logical system the attempt at *reconciling* the substance of *historical theology with the ethical and psychological principles* of our more modern systems of philosophy. This proposition has its particular applications. The Evangelical churches from which our students come* stand historically on the basis of the Reformed Calvinistic Confessions. The most generally accepted symbol is the Westminster Confession of Faith. The positions of the Presbyterian and of the Congregational Churches are determined largely by their relation to this Confession. Now, the sense of my proposition in its particular application is, that the object of the true theologian will be to reconcile the two. I do not believe that the opposition between the two parties is as real as many seem to make it. What is needed is a historical examination of the formulas, going back to their real sense. Many objections will be found inapplicable. The permanent New England theology is to be discerned in this way.

But the proposition advanced has also its general application. Christian theology has a higher office of mediation than that of merely reconciling present parties. Our aim should be to reconcile historical theology in its successive growths with the moral and metaphysical philosophy of the times. We need in our systems much more of the historical element, in order to give to theology life. It is only thus that the formulas can be understood, and objections can be rightly met. In order to the reconciliation sought,

* The students in Union Theological Seminary are mainly from Presbyterian and Congregational churches.

objective Christianity must become subjective; but to this end, again, it is necessary that the objective historical Christianity be clearly seen and fairly estimated. If theology and ethics are to be united, so that one virtue shall be seen in both, it will make a vast difference whether the principle by which the union is attempted be taken from the theology or from the ethics. If from the ethics, then the result can only be a system of moral philosophy. If from the theology—historically understood, not misconstrued subjectively in the interest of some ethical system—then the result should be a teaching from God, higher than moral philosophy, and proving its superiority by its more faithful and profound exhibition of what the true principles of ethics are.*

(5.) Our systems should aim at a still higher synthesis than that of the historical and the ethical and psychological elements, viz., at the union of these *with the Biblical*, which is to lie at the foundation of all. Only when these three points are combined can we have a truly *comprehensive* system, one correspondent with the genius of Christianity, as an eternal and divine system of truth. Biblical, historical, philosophical—these three characteristics should be radically in the system. And in the treatment of each separate part of the system each of these elements should have its proper development.†

* "The Necessity of Conjoining Historical and Dogmatic Theology, and the Universal Mode Thereof." Ernesti's *Opuscula*, 1773.

† It is especially important in our times that the attitude of the natural sciences towards theology should have full consideration. Christian Apologetics finds here a principal portion of her task.

(6.) A system of theology adapted to our times should be both *conservative and progressive*. This is implied in what precedes, and is the general summary of several of the points already noticed. It should be conservative without bigotry, and progressive without lawlessness. It should conserve all the truth and be cleared from the errors of the past, while it should advance onward towards a more complete understanding of the full mind of God as revealed in the Scriptures. He who asserts that there is no truth in past systems and thinks to make one wholly original, and he who asserts that the whole of truth, in its most perfect form, is given us in the formula of the past, and only there—each of these is equally distant from the just equipoise and equilibrium of the true student of divinity.

The whole of theology is to be found only in one book—the Bible: and the whole history of theology is but the attempt to reproduce the contents of the Scriptures in the forms needed by the different times in which the different systems were made. The Scriptures are conservative and progressive both—in their structure and in their spirit. Such should be a truly Scriptural theology—such also should be a truly Scriptural theologian. The oldest truths have the strongest living power in all times. They have proved their efficacy. The progress consists in giving to the old truths a new aspect, and adapting them to the times in which our lot is cast.

(7.) The system of theology should be controlled by the idea that it *is a system of divine things*—of the divine nature, works, and revelations—for man, yet

not of man, nor primarily about man—but about God. In a word, it should be a system of theology (doctrine respecting God), and not of anthropology, not of psychology, not of ethics, nor of metaphysics. The theological stand-point is to be reinstated in its rights, and its integrity, and fullness.

This is the central idea of the Augustinian, and Calvinistic, and Reformed systems generally ; all is from, for, and to God ; in contrast with the Roman Catholic, Arminian, and Socinian views of theology. God the center, the source, the beginning, and the end of theology. Only he can be a true divine, who feels that his system is of divinity, has a higher than human source, illustrates the glory of God. Thus only is the integrity of theology insured.

The whole of the earlier theology of this country, and of our acknowledged confessions of faith, is on this distinctively theological basis—the divine supremacy and sovereignty. And no one can strive to grasp the idea of God without feeling that this must be so, rationally as well as scripturally, logically as well as theologically. This position has indeed been carried to extremes ; the fault, however, was not in the position but in the perversion of it ; in making the divine sovereignty too mechanical, and God to work just like some men. Hence the reaction, going just as far, and proving much more fatal, on the other side.

With juster views of the divine agency, theology is to be reëstablished on its only real basis. The revolution in modern philosophy has been helping to lead theology back into its true paths, *i. e.*, begin-

ning and ending with God. As we see, for example, in the relation of the modern philosophical systems of Germany to the earlier rationalism. The speculative philosophy undermined the basis of the old rationalism, and led to the present more thorough doctrinal systems produced in that country.

Thus Hegel, in the Introduction to his Encyclopedia, says: "Philosophy has the same topics with religion. Both have the *truth* for their object, and that in the highest sense, seeing that God is the truth, and he *alone* is the truth. Both further treat of the finite, of nature, and of the *human spirit*, their relation to each other and to God, as to their truth." That is, the highest problems of philosophy and theology are one and the same; and the center and source of all truth in respect to them is to be found only in God. When theology loses the consciousness of this grand fact, and makes a system of and for man, it has in fact descended from its regal throne, and can no longer be the Queen of the Sciences.

(8.) It follows from the statements which have been made, that the theology which is preëminently needed *in our times* is that whose substance and marrow have met the needs of *men in all times*. This, in its essential principles, is the old, time-honored theology of the Christian church, with its two foci of sin and of redemption, all viewed as dependent on God. It is based upon the solid granite rock (the only true *petra*), and built up of living stones, in massive proportions, rising ever upward until its aspiring lines fade away in the bosom of the infinite, whither

it leads us that there we may rest. That old theology—older than our schools, older than the earth and the stars—coëval with the godhead; always yet never old, never yet ever new; it is dateless and deathless as the divine decree, yet fresh as the dawning light of a new day in every new-born soul; it has been known from the beginning to all penitent and believing souls; it is uttered in every humble prayer; it has been sung in such melodious and rapturous strains as have nowhere else found voice. *

That old theology, the living essence of our sacred Scriptures, abiding substance of our creed, the sense of our confessions, and the consensus of our schools; it has been held and taught by the most piercing and soaring intellects of our Christian times: Athanasius and Augustine, Anselm and Aquinas, Luther, Melancthon and Calvin, Turretine and Edwards; and through them it has taught and fashioned the most vigorous and advancing churches and nations of modern times.

And above all, when that old theology is seen in its most consummate and radiant form—Christologized—when here all the lines and problems of thought and being are seen to meet in the Incarnate Son of God, our only Saviour; when once this,

* Some one has said that it is a theology which can never be sung; but it is the only theology which has called forth the tenderest and loftiest tones of human feeling; all its abasement for sin, all its joy in salvation, which finds its full expression equally in that saddest of human music, the woful Miserere which recalls the sacred awful passion of our dying Lord, and the jubilant and triumphant anthem which celebrates his accomplished victory.

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its perfect fruit and full idea, is revealed to any human soul, then that soul knows itself also ; for it has found the master-light of all its seeing, and knows that here is wisdom, here is life.

As the great need of our time is the need of every time, so the theology which has given light and life to men in the Christian history, is the theology which should be studied, loved, and preached through all the world to-day.

THE SPECIAL INTRODUCTION,
OR
THE PROLEGOMENA
OF CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY.

CHAPTER I.

THE IDEA OF CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY.

CHRISTIAN theology is the science of Christian faith. Or, it is the science of what is known of God and his acts. Or, it is the science of divine things. Or, it is the science of the facts of the divine revelation. Or,—and this is the best and simplest statement—it is the science of the Christian religion. We have, then, four questions to answer. (1) What is science? (2) What is religion? (3) What is the Christian religion? (4) In the light of what principle of the Christian religion are we to construct Christian theology?

§ 1. *What is Science?* Science is a peculiar mode of knowledge. It is not the only, but a peculiar, mode. Ordinary knowledge is content with the apprehension of facts and of such underlying principles

as are obvious and of more immediate practical application. Science seeks the highest principles on which the facts are shaped, and among these highest strives to grasp the central and controlling one, so as to give rational unity to the whole subject under investigation. That is a science of any subject which exhibits the principles involved in its material facts, and which presents these in systematic form, *i. e.*, with reference to some one chief truth pervading the whole body of principles and laws. The scientific method which theology employs is the same as in all science, *i. e.*: (a) The careful examination of facts; (b) detecting in the facts the principles;* (c) then, by the principles, reading again and more fully interpreting the facts.

§ 2. *What is Religion?* *Religio*, from *religere*, "going over again," "carefully attending to" (not "drawing back from in awe"), signifies *strictness*, *conscientiousness*.

As human nature has three parts,—thinking, feeling, willing (as act),—religion, which is the highest and fullest activity of man, must be viewed as founded in all; *e. g.*, we cannot love God without knowing him (through the intellect), preferring him (through the will as internal), and acting out the preference (through the will as executive). The great fact respecting man is this: man, in all that he is, is made for God; his relation to deity is fundamental with him, is at the basis of his being. Hence,

* These are authoritatively announced, especially in the epistles of the New Testament.

religion is essentially of such a nature that it should be, and can be, manifested in all the three modes of his activity.

Religion was defined by Schleiermacher as "a sense of absolute dependence." In meeting the pantheists, especially Hegel, who claimed that religion was to be merged into science, Schleiermacher presented that aspect of the subject which was important for his purpose, but his definition is defective in two respects: (1) as religion involves more than the *sense* of dependence, or than any mere feeling, it includes knowledge, apprehension of an object; (2) there must be in the feeling itself more than a sense of *dependence*, there must be love, veneration, worship, endeavor after holiness.

The most general account of religion is this: It is a primary fact about human nature that man seeks after God (or the divine); and this is expressed in feeling, thought, and action. "Spiritual beings, personal beings, rational creatures, as such, are religious; atheism is only the attempt not to be so."—(Nitzsch.)

All attempts to derive religion from a merely outward source, *e. g.*, from natural phenomena, priestcraft or mere (primitive) revelation are inadequate, and are now generally abandoned. They all—even that of a revelation—labor under the defect of giving us the external and not the internal elements: as if one were to try to explain how a man may learn to reason, from education, without taking for granted the rational *powers*; or to love without a heart.

Among attempts at a philosophical definition of religion, the following may be named :

"Belief in the reality of the super-sensible." But religion is more than belief on man's side, and it reaches to more than the super-sensible on the side of its object—it reaches out for the divine.

"Becoming as like God as possible."* But, copying is not yielding and rendering ourselves to.

"Merging of men in the universal substance through intelligent love."† But, the identification of God and man leaves no room for the union in which religion consists.

"Union of the infinite with the finite."‡ True : but the question is, how ? Pantheistically or in a personal mediator ?

The analysis of the facts of human consciousness gives us, as ultimate in the intellect, the contrast and unity of the infinite and finite ; as ultimate in the heart, the feeling of dependence on a higher, objective power ; and as ultimate in the will, the striving to attain some highest, indefinite end. And from this analysis we conclude that the very idea of religion involves two elements or factors, the divine and the human. Both the thing itself and its idea involve this. God alone, viewed as in no living relation to man, could give no religion ; nor could man alone, regarded simply as "capable of the ideal," or as the subject of indefinite longings.

Religion is the union of man with God, of the finite with the infinite, expressed in conscious love

* Plato.

† Spinoza.

‡ Schelling.

and reverence. This is the generic, philosophical idea of religion, whereby it is to be distinguished from philosophy and from ethics.*

§ 3. *What is the Christian religion?* What are its most fundamental and essential characteristics, as distinguished from all others?

Some descriptions of the Christian religion which have obtained currency: "That form of religion given to us by Christ and the apostles." This is too general and external. "That most perfect mode of knowing and worshiping God, delivered by Christ" (Reinhard). This does not give the essential characteristic. "The knowledge of the Father, Son, and Spirit." This leaves out the human need and the provision for it. "The perfect (absolute) religion, and as such adapted to man's spiritual necessities." A good statement, but it does not tell us how and wherein the absolute religion is adapted to man's needs. "That form of religion in which all is referred to the salvation brought through Christ" (Schleiermacher). This is nearer the mark. "That which rests in the consciousness of the redemption of the world, through Christ as our personal Saviour" (Nitzsch). This fairly hits the mark.

The Christian religion is (*a*) religion: it comes under that general idea, since it has to do with the relations between God and man; and (*b*) has, as its specific characteristic, that it is the highest and the perfect form of religion, meeting the needs of man; it is

* This is the full conception (*i. e.* expression of the reality) of religion. There may be inferior grades and forms, not yet reaching, but striving after this, or imitating it.

that form of religion which reconciles God and man through an incarnate, atoning Redeemer. It is the religion of redemption ; its essential characteristic is *restoration after a rupture*. The person and work of Christ are central. "In no other religion is the *founder* also the *essential object* of the religion. In Christianity the essence of religion, fellowship with God, is realized, objectively and absolutely, in the historical Christ, the Son of God and man ; and then man, by believing reception of him, actually receives redemption from the bonds of sin and comes to fellowship with God " (Müller).

§ 4. *In the light of what principles—or central facts—of the Christian religion is Christian theology to be framed?*

I. Some remarks on the meaning and usage of the term "theology."

(1) Theology is distinguished from religion, as being a systematic knowledge of it, involving the more definite exercise of the intellectual powers.

Christian theology is a species of the genus Theology.

(2) In the early Christian church theology meant all biblical instruction ; hence, the biblical writers were called theologians. It was applied, also, in a special sense to those who defended the divinity of the Logos. From the XIIth century, through Abelard, it was applied to the scientific exposition of the Christian faith.

(3) The different usages of the term at present consist merely in the wider or narrower application of it.

(a) Narrowest, the doctrine respecting the god-head, including the Trinity. According to an old distinction, *theologia archetypa* is the noblest and perfect theology, being the knowledge which God has of himself; *ectypa* is the knowledge of God which man has, through revelation. (b) Any doctrinal exposition of divine things, or of man's belief as to the supernatural, whether true or false. (c) The true knowledge of divine things, both natural and revealed. (d) The broadest sense—all parts of theological study.

(4) As to whether religion or theology comes first.

(a) Logically, religion is first: for the facts must precede the science of them. (b) Psychologically, religion is first: for the consciousness must precede the reflection upon it. (c) Historically, religion is always first. Yet (d) a *true* religion and a true theology are, in advanced culture, inseparable. True religion cannot be preserved without a true theology; nor can there be a vital theology without a vital religious experience.

(5) Of natural and revealed theology. Natural theology comprehends what is and can be known concerning God and our relations to him, apart from a specific revelation, all that it is logical to deduce from nature. Revealed, all that is beyond this.*

(6) Of biblical, ecclesiastical, and doctrinal (systematic) theology. In biblical theology the object is to reproduce the doctrines as taught in scripture. In ecclesiastical, as found in the creeds of the church. In doctrinal, to state and systematize the Christian

* It also necessarily re-affirms the teachings of natural theology.

faith with the two-fold aim of giving it the best elucidation and defending it against error.

A "doctrine" (less stiff than "dogma," more stringent than "opinion") may be described as "a truth involved in, and necessary to, the completeness of the Christian system, derived from scripture, expressed in other than scripture language, and so expressed as to guard against error."

(7) Of speculative theology and the philosophy of religion. These are growths of later times. (a) Speculative theology, on the basis of modern philosophy, is the same thing as natural theology on the basis of the older philosophy. It is an inquiry into the ultimate principles, the fundamental points about man's relation to God; the speculative apprehension of divine things. This is either theistic or pantheistic, the prime questions in it being those as to the independent existence of Deity, his personality, and creation by him. Natural theology is resolving itself into speculative more and more. (b) The philosophy of religion, which may be much the same as speculative theology, has, most properly, another sense. It takes the historical religions, as they have successively existed, and inquires for the laws and principles which have run through them all. This, also, is done in a two-fold way. (1) Pantheistically. The grand result being to resolve religion into philosophy, as with Hegel. Wherever the great thing in theology is represented as the intellectual, the philosophic element, and not the objective revelation, there really is an approximation, consciously or not, to this view. (2) Christian. By the comparison to

prove that Christianity is the absolute and perfect form of religion. *The latter is one of the highest and most important forms of theology for our times*, as against pantheism, involving all the relations of philosophy and faith.

II. The constructive principle of Christian theology.

(1) By *principle* is meant "*id a quo aliquid pendet vel procedit.*" The *principium essendi*, of Christian theology, that on which it depends for its *being*, is God; the *principium cognoscendi*, that on which our *knowledge* depends, is revelation; the *systematic* principle, that on which theology, as a *system*, depends, is the doctrine respecting Christ.

(2) As the system must be a counterpart of the reality, it must exhibit that which is most special and peculiar in Christ and his work, which is, that he is the Mediator between God and man.

(3) This peculiarity is two-fold, relating both to Christ's person and to his work, to the *incarnation* and the *redemption*. "God was in Christ, reconciling the world unto Himself." * We cannot reduce the principle to a single word: "Incarnation" or "Redemption"; we must take both. Incarnation does not of itself involve redemption, and redemption without the incarnation would not be Christianity.† Moreover, the two are related as ground and consequence, means or measure, and result.‡ Hence, the

* 2 Cor. v. 19.

† See Ullmann, on "Essence of the Christian System."

‡ The position that Christ would have come as the Perfecter, if there had been no need of him as a Redeemer, of humanity, is extra-scriptural.

full idea of the Christological principle of theology is that of INCARNATION IN ORDER TO REDEMPTION.

(4) Explanation of what is meant by the above.

In saying that the principle now stated should be at the basis of systematic theology, we do not mean

(a) That the doctrine respecting Christ comes first in logical order, or is the first to engage our thoughts in theology. From the very nature of the principle this cannot be, for it involves the two ideas of the divine and the human: and hence the doctrines of God and of man must be considered before we can apprehend the incarnation or the doctrine of the God-man; and the doctrines of God's claims and man's needs must be apprehended before we can understand the Redemption, or the reconciling of the divine holiness and sinful humanity.

(b) Nor that the Christological is an *a priori* principle of theology. That is, that, obtaining it, we can infer all the doctrines from it. In a metaphysical system we can start with certain definitions, and from these develop all the system by logical deduction. Theology, which rests upon facts, not upon abstractions, admits no such method.

(c) Nor that this principle comes first in the historical order. Christ appeared in the center, not the beginning, of history.

But, we mean,—

That this principle is that which gives the true center of unity to the whole theological system. It is that in which the whole system hangs together and moves together (*pendet et procedit*). It is the prin-

ciple in the sense that all the parts can be best arranged in relation to it. It is the principle by which all the parts *were* arranged in the divine plan. A true Biblical theology will show that God's entire revelation centers in Christ and his work. Further, this is the principle by which ecclesiastical theology is best arranged. The doctrines of God and of man and of the God-man, of the work of Christ and of the applications of that work, have in the main been developed in this order.*

We define Christian theology, then, as the system of the Christian facts, arranged on the basis of the chief distinguishing characteristic of the Christian religion. It is the result of the application of human thought to the facts of revelation—of the conscious experience of the Christian faith, reducing this to systematic form. It has for its object so to exhibit the Christian faith that this shall be seen to be the only real philosophy as well as the one true faith (though to this we can only approximate).

* It is only necessary to remind ourselves of the order of such names as these : Athanasius, Augustine, the council of Chalcedon, Anselm, Luther, and Calvin.

CHAPTER II.

THE SUBSIDIARY SOURCES OF CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY.

Preliminary. Of the Sources in General.

ALL religion has to do with the relations between God and man. All that man can know of his relations to God must come through God's communications. There are two distinct forms of these: the *manifestation* of God given in the light of nature, reason, etc.; and the positive *revelation* given in the Scriptures. The knowledge from the light of nature logically precedes that which we have in positive revelation. Positive revelation is given first by teachers commissioned for the purpose; then it comes in written books called the Scriptures. We are to remember also that we grow up in this or that church, and that each church is on the basis of some distinctive creed, and has as the exponent of its belief some prominent system of theology. Hence confessions of faith and systems of theology are sources. Moreover, philosophy has to do with the shaping of our theology. We defend our system, and endeavor to elucidate it by the aid of some accepted positions in philosophy. It must be added that no system of theology can be vital if it does not reflect Christian experience. This also may be mentioned as a source,

or, it may be regarded as an indispensable condition for the right use of the other sources. The sources, then, may be thus enumerated and characterized. *Experience*, the vital source, or, the condition of the right apprehension of the facts of theology; *Confessions* and *Systems*, the traditional source; *Philosophy*, the shaping, formal source; *Nature*, the fundamental source; *Revelation*, the positive, authoritative source.

For convenience of discussion, the three first named will be considered in this chapter; while Natural Theology, the Evidences of Revelation, and the Divine Authority of the Record of the Revelation are reserved for succeeding chapters.

§ 1. *Of Christian Experience* as the condition of a true knowledge of divine things. After what has been said in the General Introduction, it will perhaps be only needful here to quote the following statement; "The Scriptures contain the perfect revelation of God in Christ, and are therefore the source of Christian doctrines. But the Scriptures are also reproduced in man's spiritual life, by a living experience of the salvation of Christ; and this experience is a subordinate, yet real source of knowledge of divine truth, especially in the central points of sin and redemption. Individual experience is tested and corrected by that of the great body of believers, as expressed in the Confessions of Faith." (Müller.) Confessions are the voice of the church, to which Christ promised his Spirit. But neither experience nor confessions can create new doctrines.

§ 2. *Confessions of Faith and Systems of Theology.*

I. Confessions.

(1) Symbols or Confessions of Faith have four objects: (*a*) to give a living testimony to the truth, (*b*) to testify against error, (*c*) to furnish a bond of union among those of the same belief, (*d*) to provide means of continuing the succession of those uniting in the belief, and instructing them and their children.

(2) The relation of creeds to the Scriptures is that the former are designed to express scriptural truth in relation to the errors, wants, and questions of the times.

(3) There are two great periods of the formation of such confessions, viz.: The Primitive Church, the first four or five centuries, and the Era of the Reformation, through to 1649.* The need of symbols or confessions of faith was early felt. The use of them began, probably, with the oral confession of the name of Jesus, at baptism. The confession assumed in early times, in the second and third centuries, the definite designation of the "rule of faith" or "canon of truth." Such symbols are found in the writings of the Fathers, in Justin Martyr, Irenæus, Tertullian, Origen, Cyprian, and in the Apostolic Constitutions.

The so-called Apostles' Creed embodies the earliest confession, and is, in some portions, the earliest of all the creeds.

With this are associated the Nicene, Constantinopolitan, and the Athanasian Creeds; the three being "the common property of Christendom."

These express the mind of the first four General

* Westminster Assembly dissolved February 22, 1649.

Councils. They are defective in respect to the doctrines of grace, Anthropology,* the Church, the Sacraments. (It would be wrong to infer that the church held nothing upon these points. Irenæus calls the sacraments and ordinances "the clothing of faith.") Hence, the Apostles' and Nicene Creeds do not suffice to be put at the basis of a system. Of the Athanasian Creed, Bunsen† says: "The seventh century presented the complete system of a Christology without the historical Christ, and of a Pneumatology without the Spirit. The climax of the profound confusion into which the human mind was thrown by the combined power of one-sided and methodical speculation, of hierarchical intrigue and of Byzantine Imperialism, is exhibited in the so-called Athanasian Creed."

With the Reformation, Protestantism introduced new treatment of theology by going back to its real sources. The Reformation presents us with the following contrasted schemes: (A) the Roman Catholic against the Protestant, (B) the Lutheran and Reformed (Calvinistic), (C) the Calvinistic and Arminian.

(A) The contrasted traits of the Roman Catholic and all the Protestant systems.

(a) The idea of the visible church and its authority. The question is, Does the church constitute or

* "Few things in the history of speculation are more impressive than the fact that no Greek-speaking people has ever felt itself seriously perplexed by the great question of Free-will and Necessity."—*Maine, Ancient Law*, 354.

† *Outlines of a Philos. of Univ. Hist.*, ii. 262.

does it simply express the relation to the Head? The Protestant distinguishes between the visible and invisible church.

(b) The relation of the Scriptures and tradition. The authority of the two respectively. The result of claiming authority for tradition is the infallibility of the church in respect to doctrine.

(c) The relation of the believer to Christ. (The "material principle.") Whether this is direct or through the sacraments. Different ideas of grace prevail. "Justification by faith." Faith and works.

(d) The subjective experience of Christianity in opposition to the mere objective, sacramental reception of grace.

(B) Differences between the Lutheran and Reformed systems. While the main points of difference are upon Predestination and the Lord's Supper, these point back to more fundamental differences which have expressed themselves in the whole structure of the theological systems.

(a) In the relation of God to man, Calvinism presents the idea of the divine sovereignty, as the principle of the system,—all from God, in an analytic method. This is the fundamental characteristic, which is carried out in predestination and reprobation. The divine plan is the great idea of theology. The Lutheran, on the contrary, goes out more from the human side, human wants, etc. Calvinism protests against all Paganism, Lutheranism against all Judaism. By this also the difference as to sacramental views is to be in part explained. Underlying the Calvinistic view of the sacraments is the idea of pre-

destination to life and of grace hence bestowed; and accordingly the sacraments are viewed more as the signs and seals of a covenant, and less as the vehicles of grace.

(b) The Reformed insist more energetically upon the sole authority of the Holy Scriptures, seeing in both the Old and New Testaments the same divine system. They have a greater regard to the law of the Old Testament, a stricter sense of the obligation of the Sabbath. Lutherans, on the contrary, protest against all Jewish tendencies, external law, etc., as tending to legalism.

(c) The Reformed theology, notwithstanding its predestination (or in consequence of this), showed a more practical tendency. The Reformed church was the church of believing congregations. This was also shown in the forms of church government adopted by the Reformed Presbyterianism and Congregationalism, and the cultivation of the sense of freedom, of human rights, etc. The Lutheran theology is more speculative, more distinctively "theological" (oriental); the Reformed more anthropological, debating the questions of sovereignty and grace (occidental).

(d) The Reformed theology has a greater variety and freedom *within the limits of orthodox belief* than the Lutheran. Among the Reformed were Zwingle, of humanitarian tendencies; Calvin, systematic and exegetical; the General Reformed Church in the Palatinate, with the Heidelberg Catechism for its symbol; the Federalists (embracing Arminians too); the Dutch School (Dort); the Amyraldists (school of

Saumur, in France); the Scotch; the Westminster Confession; the Anglican Church, with Lutheran and Arminian elements; the New England Theology.

In contrast with these, Lutherans are more of one type. Rationalism prevailed among the Lutherans, from which the Reformed were, for the most part, saved.

(e) In their systems the Reformed adopt chiefly the systematic and synthetic method, the Lutherans the local (method of *loci*) and analytic. The former proceed in a deductive method, from the doctrine of God, the latter in an analytic, from the end—the view of human wants and their supply—to the beginning. From the Reformed method there followed (1) varied statements of doctrine, according to the system; (2) a laying of objective revelation as the basis, and proceeding from that, so that the system was more biblical-historical (Federalism, *e.g.*, being peculiar to the Reformed); (3) a use of the distinction between natural and revealed theology,* which helped to save the Reformed from rationalism.

(C) The Reformed and Arminians. They differed on the "Five Points": Predestination, Particular Redemption, Total Depravity, Resistible or Irresistible Grace, and the Perseverance of the Saints.

Final Statement as to the Confessions.

The Westminster Confession, the last and ripest product of the Reformation, was shaped (a) against Romanism; (b) against Arminianism; (c) in contrast with Lutheranism; (d) to ward off Socinianism; (e) to

* This was due largely to the influence of the philosophy of Descartes, which sought union between philosophy and science.

testify against sacramental grace in the rising Anglicanism.

II. Systems of Theology. (We confine ourselves to a sketch of the course of development in the Lutheran Church, and in our own country to the period of Edwards.)

(A) Theology in Germany.

(1.) From 1750 to 1817 we have in Germany the contest of rationalism and orthodoxy, the question being, Is the received Christianity scriptural and rational? From England Freethinking, Latitudinarianism, and Deism (conquered in the Calvinistic bodies), passing to Germany, assumed the form of Rationalism. The basis of Rationalism was, in part, the common-sense philosophy, in part the influence of ethical systems, especially Kant's. Exegesis also, promoted by Ernesti and others, broke the force of traditional interpretations. Lessing's influence aided Rationalism. It was promoted by the reaction against dead orthodoxy and insufficient pietism. The end proposed was to show the harmony of pure Christianity with the results of philosophical criticism and the statutes of reason. The Confessions of Faith, taken in their literal sense, were generally abandoned. The parties were sometimes called "Rationalists," who held that Christianity is purely a moral system, and not a system of redemption; and "Supernaturalists," who held that the positive Christian truths are really in the background, but urged only their utility, and these latter were divided into "Rational Supernaturalists," who gave the proofs (external) of revelation and then received the con-

tents; and "Supernatural Rationalists," who received what "agreed with reason." On the side of the Supernaturalists the result of the conflict was the recognition of the necessity of reconciling reason and scripture, and of returning to biblical theology, with an indifference to ecclesiastical theology. The pure rationalists, with Kant, held to ethics as the chief thing, and that the Christian religion was an aid, not a necessity, a moral educational institute, to which external deference was to be paid.

(2.) From about 1817 to the present time.

Here a new basis for investigation was presented in the philosophy of Fichte, Schelling, etc. A more deeply-awakened religious spirit appeared. There arose a more thorough and philosophical view of the history of the church and of doctrines. The general aim has been: to reconcile Christianity with philosophy, putting Christianity on independent grounds; to answer the question, Is Christianity the absolute truth? and to evince, behind the Scriptures, the *necessity* of the Christian system. To give these answers, the aid has been sought of (*a*) a profounder view of the real nature of Christianity (that it is not, in essence, an ethical, nor a dogmatic, nor a legal system); (*b*) a profounder view of human reason than Rationalism had possessed (that reason is not the organ for evolving abstract truth, but is *receptive*; that thought answers to Being; and thus historical fact gains its proper place); (*c*) the reconciliation of scriptural and historical with speculative theology. Among the orthodox Germans, there are several noticeable peculiarities. Such as: the belief that Christianity

is the highest reason ; a more thorough grasping of the nature of Christianity, and so, of the whole New Testament system ; a greater, though not blind, regard for the past theologies and confessions of faith ; and also, a defense of these, on philosophical as well as scriptural grounds. Schleiermacher (with excellences and great defects) begins this movement ; then follow Neander, Tholuck, Müller, Nitzsch, Twesten, etc., to Dorner.

The influence of the German philosophy, especially of Schelling and Hegel, on theology and the positions of theologians, may be thus stated : the idea of reason, as contrasted with that of the Rationalists, is maintained—that it is not arbitrary, abstract, but is the power of knowing eternal truths ; also the objectivity of the latter is maintained ; and hence a new value is ascribed to history.*

To sum up and characterize the whole movement in the Lutheran Church, we may say : There is (1) the Reformation, carrying back theology to its true sources ; leading as a result to (2) the Lutheran Orthodoxy, in Confessions of Faith, etc. ; which degenerated, under the influence of the Leibnitzo-Wolffian philosophy, into a formal, scholastic spirit ; leading (3) to a reaction which showed itself (*a*) in Pietism—life against formulas ; (*b*) in rationalism—demanding the grounds and reasons of the faith, and which ended in the general contest between rationalism and supernaturalism, conducted on philosophical and historical grounds ; leading to (4) the attempt

* “ Christianity is eternal truth in historical form.”—Ebrard.

under the influence of a different philosophy and view of history, to show the truth of Christianity in (*a*) its harmony with philosophy, (*b*) its historical claims, (*c*) its necessity, as being the absolute religion.

(B) Theology in the United States.

After the middle of the 18th century, the Reformed theology ceased to make progress in England, Scotland, or the continent. Stapfer, the Swiss, wrote the last great work. As the discussions ceased on the other side of the ocean they commenced here. Their character was determined in part by the circumstances of the country. They were less influenced by traditional usages and modes of thought; the separation of church and state was advantageous to the tone of the theology; the necessity of commending Christianity to the free choice of each individual gave a shape to the systems; revivals had a powerful influence; the ethical and anthropological questions consequently assumed prominence—sovereignty, free grace, holiness, and the harmony of these with mental and moral philosophy. All the doctrines taught in theological discipline were preached; most of the systems were first elaborated for the pulpit.

(I.) The earlier history.

Theology was planted in this country on the basis of the Reformed confessions of the 17th century. The first controversy was with the Antinomians; the next was upon the question of the "half-way" covenant. Arminianism prevailed through the first half of the 18th century; its power was broken by Edwards and Whitfield. In the Presbyterian Church,

planted by scattered emigrants, the first Presbytery was organized in 1705. In 1741, the first division occurred, the question being in regard to revivals; "old and new side" arose, and the division continued for seventeen years.

(2.) The theology of Edwards.

His system must be studied in connection with his own spiritual growth and the feeling of the time. He held that the regenerate alone are fit members of Christ's church. On the basis of the old confessions he wrought out his system, with new applications, mental and moral. The point where religion touches the heart is made the center of his system. He deals with the subjective side—the state of man before, under, and in consequence of, divine grace: *before*, in his discussion of original sin; *under*, in his discussion of sovereignty, and his treatise on the will; *after*, in his works on the nature of virtue, and on the religious affections; and gives the *results* of this application in the end of God in creation and the history of redemption.

(a) The prevailing aim of Edwards is to show that the Reformed views on sin and the regenerate life are not only Scriptural, but also rational. All true virtue, by a philosophical analysis, will give us holiness as its end. Arminians claim that depravity is not total, because some unrenewed men fulfil "civil righteousness." Edwards shows that supreme love to God is necessary to true virtue.

(b) The great idea running through all his works is his theory of the spiritual life in man as the only true moral life.

(c) Man is dependent for this spiritual life on divine grace ; it is not originated by himself.

(d) This spiritual life in man is viewed or contrasted with his sinful state, and here comes the work on Original Sin.

(e) The application to the whole system of things is made, theoretically, in the work on God's end in Creation, and, historically, in The History of Redemption.

(3.) The later history. [This is given in Prof. Smith's History of the Christian Church in Chronological Tables, in the additions to his edition of Hagenbach's History of Doctrine, and in the volume "Faith and Philosophy," p. 113 ff., for the course of theology in the Presbyterian Church ; p. 215 ff., in the Congregational Churches.]

§ 3. *Philosophy, the formal shaping Source of Theology.* The conflict of philosophy with theology, and the attempts to adjust it, come down through all Christian history. The history of philosophy cannot be written without that of theology, nor yet the converse. There has been conflict and adjustment throughout.

(I.) The chief period and forms of this conflict are : the old Greek and Roman philosophy ; the revived Greek and Roman—in Scholasticism ; the Rationalistic—17th and 18th centuries ; the Absolute or Pantheistic systems of the 19th century.

(1.) The Greek and Roman. Christianity came as a system of revealed truth from the true God, claiming absolute authority, as against the pretensions of human reason. The conflict thence arising with the

ancient philosophy came to its height in the Gnostic (including the Manichaean) controversies of the second and third centuries, and in the Neo-Platonic oppositions, extending into the fourth century. There were two modes of defense: (a) To say that all philosophy is a fiction, and that it is necessary to cling to faith alone. This was Tertullian's method. (b) To affirm that there is a Christian gnosticism. The method of the school of Alexandria.

The general aim of the anti-Christians was to establish some supreme system of things which should prove itself superior to the Christian, as ultimate. In their speculation history was wrecked.

(2.) The Mediæval period.

Here occurred the greatest attempt to reconcile Christianity with the traditional philosophy, especially of Greece—and of Rome in part. (Erigena had derived from Plato a theosophic Pantheism.) Realism and Nominalism gave the form. The mediæval realism formed the basis of Scholasticism—the defects of that realism pervaded the entire system.

The essence of Scholasticism is in the fact that it is a combination of the Church dogmas with the philosophy of Aristotle. It may be most conveniently divided into the schools of XIIth. (Anselm, 1100, Abelard and Bernard, 1120–50), XIIIth. (Aquinas, 1260–70), and XIVth. (Occam, 1330–47) centuries. The method of the Scholastics was, to collect texts of Scripture and statements of the Fathers of the Church. But in the former they lacked correct interpretation, and in the latter, historical criticism. They also presupposed the iden-

tity of the Church system with the Scriptural and Patristic.

Yet Scholasticism was exceedingly acute. Many of our approved definitions were made by the Scholastics. The *Summa* of Aquinas remains the greatest single work in theology.

(3.) The Rationalistic period of the 17th and 18th centuries.

The Reformation had freed thought as well as the Church. The inductive spirit was subsequently applied in all spheres. Three tendencies were seen in philosophy: (a) The appeal to self-consciousness as ultimate (the Cartesian school). From this Pantheism began to be developed, but in a more hidden and less openly influential manner—to come forth in its power in the 4th period. (b) The appeal to facts—nature, naturalism—by the English mind. From this sprung Naturalism, Deism, Atheism, leaving as the form of the conflict, in Germany especially, Rationalism and Supernaturalism. (c) A theosophic tendency (Boëhme). Truth is to be found in pure spiritual vision.

(4.) The present century. Christianity stands face to face with both Pantheism and Materialism. An absolute system is sought for.* The aim is to con-

* See an article by Chalybäus in *Jahrb., f. deutsche Theol.* Bd. ii. 1857, on The Pretensions of the Absolute Philosophy. Its thesis is: all that is can be reduced to or deduced from one principle. That principle is (a) an abstract, original substance, (b) a chaos of atoms, (c) ethical-teleological (affirmed by Chalyb.). An abstract, indifferent principle, which is at the same time an omnipotent force, and which—as is claimed—is neither real (material) nor ideal (thinking, spiritual), “we hold to be utterly inconceivable and impossible, a *non-sens* and a *non-ens*, and all deductions from it must be an artificial self-illu-

struct a system containing all that is true in Christianity, and all other truth. (Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Comte, Mill, Spencer.) This has brought the question between Christianity and philosophy to its real issue.

(II.) Classification of the different positions as to the relations of Faith and Philosophy.

(a) Scepticism. The position of doubt. Hume, the chief example. We never can come to any certainty as to the ultimate ground and cause of all things—neither as to its origin nor as to its nature. The philosophical position to be taken is that of Indifference, seeing that nothing can be known, or Neutrality, Free-thinking.

(b) Naturalism. Involving the denial of the Supernatural. Nature and human nature, by and of themselves, are the sum of all truth. There is no specific revelation. The Christian religion is only a natural growth. This is subdivided as Deism, Materialism. Deism allows an extra-mundane principle as the source and origin of all, a spiritual cause or essence: simply first in the series, never breaking in by miracles. (Leland.) Materialism, pure naturalism, affirms that nature has been ever the same, and is only hypostasized and personified in the idea of the Supernatural. (The positive philosophy.)

(c) Rationalism. The ultimate contents of reason

sion" p. 392. "This prime principle must be either spiritual or material, or both; but not 'entweder-oder' nor 'weder-noch.'" All analysis here must hold fast the primitive *unity* as objective. The first principle must be the most concrete, and not the "nothing which is being"—indeterminate, super-essential, super-existential.

and revelation are identical, and reason is to determine the identity.

(*d*) Mysticism. A communion with divine things is to be held through an internal, spiritual sense, making them certain, into which the unconsecrated cannot enter.

(*e*) Supernaturalism. In Christ and the Apostles and Prophets, we have a direct revelation for Redemption.

III. As to the usage and the proper use of the terms, Reason and Philosophy.

The question centers here, What is Reason? What is Philosophy?

(1.) What is Reason? It may mean (*a*) simple "common-sense," the general truths derived from experience and understanding, gathered up in the common knowledge and judgment. This is supposed to give light for our conduct in life, and, as such, is simply prudential. When men say that there is a conflict between reason and Christianity, they often mean that the truths of Christianity go beyond the truths of "common sense." If this is urged as the only definition of reason, then there follows denial of all *absolute* truth or certainty. It is denied that man can know aught beyond the sphere of every day experience. What does not come within the bounds of my experience is not true. Here arises conflict between the individual and the race. (*b*) Reason may and does mean man's rational power by which he can know axioms and logical truths. "Whatever is, is." "Things equal to the same thing are equal to one another." The principles of identity and

contradiction. These are derived from "reason" instead of experience. In this sense there can be no pretense of a conflict between reason and revelation.

(c) It is often taken, by the educated, as equivalent to the ultimate dictates or postulates of a generally received system of philosophy, *e. g.*, Bacon's, Locke's, Reid's, etc. Between reason, as used in this sense, and revelation, the conflict arises, and must, until reason shall grasp the true and final system. All systems of the past have had a shifting character. The Germans thought, half a century ago, that they had superseded all other systems and completed the course of human thought.

(d) The proper sense of Reason is found only in this proposition: "Reason is the power by which we discern those truths which are universal and necessary." Is there anything in revelation in conflict with the universal and necessary truths of the human mind? Miracles, say opponents, contradict reason. Yet they do not mean that any known or necessary truth of the human mind is contradicted. Miracles contradict the principle of the uniformity of nature's laws. But this is not a "truth of reason." *

(2.) What is Philosophy? Parallel with the above, it may mean: (a) Truths obtained from the inductions of particulars; (b) Systems resting in axioms and definitions; (c) The current system of an age; (d) The absolute system, in which all is deduced from *a priori* principles; (e) Knowledge of things through

* See *Apologetics*, p. 100 ff.

their grounds and causes, culminating in the knowledge that the absolute is, and is manifested.*

IV. The relation between Reason and Revelation ; or, The true office of Philosophy in Systematic Theology.

(1.) Some general statements :

(a) Reason in Revelation grasps and arranges what it can ; in respect to the rest, the incomprehensible and mysterious, it may show, that on these points revelation comes to meet certain aims and to solve certain problems which, by reason alone, we cannot deduce or be sure about.

(b) It must be taken as an ultimate fact that there cannot be an antagonism between the two : between God's revelation in reason and in Christianity. "*Qui contemnit philosophiam contemnor est veritatis.*" (Augustine.)

(c) We cannot define their relation by saying that they have different objects in view, cover different spheres. For both are ultimately concerned with the same great objects : God, Man, and the Relation between them. The ultimate questions are the same in both. Theology begins with God, Philosophy ends with him ; the one comes down over the field of human knowledge, the other ascends ; the field is the same for both.

(d) Much less can we resolve the question by assigning to faith a lower sphere than to reason. "Human opinion is as dogmatic as revelation." (Pusey on Amos, ii. 4.) "Religion is an element of

* See *Apologetics*, pp. 24-46.

knowledge. Philosophy is quantitatively beyond religion, since, *e. g.*, it goes back to the beginnings of knowledge; but religion is *qualitatively* above philosophy, since it is life in God, in which knowledge is only a *moment*. Faith in God is both knowledge and appropriation. Faith is sometimes said to be: holding true on subjective grounds; philosophy: on both subjective and objective, and so higher. Not so. There is no knowledge of a personal God *above* faith. Faith does not go over into knowledge but into *vision*. The knowledge of God's personality is gained from faith *before* philosophy. Dogmatics is never merged in philosophy; its truths are immanent in the soul, and from a positive revelation." (Müller's Lectures.) These are the true positions, especially as against the suggestions in the beginning of Herbert Spencer's "First Principles."

(e) Reason is not entitled to evoke Christianity from itself, nor to resolve Christianity into dogmas of philosophy. "Rationalism says, reason is the highest authority in religion and must decide upon the truths of revelation. *But reason is real in man only so as he has the knowledge of God and conscience*; and these factors make the transition to Christianity and faith; they prepare and condition the reception of Christianity.* It is the fundamental error of rationalism

* James Mill (and substantially his son) "found it impossible to believe that a world so full of cruelty and wrong could be the work of a Creator uniting infinite power and wisdom to perfect goodness." He could see no clew to a Theodicy in the assertion that "sin entered into the world and death by sin." Moral considerations, such as rise to view in the Christian doctrine of sin, had no weight.

that faith is intellectual conviction, proceeding from a weighing and holding as sufficient certain general grounds or reasons; but faith is an internal act, appropriating and giving oneself up to the object—called forth by the needs, not only of the intellect, but of the whole man. If it comes to deeper knowledge (philosophy), it is only by receiving revelation; if difficulties are found, we must see our limits and await the solution. Reason merely criticising the contents of Christianity is not Christian Rationalism, but stands outside of Christianity. And so Rationalism seeks only to bring Christianity down to itself—to the development of a knowledge assumed to be sound and complete.” (Müller’s Lectures.)

(2.) What faith concedes to philosophy, in respect to a revelation and to theology.

(a) In what logically precedes the revelation, we must go back to rational truths as the basis, *e. g.*, the Being and Personality of God, the need of a revelation, etc. Even the Romanists are clear upon this. Of the four propositions of the Holy See (Dec. 12, 1855) about Traditionalism and Rationalism, the third is “*Rationis usus fidem præcedit et ad eam homines ope revelationis et gratiæ conducit.*”*

(b) Within the theological system, philosophy must shape the definitions, so as to ward off error and bring out the truth with reference to the particular wants and philosophical attainments of each age.

* Pius IX. (quoted in Brownson’s *Quarterly*, April, 1861, p. 234) said of Traditionalists, “They want no more human reason. But, my God, if this poor human reason is no longer anything, faith itself will be no more. Let each have its due.”

(c) Reason must decide whether revelation is accompanied by due and convincing evidence. Yet here "reason" must stand to such a degree within the sphere and influence of the revelation as to be able to appreciate its evidence, otherwise, to what is best and strongest, it may be blind.

(d) Reason must decide as to actual content of revelation—what it is that is conveyed in a fair historico-grammatical interpretation.

(e) Philosophy or reason is to discern between mysteries and contradictions; to investigate seeming conflicts with natural science, etc. It has a great office in showing that the deep truths of revelation do not involve anything contrary to the ultimate truths of human reason, however they may transcend it.

(3.) What philosophy must concede to faith.

(a) That Christianity has its independent grounds, as much as nature, and its independent evidences. It is a divine revelation, as real as that in the kingdom of nature; proved independently by the "evidences," by experience, by history. This is the position of supernaturalism, and as fact, is impregnable.

(b) Philosophy, from its very nature, cannot deny that in revealed facts there is, and is to be expected, that which is essentially beyond the grasp, the distinct comprehension of the intellect. This appears (1) From the nature of philosophy; it is the "science of principles," but of the principles *of things*. It has to show the grounds, reasons, ends (laws) of facts, and it must begin with receiving, on the proper evidence, facts, which in their essence are inscrutable.

(2) From the nature of religion. Here are the highest and most mysterious facts, in respect to which we can only know *that*, not *what*. If in nature philosophy is to be reverent to facts, *a fortiori* in religion.*

(c) As against the pretensions of the absolute philosophy, it is to be affirmed that the human mind is unable to deduce by a logical process the finite from the infinite, or the relative from the absolute. We can no more do this than by "induction" we can pass from the finite to the infinite. And, if the finite could be deduced from the infinite, still the problems of destiny would not be solved. These are moral problems, and a revelation is needed to answer them.

(4.) *The final statements.*

The real and ultimate reconciliation of Faith and Philosophy will be effected only when it is shown that the Christian faith is the highest form of wisdom for man.

Philosophy must shape itself in conformity with revelation; it cannot claim that the higher truths shall conform to its modes of apprehending things. (1 Cor. ii. 7-10).

"There can be no real reconciliation from without; only in the unfolding of what is in Christianity, viz. : finding from the contents of the Christian religion,

* Hence the course of training in theology is akin to the course elsewhere. Rest in the facts and then explain them. Receive them to know them. *Crede ut intelligas.* "*Ut ea quae fidei formitate jam teneas, etiam rationis luce conspicias.*" (Augustine, in Neander, ii. 766.) If this be all that is meant by "induction," then the method of theology is most eminently inductive.

as its metaphysical complement, ultimate and absolute scientific statements, relative to the existence of God and the world, and their mutual relations, in such a way that they shall, of themselves, constitute a system of Christian philosophy." (Müller, *Doct. of Sin*, i. 79.)

The relation of philosophy to theology has never been better stated than by Auberlen (*Div. Rev.*, Eng. trans., p. 66): "This is the task of all philosophico-theological labors, to see the actual as it were transparent, as illuminated by the divine idea, the positive as ideal, the real—that which is truly real, that which is effected by God—as rational, so that it may lose that external character in which it might seem foreign to our minds. In this view of the work we are at one with our opponents; only we perform it in a *realistic* and spiritual, and not in an *idealistic* and spiritualistic way; because experience shows that idealism always degenerates into materialism."

CHAPTER III.

NATURE THE FUNDAMENTAL SOURCE OF THEOLOGY —NATURAL THEOLOGY.*

“Man muss Gott seyn oder Gott lieben.”

A DISTINCTION is to be made between natural theology and natural religion. The latter is as old as human history, the former as a science, is of later growth. Natural religion is sometimes used as including the body of truth found in natural theology.

Natural theology has never been found in a church form. As a science it aims to unfold what can be known of God and our relations to him in the light of nature. Not that nature has actually given these truths, but they may be legitimately inferred from nature. Not that men ever have come at them without revelation, but that it is logical to do it.

§ 1. *Of the kind of argument to be employed in discussing the questions raised by natural theology.*

(1.) The most general division of sources of evidence is into demonstrative and moral (or probable). Demonstrative evidence yields conclusions which are based upon or result from axioms or definitions, or both. Demonstrative evidence rests ultimately in

* “The Natural Theology of St. Paul.” Hebert, Nuremberg, 1860. Acts xiv. 16 *seq.*, xvii. 22-31; Rom. i. 18-32; ii. 14, 15; i. Cor. v. 1; i. Thess. iv. 5.; Eph. iv. 17-19.

intuitions. Probable evidence is all other proof. "Probable evidence does not imply any deficiency in the proof, but only marks the particular nature of that proof as contra-distinguished from other species of evidence. It is opposed, not to what is certain, but to what admits of being demonstrated after the manner of mathematicians." (Dugald Stewart, *Intell. Phil.*, II., § 19.) Probable evidence is all that the nature of the case admits of.

(2.) Of knowledge as intuitive and discursive.

"The different species of intuitive evidence are (*a*) the evidence of axioms, (*b*) of consciousness, (*c*) of the fundamental laws of human belief (*e.g.*, personal identity—the principles of common sense)." (Stewart's *Outlines*, *Men. Phil.*)

Discursive knowledge includes what is reached by the processes of induction and deduction (the latter being carefully distinguished from demonstration resting upon intuitions).

(3.) Of induction and deduction.

The process of induction consists in applying to a sufficient number of observed analogous instances the principle (derived from a greater induction, not an intuitive necessary principle) that the laws of nature are uniform. Hence a greater law is reached.

Deduction consists in deriving from a general truth whatever other truths are involved. (If the truth be "universal" as well as general, the process of deduction will partake of the nature of demonstration.) In deduction, the results and a part or the whole of the premises are perfectly equivalent.

The characteristics of a sound and valuable induc-

tion (as stated by Jouffroy, see Quarterly Rev. No. 68) are : (*a*) that the general proposition be more than the sum of the particulars ; (*b*) that it be such as to enable us to predict what will occur in like circumstances ; (*c*) that, especially in the greatest theories, there be found " the consilience of inductions. "

The value of the inductive process is not so much in the inference as in the careful study of facts. Sir William Hamilton well said : " There are more false facts in the world than false theories. "

(4.) Of the terms Reason and Reasoning.

(*a*) Reason, as commonly used, means our whole intelligent nature. As used strictly, it means that power by which we know necessary truth, in distinction from the understanding, which, when used strictly, means that power (or adjustment) of the mind by which we know objects and truths in their finite connections and relations.

(*b*) Reasoning includes the use of demonstration and of the method of employing moral evidence.

In demonstrative reasoning the inference is necessary at every step ; there are no degrees in it, there is no counter-possibility.

It is applicable only to necessary truths.

It is of two classes : (1) metaphysical, in which an immediate conclusion is drawn from a first principle (*e. g.*, it is impossible for a thing at the same time to be and not to be) ; (2) mathematical, resting on axioms derived from the nature of quantity. (The fundamental positions of Mathematics " must be axioms as well as definitions. ")

In the use of moral evidence the principle of caus-

ality is perpetually appealed to. Evidence consists of facts for which a sufficient reason or cause must be found. The cause or ground of the facts of evidence being thus and not otherwise is the object sought for through the evidence.

All truths of fact (save one) are contingent truths; there is a possibility that they may be or might have been otherwise: they are not demonstrable from a simple inspection of their nature and discernment of their being. Yet

A *contingent truth may be as certain* as one demonstrated. One may have no more doubt and no more ground for doubting that a piece of information given on human testimony is true to fact, or that certain observed effects are due to the agency of a cause which in similar circumstances will produce similar effects, than he has of any mathematical axiom.

(5.) Of the terms *a priori* and *a posteriori*.

These are phrases which are liable to be misunderstood, on account of the fluctuating usage about them. It is commonly said that *a priori* reasoning is from cause to effect, and *a posteriori* the reverse.

It is better to fix as the meaning: *a priori* reasoning is from intuitive truths, *a posteriori* from observed facts.

§ 2. *What may be considered as a valid proof of Divine existence?*

A. Of invalid modes of argument.

(1.) It is manifest that the proof required cannot be just like that which we give of the existence of an external, material object—*e. g.* of a tree, a man, an animal; for God is not subject to the inspection of the senses. The mode of proof must be such as we apply to estab-

lish the valid being of anything which is not limited by the relations of time and space, nor grasped by such perceptions as belong to the sphere of sense.

(2.) Equally excluded from the proof (as ultimate and conclusive) is another method, which is applied, not to material things, but to those that are purely spiritual—viz. : the evidence of direct consciousness, or immediate intuition (*e. g.* the idea of space, or time, or being, or right). With the idea, in such cases, is given the recognition of its valid being, of its inherent reality. "I cannot *not think* it."—(Schelling.)

But the existence of Deity is not a mere idea; it is a matter and question also of fact—*i. e.* of a *personal deity*. We may prove by the method named above, that there is something infinite, eternal, unlimited, even (*quasi*) spiritual—without arriving at a God who is to be loved and worshiped.

(3.) Equally excluded is the method of mere induction, by which only truths of *the same class* with those that are observed in order to make the induction can be reached.

(4.) The proof required is evidently not to be sought from the exercise of the mere understanding (using the term in the strict sense, *i. e.* as connecting what is given in experience).

B. Outline of the method of the argument.

I. Of the connatural knowledge of deity.

II. The analysis of the idea of deity given thereby.

[This is not treated by the author.]

III. The *a priori* proofs.

IV. The *a posteriori* proofs.

V. Summary and combination of the two.

VI. The Anti-theistic theories.

VII. Where natural theology leaves us. The need of something more.

§ 3. *Of the connatural knowledge of Deity.*

This phrase is preferred to the phrase—"the innate idea of God," on account of the indefiniteness of the latter.

The inquiry under this head, now, is as to a matter of fact—viz.: whether human nature is such, whether man is so constituted, that he comes naturally, through his implanted principles, to the belief in, and recognition of, the divine existence. It is not an inquiry, yet, as to the validity of this knowledge, but as to the fact of it, whether it be a fact of human nature. The proof of an objective reality corresponding to that idea must come up afterwards. If we establish the fact, we have found a basis, a point to start from.

Order of discussion—(A) Meaning of the phrase: connatural knowledge; (B) sources of the proof that the knowledge of God is connate with man.

(A.) The meaning of the phrase "connatural knowledge."

(1.) What is not meant by it.

(a) That every human being, from earliest infancy, or that even all adults, have a *true* knowledge of God, as a personal, omnipotent, omniscient, holy, benevolent Being. That is the idea given through education, culture, and revelation.

(b) It is not meant that the idea of God, as a complete idea, as a single, complete conception, exists in

the human mind, in all men. The knowledge of the existence of God, as an objective fact, is not an absolutely intuitive knowledge, in the sense that the knowledge of our own existence is—or, even, that the knowledge of the external world is. If it were, there could be no more of intellectual atheism, than of pure idealism ; yet there is much more. The denial of the existence of God does not involve an absolute contradiction.

(c) Nor is it meant that, as a matter of fact, men come to the knowledge of the being of God without education. No such instances can be found. Education is necessary, in all cases, to *educate* our ideas, even our intuitive ideas, into clear consciousness. (The difference between what education alone gives and what nature and education together give, is seen in the difference between learning a written alphabet, which is wholly a result of education, and learning to talk, in which nature and education have each a part.)

(2.) What is meant.

(a) That man is so made, that when the idea of God is presented to him, in evidence, he spontaneously assents to it as real, as true, as valid. He does this in early life, he does it in his maturity.

(b) In other words, it is meant, that such is the human constitution, that under appropriate circumstances, it always recognizes the existence of God as a fact. There may be moral impediments ; but still, in spite of these, almost all men do. The moral impediments may be so great as to stifle, for a time, the power of recognition ; but in hardly any case can it

be so for all time. Even the most depraved have some idea of God.

(c) It is also meant, that this idea is given by human nature in its natural development, in *distinction from* its being merely a product of education, of priestcraft, of delusion.

Not of education, for that could not, by any conceivable process, give us the idea, unless we were made for it.

Not of priestcraft, for how is the influence of the priestcraft itself to be explained?

Not of delusion—unless man was made to be ultimately deluded, in his highest knowledge and aspiring—unless all is a delusion.

Man is truly man in proportion as he knows God.

(d) It is meant, in short, that the knowledge of God is innate in the same sense in which we say that the knowledge of moral law, of right, is innate. Not that it is given before consciousness; not that it is without education; not that a man may not become so debased and depraved as to deny it. But that man is made to be a moral being, and to act under moral laws, recognizing their binding force. No education, no induction from sense, could give this elevated idea of moral right (so diverse from all nature offers) unless man was made for it.

To the question, How this knowledge exists in the human soul before it is educed, or called out, it is to be answered: It exists really, potentially; as the fruit in the seed. We call, in all cases, that knowledge connatural, to which man comes under

the average influences and development of the human constitution.

(B.) Sources of the proof of such connatural knowledge. They may be considered under the following heads:

(1.) Historical. The consensus gentium embracing: (a) confessions of the necessity of worship and an object of worship; (b) the actual prevalence of religious worship everywhere; (c) the ultimate recognition of one Supreme Being.

(2.) Psychological. The existence of a generic religious sentiment, as native to man, producing all these modes of worship.

(3.) Philosophical. The analysis of human nature itself, showing that the highest exercise of all its powers is in the adoration and service of God.

The proof should conclude with—

An analysis of the idea of God, such as men have it; giving its general elements, or what is essential to it.

Thus the way is prepared for the direct proof that a being corresponding to this idea, to this connatural knowledge, really exists.

(The advantage of this method is that we do not *assume* that the idea carries its verification with it. We undertake to prove its verification. We here establish the matter of fact, that such a knowledge, such an idea of God, exists; and then we proceed to the proof that the Being answering to the idea exists. One line of argument *may be*: the idea is of such a nature as to carry adequate evidence with it; but that we do not assume.)

§ 4. *Of the Ontological or a priori argument for the Being of God.*

I. The Nature of the Ontological argument.

"Ontological" is "from the essence of things"—
ἐκ τῶν ὄντων.

It is not *a priori* in the sense of finding a cause for God's existence; nor, in the sense even, of finding an *a priori* ground for his being, as if we could get behind God; nor, in the sense of finding something on which he depends.

It is simply a mode of proof of the divine existence—a way in which we prove it to ourselves, or show valid reasons therefor. It is not supposed that the being of God (or his not being) depends on the argument, or on that which is the basis of the argument; but that our conclusion, our argument depends thereon.

The argument is this—that there are certain necessary ideas in the human mind, from which we may make a valid inference that God is, *i. e.*, that an infinite, personal cause of all things exists.

[Ontological and *a posteriori* arguments may be thus contrasted :

Ontological present :	A Posteriori furnish :
(1) an abstract scheme ;	concrete verification.
(2) rational frame ;	fact.
(3) possibility ;	actuality.
(4) necessity of thought ;	reality of being.
(5) mathematical concep- tions :	mathematical forces.]

II. The different ways in which the ontological argument has been presented.

Not pausing here to speak of hints in Plato and Aristotle, in Athanasius and Augustine,* we mention—(1.) Anselm's argument. We have the idea of a being infinite and perfect, but to perfection real existence is necessary. "All men have the idea of God, even those who deny it, for they cannot deny that of which they have no idea. The idea of God is the idea of a being absolutely perfect, one whom we cannot imagine to have a superior. The idea of such a being necessarily implies existence, otherwise we might imagine a greater being. Anselm's point is: there is an *essential* distinction between the idea "quo majus cogitari non potest" and all other ideas, in this, that it involves necessary existence.

(2.) Descartes' argument. "Our idea of such a being as God cannot be from experience, nor is it from revelation." "Our ideas are adventitious, factitious, and innate." "The idea of a most perfect being is not adventitious (from experience) nor factitious (invented); hence it is innate, God-given." The argument is *ex conscientia Dei*. Descartes has three proofs of the Being of God. (a) We are imperfect, yet have the idea of a perfect Being; *only a perfect being could give us this idea*. (b) We are dependent; there must be a perfect Being, independent.† (c) We have the idea of a perfect Being; in the idea itself is the evidence for the existence of

* See for these, and also for Albertus Magnus, Aquinas, Duns Scotus, R. Bacon, etc., references in Macmahon's *Met. and Revel'n*, page 167, *seq.*

† Leibnitz called this argument "cosmological"—a *contingentia mundi*.

such a being. This last Leibnitz elaborated, and this Kant* takes as *the* ontological argument.

(3.) Dr. Samuel Clarke. As commonly given: "Time and space are—they are respectively eternal and immense—they are not entities but must be attributes—they cannot be attributes of creation, for we can conceive creation not to be; they are attributes of some substance, and that is God." The common objections: (a) We cannot say, all is substance or attribute. "Of what being is a foot of space the attribute?" Or, of what attribute is it substance? for space and time might just as well be called substances as attributes. (b) This would give us only an immense, eternal something, not God; (c) God is not space-filling, nor time-filling. But Dr. Clarke is often misunderstood, through Brougham's misrepresentation.† He, in his *Discourse*, etc., puts it as if Clarke, by his argument about space and time, meant to demonstrate the *being* of God. But Clarke's argument here is his 6th proposition, and supposes the *existence proved* in what goes before; he aims here to establish the infinitude and omnipresence of the first Being. He does *not* prove existence from immensity. Butler, in his correspondence with Clarke, states it rightly; and Butler concedes all that goes before the 6th proposition.

III. Statement of the Ontological argument. Preliminary explanation of terms.

* Kant himself once said (what he afterwards abandoned) that if there were nothing actual nothing would be possible.

† See Turton on Brougham. Dugald Stewart, *Disc. on Ment. Sci.* Pt. 2, p. 67, makes the same mistake.

(1.) God as the absolute being : unconditioned.

This is the most general predicate—*causa sui*, in and of himself—absolved from all *ab extra* conditions—superior to all limitations—complete in himself.

I John, i. 1. "Ὁ ἦν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς.

The name: "Jehovah."

John v. 26. "For as the Father hath life in Himself—"

John vi. 57. "As the living Father hath sent me—"

Rom. xii. 36. "For of Him, and to Him, and through Him are all things."

Eph. iv. 6. "One God and Father of all, who is above all, and through all, and in you all."

Heb. ii. 10. "—Him for whom are all things, and by whom are all things."

Rev. i. 4. "—from Him which is, and which was, and which is to come." (Rev. i. 8, also.)

Rev. iv. 8.

Rev. x. 6.

Rev. xi. 17.

(2.) *Several kindred terms:*

(a) Infinite : the negative side of it.

(b) Necessary being : that which is unconditioned is necessary.

(c) Aseity : of himself.

(d) Unity : only one absolute, else not unconditioned. As *unus* (absolute quantitative) One, in numero et specie ; (the genus and individual one ; no difference) ; as *unicus* (qualitative) only one of the kind.

(e) Absolute and personal : As absolute, also personal : for the absolute is that which is determined by itself alone ; that is, personal self-determination. (This is demanded by the religious consciousness—one ego—in prayer, etc.)

Against this, Spinoza, and especially Fichte (in his earlier view) assert : they exclude each other ; a person implies another outside of itself ; it is merely relative.

But this confounds person and individual ; personality distinguishes self from self (object and subject)—not necessarily self from other things.

Personality is not a mere relation ; it is a point of fixed being, with that internal distinction of self from self, which is the peculiarity of it.

God is not an *individual*.

Person is *being* determined as Ego, and which distinguishes itself from itself, itself as object from itself as subject ; its nature or being is distinguished from itself in personal consciousness (not another nature necessarily, else brutes were persons.)

(I.) Being Is—is the grandest of tautologies ; in it subject and predicate are one ; idea and reality, one.

The idea involves radically, analytically—not synthetically—the existence.

The old scholastic maxim was—objectum intellectus est ens. It is pure, simple, abstract, yet real being.

Kant introduced the phrase : “ synthetic judgments, a priori.” Analytical propositions, a priori, present no room for debate. *E. g.*, space is infinite, being is either limited or unlimited. They are simply state-

ments of what is contained in the ideas themselves. In synthetic judgments, however, something is added to the proposition from some other idea or source. *E. g.*, universal being is personal, matter has color, space contains body. The substance of the position that synthetic judgments, *a priori*, are possible is—that knowledge is of the objective and is not merely subjective.* The distinction of subject and object is in our consciousness. In perception we do not deal merely with our own subjective ideas; and so, in more spiritual apprehension, *e. g.*, of space, time, right, in all our intuitive ideas, we have to do with being as well as with thought.

The starting point in the argument is the rational idea of being. That idea is not a *mere* abstract idea—it is an idea of that which is—*i. e.*, of real being.

This is an ultimate belief, a fact of irresistible consciousness; the test of which is, *that we cannot conceive it not to be*. All so-called proofs here are simply the analysis of this idea. Descartes' *Cogito ergo sum* is analysis and not proof. So, too, the formula: Something is, therefore something must have been, is not a logical inference. So the argument: The contingent is and therefore the absolute is, is not logical: the statement is only an analysis of consciousness. When we inquire further, what are the characteristics of this *ultimate* being? and judge that they are

* See Brit. and For. Ev. Rev., Jan., 1858, p. 19, *seq.* The distinction is well made between logical (analytic) and primitive (synthetic) judgments. The latter gives us an *a priori* argument for the being of God. This was Sir William Hamilton's view. "We are conditioned," "The unconditioned is"—are primitive judgments.

self-existence, independence, and immutability, we reach the judgment that the ultimate being is also the *absolute*. There is *self-existent being*.*

Anselm's argument is an analysis which brings out the fact that our idea of being is of *objective* and not merely subjective being. His argument is only an analysis and not a proper syllogism.

The full idea of being is of absolute and not merely of relative being. The idea of relative being does not satisfy, fill up, the idea of being—only the idea of absolute being does this.

Something is, always has been, else *ex nihilo nihil* would be false. We cannot think it not to be so. (So Plato, Aristotle, Leibnitz, all Germans, etc.) *There is independent being*.

(2) What the Ontological argument does not by itself alone demonstrate.

(a) The idea of a perfect being does not necessarily involve the fact of the existence of that being as intelligent and personal. This were to claim that we have an intuitive idea of a personal God, a face to face vision of him.

The argument that "existence is a perfection," etc., is a fallacy, is no argument; it is only a further analysis of the idea itself. The idea is of the existence of an absolute substance, infinite, etc.

(Yet, it is also true that we cannot well conceive of such a spirit, as not being intelligent and personal. But the Pantheist so does.)

(b) The nature of the causality which inheres in

* Idea in Deo nihil est aliud quam essentia Dei. (Aquinas.)

the absolute being can only be inferred from the effects produced. It cannot be inferred that this being or substance is a strictly creative power. Hence, we need the union of the a priori and a posteriori arguments for full demonstration.

"The a priori argument is the algebraic formula of the Universe." (Dove. Logic.)

(3.) To this substance, which we reach in the rational idea of being, we attribute the properties of infinitude, in respect to, and compared with, both time and space. (Infinite, *i. e.*, "which never can be completed in" or measured by space and time.)

That is, it is immense, eternal, and these two are positive attributes, and not merely negative. It is immense and eternal, as above, and beyond, and superior to all that is finite, bounded, etc.

It is not a mere extension of successions of time, and of parts of space, indefinitely. It has the positive attributes of eternity.

(This is from the combination of our necessary ideas of time and space with the idea of substance. The one proves there has always been some substance; the other adds infinitude thereto.

(4.) This infinite being must also be the absolute causality, *i. e.*, contain in itself the last ground and source, the sufficient reason of all that is, of all that is different from itself. That which is finite depends on that which is infinite. All finite causes run back to an infinite causality. All that is has its root and ground in something which is eternal.

(This is from our necessary idea of cause; we cannot conceive it otherwise.)

[To determine the nature and characteristics of this causality we can no longer rely on the ontological argument alone; for the nature of the cause is seen by us only in its effects; and so, to determine its traits, we need to bring in the *a posteriori* argumentation.]

(5.) This being is one. There can be only one absolute and infinite. To suppose two is a mere repetition of the idea.

(6.) Ontologically, we may also assert that this absolute causality is perfect being, *i. e.*, is free from all the limitations and imperfections of time and space. Whether absolute moral perfection or holiness can, on *a priori* grounds alone, be asserted, is more doubtful.

(7.) We cannot conceive of a substance infinite and absolute, and the absolute causality, except as being also spiritual—a spirit.

By saying that it is spiritual, we do not here mean that it is an intelligent, personal spirit; but that it is spiritual as contrasted with what is material. As force and causality; as infinite (*i. e.*, eternal and immense), this primitive substance has spiritual, in distinction from material, attributes. If it had material, then it would be limited, finite, measurable; a part would be here and not there; now and not then—which contradicts the notion of pure being.

All matter is measurable, *i. e.*, it is included in and defined by its relations to finite space. Not so this primitive substance.

Thus far we have a good pantheistic ground and source of all things.

(8.) We may add to this enumeration of the deductions from the ontological source—fairly, I think—that it is difficult, if not impossible, for us really to conceive of this primitive substance as being other than a self-conscious intelligence, *i. e.*, as having personality, reason, and will. And this on a priori grounds. But it is not demonstrable.*

And hence we add the a posteriori arguments.

§ 5. *The A Posteriori Arguments in General and the Cosmological Argument.*

I. The nature of these in general is that they are from effect to cause, from all effects to one adequate cause.

The existence of external phenomena, events, changes, is assumed.

The prime category here is that of cause. This is to be investigated first.

The principle involved is—Every event or change of existence implies a cause. Extended in a proposition it is—For each and for all events there must be an adequate cause.

What, then, is a cause? What do we mean by it?

Here it is necessary to distinguish between the origin of the idea and the nature of that idea.

(a) The idea (chronologically) comes up in the mind by and through experience, either from noticing the phenomena of the universe or the operations

* Plato in *Timæus*. "All that becomes must necessarily have come from something; but it is difficult to find the author and the father of the universe, and impossible, after having found him, to make him known to all the world."

of the mind (probably the latter, really and ultimately).*

But this is only the occasion of the development of the idea, it will not account for the attribute of necessity which we find in it.

(*b*) This idea is not merely that of the succession of phenomena conjoined by custom (Hume); for this does not account for its characteristics as universal and efficient. “Causa est ea quid efficit id cujus est causa.† Non sic causa intelligi debet, ut, quod cuique antecedit, id ei causa est, sed quod cuique efficienter antecedit.” (Cicero.)

(*c*) Nor is the idea that of invariable antecedent and consequent (Brown) for the same reason. There is between the two no power, says Brown, yet he is obliged to take refuge in a primitive belief to account for the idea. “We do not *see* power in external nature: yet we cannot but believe that it is there.” (Cousin on Locke.)

(*d*) Nor is the idea a generalization or induction from experience. We cannot conceive *any* event without cause.

(*e*) Nor is it (Hamilton) a form of the mental law of the conditioned. He says that we cannot conceive of an absolute commencement or an infinite non-commencement of things in time. The judgment of

* So Cousin. Maine de Biran makes the derivation of the idea to be: (1) act of will; (2) motion; (3) the relation of the two.

† The difference between *cause* and *occasion* may be illustrated by what occurs when a sluice of water is opened. The opening is the occasion of the water's running, but the cause is the weight of the water.

causality, he says, is this: any phenomenon which we perceive pre-existed under other forms, and this is the same as saying it had its causes. There is no "positive power," the cause of each and every phenomenon is "a negative impotence." "A general imbecility" accounts for all.

That is a curious doctrine of a great philosopher. He argues for it (1) from the law of parsimony; (2) that if we assume an express affirmation of intelligence for the position that existence cannot absolutely commence, we must also for the position that existence cannot infinitely not commence, which involves contradictories; we escape this by the theory of "limitation of our faculties"; (3) The other view affirms ultimately that there is no free causation; it has a pantheistic tendency, leaving no room for creation.

But against this lie the considerations: (1) that it does not explain the necessity of the conviction of causality; (2) that the whole true idea of causality is not given us in the position that the phenomenon pre-existed in other forms (*e.g.*, vital force, spontaneity, any new production of art); (3) the judgment of causality is, not that existence cannot absolutely commence, nor that it cannot absolutely not commence, but every change or event must have a cause.

(*f*) The true doctrine of causality is this, that for every event in time or succession there must be a pre-existent cause or causes, and this cause or these causes have direct efficiency in respect to that event.

(1) The judgment of causality is primitive and ultimate. We cannot conceive it to be otherwise.

(2.) It has the marks of necessity and universality.

(3.) The limitation given above "to successions in time" saves it from the antinomy which Hamilton puts upon it. (The statement also leaves room for the truth—God is uncaused.)

(g) The principle of causality also implies that every event and all events must have a sufficient cause or reason for being what they are.

This is but an amplification of the preceding. Whatever there is in the event or events must have a rational sufficiency in the cause to account for them. The cause must be adequate to the effect. This needs no further arguing.

This judgment* about causality is at the foundation of the cosmological argument in its leading principle.

NOTE.—There is a question coming up here, in respect to which the notion of causality needs to be further elaborated than has as yet been done. It is the question of the doctrine and law of causal resemblance, or how far must the cause resemble the effect?

Spinoza (*Ethica de Deo*, Prop. III.) says: "*Quæ res nihil commune inter se habent, earum una alterius causa esse non potest.*" (see also Axioms, iv. et v.) Coleridge (*Biog. Lit.*, i., 8) says: "The law of causality holds only between homogeneous things, *i. e.*, things having some common property," and "it cannot extend from one world into another, its opposite."

* It is a judgment of the reason. Its ground is not found in exterior, nor even in interior phenomena directly. Hickok *Rat. Psy.*, 302.

This is contested by Mill (Logic ii. 383); he says that Spinoza's doctrine would prove the materiality of God, and that Coleridge's leads to the result that "mind cannot act upon matter nor matter upon mind." *

The real problem in this matter comes up with the two contrasted extremes:

(1.) If the cause must contain all that is in the effect, then the cause of matter must be impenetrable and extended.

(2.) If the cause need not contain what is in (resembles) the effect, then the cause of designs need not be a designer, need not be of an intelligent order, need not be intelligent.

The materialist says: Matter may produce feeling, thought, etc.

The pantheist says: Unconscious spirit may produce conscious intelligence.

Here is where the question of doctrine, notion of causality, needs to be further elaborated.

The true position is that—

Nothing can be in the effect which is not potentially in the cause.

The cause must always be, in its nature and possibilities, superior to its effect.

II. The Cosmological Argument.

This is the connecting argument between the *a*

* In combating the position that nothing can be in the effect which is not in the cause, Mill objects, "If soups have pepper, the cook must be peppery." But "causes are *material*, formal, final, efficient." The efficient cause sets in motion, produces; the others give the materials, etc., for the product.

priori and *a posteriori* arguments. It contains elements of both. Beginning with the finite, it would lead to the infinite; from the relative to the absolute, from the fleeting to the necessary. (This—its true place—is not fairly grasped usually in the treatises on this subject.)

(1.) Statement of the argument.

The substance of the argument is this: that we are compelled to reason back from all finite and contingent events and relations to an adequate cause, a sufficient reason for them. The principle of the argument is given by Aquinas (from Aristotle) as: "Omnis motus fundatur in immobili."

The argument is from experience—from the data given in experience, but the principles lie back of experience. They are these: (a) Every event must have a cause; (b) There must be a sufficient reason (or cause) for all the series of events. On these two is based the conclusion: That sufficient reason can only be God.

In other words: All is in perpetual change; what was yesterday has produced what is to-day: so we go back, in perpetual regress, from effect to cause; and the mind cannot be satisfied by such regress, by a mere endless chain of causes; it demands to rest in a first cause—that is, God.

We have the idea of God (ontologically, *i. e.*, from our necessary view and recognition of Being; we *must* divide Being into derived and underived), and this regress of causes compels us to refer all the chain of events to him.

Leibnitz: "If we go back to infinity, we should

never find a *sufficient* reason* (a reason which did not demand a reason). This cannot be found in any particular, only in a general reason—in an universal intelligent author."

Another form in which the argument is sometimes given.—All that exists is contingent, by which is meant that it depends on something else out of itself. This is true of the whole universe so far as known. Consequently, there must be some self-existent, necessary being—the cause of all that is.

The further application of the above: (a) We cannot rest in an infinite series of causes, yet we must accept either this or an absolute and intelligent cause. (b) The world *is* an event, a course of results, a something which has come forth, eventuated, from a series of causes. This is proved (1) from the consideration that all that now is is the effect of what went before.† Yet, as already said, it cannot be that something has gone before in this succession from infinity, for this would be a series of changes without any *sufficient* reason. (2) History and Geology, it is said, show the same, as to parts, *i. e.*, show events which do not belong in any series of such, and which must be re-

* For "sufficient reason" see Thomson's *Laws of Thought*, 3d ed., p. 280.

† Stated—and overstated—by Hamilton. "When aware of a new appearance, we are utterly unable to conceive that therein has originated any new existence, and are therefore constrained to think that what now appears to us under a new form had previously existed under others. . . . The mind is thus compelled to recognize an absolute identity of existence in the effect and in the complement of its causes—between the *causatum* and the *causa*. . . . Each is the sum of the other."

ferred to a causality out of the line of successions. (But these do not prove the point as to the world as a whole.)

(2.) How far and what the cosmological argument proves upon the subject.

(a) It brings out the fact that the mind cannot rest satisfied with taking events as they are—that we must refer them to some ultimate ground further back.

(b) This ground must be an unconditioned source, viz., outside of the whole known universe. (Here we have the ontological element in the argument.)

(c) But it cannot by itself demonstrate the existence of a personal, intelligent cause of the events of time. It needs to be combined with the strict *a posteriori* arguments, the theological, etc.

(d) It says: *Either* an unconditioned source outside, *or* the infinite series within. Then the question remains—

(e) Why we exclude the *Infinite Series*.

The hypothesis of the Infinite Series is this: that the same series of causes and effects has existed eternally, and that that is a sufficient and an *ultimate* account of the causality and order of the universe. All that we have to deal with in the argument from effect to cause is sufficiently explained by what has occurred previously; we need nothing more than the causes operating in the sphere of our experience yesterday to account for all the effects we find to-day. The hypothesis rests on the notion of succession in time as being eternal.

It is an insufficient reply that the hypothesis gives

us a series of effects without cause, or of results without a beginning. Also, that as all the parts are contingent, we have in the whole only a universal contingency.

Remarks : (1.) We need not deny the *possibility* of such a succession in the abstract. But the *fact* of an eternal succession cannot be proved—not even eternal succession of time, much less of events. We grant that the eternal succession of time cannot be disproved; we say only, it cannot be proved.

(2.) The true position to take is, that the series does not do what it pretends to do. The object of it is to account for things *rationally*. Supposing it to account for the succession of events, it would not render any adequate solution of the main points in the argument; it would not conduct to a sufficient cause—to the existence of an ultimate, efficient causality, nor to any explanation of the intelligence and final causes in the series.

Hence the conclusion: (*a*) The series does not do what it pretends to do; (*b*) If it did, it would be only a bare possibility; while (*c*) God as cause, etc., corresponds to all our wants (intellectual * and other)—to our idea of Being.

§ 6. *The a posteriori argument for the Being of God from Marks of Design.* The Teleological or Physico-Theological Argument.

This is the simplest and readiest mode of argument; to the greater part of men, the most convincing. "It is the oldest, the clearest, and the most adapted to

* *I. e.*, the necessities of our thought. See *Apologetics*.

human reason. It animates the study of nature, just as it has its existence from this, and thence ever receives fresh force." (Kant.) "Things which exist for some useful purpose must be the production of intelligence." "Does it not seem like a work of forethought to guard the eye, since it is tender, with eyelids like doors, which, when it is necessary to use the sight, are set open, but in sleep are closed? To make the eyelashes grow as a screen, that winds may not injure them? To make a coping on the parts of the eyes above the eyebrows, that the perspiration from the head may not annoy them? To provide that the ear may receive all kinds of sounds, yet never be obstructed? And that the front teeth in all animals may be adapted to cut and the back teeth to receive food from them and grind it?" . . . "Does not this look like the work of some wise maker who studied the welfare of animals?" "Can all this [world] be maintained in order by something void of reason?" (Socrates. *Mem. Xen.* Bk. i. ch. 4., §§ 4-10.) Aristotle (*De Coelo*) says, neither deity nor nature does anything in vain (*μάρτην*).* Cicero (*de Divin. lib. ii.*): "Esse præstantem aliquam æternamque naturam, et eam suscipiendam admirandamque hominum generi, pulchritudo mundi ordoque rerum cœlestium cogit confiteri." (Lucretius, Bk. iv., 821-30 *seq.*, formally denies that the eye was made to see, ear to hear, tongue to talk, etc.—made and did so, but not *to* do so. Some modern objectors to teleology go back to about that.) Agassiz ("Premeditations Prior to

* Alex. von Humboldt harps on this.

Creation," the object of his Essay on Classification); "Natural History must, in good time, become the analysis of the thoughts of the Creator of the Universe, as manifested in the animal and vegetable kingdoms" (p. 135).

The order of discussion: I. The principles involved in the argument; II. The nature of the argument; III. Logical analysis of it; IV. Different branches of the argument; V. Consideration of objections.

I. *The principles involved in the argument.*

It is a *posteriori*, reasoning back from effects to cause.

It takes for granted three points: (*a*) That every event must have a cause, (*b*) must have an adequate cause, (*c*) that what shows marks of design must have an intelligent cause. The argument is thus made up of the preceding with an addition—viz.: (*c*) intelligent cause. This last, however, is an extension or appreciation of the principle (*b*), that every effect must have an adequate cause. It is proved by irresistible conviction. We cannot help believing it.

II. *The nature of the argument. What is design?*

Design is—final cause.*

"Four causes: material, formal, final, efficient."

A final cause is such an adaptation of means, or structure, to an end or object, as implies a pre-existing intelligence; a preadapted fitness to an end (or

* See Janet on Final Causes. Teleologische Grundgedanken, by C. S. Cornelius, in Z. f. exacte Phil. bd. i. 1861. Trendelenburg, Logische Untersuchungen. Gust. Schneider, De Causa finali Aristotelea, Berl. 1865.

"to a future event")*, in beings or agencies which could not of themselves have made this fitness.

The objection made by many to the whole doctrine of Final Causes: "there are no such," rests on the assumption that in nature all we can find are antecedents and consequents (cause and effect in this sense†); and that we are not warranted in going behind or before this succession, to seek either efficient or final causes.

But simple facts refute this. The seed, preadapted to the influences which caused it to germinate and grow. The embryo, adapted long beforehand to the new sphere of being. The eye to the light, and yet neither did the eye make the light, nor the light the eye.

The progress of the natural sciences has made design evident, *e. g.*, physiologists of almost all schools recognize this.‡ We cannot *define* or understand any organ, except in and by its use.

III. *Logical analysis of the argument.*

The syllogism. (1) Whatever exhibits marks of design (or "pre-conformity to a future event") implies an intelligent author; (2) the world exhibits such marks; (3) therefore, it has an intelligent author.

The 2d was formerly disputed, the 1st is now, most generally, by the opponents. Their objection

* Preferred by Janet.

† Huxley is driven back to the ground of Hume (see Huxley's Hume). To say, efficient cause will account for all, is not satisfactory to this school.

‡ Conceded by Mill, in the Three Essays.

is to the universality of the premise. How, then, shall this first premise be proved?

Sometimes a syllogism is framed thus : (1) In our experience, design implies intelligence ; (2) the course of nature is uniform ; (3) therefore, all cases of design prove intelligence. This is not satisfactory. The 2d statement, as taken for the purposes of this argument, may be disputed. Or, the argument may be put thus : (1) all similar effects have like causes ; (2) the universe is an effect "like" to such as we know by experience to be the work of intelligence ; therefore (3), it had an intelligent cause. It is the 2d of this syllogism which is disputed by Hume.

"The world is a singular effect. When two species of objects have always been conjoined, I can infer by custom the existence of the one, whenever I can see the existence of the other ; this I call an argument from experience. But here is a single case without parallel. We must have had experience of the origin of the world, to reach the conclusion."

The proper answer to Hume, and the required proof of the 1st premise (in the syllogism first stated above), is in the position that the principle : "The same causes, in the same circumstances, will produce the same effects," is a *rational* and not an inductive principle. The idea of causality requires that the affirmation be universal. The converse : "the same (or similar) effects must be assigned to the same (or similar) causes" gives the required proof. If there is intelligence in any product, there must be in its cause at least as much.

IV. *Different branches of the argument.*

All the sciences may here contribute—even the mental and moral.

But in the sciences there are very different points bearing on the main result. Thus, at least, these four : (1) special marks of intelligence in the particulars ; (2) combinations of the particular in general arrangements ; (3) unity of type ; (4) unity of the whole.

(1.) Specialties in the particulars. (Paley, *Natural Theology* ; *Bridgewater Treatises* ; especially, *Bell on the Hand*). Thus, in the whole range of anatomy and physiology, the structure of the eye, the ear, the arm, and hand, etc. And this through all the vegetable as well as the animal kingdom. Even in the inorganic world, the mineral has its adaptations of structure, etc.

(2.) Combined arrangements. The inorganic is related to the organic, the vegetable to the animal, the animal kingdom to man. In man all the lower is combined, he is the crown of creation. Each lower kingdom of nature furnishes the base, and gives contributions to all the higher.

In the inorganic world, where fixed mathematical laws prevail, "God geometrizes." La Place (*System of the World*, bk. v. C. 6).

The largest bodies of the solar system move in the same direction, and in planes not much inclined to the elliptic—this gives stability. "Given the several bodies of the system, it is demonstrable that the chances are as millions of millions to one against its being the result of chance." Cooke (*Religion of Chemistry*,* *Graham Lectures*, 1864).

* See article in *N. Brit. Rev.*, Oct., 1857, on the Atomic Hypothesis of Dr. John Dalton.

(3.) Unity of the type. Owen: "Certain jointed bones in a whale's paddle are the same bones which, in the mole, enable it to burrow, which, in the bat, enable it to fly, and in man make the hand with its wealth of functions."

Unity of type and special adaptations do not exclude each other.

Wherever life exists, there is a preconceived *idea*. This is particularly exemplified in organism; organism cannot be deduced from the general properties of matter.

(4.) Unity of the whole. Science is ever seeking to approximate to this. Humboldt's *Kosmos*. Yet, see hint in Ed. Rev. 1858: the real "Unity of Science," "Unity of Law," "Unity of Principle," of which so much is now said (Powell, after Humboldt, etc.), does not represent any actual knowledge.* The sought for unity can be found only in the idea of God as the center and source of nature; we reach it only in that one sublime sense of the unity of the divine creating power.

V. *Consideration of Difficulties and Objections.*

(1.) Objected, that instinct might account for the apparent design. *E.g.*, in the cell of the bee and the dam of the beaver we see "design," "adaptation of present circumstances to a future event," but we do not believe the animal to be an intelligent designer.

But, (*a*) The blind instinct does not account for the intelligent result—as intelligent. To get at an

* 'Tis an assumed "metaphysical background" to knowledge. See Apologetics, article "Evolution" in the appendix.

adequately intelligent cause, we go back to one who made the bee and its instincts. This is necessary. Only thus do we reach the *sufficient* reason.

(2.) Objected, that the argument does not prove a creation of matter; that besides design, we need and must have a *begun* design, one which we can show not to have pre-existed in finite causes.

But if all design does not prove, require, an intelligent author, then, *begun* design would not: there might still be a blind cause, instinct *supposed* behind.

The argument proves creation of matter so far as this—so far as there is any design or arrangement in the most primitive forms of matter. What is matter to begin with, if it has no “laws” of chemical affinity, gravity, etc.?

(3.) Objected, that the argument does not give an absolute, creating cause. (Kant.) It does not give anything more than an intelligence equal to the effects. (J. S. Mill.)* But, “if all the world is contingent, the cause must be absolute. . . . If the matter of the world is absolute, so must be the arranging cause. . . . If all in the world is means and end, then the world must have been created.”†

(4.) Objected, that the argument suggests a false analogy. The works of men have an end outside of themselves; but the world has not. (Hegel.) “But, *c. g.*, works of art have not the end outside.” (Janet.)

* Mill seems to think that the imperfections of the world *prove* limitations in God's intelligence and power. He makes the theodicy by saying, God does the best he can.

† Janet, account of his Lectures, in Rev. Chrét., 1863, p. 243; also, his book on Final Causes.

(5.) Objected, that God's majesty is lowered by being made to think and act like man. But in the Hegelian system, he is made to be a blind, unconscious force; is that any higher?

(6.) Objected, that the validity of the argument can be made good only in the disclosure of a sufficient end of the whole system of things. The discernment of *ends* within the system is not enough; we must have *the* end. This would lead to the position that we must know all things before we can be certain of knowing anything. Besides, in the Christian revelation, the "end of all"—the glory of God in the blessedness of intelligent beings—is fully disclosed.

(7.) Objected, that the mind naturally slips into the notion of an *infinite* cause, which the existence of a finite universe does not warrant.

This action of the mind is a remarkable fact; it simply shows that the mind naturally recognizes more than this single argumentation gives. We cannot, and do not, by induction of the finite, come to the infinite. The infinite is foreshadowed within the mind; we prove, a posteriori, the intelligence of the infinite Being, and so we "slip into" (or better—grasp) the notion of the infinite, intelligent cause.

§ 7. *The A Posteriori Argument from our Mental and Moral Constitution and from the Moral Order of the World.*

(Cf. Hamilton, *Metaphs.*—Proof only of conscious, moral intelligence. Chalmers, in *Bridgewater Treatises.*)

I. From our Constitution.

(1.) Mental. (a) The mind, with its faculties and powers, requires an adequate author, one capable of knowing and creating mind. (b) The mind has eternal and necessary truths in itself, and finds the highest laws and principles, corresponding to these, in operation; hence, an adequate author—a Supreme Intelligence—a Mind over all—is required. Another form (Fénélon): “I have the idea of the infinite, etc. I could not have generated this idea. . . . There must be an infinite being, who gave me such an idea.” (c) From the mind, we have the notion of personal, conscious intelligence. The question here arises, *What is Personality?* We know it only from our own consciousness. Every act of intelligence involves these three elements: self, not-self, and an intimate connection between the two. Some hold that the knowledge of self is not direct, but inferred from phenomena, but it *is* direct, if anything is. Self-consciousness and personality are nearly synonyms. It is indefinable, because ultimate. That being has personality which can say “I” distinctly. We say that God is such a Being: (1) Because we cannot conceive a being, a spirit and substance, the cause of all things, including an intelligent plan (and a moral order to be considered), which has not personality. (2) If the cause of personal Being is not itself personal, there will be more in the effect than in the cause, which is inconceivable. (3) This Being, as an intelligent spirit (result of the teleological argument), must also be personal. But, it is objected, personality is necessarily finite; in the infinite, absolute Being, personality is excluded, by the

very idea of such an one. We reply: (1) *Our* personality is finite, because we are limited by time and space. (2) There is nothing in the idea of personality which makes it necessarily finite. Personality is not to be made equivalent to individuality and limited to time and space. It is self-consciousness, to which the sense of limitation and distinction of self from a not-self is *not* necessary.* (3) Though there may be in the infinite Being a modification of self consciousness, which is not found in finite beings, yet (4) there is nothing in the idea of the absolute and infinite which is inconsistent with exalted personality. The absolute must not be taken to mean: "that which is *completed*"—made up, and the infinite: "that which cannot be completed." The absolute is that which *is complete*—not, which is completed; the infinite is not (as Hamilton holds) its contrary; but is in *essence* the same as the absolute. The absolute, positively viewed, is that which is complete in itself; viewed more negatively, as that which is *absolved* from all restriction, limitation, imperfection, it *is* the infinite. And thus understood, there is no contradiction between the absolute and personality. Rather, the true absolute and infinite are found only in the personal God. (See Hickok's Rational Cosmology.)

(2.) Our Moral Constitution.

(a) There is an adaptation between man's moral

* We have no right to say that the absolute Being is self-conscious only as he distinguishes between himself and a possible not-self, which might exist through creation.

nature and external relations. Whence is this if not from the supreme ordainer? *

(b) We have the idea of right—whence, if not from one in whom the idea has its original seat? †

(c) We have the sense of obligation which implies responsibility—and to whom?

II. From the Moral Order of the World.

(a) Here, then, is a moral government going on, ‡ hence there must be a moral ruler. Abstract right is not enough. The facts require belief in a moral government and governor, even if only “a power without us, not ourselves, which makes for righteousness.” Here the argument from the retributions of history (different from the “historical argument” for the Being of God, *i.e.*, the proof that men naturally believe in a Supreme Being).

(b) In this moral government we find that right and happiness are unequal. Virtue is unrewarded and vice unpunished. Right and happiness should be equalized. (Happiness *in* right, not *from* right, as though the idea of right is completed only in happiness, is all the necessity.) This proves that the moral

* This involved in all the argument of Butler's Analogy.

† Cicero defines conscience: “Deus regnans in nobis.” Abelard (Theol. Chr. v. p. 1350. ed. Martene) quoted as the first(?) instance of proof of the Being of God from conscience: “Quam honestum vero sit ac salubre omnia ad unum optimum tam rectorem quam conditorem spectare, et cuncta potius ratione quam casu fieri seu regi, nullus est cui *proprie ratio* non suggerat *conscientiae*.”

‡ Butler, in Analogy. Butler's position: *Notwithstanding* the confusion in the world, there is abounding proof of a moral ordering; Kant's: *On account* of the confusion in the world, we must assume a moral governor to rectify it.

government is to be consummated by and by. This is Kant's argument for a moral governor and immortality. We can say, It proves that moral government is to be consummated; without saying, It is the only proof of the existence of a moral governor.

III. Objections.

(1.) From the Pantheistic school.

(a) To the mental argument. It is said that the *idea* of ultimate truth will cover the case. The ultimate may be ideas of abstract truth, and not a personal conscious intelligence. But we cannot conceive of ideas existing apart from a mind. And a mere idea could never bring a mind into being.

(b) To the moral argument. It is said that our moral ideas can be satisfied by the conception of a universal moral order, and that though the argument drives to a moral law, it does not to a moral law-giver (Fichte's early position). But a moral law is inconceivable without a moral law-giver. The universal moral order must inhere in a conscious mind. (Fuller discussion of this important point belongs to the refutation of pantheism.)

(2) From the Materialist. (See discussion of Materialism, p. 124).

(3) From the Pantheistico-Materialists (Evolutionists). (See outline of lectures on Evolution in the *Apologetics*, p. 170.)

§ 8. *Summary and Combination of the Two Great Classes of Proofs, the A Priori and A Posteriori.*

(1.) Summary.

(a) The ontological or a priori argument proves from our necessary ideas that there is a being neces-

sarily existent, an infinite, spiritual (not as yet proved personal) Being, the adequate and absolute cause of all that exists beyond itself (this the cosmological aspect or "moment" of the argument).

(*b*) The various forms of the *a posteriori* argument mutually support each other. They are successive enlargements of our idea of the First Cause.

The cosmological (resting on the ontological) gives a prime substance, the ultimate cause of phenomena, itself independent and uncaused.

The teleological gives an intelligence, a rational designer, pre-existing before all the forms of creation, and adequate to all the effects found in the universe.

The mental (or anthropological) and moral shows that the author of man must be himself a mind, and that in this intelligent substance and cause, which is also personal mind, there is also inherent rectitude, he is the source and adjudicator of moral order in the universe.

(2.) The combination. What warrants us in making it? How do we know that the infinite substance is the same as the intelligent, personal, moral, Being? *

(*a*) The law of parsimony, which will not permit us to predicate more ultimate causes than are necessary.

(*b*) The one common idea in both which links them together, the idea of *cause*. By the *a posteriori*

* Kant is against all the forms of argumentation, as taking for granted, silently assuming, what is supposed to be proved. This only so far as infinitude and personality. Hegel views them all as different explications of our fundamental idea of God.

we ascend. By the a priori we descend. The law of causality is the leader in each case, and they meet in one Being, the cause of all things.

§ 9. *The Anti-Theistic Theories.*

These may be classified as pantheism, materialism, and evolution.*

[Pantheism and Evolution are considered in the Apologetics. An outline of the discussion of materialism is given here.] I. The materialistic position.

II. Criticism of it.

I. The Materialistic Philosophy.

Diderot carried out the philosophy of Locke to atheistic results. It is only within the present century that this system has come to definite philosophical statements. Comte has developed the most entirely materialistic system of philosophy, based on the principle that *all* knowledge is from induction.

The position is, that by matter and its modifications, all phenomena can be explained. That which is *ultimate* is matter, it is the first and principle of all things. (*Dualism*† makes both matter and spirit ultimate. Christian dualism affirms the reality of the infinite spirit and the finite universe, and ascribes the one to the causality of the other.) The theory is that Matter Is (in opposition to the claim, The Supernatural Is‡), and from matter all proceeds. All facts can be explained by matter and material forces.

* Deism comes under the general head of theism. It grants the *existence* of God, "affirming his absolute transcendence, and denying to him any immanence in the world."

† *I. e.*, Philosophical Dualism.

‡ See the first position in the Apologetics.

II. Criticism.

(For the sake of the argument we waive the question as to whether we know what matter is.)

If matter is the ultimate principle, we may from it develop everything else.

Either everything is the product of matter or materialism is not proved, it is disproved.

(A.) What, then, materialism has to show :

(1.) It must show that from matter can be deduced all the powers and forces of nature, as magnetism, light, gravity, or that matter eventuates in these forces.

(2.) It must show that the principle of life is also a modification of matter, and also the principle of organization, *nisus formativus*. The idea of an organizing faculty must be deduced.

(3.) It must show that the soul, with all its faculties, is a product of matter ; as also all that the soul produces—art, science, law, etc.

(4.) It must show that all knowledge, all truth, all ideas are simple inductions from material facts and phenomena, that all knowledge is a modification of sensation.

(5.) That the material world has the ground and end of its existence in itself—that there is no power above it, producing it, and no end for which it was made—that irrational power is sufficient to produce all there is in the world.

(6.) That the moral law, so-called, is nothing more than a modification of the sequence of phenomena, not a binding law given from above.

(7.) That God is merely a name for this ultimate matter, and that there is really *no* God.

If materialism fails to deduce any of these things from matter the entire system fails. It no longer can claim to be ultimate.

(B.) Materialism cannot establish these propositions.

(1.) The fundamental principle is a rational hypothesis,* and not a materialistic fact or principle. In the very statement of the argument the theory contradicts itself. "Matter generates all." But what is this matter? It is a rational idea, the substratum underlying all phenomena. No one ever saw it or felt it. It is cognizable only by the reason. Abstract nature is something not coming within the ken of the senses. If it is a force, who has ever seen a force? *Reason* then gives us the principle, and not the *senses*.

This theory affirms thus, at the start, an ultimate truth, pretended to be derived by induction from phenomena.

(2.) It is also refuted by its own assumptions. Its notion of matter must be broad enough to include all phenomena; for there can be no more in the effect than in the cause. What sort of matter is that which has personality, thought, feeling, religious ideas, science, etc.? It may be *called* matter, but it is no such thing.

(3.) It cannot prove that the laws or forces of nature are necessarily the product of sheer matter. Nature, in its ultimate analysis, is one of three things: atoms producing forces; or, forces producing

* Assumed "metaphysical background." Apologetics, App.

atoms; or, the two combined. Materialism assumes the first, as either of the other two would destroy its position. It must start with atoms. But forces exist *with* the atoms (if they do not produce them), and thus we have something at the outset which is not matter.

(4.) The materialistic hypothesis cannot explain the phenomena of life, neither the animal organism, nor the life which results from it.

(a) It cannot explain an organic body. Take the humblest plant. One life runs through its parts. There is something more in it than atoms and general forces of nature. What modification of bare matter can give us a *type*?

(b) Still less can it deduce the principles of life from the organism. The reason is, life is simple, organism complex. The simple cannot be deduced from the complex. The complex comes from the simple.

(5.) Even if materialism could deduce all that precedes, *soul* could not be shown to be a modification of matter.

(a) The most simple phenomenon of the soul, as conscious intelligence, is *personal identity*, which is given whenever there are two states of mind to be compared, the soul recognizing itself as the same in both. If the soul be material, it is the brain acting. But the brain is an aggregate or complexity of organs, to which, therefore, strict unity does not belong. But strict unity does belong to the soul, as is seen in the consciousness of personal identity. Hence, the soul cannot be derived from the brain.

(b) Thought, and feeling cannot be explained as secretions of the brain, or as products of it, in any way.

(c) Still less can will or choice be derived from brain. In choice we are conscious of powers above the material world.

(6.) Materialism cannot derive all knowledge from matter.

(a) Even in sensation, there is more than matter can give. It implies soul as well as body. Matter can give certain material impressions, but not the feeling of those impressions.

(b) Perception, as usually defined, involves a conscious distinction between *self* and the object perceived (which distinction is not necessary in sensation). Self cannot be derived from not-self.

(c) The existence of any necessary truth is fatal to materialism. Matter can give nothing but what is fluctuating and contingent. If materialism were true, there would be no axioms or laws of logic. Axioms precede all induction, which is conducted in accordance with them.

(7.) If there be any final or efficient causes, materialism cannot be true. A final cause supposes a wise author of the world. An efficient cause supposes a power above that which it produces. Organization shows final cause,* and the efficient cause is necessary to satisfy the reason.

(8.) If there be any absolute right, materialism

* The sagacity of Paley (Natural Theology) in conducting the argument from this position, is vindicated by the latest and ablest writers. Final Causes (Janet).

cannot be true. It can admit no right beyond a comparison of sensations, as more or less pleasurable. Any law of duty is quite inconsistent with materialism.

(9.) Materialism must deny any ultimate cause or end of the universe out of itself. If the universe indicates a source lying behind it and a goal before it, materialism is a failure.

(10.) The idea of matter is one of the most difficult to explain. We know mind more directly and certainly than we do matter, being directly conscious of mind, in every act of perception. In the proposition: "I know matter," is given (*a*) The knowing I; (*b*) The act of knowing; (*c*) *Matter*, an idealistic conception, about which we know less than we do about either of the others.

NOTE.—The following points should be treated in a full discussion of Natural Theology:

I. The proof of the existence of one personal God, and of his attributes.

II. So much of the providential and moral government of God, as may be inferred from the light of nature.

III. Our duties, so far as seen from the light of nature.

IV. The exposition of our destiny under God's moral government, including our immortality.

V. The showing that man needs another and a higher revelation than the light of nature.

In an introduction to Christian Theology, however, we may best confine ourselves to I. and V. We proceed, then, to

§ 10. *Where natural theology leaves us.*

The need of a revelation.

I. In what sense revelation is needed.

(1.) It is not needed :

(a) To teach truths about nature and physics, astronomy, geology, etc.

(b) Not needed to give us the necessary ideas on which reason and philosophy rest.

(c) Nor to give all moral truth. Man can know much without, as we see in Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and in some precepts of Confucius.

(d) Not to furnish evidence of the being and general perfections of God. This is pre-supposed.

(e) Not needed to secure religious and moral responsibility. Rom. i., 19-24.

But, (2.) needed :

(a) To give us a perfect system of morals, on the authority of a supreme moral governor, so as to make the system complete, and our responsibility direct to God ; to give the perfect form of ethical truth. Only here is *love*, the supreme principle—love to God and men—in a real ethical system.

(b) To give correct views of God, the absolute truth about his nature, being, and perfections, in an authentic form.

(c) To give us the key, the clue, the solution to the great problems of philosophy and morals : First, To give absolute assurance on the ground of testimony to what is probable on grounds of reason and conscience, on two specific points—immortality and judgment ; second, To meet man's needs as a sinner, by offering him redemption (showing his real condi-

tion under God's government, and offering salvation in Jesus Christ.

(*d*) To reveal some truths which man could not otherwise know, such as the Trinity, the Incarnation.

(*e*) To vindicate the divine character and government.

(*f*) To give the highest efficacy and influence to moral and religious truth. They had not this before. They never had it under heathenism, nor would they under deism. Rousseau said (to the Encyclopædists): "Philosophy can do nothing which Religion cannot do better than she; and Religion can do a great many other things which Philosophy cannot do at all."

II. The proof of such need.

It is partly involved in the preceding statements.

(1.) The state of the heathen world in the times of Abraham and Moses. "Darkness covered the earth, and gross darkness the peoples." (See "The Primeval Mythology, by Schelling and Schlegel.)

(2.) The state of the world at the time of the coming of Christ. See the pictures in Tacitus. Varro refers to the 300 discordant opinions. The choice of the thoughtful lay between Epicurianism and Stoicism, *i. e.*, between a somewhat disguised and an undisguised despair. (See Neander's vigorous sketch.) The popular beliefs included some 50,000 gods. The officers of religion "could not meet without laughing." Civilization in its highest forms rested upon the degradation of enormous masses of untaught slaves.

(3.) The present state of the heathen world where the Gospel is not known is similarly dark, and proves the same need.

(4.) "Natural religion" is not natural, and, such as it is, is never sufficient. The religions which are really native among unenlightened men are very different from the deistical systems of so-called natural religion, framed in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries,* and these latter are insufficient to secure the ends of religion even with their devisers. Herbert asserted that "lust was to be blamed no more than hunger;" Bolingbroke, that morality was but selfishness; Hume, that self-denial is mischievous.

(5.) Philosophy could give no help.

(a) It could not have availed for all, or for many, even if it had been clear and certain.

(b) All was confusion and discord in the schools.

(c) No school had absolute truth upon the highest problems. There was no certainty.

(d) The light in the best was as darkness. With Plato, the body is the opposite of the soul and in thought and philosophy is the only cure of evil. No real internal change was seen by him as the prime necessity. With Aristotle the "virtues" were simply human and heroic, and were confined necessarily to a few; while the most must be given up to sense and vileness.† (Politics xi., 4.) Seneca‡ says: "Beatae

* The name of "Deist" first applied in 1565; the first Deist of note, Herbert of Cherbury, 1624.

† A German writer says: "That the progress of Christianity at the first was slow in Germany, because *there were few slaves there.*" What would Aristotle have thought of that?

‡ And this was the practical result after all the "Pauline" utterances which are found in Seneca: *e. g.*, "Quos probat Deus, quos amat, eos indurat, recognoscit, exercet." (De Provid. c. i.) Comp. with Heb. xii., 6, 7.

vitae causa et firmamentum est, sibi fidere. Quid votis opus est? Fac te felicem: exurge et te dignum finge Deo." (Ep. 31.)

Where in all heathendom is found the desire for Redemption, Holiness, Love?

The Stoics put love among the natural affections which are to be subdued.

The "likeness to God," which Plato made the aim of "Religion," was a likeness in knowledge merely.

(*c*) Moral systems were ineffectual upon their own grounds, and were altogether incompetent to meet the great question of sin.

(*f*) The most important light and truth which men now have in respect to the highest themes can be traced to this revelation. This shows the need of it. Men have never got beyond it. Blot out the light from Sinai and Calvary—what is left?

CHAPTER IV.

REVELATION, THE COMPREHENSIVE AND AUTHORITY- TATIVE SOURCE OF THEOLOGY.

"THE EVIDENCES OF CHRISTIANITY."

§ 1. *General Considerations.*

(1.) The evidences embrace all that goes to show that Christianity is a positive divine revelation, and is the perfect form of religion. (Bp. Butler, Anal., Pt. II., c. vii. "The Evidence of Christianity is—a long series of things—reaching from the beginning of the world to the present time—of great variety and compass—taking in both the direct and collateral proofs—and making up together one argument; the conviction arising from which may be compared with what is called the effect in architecture or other works of art; a result from a great number of things so and so disposed, and taken into one view.")

(2.) The nature of the Evidences.

(a) They are moral—probable, yielding certainty. They cannot be mathematical, for it is not a mathematical truth we are after; nor demonstrative, in the sense of a priori deduction. (See the Prefatory Observations to the argument for the Being of God, in regard to the nature and kinds of evidence.)

(b) The evidence is moral in another sense—that

Christianity is adapted to our moral wants, and we must feel those in order to feel its full evidence. Faith in Christianity is not merely intellectual, but moral. The evidence does not compel assent against the will, but with the will. The sense of need is necessary, as also the sense of God's government and rightful authority. The evidence might be higher in some aspects, but could not be more complete in all. More evidence might conflict with the right reception of Christianity as adapted to moral wants. (The question arises, Whether men are responsible for their belief.* It must be answered: Wherever belief is dependent upon a moral state, or has reference to moral wants—there we are responsible. Men may and do shut their eyes to the evidence.)

(c) The evidence is rational, it stands on grounds of reason—not of faith, excepting in a general sense of faith. It includes the Scriptural evidence, but not as inspired, simply as a part of history. Reason is not all delusive; if it were, we could not have any evidence at all of truth.

(d) The evidence is in part historical. Historical view is, a view of an event not as a bare fact, but in its chronological relations—geographical position—its political, ecclesiastical, social, moral, spiritual bearings—and its connection with the highest interests of the race and with the realization of the kingdom of God.†

* See Pres. Hopkins, *Lectures on the Evidences*, and *Princeton Essays*, Vol. I.

† See *Nature and Worth of the Science of Church History*, in the vol. "Faith and Philosophy," p. 49.

(e) The evidence is cumulative, part supporting part. It is such as increases with each century and even with each individual. *E. g.*, In the historical evidence, the benign influence of Christianity is a grand source of evidence; and in the philosophical evidence, the victory over pantheistic objections, increasing the sum of proofs.

(3.) *Outline of the Argument.*

The object is to prove that Christianity is from God, and is the perfect form of religion.

Introductory: 1. The Possibility of a Revelation.

2. The Necessity of a Revelation.

Part I. Historical Proof that it has been given in the Christian Religion.

1. Of Christ.

2. Of the Apostles and their Testimony.

3. Of Miracles and Prophecies.

4. Of the Scriptures as containing the record.

5. Of the Diffusion of Christianity.

Part II. That this Religion is the highest, the perfect religion.

1. Philosophy of Religion, historically.

2. Philosophy of Religion, speculatively.

3. Philosophy of Religion as the center of all history.

Part III. The argument from the practical effects.

§ 2. *Introductory:*

(*The basis of the argument.*)

The Possibility of a Revelation.

By a revelation is meant, the communication from God to man of divine and needed truth, through

authentic agents. Its source is supernatural, *i. e.*, it is above nature—*i. e.*, it is from God.

By revelation is not meant here the natural revelation in the works of God, nor in reason, nor in conscience; but

That which is original from God, and supernatural. All the agencies need not be supernatural, but the source must be.

It may comprise what is revealed in nature and reason; it must not conflict with it; but it must also give more.

I. Such a revelation—is possible.

1. It involves no contrariety to any known truth to suppose it to be made. No truth of reason is contradicted by it. There is nothing from the laws of nature, nothing from human reason or conscience to be urged against the possibility.

2. It is possible, so far as God is concerned, *i. e.*, His Being and general perfections being proved. Such a being, the author of nature, sustaining and governing it, may well be supposed able to interfere, to communicate himself in other ways, through and above the powers and agencies which he has established. To suppose that he could not do this, is to suppose what contradicts the divine omnipresence and the dependence of the world on him.

The prejudice against the possibility of a revelation rests solely on the ground that God is only the first in a series of necessary causes—is a part of fate—without will, or rational and conscious ends. This is the materialistic, pantheistic, and deistic view. As soon as the world is viewed, not as a complex of nat-

ural causes, but as a moral order and state, with a moral governor, the main objection to a positive revelation disappears. The natural is less than the moral. Leibnitz has put this admirably: "In miracles nothing is changed but natural facts which, in their very nature, are contingent, and hence may be changed; and since they are established by God, may be modified by an act of the divine will. Miracles only interfere with natural necessity; this has no eternal truth and reality; and hence no miracle can be against reason, but only *above* it; it may surpass experience, but not contradict reason."

Nature is under physical necessity.

A miracle is an act in the moral sphere.

The physical is under and for the moral.

3. It is possible so far as man is concerned; *i. e.*, man can receive, test, and know a revelation. It involves no contradiction to any truth respecting *man* and his *powers*; there is no antecedent probability, as far as human nature goes, against such a revelation.

Here it may be considered:

(a) That man has always believed in the possibility, because in the actuality of a revelation; the possibility having been presupposed. Man is inclined to expect supernatural communications.

(b) Man has such powers that he can test the evidence of the revelation; experience, reason, moral needs, the sense of what it is befitting God to do (to a sufficient extent).

(c) The true idea of man is that he was made for God, and as such, a revelation is possible to him. Man is essentially made for religion.

(d) That man can know something of God, through nature and reason and conscience, leads to the same inference. If he can receive a revelation in those ways, why not in other ways?

(e) The argument **against** the possibility of man's **receiving** a revelation, can be framed only on the basis of a materialistic, unspiritual philosophy.

II. Such a revelation is needed.

This can be discussed, either as the last topic in Natural Theology, or as one of the first in Historical Apologetics (or the evidences). We have preferred to treat it as the last under Natural Theology. (p. 130.)

§ 3. *The Historical Proof, or Historical Apologetics.**

I. *Outline of the argument.*

1. The Christian religion and church are now in the world, historically established, wider spread than any other, the source of constant blessings, leading the way in all beneficence. The Christian is the best, most prosperous, most advancing system extant.

2. This church can be traced historically, through each century (19th to 18th, to 17th, 16th, 15th, etc.), back to the beginning of the second, the close of the first century; and through the whole period we find the same faith, centering in Christ, and the same records.

3. This church rests for its foundation on Christ, as having revealed God's will and made redemption for sin—*i. e.*, on supernatural facts which centre in the person and work of Jesus Christ.

* See Apologetics, p. 10.

4. The Christian Church has the books of the Old and New Testament—so called—which all centre in and refer to Christ and the redemption accomplished through him.

5. The Scriptures of the New Testament were composed by Apostles of Christ, or those immediately connected with them; and were extant in the last half of the first, and received through the second and subsequent centuries, as authentic testimonies to the facts recorded.

6. These Scriptures were composed by men who, from the nature of the case, could not be deceived—and who testify to the reality of the facts centering in the person and work of Christ.

7. In attestation and confirmation of these facts, *miracles* were wrought by Christ and his Apostles, testifying of the reality of their mission and religion.

8. The coming of Christ, as such a divine herald, as well as many other historic facts, was foretold, prefigured in the Scriptures of the Old Testament (which were received by Christ and the Apostles). And the argument from *prophecy* is thus added to the argument from miracles.

The Scriptures of the Old Testament also show and prove that this same system, in an inchoate, preparatory state, has been in the world from the beginning.

9. These records exhibit as the great central object, the person and character of Christ, and *he testifies* to the reality of his divine mission and work.

10. Conclusion. It is impossible that such a religion, centering in such a person as Christ, with such

witnesses as the Apostles, such a result as the Christian Church, attested by miracles, prophesied, existing in germ from the beginning, should be other than a religion from God.

On historical grounds of argument and testimony, the proof is complete.

When added to the proof from the need of a revelation (already given), and the "Internal Evidence," the proof from the beneficent effects, etc. (to be given), it amounts to a moral demonstration.

The only other supposition is that man, in his highest interests, is unprovided for, unsatisfied; that history is all a falsehood; that there is no absolute truth in history, that it rests altogether upon credulity and fraud. The supposition must be, that fraudulent collusion runs through the whole history of mankind.

[NOTE.—In the following outline of the evidences, it is not proposed to dwell upon all the points named above, but to select only the most important.]

A few words should be added as to the nature of the evidence which proves *historically* that Christianity is a religion from God.

The evidence, here, is primarily historic testimony, or testimony to outward, duly attested, historical facts.

Christianity presents itself not as a system of philosophy, not as a speculation, but as a series of divine facts, in the course of human history, introduced by divine supernatural agency.

This is one of the strongholds of the Christian system.

The testimony is not merely from the sacred Scriptures, but from other contemporary and subsequent sources. The Scriptures are a *part*—the central part—of a whole body of evidence. (See Leslie's Four Rules, in his Method with the Deists.)

II. *The Person and Work of Christ form the central part of the historical argument for the truth of Christianity.**

Christianity stands or falls with the Person of Christ.

All its evidences centre in Him.

The living, vital centre of Christianity is in Him.

Faith rests in Him—only in the faith which reaches to Him is there eternal life; that which rests in abstract truth has no such boon; “grace and truth came by Jesus Christ.”

The history of the Church and of the world centres in Him.

If Christ be what he claims to be, Christianity must be from God.

It is incredible and impossible that his life should be a fiction. Accordingly he must be true and his religion divine.

(1.) Christ's personal character is unlike that of all other men in its perfection. (See Ullmann's Sinlessness of Jesus.) The harmony and combination of

* See P. Schaff, *Bibl. Sac.*, 1860; Bushnell's *Character of Christ*; P. Bayne's *Testimony of Christ to Christianity*, 1862; Alexander's *Christ and Christianity*; Young's *Historical Argument*; Ullmann's *Sinlessness of Jesus*; Hopkins's *Lectures on the Evidences* Lect. viii.; Rogers *vs.* Newman, in *The Eclipse of Faith and Defence*; Taylor's *Mor. Demonstration*, in Brown's *Theol. Tracts*, vol. ii.

traits exalt every single characteristic. In the perfection of his humanity there is more than any human mind has grasped, yet it does not fail to extort from all, even from unbelievers, a measure of appreciation.

Strauss has called him "the greatest religious genius in history." Renan has said: "He can never be replaced by a superior ideal;" "all ages shall proclaim him the greatest of mankind;" "his worship shall be perpetually rejuvenated." Hegel finds "the turning-point of history in Christ." Emerson has confessed that "alone in all history Jesus estimated the greatness of man." Theodore Parker said: "Jesus is the highest fact in our story, the greatest achievement of the human race." Miss Cobbe calls him "the helper and (in the highest philosophic sense) the Saviour of humanity," "the greatest soul of his time, or of all time," "who opened the age of endless progress." Rousseau* said: "The Gospel exhibits characteristics of truth, so great, so striking, and so perfectly inimitable, that its inventor would be more marvelous than its hero." Spinoza, speaking on Prophecy,† said; "Of him [Christ] I hold, that we are able to judge that he perceived things immediately, adequately, truly; for Christ, though he also appears to have enunciated laws in the name of God, was not so much a prophet as he was the mouth of God. . . . Standing as the substitute of God, he accommodated himself to the capacity of

* Emile, Liv. iv.

† Tractatus Theologico-Polit., Eng. transl., 1862, pp. 97-8.

the vulgar, and spoke more clearly than the prophets generally had done."

(2.) Christ's life is the most marvelous on record. In his life and his death he stands alone. He is just such a pattern and model as man needs. If all men were Christ-like, what could be imagined for humanity fairer or greater?

The best that Paganism could present in comparison with him was Apollonius of Tyana.*

(3.) He claimed to be from God; to be the prophesied Messiah: his claim was attested by miracles.

Prophecy and miracle meet in him as in no other. Taylor says: "He was described by infallible characteristics, which did fit him and did not fit any but him."

The precision and the distinct fulfillment of the prophecies that meet in Christ may be compared with the vagueness and futility of other predictions. *E. g.* Suetonius says, of the birth of Augustus, that before his time it was reported that "nature was then in labor to bring forth a king that should rule the Romans," which Virgil explains of prophecies concerning *the race of the gods*: thus

"Hic vir, hic est tibi quem promitti sæpius audis
Augustus Cæsar, Divi genus; aurea condet
Sæcula qui rursus Latio, regnata per arva
Saturno quondam." (*Æn.* vi. 791.)

* See Baur. Also, Bulfinch, *Chr'n Exam.* Mar. 1868. The Life of Apollonius was written by Philostratus, at the request of Julia Domina, Empress of Alex. Severus (†235). Philostratus had materials purporting to come from Damis, a companion of Apollonius. Apollonius was born about the same time as Christ, and this "Life" was issued, A.D. 217. Porphyry and Jamblichus propose him as Christ's rival.

This was not realized in Augustus, but when Augustus's wife, Scribonia, was pregnant, Virgil, in *Ecl.* iv., ascribed to the coming child all that the Sibylline verses proclaimed of the coming great king; but Scribonia's child was not a *male*.*

(4.) Christ claimed and received personal love and faith as the giver of salvation. The claim, if not just, was utterly blasphemous.

(5.) All the great doctrines of Christianity, as a system of Redemption, centre in him. Atonement, Justification, Regeneration, the complete Redemption.

(6.) All history centres in him.† (See above.)

(7.) The church founded in his name has been the only kingdom that has had perpetuity in human affairs.

(8.) The personal experience, the faith of millions rests in him.‡

(9.) The great problems of human destiny are solved in him.

III. *The Christian Religion is shown to be true, on historical grounds, from the character and acts of the*

* See J. S. von Drey, *Die Apologetik*, 1844.

† "The last alternative," says Auberlen, after reviewing history and prophecy respecting Christ, "is, that the world is a mad-house or the temple of the living God." (*Die gottl. Offenb.*, 1859.)

‡ Said an infidel lady once to Lord Chesterfield: "The British Parliament consists of five or six hundred of the best-informed men in the kingdom. What, then, can be the reason they tolerate such an absurdity as the Christian religion?"

"I suppose," replied his lordship, "it is because they have not been able to substitute anything better in its stead; when they can, I do not doubt that, in their wisdom, they will readily adopt it."

*Apostles of Christ, as narrated in the New Testament.**

The following are the heads of argument :

(1.) Their personal character insures confidence.

Paul, Peter, James, John, are men to be trusted.

(2.) As companions of Christ they had ample opportunities to know the facts of his life. (He who was not a companion of Christ was the scrutinizer of the accounts given by those who were, and had a special attestation furnished to him of the truth of the history.)

(3.) They assert that Christ gave them a revelation from God, confirmed by his miracles and culminating in his death and resurrection.

(4.) In Christ's name they preached and founded a church.

(5.) " They lived, suffered, and died in attestation of the truths which they declared."

There is no parallel instance of such disciples, bearing such testimony and showing such personal faith.

IV. *The New Testament records have the fullest historical authority and weight.*

The argument in respect to the Canon belongs in another place; it is proposed to state here only the general argument for general purposes.

The terms commonly employed for this subject are :

Genuineness, meaning, from the authors named ;

* See Paley's Evidences, Dean H. H. Milman, Character and Conduct of the Apostles considered as an evidence of Christianity, Whately's Historic Doubts as to Napoleon.

Credibility, meaning, worthy of reception, nearly synonymous with authenticity, meaning that the records are authentic—are true to fact ; and *Integrity*, meaning that in the common copies we have what was originally written—that one copy corresponds to another.

The object of the New Testament is to set forth the facts and doctrines centring in the person, work, history, and kingdom of Christ : as fulfilling the Old Testament, and giving us a perfect and final revelation.

The process of the argument as to its historical authority is, to speak (1) of the integrity, (2) the genuineness, (3) the credibility of the New Testament writings.

(A) Of their Integrity.

“There is not so much evidence of the integrity of any heathen writer.” (Is. Taylor.) A special providence has been exercised to insure the transmission of the writings in an uncorrupted state.

The sources of proof of their integrity are :

1. Citations in the Apostolic Fathers (the Fathers in the first quarter * and half of the second century) which correspond not only in respect to *fact* and *doctrine*, but also in respect to *language* with our Canonical Scriptures.

2. Abundant—super-abounding—citations from the time of Irenæus, through the third and fourth centuries also correspond. “From the Christian literature

* Better, perhaps, confined to those of the first quarter and the time preceding : Barnabas, Clem. Rom., Ignatius, Polycarp. (See Westcott on N. T. Canon.)

of this period almost all the New Testament might be gathered."

3. The allusions in heathen writers testify to the same.*

4. The early Versions, the Syriac-Peschito, with its traces of an "Old Syriac," going back almost to Apostolic times; and the "Old Latin" of North Africa, nearly, if not quite, as ancient as the "Old Syriac;" † show that our Canonical Scriptures are the same with those from which the Versions were made.

5. The collation of Manuscripts of the New Testament of every century from the fourth to the fifteenth, amounting to several thousands, shows, in the midst of numerous unimportant variations, the substantial integrity of our New Testament.

(B) Of their Genuineness.

These Scriptures were written by those whose names they bear: viz.: Apostles or companions of Apostles of the Lord. (Paul's case was special.)

1. Many of them profess to be by certain writers, who were Apostles or companions of Apostles, and the books are accompanied by their signatures or address.

2. All the early Christian writers—the Apostolic Fathers, Apologists, and Church Fathers—received the books as genuine. The few cases of doubt leave the main portion of the books unquestioned.‡

* See Dr. Giles's "Heathen Record," Lond., 1856. Also, "Why have the heathen writers so rarely alluded to Christianity?" H. T. Tzschirner, *Opuscula*. Kitto III., Jan., 1853.

† Westcott on the N. T. Canon.

‡ See the argument from the fact that each book was received and judged by itself stated in Hopkins on the Evidences, p. 286.

3. The opponents of Christianity did not deny the genuineness of the Christian books.*

4. In controversy carried on by the Church the books were constantly appealed to—showing that no suspicion about them had place in the minds of Christians.

5. No one lived in post-apostolic times to whom they could be referred: no mistake or confusion respecting, *e. g.*, John † or Paul was possible.

6. Through the whole course of history the writings have been received as genuine.‡

There is no such parallel of testimony in the case of any books not genuine.

(C) Of the Credibility of the New Testament Scriptures. (Consider here the Gospels only.)

There are two sources of evidence here: external vouchers and the internal character of the writings bearing testimony to the writers.

Credibility means—worthy to be received as authentic records of facts.

It is a general rule of evidence, that men generally tell the truth.

1st Source of Argument—Internal Character of the Writings.

(a) The writers appear trustworthy and capable.

They had capacity—

* See extracts from the fragments remaining of the Gnostic heretics in Westcott, N. T. Canon.

† The attempt to ascribe the writings of the Apostle John to the Presbyter John is made in defiance of history.

‡ The assaults of the school of Tübingen, etc., are to be considered in another place.

They had opportunities—

They sealed their testimony with their devotion.

Consider John, Peter, Paul, James. If any human beings are to be believed, these are.

Infidels here go against the general rule of testimony. They claim that before any fact is received, it must be confirmed by some one who **had not as good opportunities of knowing**. Whereas, the witnesses *of* the fact are the best witnesses *to* it.

(*b*) There are the marks of truth in the composition, the style, the manifestation of sincere and holy personal character.

Their writings are simple, artless, often impetuous, out of the fullness of conviction and feeling.

They write just as Jews of that time would—in the Hellenistic dialect. Circumstantiality is a characteristic of all their writings. They abound in references to current events.

(*c*) The writers support and confirm each other. We have testimony in its best form—independent and then combined. There are eight witnesses. The four Gospels are independent of each other. The Gospels are placed in combination with the book of Acts. The Gospels and Acts with the Epistles. (Paley's *Horæ Paulinæ* and Blunt's *Undesigned Coincidences*.)

(*d*) A comparison of the Gospels with the Apocryphal Gospels brings out in distinctness the "internal evidence" of the former. The latter, moreover, were not known till the last part of the second century. No Christian history besides the Gospels

and Acts is cited in extant works for the first 300 years. The Apocryphal Gospels are found in no catalogue.

(e) Jewish and heathen writers, as far as they go, confirm ~~the~~ **the** credibility of the Gospels.

The few things which ~~they say~~ **they say** do not conflict with the credibility.

The Talmuds, from the second century, speak of Christ and the Apostles, of "Jesus"—"Mary his mother"—of "Jesus, the malefactor, who was crucified"—and of his "miracles." The "Acts" of Pilate are referred to by Justin Martyr.* What we have in Josephus coincides with the general outline of the gospel history.† Tacitus has an explicit reference to Christ. Pliny's letter to Trajan shows the Christians in the attitude and relation to Christ which the New Testament depicts. Celsus refers to the miraculous birth, descent of the Spirit, prodigies at the crucifixion, resurrection, and miracles of Christ; but calls them "magical."

(f) The Scriptures of the New Testament (and of the Old) were public, known and read of all, and were appealed to in disputes, as authentic, credible, final.

(g) Monuments and memorials attest the facts and truths published in the gospels. (Leslie's Short Method.)

(h) Christianity was propagated as divine on this basis. "The Scriptures consecrate no belief which

* The extant "Acts" are a forgery: see Lardner, vii. p. 189, for the argument as to a real work. Also, Casaubon, Exerc. in Baronii Annales, xi., 154; Pearson, Sect. in Acta Apostolica, Lect. iii., v.

† As to the contested passage about Christ, see Gieseler, Vol. I.

is not seen embodied in Christian life." The Apostolic tradition seen "in the earliest forms of Christian doctrine and phraseology exactly corresponds with the different elements of the Canonical writings." Hence, "the written books and the traditional words equally represent the general sum of essential apostolic teaching." *

2d. Source of argument. External Vouchers.

Among these *Incidental Points* of testimony there may be named :

(1.) The fact that these books were publicly and generally read in the church, as apostolic. There was a class of "Anagnostae" readers. (To this we have the testimony of Justin Martyr, the Ep. ad Diognetum, and Tertullian.) No others were read so publicly and generally. The Muratorian Fragment intimates that the Shepherd of Hermas was not read, as belonging in the class of Apostles and "Prophets." Other books were read here and there in the churches, but "for edification" not as authoritative.

(2.) They were appealed to always in controversy and debate, as of ultimate and apostolical authority.

"At meetings of Synods a throne was erected, and on it the four Gospels were placed, as the image of Christ's presence." (Wordsworth.) At the Council of Nice, Constantine,† speaking of the Evangelists and Apostles, said, "Let us decide our controversies from the divinely inspired books."

* Westcott on N. T. Canon, Preface.

† He also provided for the making of fifty copies of the Scriptures for the use of the churches.

(3.) When the "Canon" was at last formed, and all the books which had been received as apostolical, were brought together, these and no others received ecclesiastical sanction.

There was a sifting process: the line was drawn then where upon external and internal ground it is and must be drawn now: showing that historical criticism, though unconscious of itself, was awakened.

(4.) Even *without the Scriptures*, the evidence on historical grounds is sufficient to show that in the reigns of Augustus and Tiberius, Jesus Christ appeared in Judæa, that he came professing to have a divine commission, that he founded a church whose faith rested in Him as the God-man and Redeemer crucified for men, and that this church ever since, with faith in Christ as its centre, has gone on conquering. This is without example; so that, *excluding* the Old and New Testaments, the balance, in a comparative line of argument, is for Christianity as against any and all other religions.

3d. Point in the argument. The failure of the attempts to subvert the historical authority and weight of the New Testament Scriptures.*

The denial of the historical authority and weight of the New Testament writings must be sustained, if at all, upon the following grounds: that they are forgeries, or myths, or are the products of historical "tendencies."

* For the author's view of Strauss's latest work, see Faith and Philosophy, p. 443; for his views of Renan, see the same vol., p. 401.

(A) As to the possibility of their being forgeries.

(a) If so, the imposition would be stupendous, a scheme running through all history. All faith in historical facts would be subverted, if confidence in these writings could be destroyed by the discovery that they were forgeries.

(b) If forgeries, it is out of all analogy that they should not be detected as such. The most successful attempts at forging historic documents are detected sooner or later.

(c) There is no trace of collusion, of fitting in, among the four evangelists, or of attempts to adjust to one another.

Forgeries are chiefly parodies.

(d) If forgeries, how is their general reception in the latter part of the second century to be accounted for? There are two suppositions: (a) They were forgeries then; but in that case their reception would involve a universal fraudulent collusion at that time; (b) they were forged at some time previous; but then the same impossibility (as it must be called, considering the absence of all conceivable motives) is encountered in that period.

Moreover, persons forging such writings would have selected other names for the authors than those of Matthew, Mark, and Luke, unknown men; and they would not have allowed such discrepancies to stand. (Alexander's Christ and Christianity.)

The supposition of the forgery of the Gospels implies almost a greater miracle than any of those recorded in their pages.

(B) As to the possibility of their being myths.*

This claim is a desperate resort, showing the weakness of the modern infidelity.

The view of Strauss is, that religious ideas existed, leading to credulity; these embodied themselves in the course of time, around some persons offering favorable conditions. Actual historical events worked over by the popular imagination became legendary; on the other hand, philosophical ideas take the form of narrative; and both these are combined in the history of Christ. The myth comes first, then the legend, then the surreptitious addition.

Strauss's principles of criticism are: (1) No account containing the reports of miracles is to be received as historical; (2) No account which is inconsistent with itself or with other accounts (a principle according to which one false or inaccurate witness can vitiate the testimony of ten who are true); (3) The Old Testament type furnished the germ and incentive of the New Testament stories.

Some of the obvious difficulties with which the theory is fatally burdened, are:

(1.) The time for the growth of myths is too short in the case of the Gospel histories. They must have grown up before the destruction of Jerusalem.

(2.) Old Testament types would have had no charm for the heathen.

(3.) The Jews were not looking for such a Christ.

* A myth is a fable in which truth is hid—"veritas quæ in fabulæ involucri latet." (In the New Testament the word is used only of lying fables. 1 Tim. iv. 7, etc.)

The life of Jesus did *not* correspond with the expectations of the Jews, and *did* with prophecy.*

(4.) The myths are chiefly about Christ, where they would be the most tested. The historical facts in regard to him, which must be admitted to furnish a point of attachment for the myths, are inconsistent with the supposition that he stimulated or could avoid excluding even the mythical spirit in the minds of those who knew him.

(5.) There are no characteristics or signs of the mythical tendency in the Gospels.

(6.) We are furnished with a body of literature which illustrates the mythical or legend-framing tendency in the Apocryphal Gospels. The contrast between fact and invention could not be more clearly exhibited.

(7.) The character of the Apostles—the holy personality which discloses itself without being presented in their writings—is at war with the supposition that they trifled with truth or promoted a tendency to trifle with it.

(8.) The facts narrated in the gospels can all be explained, if they are taken as a veritable history—and only so. “If the Gospel-narratives are so significant as *myths*, why should they not be still more significant as *facts*?” (Pres. Walker.)

(9.) The true mythological process is *not* the seeing things as things, and then personifying, but seeing things as living beings, first, and afterward coming on reflection to say, that they are only things.

* See Norton on Strauss, in “Internal Evidences.” See, also, Chr. Exam., 1855, Jan.

(10.) The mythical hypothesis does not give enough of Christ to account for Christianity.

(C) As to the possibility of the Gospels being the products of "Historical Tendencies." This is the position of the "Tübingen School," whose general scheme is as follows: Christianity is the union of God and man, or (which is the same thing) the idea of the universal, spiritual, and truly free morality. Socrates began the movement of the subject knowing itself (which Judaism hardly recognized, except at Alexandria). Christianity is *nothing new*, all was in the world before—in lower forms. The Catholic Church is the end, not the beginning, of a development, which was reached by compromises, especially between the Judaic and Greek types. Christ was of an anti-Judaical spirit, asserting liberty of conscience. His antagonists are figured in "the Jews" of the fourth Gospel, and "the Scribes and Pharisees" of the Synoptists. Christ's teachings vanished for a time, then came Nazarene Christianity, with its "beggarly elements" (Gal. iv., 10); St. Paul came then, proclaiming universalism, ("not the therapeutic idealism of the Sermon on the Mount"), the doctrine of *grace*, of righteousness objectively conferred, of God's grace in the soul. There was conflict for fifty or sixty years. Paul stood against the twelve (Gal. ii. 4); Peter declined fellowship with him; the Pauline and Petrine parties arose. At Paul's death his party was in disgrace at Rome (2 Tim. iv. 16); he is the person alluded to in the exclamation, "O, vain man!" (James ii. 20); the Clementina testify against his Antinomianism. But the fall of Jerusalem and the rise of the

hierarchical spirit gave him the victory. Metaphysics were also at work, Gnosticism arose; the result of all was the formation of the Catholic Church.

The problem then is, how to arrange the New Testament books upon the basis of this theory.

The general position is that as the Church was before the Bible, the Scriptures are to be viewed as literary documents representing tendencies, having a purpose. The books are not forgeries ("they are eponyms, not pseudonyms"); each local church had its writings which were held to be Apostolic. Ultimately, the Canon was framed as a compromise, admitting all irenic books.

The details of the theory as to the books of the New Testament may be briefly stated thus:

(a) The Book of Acts represents Paul and "the Twelve" as at one. Paul was originally Jewish (xxii. 21); Peter is represented as admitting Gentiles; Paul acts under the Twelve (xvi. 4). In his preaching Paul dwells only upon "general truths" (xx. 21).

(b) Peter is exhibited as at first of a kindred character; he modified Paulinism. A Paulo-Petrine syncretism is sketched.

(c) Four of Paul's Epistles are admitted to be genuine: Gal., Rom., I. II. Cor. These are the earliest records of Christianity against the Judaical spirit. They all contain concrete, personal matters and aims—a marked particularity.

(d) I. Thess. is admitted by Hilgenfeld (he rejects II. Thess.); it was written not late, for it shows that the Second Advent was expected.

(e) Eph., Philipp., and Col. are Gnostic productions,

with no specific purpose. ἐκένωσε (Phil. ii. 7) "is Gnostic—not Pauline." (Baur.)

(f) I. II. Tim. and Titus are of the second century: products of the hierarchical spirit. There is no thought of a hierarchy in Paul. Episcopacy is recognized here. Mark and Luke (named in II. Tim. iv. 11) are "symbolical of tendencies."

(g) The Epistle of James adjusts faith and works, which Paul had sundered.

The Epistle to the Hebrews, making the Old Testament an allegory of Christ and placing Christ above the angels, shows a Jewish reaction.

(h) For the writings of John there is no external evidence. The author of them cannot be the Apostle John. He led the Judaical party—was at Ephesus as the victor over Paul. Yet the Gospel is anti-millennarian and anti-Jewish.* John was for the Quartodecimans; the Gospel is against them. In the Gospel we have ideal Christianity; Montanism and Gnosticism are harmonized; it is a moral drama, with Christ as the center, and "the Jews," unbelievers, figuring in their appropriate places.

(i) Mark comes last—after Matthew and Luke—he is neutral and Petrinic; he suppresses controversial matter and leans to Docetism.

(j) Luke is next to John in "purpose." Our present Gospel is from an earlier Luke which was more Pauline and anti-Jewish. (The notices of Tertullian and Epiphanius on the Gospel of Marcion enable us to discriminate. Marcion used the original.)

* De Wette defends John.

The late Gospel is a "Catholic" compromise. Jesus is the Jewish Messiah (as in the Acts by the same author), the son of Adam; the accounts of the infancy, baptism, and temptation, the genealogy and adaptation of Old Testament prophecies are all later. The Twelve are depreciated, and the Seventy are upheld (as against Matthew).

(k) Matthew is the original of Luke and Mark, or else all three are from a common source. This Gospel is artificial in structure; the discourses are grouped—the parables also, and the healings. The Sermon on the Mount is given as the substance of Christ's teaching. The object of the Gospel is to exhibit the Messianic types of Christ. The xxivth. chap. cannot be by Christ, nor the allusion, xxiii. 35, which must be later. There was an earlier Hebrew Gospel (of "Peter," of "the Apostles," of "the Ebionites," of "the Egyptians," of "the Hebrews"). This was perhaps the original of Matthew's Gospel. Jerome translated "the Gospel of the Hebrews" into Greek—a proof of its having been different from our Matthew.

Remarks upon the theory of "Historical Tendencies."

(1.) It is a labored hypothesis; it is too elaborate to be true. The facts which are here readjusted yield no such combinations, except under protracted studies of them *with a view* to such arrangement.

(2.) The whole theory rests upon the position that "the higher cannot come first," but only as a process of development. This is an inference of Pantheism, a philosophical position to which the facts of history must be made to bend.

(3.) The admission that four of Paul's Epistles, Gal., Rom., I. II. Cor., are genuine and were written about A. D. 60, is fatal to the entire theory. This is an admission that Paul was in possession of all the chief elements of his christology and soteriology within thirty years after Christ's death.

(4.) "Catholic" doctrine was a combination, not a compromise. It was the reflection from the consciousness of the church of *all* the teachings of the New Testament—as against partial (heretical) views. The continual appeals of the early Christians writers to the New Testament Scriptures show this. Moreover, writings produced in a spirit of "compromise" would have been devoid of the originality and power which are stamped upon every page of the New Testament.

(5.) It is not the fact that Ebionitism came first and Christianity afterward. Ebionitism has all the marks of degeneracy. It is easy for men to fall off from that which is divinely perfect to that which is full of human imperfection; but that they should rise from the latter to the former, or by uniting two or more streams of human imperfection should reach a perfect result, cannot be believed by any who study the facts of history, unbiassed by pantheistic theories.

(6.) The conflict and collision of "Paulinism and Petrinism," so far as it existed in the Apostolic times, is fearlessly and fully stated in the New Testament writings. It was characteristic of Peter that he should yield under a sudden assault (Gal. ii. 13), and should afterward stand firm in the truth.

(7.) The Gospel of John stands against all assaults, "as the best attested book of antiquity." Even the

heretics who "lived on the verge of the Apostolic age," incidentally bear witness to its existence and undoubted reception as of apostolic authority.

(8.) The "Tübingen School" has had its use in stimulating scholars to a closer scrutiny of the history of the church, and of the relations of the New Testament Scriptures to that history. It is ceasing now to be an influential theory. It was the ablest effort of modern times to give a historical interpretation to the facts of primitive Christianity which should break down their direct relation to Christ. It has resulted simply in deepening the conviction that that relation cannot be broken down.

(D) Renan's *Life of Christ*. [Considered by the author only in the article reprinted in *Faith and Philosophy*, p. 401.]

General Conclusions.

I. In the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments (especially the latter), truths and facts are recorded as being a divine revelation.

II. These truths and facts all have direct relation to and centre in Christ and his work.

III. If the Scriptures can be trusted in what they say respecting Christ and his work, this revelation is from God.

IV. That they are trustworthy is proved by the argument from their genuineness, authenticity, and credibility.

V. Of *Miracles and Prophecy*.

(A) Miracles. [The author's view is given in the *Apologetics*, p. 90.]

(B) Of the argument from *Prophecy*.

The nature of this argument is seen from such passages of Scripture as the following; John xiv. 29. "And now I have told you before it come to pass, that when it is come to pass ye might believe." 2 Peter, i. 20. "No prophecy is" (*γίνεται*, cometh) "of private interpretation" (*ἐπιλύσεως*, loosing out), *i. e.*, is of one's own private solution; not as to the meaning, but the origin of the prophecy. (See Fairbairn, p. 497.) "For the prophecy came not in old time by the will of man: but [holy] men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost."

Prophecies are wonders of the word, as miracles are of act and fact. They have the same relation to *history* that miracles have to nature (and miracles to nature the same as redemption to the spiritual realm). The design of prophecy is not to do away with man's permanent and orderly relation to history (any more than miracles to nature). They shed a higher light on it, show the divine plan running through history.

Prophecy implies omniscience and omnipotence. "All prophecies are real miracles, and as such only can be admitted as proof of revelation." (Hume, *Phil. Essays*.)

"To declare a thing shall come to be, long before it is in being, and then to bring about the accomplishment of that very thing according to the same declaration, this—or nothing—is the work of God." (Justin Martyr.)

The argument is a growing one; stronger now than formerly. The voices from Babylon, Nineveh, etc., speak more plainly.

The argument ranges over a vast extent. Enoch, Abraham, Jacob, Moses, David, Elijah, Isaiah, Eze-

kiel, Daniel, Hosea, Amos, Micah, Haggai, Zechariah, Malachi, form a long succession, closing in Christ and his apostles.

The prophets had three functions, as the noted words of St. Bernard indicate—Respice, Aspice, Prospice, interpreting the divine will in respect to the past, present, and future. In all their functions they witness to the divine nature of the revelation which they expound or declare.

The statement of the Argument from Prophecy is: that future events which God only could foreknow, having respect to Christ and his religion, and to the fate of nations standing in certain relations to this religion, are predicted in the Scriptures of the Old Testament, and have been fulfilled.

Heads of the Argument.

Of the various classes of prophecies, the most comprehensive are the most wonderful.

A. The Old Testament prophecies.

(1.) The whole of the Old Testament is really a prophecy of the New; its types are shaped by principles of the divine government and guidance of men which could have their full expression only in Christ. "He that cannot find Christ every where in the Old Testament can find him nowhere." (Alford, Comm. on Hebrews.)

(2.) The specific Old Testament prophecies about Christ and his work, show that He who directed the prophets had not only principles of administration, but a definite plan which was to culminate in Christ.*

* See Pascal's Thoughts; Doddridge's Lectures: for noble views of this subject.

(3.) The predictions about nations and kingdoms show that He who presides over all human affairs spake through the prophets. (*E. g.* The prophecies respecting Babylon, Is. xiii., xiv.; respecting Tyre, Is. xxiii.; Ez. xxvi.; respecting Egypt, Ezek. xxix.) The history of the world was foretold in Gen. ix. 23-7. (Canaan, Shem, Japheth.)

(4.) In respect to the Jewish nation.

B. The New Testament prophecies.

(1.) Christ's predictions of his kingdom.

Such predictions as Matt. xiii. 31, the Parable of the Mustard Seed, and indeed a large proportion, about one half, of all the parables; the declaration, Matt. xvi. 18, "On this rock I will build my church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it;" the prediction, Matt. xxiv. 14, "And this Gospel of the kingdom shall be preached in all the world;" the commission, Matt. xxviii. 19, Mark xvi. 15, Luke xxiv. 47, "Go preach the Gospel in all the world—to all nations."

(2.) Christ also predicted the Destruction of Jerusalem, Matt. xxiv. Josephus is an involuntary witness to the truth of the prediction. (Alexander's Christ and Christianity, pp. 230, *seq.*)

The predictions respecting the Jews, which are found in the Old Testament, are partly fulfilled and partly repeated in fuller detail in the New.

C. Observations relating to the whole series of prophecies.

(1.) The entire course of prophecy proves that the revelation of which it forms an integral part is from God. (Prophecy *is* such an integral part of revela-

tion. In many places it may be said to form the warp on which the Scriptures are given; if it is rent away, the fabric is broken.) Only omniscience and omnipotence could have had such foresight and produced such fulfillments.

(2.) The whole of prophecy discloses one system of divine dealings and one plan, running through all nations.* Many prophecies are known only in the event; this is confirmatory. (See Fairbairn, Part I., chap. vi., on the "Interconnected and Progressive Character of Prophecy.")

(3.) Prophecy has a progressive development, which is still going on. This is seen conspicuously in the character and fortunes of the Jews. "In prophecy there is this advantage to us over miracle, that while we have to depend on testimony for our knowledge of the latter, the fulfillments of the former are taking place daily under our eyes." (Just. M. Apol. I., c. 37.) Eusebius (in his *Demonstr. Ev.*) calls the prophets "divine historians in advance of history."

(4.) As to the probabilities of random predictions having such fulfillments, the passage in Gregory's Letters may be quoted: "Suppose that only ten men were prophets, each of whom gave five independent criteria—all of which meet in one person. The probability of these fifty meeting thus (allowing equal chances) is that of the fiftieth power of two to

* "Where Scripture History fails, there Prophecy takes its place; so is the account still carried forward, and the chain is not broken till we come to the very last link—the consummation of all things." (Pres. Edwards.)

unity; *i. e.*, greater than 1,125,000,000 of millions to one."

(5.) The Christian Religion here stands alone. The oracles of the heathen were dark and vague with respect to particular events*; they never dreamed of disclosing the course and sum of all events.

(6.) The beneficence of the prophecies is to be considered. It is Christ's kingdom: its beginning, course, and consummation which they foretell. Man, apart from God's teaching, has had no thoughts of God's love to warrant him in framing any such picture of the destiny of the race.

§ 4. *The Internal Evidences, embracing "Philosophical Apologetics."* †

The internal evidence would comprise at least five topics. (a) The conformity in style, historical allusions, etc., with the known historical circumstances of the different periods when the bearers of the revelation appeared; (b) The holy character of the persons and the high and holy nature of the events (the supernatural events especially) which the revelation exhibits; (c) The internal harmonies (1) of the history, both in its different parts (*e. g.*, as shown in Paley's *Horæ Paulinæ*) and as a whole (Edwards's *History of Redemption*), and (2) of the entire body of doctrine; (d) The power of the central matters of

* *E. G.*, That of Delphi: "Croesus crossing the Halys shall destroy a great empire"—which he interpreted of the Persian. (*Herod.*, I. c. 53; *Suidas*, iii. 382.

† See Lectures on *Apologetics*, p. 10.

the Revelation over the soul; (e) The fact that the Revelation is the highest and the perfect religion, and opens the way to the true and final Philosophy.

Of these, the three first named are most conveniently treated in connection with the historical evidence. *E. g.*, The character of Christ and his Apostles, and the bearing of all the parts of the Revelation on the one fact of His appearing in order to redemption, have been referred to in the foregoing section. These cannot well be sundered from Historical Apologetics. The two last named make up the Internal Evidence in the strictest sense, comprising "Testimonium Spiritus Sancti" * and Philosophical Apologetics.

I. The Testimony of the Holy Spirit.

[Upon this first head of the Internal Evidence in the strictest sense, only the following is found.]

In the *Evangelical Christendom* (the London organ of the Evangelical Alliance), there was an interesting correspondence between Dr. Dorner and Bishop Fitzgerald (of Cork) looking to a better understanding between German and English divines. Dorner objects to the English theology that it lays too much stress upon the external evidences for Christianity, and cites Maurice as saying that this has led to widespread unbelief. (*Ev. Christendom*, April, 1860). Dr. Fitzgerald replied in the same magazine, Jan., 1861, asking, how we can prove that the testimony of

* That is, the subjective testimony in the experience of the believer; the Spirit's objective testimony is in miracle, prophecy, etc. Heb. ii. 4.

the Holy Spirit, on which Dorner lays such stress, can be shown not to be merely subjective; and how, for example, the resurrection of Christ can be proved in any other way than by external testimony. "Our divines say that it can be proved by stringent external evidence, and can the German theologians give a better answer?" He puts the case thus: The truths of revelation are facts; not self-evident; not to be demonstrated *a priori*; nor to be proved by saying it were best that such facts should have occurred; nor yet, by the assertion that the Holy Spirit leads to a belief in them. In this sense, Dr. Fitzgerald's essay in the Aids to Faith is also written. In the *Jahrbücher für deutsche Theologie*, 1861, Dr. Dorner reviewed at some length, and ably, the whole Mansel and Maurice controversy. In this he replied to the positions of Dr. Fitzgerald, stating the German ground, that external evidence and authority can never produce real, living, saving faith, and vindicating "the testimony of the Holy Spirit" from the charge of being merely subjective. That the Word and faith are inseparable, he says, is the principle of the present evangelical theology of Germany. Neither *a priori* nor merely logical proofs are sufficient; we must have the living presence of Christ in the soul, and the witness of the Spirit. Here alone is the final ground of assurance. The authority of the Scriptures depends on the authority of Christ, and not the converse.* It is a good thing that the matter is mooted in our times.

* See Dorner's *Glaubenslehre*. The problem of Pisteology.

Vinet, in his Discourses, thus speaks: "The gospel unites itself intimately with all that is most profound and ineradicable in our nature. When the soul has thoroughly appreciated it, it blends indistinguishably with all the primitive beliefs and the natural light that every man brings into the world." He compares it to the broken token of ancient hospitality—forming years afterward a bond of recognition. "So in the book of our soul does the Divine Revelation unite itself to the old traces there. Our soul does not discern but recognizes the truth. It infers that reunion—impossible to chance—impossible to calculation—can only be the work and secret of God; and it is then only that we believe—then when the gospel has passed from the rank of external to the rank of internal truth—when it has become in us part and parcel of our consciousness."

II. The Philosophical Proof. Christianity the perfect form of Religion.

[This was never fully wrought out by the author. Only an outline can be given. See Lectures on Apologetics, p. 10. "Philosophical Apologetics takes its materials (1) from the Philosophy of Religion; (2) from the Philosophy of History; (3) from the Nature (or Philosophy) of Christianity itself."]

A. Proof that Christianity is the highest form of religion, from the *Philosophy of Religion*.

Here it is to be shown (1st) in the way of historical testimony, on the basis of the history of religions, that the Christian system, under the divine plan, has (a) always existed in its elements, as type, etc., in human history; (b) that the other religions, under

divine guidance, so far as human history has advanced, have been tending toward, have led to, Christianity—to the Incarnation for Redemption, as their historic consummation; *i. e.*, by their higher and higher endeavors and manifest failures have made it plain that a religion like the Christian was the world's great need.* [These points treated by the author in lectures on the Incarnation.]

It is to be shown (2dly) by a comparative line of argument (as in Comparative Philology, etc.), (*a*) that Christianity contains all truth that is felt after in other religions, (*b*) in a more perfect form, and (*c*) other, most needed facts and truths, which cannot be found in any other form of religion.

Heads of the argument from the Philosophy of Religion in a different form of statement.

(1.) State the central characteristic and peculiarities of all religions:

(*a*) The Fetich.—God, any chance object taken for a time.

(*b*) The Chinese. The main idea that of external order, a sort of police religion.

(*c*) Hindoo religion. Pantheistic.†

(*d*) Parsee religion. Dualism of good and evil. Worship of fire.

* In Hegel's and many of the speculative philosophies of history, the point (*a*) is ignored or neglected, making Christianity to be merely the flower of all the religions, and to be developed out of them, instead of being a new and divine and supernatural order of things (economy, dating from the beginning) in a sinful world.

† It appears to be proven that Buddhism, driven from India as a cult, left its impress as a philosophy on the old religion.

(e) Egyptian. Deification of the principle of life.

(f) Greek. The central idea, that of beauty. Man deified.* The gods of like passions—even lusts—with men.

(g) The Roman. An eclectic religion. The Roman worshipped, first of all, the State.

(h) JUDAISM. The principles, Monotheism and the promise of the Messiah. Fulfilled in Christianity.

(i) Mohammedanism. A corruption of Christianity and Judaism.

(j) Modern attempts to make a religion. The Deists. The effort in the French Revolution. St. Simonians. Comte.

(k) CHRISTIANITY. Central idea, the Incarnation of Christ in order to Redemption, to man's full restoration to the holy favor and fellowship of God.

(2.) Show that as a matter of fact Christianity has triumphed over all other religions, when its proper spiritual weapons could be used.

(3.) It contains all the truth they contain in a more perfect form. The majesty of God, the capacity of man for communion with Him, the Atonement (compared with their views of sacrifice, etc), the Eternal Life (compared with their presentiments of immortality, transmigrations, elysiums).

(4.) It contains other most needed facts and truths. The full doctrine of God's unity, holiness; of the God-man; of the way of reconciliation; of spiritual

* The *Præparatio Evangelica* in Greece (Gladstone, Disc. as Rect. Ed. Univ., 1865), found in the Greek thinkers rather than the Greek religion.

renewal ; of the fellowship of souls ; of the resurrection ; of the kingdom of God, etc.

(5.) It comes with divine authority, and with inward as well as outward witness from God.

(6.) It has always existed in the world, in rudiments. "Paul showed that Christianity was older than Judaism." (Ep. to the Romans, Gal.)

(7.) There are auguries, on historical grounds, of its final and sole supremacy over all other systems.

B. Christianity is shown to be highest and the perfect system for the world from the Philosophy of History.

General observations on the Philosophy of History.*

This philosophy can be constructed only on the idea of a kingdom of God, centering in Christ.

The attempt at constructing such a philosophy must come up late. There is no branch of philosophy which is obliged to master such a vast variety of materials. (The materials must be at hand before the philosophy can be ; for philosophy *consists* in reducing materials to laws and principles.) And the materials of history are so *varied* as well as so vast, that the attempt to frame a philosophy of it must be both late and difficult. All the interests of man are comprised in history, are developed in it : art, science, law, politics, social interests, and religion. All must be understood and appreciated for the philosophy of history. This branch is of the highest moment, espe-

* See the volume Faith and Philosophy, p. 55, *seq.* Also, in the same volume, p. 337, The Intellectual Development of Europe.

cially since materialistic and idealistic schools have attempted to elaborate it on their own bases.*

(1.) The more considerable attempts to frame the Philosophy of History.

(a) Bossuet. (Discourses upon Univ. Hist., from Genesis to Charlemagne.) Has the religious point of view; the plan of God in the world. Philosophy of history is based on the position that "God rules the world providentially, and so rules it that his own purposes are fulfilled." Deficiencies of the book: It is confined to religious interests; does not show subordination of other interests; is indefinite, using too general terms; art and human society are hardly recognized; for ancient times, it is confined to the Jewish people; the religion he recognizes is that of the Hebrews and Roman Catholics.† Its excellence is in the idea of the plan of God.

(b) Vico,‡ taking almost the extreme opposite point of view. Principles of a New Science, 1725. (Said to be the model of Montesquieu's "Spirit of the Laws.")

The point of view: that of a statesman, in reference to laws and civil society. There is a common nature in the different nations, which manifests itself in the same general course of growth, progress. This

* The German test of a true philosophy is, that it be capable of application to history. On this, the pantheistic system of Hegel was broken; when it touched the Christian church, it lost its power.

† He is not, however, violently bigoted.

‡ Born 1660 or 1670, at Naples, son of a bookseller, made immense attainments. His book admirably translated into French. Goethe very partial to it. (See N. Br. Rev., Aug., '51).

is seen especially in the jurisprudence of the nations. There is a fund of human nature in every nation, as there is tree nature in every tree; and as each tree passes from seed to decay, so does each nation. This law of growth has three stages, which necessarily recur in every nation. (1) The primitive rude condition—barbaric state; where the feeling of reverence predominates; where priests rule. (2) The state of reverence for persons, heroes; the mythological period; where distinct individualities come upon the stage. (3) The constitution of a regular civil community is formed, government and laws; this is the highest, perfected state. Religion is to Vico a part of the state; it is a subordinate interest. After a state has run through these stages, it must die out, and another succeeds. These are the "returns" of history. Defects: Plan does not reach the *whole* of history; inquires for the internal law of particular nations only. (Bossuet had not the plan for each nation; this has none for the whole.) He has exclusive regard for political development. He confines himself chiefly to the ancient nations (dwelling most on those whom Bossuet most neglects). Excellence: seeing a law in each individual nation.

(c) Herder.* "Ideas for the Philosophy of History."† (1780-91, 4 vols. Eng. transl.) Idea: that of Humanity. What is human is his idol. He

* Half a century after Vico (b. 1744), Court Preacher at Weimar, then the German Athens. From his early youth, had the idea of the Philosophy of History.

† Also "Preludes to the History of Humanity," and "After Scenes" in do.

brought out all the relations and interests of man.* His services to the historic problem: he brought into the treatment of it more material than any other; felt its amplitude more than any other; has been the source, as to details, of other histories; treated poetry and art very fully and in a most masterly way. Defects: His chief position (comparing course of history with periods of an individual human life: Orient, with infancy; Egypt, boyhood; Greece, manhood in youthful energy; Rome, manhood in mature power [extreme old age would probably be in this country]) is a poetical analogy, not a philosophical comprehension. His statement of the object of historical development is too indefinite and too low. It is, *e. g.*, the great fruit of Christianity, that it is doing what Rome could not do, making all *nations* one. The work does not give any proper, definite law of growth. It is confined too exclusively to the human side; "the divinity that shapes our ends" is not brought enough into the foreground.

(*d*) Schlegel.† The aim and end of history is the restoration of man to the lost image of his Maker. The substance of history is found in the collision between what is natural and what is divine. Excellence: The general idea of the end of history, which is correct. Defects: His characterizing of nations by their powers of mind (Greeks, understanding;

* Differing from Bossuet and Vico, in looking at humanity in all its interests, religious, civil, and all. All later writers have plundered from him. Cousin said, "This was the first great work raised to the progress of humanity in all respects and in all directions."

† He became a Roman Catholic, chiefly on æsthetic grounds.

Romans, power of will; Middle Ages, power of fantasy; Moderns, reason) is artificial. He is unable to get any conception of Christ's kingdom, except as organized under a hierarchy.

(e) Materialistic attempts. Voltaire, "The Customs of Nations," not of much value. Ferguson, "The History of Civil Society." Cousin said of it, "The feebleness of the ideas is only equaled by that of the learning." The most important: Condorcet, "Sketch of the History of the Human Race." (1793). The theory of the perfectibility of the race is brought out in the worst form. The work is a text-book for those who advocate that dogma. The conception of perfectibility is development of man's own nature apart from spiritual influences. "Humanity," "progress," "civilization," the substance, law, and end of history for him.

(f) Hegel, "Philosophy of History."* The most important work on the subject. The history of the world (from East to West, Europe being the absolute end as Asia was the beginning) is from the progress of the irrational, unsubdued natural will, to freedom, and progress in freedom is the great thing in history. (Freedom is not power of choice, but is found in what makes men spiritually free, in conformity to what is *rational*, true.) There are four periods: (1) The Oriental world. Here the individual does not know his freedom. The rulers are everything. There is

* Posthumous work. Well edited, made up largely from students' notes. Published in 1837. Cousin, in 1826, had had Hegel's course translated into French.

no conception of the state being for the general good. (2) Greeks. Here subjective freedom appears. There is individuality and free government. The individual is viewed as in harmony with nature, but not with reason, with the spiritual sphere. Socrates was the index of the necessary struggle to harmonize individuality with reason. He taught the Greek mind that there is something higher than nature; and so it came to feel the necessity of that spiritual good it could not attain. (3) The Roman world. Here the legal rights of persons under the State were recognized, but not their rights as individuals so much as citizens. The idea of a universal kingdom, and the universal sway of law.

The problem remaining after Rome had failed was: the full reconciliation of what belongs to the whole with the rights of individuals, and of both with the highest spiritual good. This found, in (4) The German (comprehensive sense) world, under the shaping power of Christianity. Here man comes to know what he really is, as man, and in his relations to the highest spiritual good which he can attain. Since the Reformation, the state as a state is *rational*; the most general idea of Hegel's system is that there is *reason* in history, and the great end of man is to live in a state so organized that the highest functions of the individual can be developed in it.

Defects: The scheme neglects entirely the idea of a kingdom of God in the world, and so wars against the most patent facts. It puts the Jewish nation into a subordinate place (between the Greek and

Roman) and misinterprets the spirit and character of the Old Testament (probably because the Jew had too distinct a conception of the divine personality.) It puts the end of the race in what man can accomplish here on earth in a social condition (as every Pantheistic scheme must do). It supposes that human history can be explained as the development of an abstract general idea. It lays the idea of freedom at the basis of history and makes the whole of history an evolution of that idea, thus attributing to an idea a power which is inconsistent with any philosophical notion of ideas.

The development of freedom is found in history; but the problem is to explain it. We must not make the mere idea ultimate, we must go behind it for the power.

(g) Socialistic and allied systems.

Much as socialists have written on human destiny there is no work in which their system is applied thoroughly to human history.* Comte's work is the fullest. In human history there are three eras—of theology, of metaphysics, and of physical science. The last is the highest, having for its object the regeneration of human society. No one conception running through the different eras is given. The end of the race is in the organization and development of industrial resources, and the agent of this is the growth of the positive sciences, *i. e.*, those which have position in time and space. This view of the 3rd

* Some hints of the author's estimate of Herbert Spencer are given in the Lectures on *Apologetics*.

era is common to nearly all socialists.* Their general characteristics : (1) They sacrifice liberty to equality. In this they are the antipodes of true republicanism. (2) They merge the natural relations of social life in arbitrary schemes. (3) They demand the reorganization of human society in both Church and State. This reorganization is to be effected by the "harmony of the passions," *i. e.*, the passions are to be set over against each other. No regeneration is thought of. (4) They have to do with man in the natural and social relations exclusively. The grand result of their system is in harmony also with the Pantheistic tendencies of the day, and there is progress toward the alliance of socialistic, democratic, and pantheistic tendencies, which will form the grand opposing power to Christianity.

There is however one element of truth in the socialistic scheme. It is that which looks to the doing away of the terrible contrasts between proud luxury and utter poverty. There is needed a Christian aim on a Christian basis for the same ends.

(*h*) The scheme of Jonathan Edwards in his History of Redemption. (First in sermons at Northampton, 1739, published in Scotland, 1774.) The work of Redemption is "the work which God carries on from the fall of man to the end of the world." There are two senses of Redemption—one, applicable to the work of Christ; the other, to the carrying out of that work

* See, in "Faith and Philosophy," review of Draper's Intellectual Development of Europe. Dr. Draper asserts that the race must be understood in the light of physiological laws.

in human history. He views the work in its grand design in general. He divides history into three periods: (1.) From the Fall to Christ's Incarnation, (2.) From Christ's Incarnation to His Resurrection, (3.) To the End of the World. In (1.) we have the forerunners and earnest of Redemption, in (2.) the procuring and purchasing of Redemption, in (3.) the effects of the purchased Redemption.

(2.) The Grounds of the Superiority of the Christian View of History over other partial schemes. The general position: The Christian view comprises what is true and rational in other schemes, and subordinates them to its own more comprehensive objects and ends.

(a) What it comprises. It proposes the Redemption of men, through Christ, as the great end, and this to be done in a real, eternal kingdom of which Christ is the centre. Particulars: (1.) It views the race as in a sinful and fallen condition; many other schemes agree with the substance of this position, yet do not hold it from a Christian standpoint. (2.) From this state of ruin the race can be restored only through Redemption; there must be Deliverance from without and above. (3.) This Redemption can be accomplished only in a real and divine kingdom—(4.) a kingdom which is not only for this world, but, and chiefly, for eternity. (5.) The whole Redemption and all that is in the course of history is ultimately to be referred to the agency and plan of God.

(b) The points of superiority. (1.) It is the only scheme which is consistent, on the one hand, with belief in a personal sovereign Ruler of the world, and

on the other hand, with the fact of human sinfulness. (2.) This scheme of things can be traced through all history, from the beginning until now. The best grouping of all history is that which has respect to the kingdom of redemption, and this is the only grouping which can be carried out. And if the Philosophy of History *is to be inductive*, this is decisive.* (3.) This view receives the facts of history in their historic integrity—does not resolve them, as many others do, into abstractions. Sin and holiness and the conflict between them are the two factors. In all other systems there is a tendency to make these only a part of education. The “reactions of history” are best explained, when sin is fully taken into account and the divine judgments for sin. (4.) It embraces as subordinate ends, what other systems propose as the highest ends. All that Socialism proposes for the real good of man can be made part of the history of Redemption; and the Redemptive end yet comes out beyond all the others. This is another recommendation *on theoretic grounds*. The Christian scheme is comprehensive of all. (5.) It meets the moral wants of man; appeals directly to spiritual needs, especially to the sense of sin and the need of deliverance. Other schemes have to lower the sense of sin and to explain away man’s need of rescue. (6.) The scheme is thoroughly theistic. It connects the human race with

* If Christ is the turning-point of history, in fact—if, however we may account for it, somehow or other, the history of the world turns here—if Christ is its angle, its chief corner-stone its focus, its soul, then history is *essentially* moral, spiritual, religious.

God, with the divine purposes and agency, and thus gives causative energy which is sufficient to account for and carry through the whole movement. It makes efficient and final causes work harmoniously together. (7.) It embraces the future as well as the present destiny of man, and this is alone consistent with the belief in immortality. (8.) While perfectly adapted to the spiritual necessities of every individual, it also looks forward to an organized economy, a divine kingdom, and so meets man's social as well as individual wants. No theory which does not meet the social tendency in men can be valid. This is one source of the strength in Socialistic schemes. (9.) The rapid and extensive propagation of Christianity is an argument in proof of its being the true key to history. Not all religions are true—we must acknowledge—which have spread rapidly. Yet that which has been diffused through all times, and among the most enlightened nations, has a very strong argument in its favor. * (10.) Another argument is derived from the beneficent practical effects of Christianity. Wherever it has prevailed, it has ameliorated the condition of man, made his life happier, and freed him from many miseries and burdens, and wherever it has been held in its greatest purity, there its beneficent results have been the most plainly seen and felt.

(c) Concluding statement. The Christian Philosophy of History is the only one which can be conformed to the four requisitions* of a true science of

* See the volume, Faith and Philosophy, p. 49, *seq.*

history. (1.) The scheme must be a legitimate generalization from the *entire mass of historic facts*. The kingdom of Redemption can be historically traced through all the records of the earth. The "preparations" for it, direct or indirect, the receptions and reactions in regard to it, have run through every historic nation. It has survived all states. (2.) The scheme must be able to state some one adequate law of progress running through all history. The progress of this kingdom has been a perpetual growth through perpetual conflicts. All other conflicts may be resolved into the conflict between sin and holiness. (3.) The scheme must propose some adequate end or object of the whole historic course. Christianity sets before the human family a grand and glorious consummation, where the natural interests of man, in their integrity and their full development, are made subservient to spiritual interests and to the revelation of the highest spiritual glory. (4.) It is necessary to recognize a power adequate to the whole result. The kingdom of redemption is God's own work and plan, projected, upheld, consummated by him. Facts, law, aim, and author are bound up into one scheme by this divine agency.

Hence, on *philosophical grounds*, we are forced to seek the solution of the *historic problem* in the kingdom of redemption. We can connect human history into an organized unity on no other theory or ground.

C. The proof from the nature or philosophy of Christianity itself, that it is the highest and the perfect religion.

Here the comparison must be between the whole of philosophy and the whole of Christianity.

The general position : Christianity *solves* the problems of human thought and human destiny which philosophy can only state. It furnishes in a form for practical use the truths which philosophy strives to master speculatively. It contains, substantially, the true philosophy.*

(1.) The first problem of philosophy is to ascertain the capacities and powers of the human soul. The extent of these can be known only when they have been tested in use upon the highest objects. Only Christianity brings them into full exercise. We learn what are man's powers of intellect, feeling, and will as we see them here in their fullest activities. (a) The intellect is employed on that which is absolute, infinite, perfect, personal, holy. When man apprehends God as He is revealed in Christ, the grandeur of the human intellect is most fully manifested. It is using its highest powers of intuition, and putting forth its utmost reach of deduction. (b) The highest exercise of the human sensibilities, or powers of being affected by the excellency of objects, is disclosed in the operation of the Christian religion on men's hearts. Under no other influence can feeling so overspread the *entire* nature, passing unchecked through the whole capacity of the soul, and under no other can feeling be so *intense*. (c) The will shows

* We may not be able as yet to evolve all its substance in complete philosophic form.

its highest capabilities in the determinations to which Christianity moves the soul. Obedience under the noblest motives gives the highest conception of its *freedom*, and the energy with which it can act in such obedience shows its *power*.

(2.) The second problem of philosophy is as to the universe, to grasp the true relation of the finite and the infinite. Christianity solves this in the doctrines of creation and providence. "It maintains both the transcendence and the immanence of God," neither merging Him in the world nor detaching Him from it. The actual union of the finite and infinite—the highest problem of philosophy—is disclosed in the person of Christ, and in the believer's union with Christ. Here the highest speculative question is answered.

(3.) The highest moral problem is solved. The fact of sin, attested by our consciousness, is fully recognized in the Christian system, and complete redemption is provided.

(4.) The grand social problem is answered: how to unite the fullest development of the individual with the most perfect subserviency to law and to the general interest. This is met in the *kingdom* of Christ.* The bond of union here endures through eternity, and makes each the object of the love and concern of all, and all the object of the love and concern of each. And here—

(5.) The highest problem as to the future is solved:

* "I am the true Vine," the fundamental and perfect bond of fellowship.

Whether there is a future life and what is its nature. The union in the church of Christ—the only real brotherhood among men—is for eternity as well as time.

(6.) The practical efficacy of the Christian system springs directly from those truths in it which have the greatest theoretical grandeur. "Its simplest lesson is in its sublimest fact." Christianity, by its *peculiar* truths, is thus efficacious, and so it is superior to any possible form of philosophy.*

* See General Introduction.

CHAPTER V.

THE DIVINE AUTHORITY OF THE RECORD OF REVELATION.

THE CANON AND INSPIRATION OF THE SCRIPTURES.

IN Historical Apologetics, or "The Evidences of Christianity," it has been shown that the Christian Religion has divine authority and sanction, that it is from God; and (in Philosophical Apologetics) that it is the highest, the perfect form of religion.

But this religion does not merely exist in history, it is not merely handed down by credible witnesses; it is recorded in Scriptures, which have canonical authority, and are inspired of God. Not only is the religion from God, but the record of it is from God.

Hence we proceed to the discussion of the questions of the Canon and Inspiration of the Scriptures.

The questions here are two; (1) The testimony as to what books were received as having divine authority; (2) The ground on which they were thus received.

The first is an historical question: the second is a question of authority; the first is a question of fact, the second of the grounds of that fact. Some of the arguments bearing on the questions are the same, but the questions themselves are different. We have then, in the subject: Part I.—The Canon of the Scriptures. Part II.—The Inspiration of the Scriptures.

PART I.

THE CANON.

§ I. *Introductory.*

(1.) *Meaning of Canon.**

The idea of Canon is that of a measuring-reed : "arundo et mensura fidei." F. C. Baur sets forth its primitive meaning as "not writings having the force of law, but definitely distinguished and set apart writings." Westcott holds that the term canonical was applied to the Scriptures at first in the sense of "conformed to a standard"; that "the measuring-reed" was, that which was received in the churches as having divine authority, and that the writings which met this requirement were deemed canonical. Afterward the term was applied to the Scriptures in the sense of "furnishing a standard" by which all utterances respecting the Christian Faith were to be tested.

The established sense of the word is, "received as having divine authority," "the test of truth," "the only sufficient rule of faith and practice."

It was sometimes used loosely as including both Scripture and tradition; sometimes as including Apocryphal and ecclesiastical, as well as Divine books. It meant, then, books permitted to be pub-

* For the idea and application of the word, see Credner Int. to N. T., and especially Westcott, The Canon of the N. T., Appendix, a full and careful account.

licly read, as the Apocrypha, the Epistles of Barnabas and Clement. Jerome speaks of such as read, but not to establish doctrine.*

But, in the stricter sense, it meant only those books which were received as having divine authority.

The question as to the canon, then, is simply this: What books can be proved to have been received by the Jews and early Christians, as having divine authority, as being canonical?

(2.) Mode of proof of canonical authority.

There are different positions as to the kind of proof which is to be employed.

Some appeal exclusively to the witness of the Spirit. This is co-ordinate but not adequate. How do we know that we have the Spirit? The spirit must be tried by the Word. The conviction as to the divine authority of certain writings which spread itself through the primitive church, and which furnishes the leading proof of the canonicity of those writings, should not be confounded with the inward persuasion of their authority which the Holy Spirit produces on individual minds.

Others appeal to the contents and results of the Scriptures. They furnish a revelation of truth not otherwise to be known, and they produce the most beneficial results. Writings lacking in these respects could not be deemed canonical, but these are not the chief things which determine the canonicity.

What we must regard is, the specific evidence, from competent sources, that such and such books

* See Stuart on O. T. Canon, p. 26.

and no others, have been received as being the Word of God to man.

Where can we find such authority?

The answer is, in the testimony of Christ and the Apostles. We have seen, on historical grounds, that we may trust their testimony. By their lives and wonderful works they prove to us their divine commission. The canon runs back into their testimony. As our religion centres in them, so does the proof of what books contain the record of this religion.

To the question, How far does the testimony of the Fathers of the Church have weight and authority in this matter, it is to be replied: So far, and only so far, as they give to us credible witness as to what books Christ and the Apostles recognized, and received, and issued, as having divine authority. The Fathers are to be received as witnesses to facts, as certifying what the church in their times believed in regard to the different classes of writings which were in her possession.* The comparison has been made, of a sign-post to show the way to a city, but the sign-post is not the city; and of the Samaritan woman's leading her fellow-townsmen to Christ, while she was, in no sense, the source of Christ's authority.†

* See Bp. Jewel, *Defense of Angl. Ch.*; Duille, *Right Use of Tradition*; Chillingworth, *Rel. of Protestants*; James, *Corruption of the Faith*; Pusey, *Rule of Faith*, *Church Review*, Jan., 1852.

† The comparison of the relation between the Scriptures and the Fathers to that between the laws of a state and the judicial interpretation of those laws, brings up the matter under another aspect. As "witnesses to the sense," the Fathers are to be received, so far as they are sensible.

Augustine's declaration, "I should never have received the Scriptures unless the authority of the church had moved me to do so," is fairly interpreted as meaning not, that the church gave authority to the Scriptures, but gave to Augustine his authority for receiving them.*

The position of the church of Rome is summed up in the "dictate" of Pope Gregory VII., "No book is to be regarded as canonical without the Pope's authority." The extreme statement is seen in Pighius (Hierarch, III. 3), "that the church can *give* canonical authority to books which have no such authority from themselves or their authors." This position is defended by a theory of inspiration—*inspiratio subsequens*. Bellarmine, however, says,† "That the church only *declares* what books are to be esteemed canonical—*ex veterum testimoniis, communi sensu, et quasi gustu populi Christiani*."

This position of the Roman Catholic church confounds: 1. Testimony with authority. 2. Church authority with divine authority. 3. The authority of the Roman Catholic church with that of the universal church.

The argument that "the church is older than the Scriptures" is also urged in support of the Roman Catholic view. But the church is only older than the *written* Scriptures, not than the Word of God—the revelation. That revelation through Christ and his

* Augustine, too, makes "confirmation in apostolic times" necessary. Cf. Theol. Quartelschrift, 1855, p. 61.

† De Verbo Dei, Lib. I., c. 10.

Apostles, the founders of the church, was written down by the Apostles, *not as the testimony of the church*, but as the testimony of God, and by the church as the witness to this delivery of divine testimony through the Apostles, has been handed down to us.

§ 2. *The Old Testament Canon.*

(1.) *Introductory.*

We here presuppose the proof (given in previous lectures) of the Integrity, Genuineness, and Credibility (or Authenticity) of the books composing the Canon.

The general results established are:

1. As to Integrity. It is proved from citations in the early Fathers, in the writings of heathen and Jews, by the Peschito and Old Latin versions, by manuscripts,* and by the well-known scrupulous care of the Jews.

2. As to Genuineness. Particular discussions as to certain books, especially those raised by Ewald,† result in the confirmation of their genuineness; but we are not deeply concerned in these discussions, inasmuch as we have for the Old Testament *as a whole*, the direct testimony of Christ and his Apostles that

*Six hundred of these were collated by Tischendorf. The Masoretic text of the Old Testament was settled in the eleventh century. The earlier MSS. have perished. Leading critics put one in the eighth century, one in the ninth or tenth. It is said that one exists at Odessa going back to 580—but this is doubtful. See Davidson's *Bibl. Crit.* i., 131, 370.

†Again by Kuenen and others.

it is the work of "Moses and the Prophets" instrumentally, and ultimately of God.

As to Credibility (Authenticity) the consideration just presented also applies in full force. Subordinate considerations are, that the writers are evidently truthful and trustworthy, their style is that of truthful men, they support each other, their historical accuracy is vindicated by recent discoveries, etc.

(2.) Proceeding, on the basis indicated above, to the question of the O. T. Canon, we find it to be simply this: What books of the Old Testament were received by Christ and his Apostles as divine?

The answer is: The Collection of Books which we have, and such as we have it, in the Hebrew Bible.

What is that Collection? What is included in the Canon of the Old Testament?

It comprises, the Law, the Prophets, and the "other writings" (Hagiographa). This is an ancient division; it is found in Josephus and Philo (in the Talmud also), and it is recognized in the N. Testament (Luke xxiv. 44)—"which were written in the law of Moses, and in the Prophets, and in the Psalms."*

The supposition of a double Canon (to get a warrant for the Apocrypha), Palestinian and Alexandrian, has no support.†

* Maimonides, in showing that this threefold division is not arbitrary, affirms that there are three stages of revelation: 1. Of the law—the basis of the whole. 2. The history under the law and the prophecies of future history. 3. The subjective effects of the revelation.

† Havernick, *Introd.*, Stuart, O. T. Can., p. 298.

(3.) The general historical proof as to the O. Testament Canon.

A chief head of evidence as to such a Collection is to be found within the Canon itself. As to "The Law," in such passages as Deut. xvii. 18, "And it shall be when he sitteth upon the throne of his kingdom that he shall write him a copy of this law in a book out of that which is before the priests, the Levites"; Deut. xxxi. 26, "Take this book of the law and put it in the side of the ark of the covenant of the Lord your God, that it may be there for a witness against thee." II. Kings xxii. 8, "And Hilkiah the high priest said unto Shaphan the scribe, I have found the book of the law in the house of the Lord."

As to the *Law and the Prophets*, in such passages as Zech. vii. 12, "Yea, they made their hearts as an adamant stone, lest they should hear the law, and the words which the Lord of hosts hath sent in his Spirit by the former prophets."*

As to "the other writings," Prov. xxv. 1, "These are also proverbs of Solomon, which the men of Hezekiah king of Judah copied out"—showing a Collection. Ps. lxxii. 20, "The prayers of David the son of Jesse are ended." Eccles. xii. 11, 12, "The words of the wise are as goads and as fastened nails; the collections (or collection) are from one shepherd. And, my son, be warned from what goes beyond these: of making many books there is no end, and

* Cf. Keil. "The law and the prophets are referred to here, as collected."

much study" (much itching to read all) "is a weariness to the flesh." *

Jeremiah cites largely from the old literature.

As a specimen of the evidence in regard to the O. T. Canon which is furnished by *Jewish writers*, Josephus may be quoted. He says,† to show the superiority of the Jewish literature: "The Greeks have not, like the Jews, *public*, authorized, authentic collections. Among the Hebrews, the priests and the prophets have had an unusual care for their books; there are not 10,000 books, but they are sifted." He says also ‡ that twenty-two books are received as divine: five books of Moses, thirteen of the prophets,§ and four containing songs of praise and precepts for the conduct of life. These declarations of Josephus as to the books which were deemed sacred are abundantly confirmed by his casual quotations.

The 1st Book of Maccabees, c. ix. 27, speaks of "a great affliction which was in Israel, the like whereof was not since the time that a prophet was not seen among them." Also, ch. iv. 26, "And they laid up the stones (of the sanctuary) in the mountain of the temple in a convenient place, until there should come a prophet to show what should be done with them." These utterances confirm the general tradition that

* Cf. Oehler in Herzog, Art. *Kanon*, S. 248.

† Contra Apionem, Bk. I., c. 8.

‡ Antiq., Bk. xi., ch. 6.

§ To make out the 13. Judges and Ruth, I. II. Sam., I. II. Kings, I. II. Chronicles, Ezra and Nehemiah, Jeremiah and Lamentations, are counted each as one book, and Job is counted among the prophets; the twelve minor prophets forming one book.

Malachi was the last of the prophets (in the reign of Artaxerxes, 430-424, B. C.) (The passage, I. Macc. iv. 26, incidentally shows that no personage of sufficient authority to write and procure credit for the Book of Daniel was known in the time of the Maccabees.)

The Pharisees arose in the interval, the inflexible guardians of the letter of the O. T. Scriptures. Since then there has been a uniform Jewish tradition, allowing no alteration.*

The Septuagint Version—it is agreed on all sides—was made not later than 280 B. C. It bears testimony to the Canon as we have it.

The testimony of the Fathers of the Church shows that they had received from the Jews the same Canon which we have. Irenæus, Melito of Sardis (gives twenty one books, omitting Esther), Theodoret, Chrysostom, Eusebius, Jerome, Augustine, give explicit testimony.

The Prologue to the Wisdom of Jesus the Son of Sirach (earlier than the books of the Maccabees) has this expression: "Whereas many and great things have been delivered to us by the law and the prophets, my grandfather Jesus, when he had much given himself to the reading of the law and the prophets and other books of our fathers, and had gotten therein good judgment, was drawn on also himself to write."†

* Norton's assertion that "all Jewish books and literature at the time of the Return were put into the Canon" is destitute of evidence. Cf. Stuart, p. 243.

† Compare the Prologue to Luke's Gospel. Observe, in passing, that this writer *does not speak* as authoritative and inspired. He asks (later) "to be pardoned in what he may come short."

(4.) The testimony of Christ and his Apostles as to the O. T. Canon.

The threefold division is recognized by Christ, Luke xxiv. 44, "which were written in the law of Moses, and in the prophets, and in the psalms, concerning me."

Luke iv. 17, "And there was delivered unto him (*i. e.*, to Christ, in the synagogue at Nazareth) the book of the prophet Esaias." *

Acts xv. 21, "For Moses of old time hath in every city them that preach him, being read in the Synagogue every Sabbath day" (The address of the Apostle James).

Acts xiii. 27, (Paul at Antioch in Pisidia)—"because they know him not, nor yet the voices of the prophets which are read every Sabbath day—"

"The Law and the Prophets" formed the popular division of the Old Testament.

Acts xxvi. 27. "King Agrippa, believest thou the prophets?"

Acts xxvii. 2. (Paul at Thessalonica)—"and three Sabbath days reasoned with them out of the Scriptures."

Acts xvii. 11. (The Bereans) "Searched the Scriptures daily—"

Acts xviii. 24. Apollos, "mighty in the Scriptures—"

Acts xviii. 28. Apollos, "shewing by the Scriptures that Jesus was Christ."

* See also Matth. iv. 4, 7, 10; Luke xvi. 17; Mt. xxii. 40; xv. 6, 7; Lk. xx. 37, 42; John x. 35; Mt. xxii. 29; Lk. xvi. 29;—illustrating Christ's estimate and use of the O. T.

Acts viii. 28.—“A man of Ethiopia . . . was returning and sitting in his chariot read Esaias the prophet.”

Heb. i. 1, “God, who . . . spake in time past unto the fathers by the prophets.”

II. Tim. iii. 15, “And that from a child thou hast known the holy Scriptures.”

The Old Testament is called *ἡ γραφή* fifty-one times in the N. Testament, the word being used in a specific sense implying that there was but one *γραφή*.

All the citations from the Old Testament in the New—of which there have been counted of direct quotations 263, while of references there are 375—are proofs, more or less, that the Old Testament—as we have it—was held to be of divine authority.

The direct testimony which is to be adduced from the N. Testament to the *inspiration* of the Old completes the evidence of Christ and his apostles on the subject.

II. Pet. i. 21, “[Holy] men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost.”

II. Tim. iii. 16, “All Scripture [is] given by inspiration of God—”

(5) The Christian Fathers and early writers in the O. T. Canon.

It was received by all. Among early writers Marcion is an exception, whose arbitrary proceedings in respect to all sacred writings are well known.

Among opponents, Celsus directly attacks the O. Testament, “Because,” says Origen,* “he thought he

* Contra Cels. lib i., s. 22.

could not more effectually overthrow Christianity than by his assaults on the Jewish system on which the doctrine of our Saviour is acknowledged to be built." Lactantius* expresses the common testimony of the early writers: "The Jews use the Old Testament as we the New; but still the two are not diverse, for the New is the completion of the Old, Christ being the common testator."

§ 3. *The New Testament Canon.*

The same rule governs here as in respect to the O. T. Canon: Those books are canonical which have apostolic authority. The authority of the Apostles is derived from Christ, and rests on his promise that he would lead them into all truth, and that the Holy Spirit should bring all things which He had said unto them to their remembrance, should guide them into all truth and should teach them what they should speak. Hence, those books, which the Apostles wrote or sanctioned—in other words, those books as to which there is sufficient testimony that they have been received as the works of the Apostles of Christ, or as sanctioned by them—are canonical. The proposition to be maintained is this: The books which we receive as canonical have been in the Christian Church, and have been received as having apostolic authority from the times of the Apostles; and none others have been thus received.

The Roman Catholic position is, that the Church

* Div. Inst. lib. xiv., c. 20.

did not have the Canon for three centuries, and then decided upon it by Church authority. The position which we maintain is: The books were there, and the Church testified to them. The Church was like a jury which estimates the weight and decisiveness of evidence, but gives to it no intrinsic authority. We assert: (a) That the books were in the possession of the Church from the first and were considered to be of apostolic origin; (b) that they were appealed to from the first by the Fathers as authority; (c) yet that there was diversity of view as to some books, whether they were apostolic or not, whether there was enough evidence of this; and hence the practical necessity of some general understanding and decision. The diversity is in the greater or less degree of testimony; but all the books *have* testimony as to their apostolic origin.

Two points are to be noted. (1) In the circumstances of the composition of these works—as epistles or documents for special facts at the first—lies the ground of the diversity of testimony. Some books would be more widely, others less diffused. (2) While we do not say that there is equal testimony for all, while we agree that “John’s Gospel is the best attested book in the world,” that there is less testimony to the apostolic authorship or sanction of the Epistle to the Hebrews than to any of Paul’s acknowledged thirteen Epistles, that there is less for the Apocalypse—as John’s Book—than for his Gospel, and less for the 2d Ep. of Peter than for the 1st—we claim nevertheless that there *is sufficient testimony for all*. We also claim that if all over which

any doubt is cast were thrown out, enough would remain to confute the unbeliever and to stand as a divine record of the Christian Religion.

The early Church was competent only to give a verdict on the Canon according to the evidence; to declare what had been sufficiently received as resting upon Apostolic authority to afford good grounds for the belief that it did rest upon such authority. There is a world-wide difference between the declaration that certain facts are established by their proper evidence and that they are established, apart from the question of evidence, by the authority of those who report them.

The General Results as to the Canon of the New Testament.

1. The evidence is stringent as to all the main portions—both historical and doctrinal: *e. g.*, the Gospels of Matthew and John and 13 of Paul's Epistles, I. Peter, I. John (and James). If we rest here alone, we have enough, on historical grounds, to confute the skeptic, and establish all the fundamental facts and doctrines of the Christian system.

2. The evidence is satisfactory as far as the other books are concerned—the second Epistle of Peter and the Epistle of Jude perhaps having the least.

3. Though the Epistle to the Hebrews be not ascribed to Paul, nor the Apocalypse to John, yet there is evidence sufficient to show that they contain apostolic teaching and were received as such. And even on historical grounds the preponderance of evidence is in favor of the authorship of Paul and John.

4. Great care was used by the early Church in

sifting evidence and receiving documents. A higher degree of critical sagacity was brought to bear upon the books composing the New Testament than upon any other literature.*

5. If from internal evidence we should now attempt to draw the line between canonical and uncanonical books, between inspired and uninspired, we could not draw it anywhere else. Let one read the Epistles of the Fathers, and mark their conscious and confessed dependence—their entire lack of that original authority which characterizes the canonical Scriptures. None of their Epistles has the apostolic air or weight. Especially let the Apocryphal Gospels be read, and let the reader try to imagine the Church at the beginning of the fourth century including them in the collection of books which had been received from the beginning!

PART II.

THE INSPIRATION OF THE SCRIPTURES.

§ 1. *The distinction between Revelation and Inspiration.*

The specific revelation from God—as distinguished from the manifestation of himself in Nature †—appears among men in a supernatural way or order, yet so that the supernatural unites with the natural in the communications which are made. This Revelation is through teachers, prepared for the work,

* Many spurious works passed unchallenged under the name of writings of Plato and Aristotle.

† *αποκάλυψις* as distinguished from *φανέρωσις*.

such as Moses, David, Isaiah, John, Paul : through men as for men. Through such teachers the Revelation is made manifest as a complete authenticated Revelation in a threefold form: 1. Miracles; 2. Prophecy; 3. Inspiration of teachers (*a*) as respects speech, (*b*) as respects writing. This is the threefold mode of Revelation as supernatural.

We do not here speak of Miracles and Prophecy, but of Inspiration—of the divine influence upon word and utterance of man through which the Revelation from God is presented to men in such lights and under such points of view as God has determined.

Revelation,* in strictness of speech, is the communication from God to man of such truths and facts in respect to divine nature and kingdom as are not and could not otherwise be known. It is *ἀποκάλυψις*, an uncovering of things already existing—in the unseen world or in the divine purpose—but which only the divine will could disclose to man.

Inspiration is that divine influence by virtue of which the truths and facts given by revelation as well as other truths and facts pertaining to God's kingdom are spoken or written in a truthful and authoritative manner. (Truthful *and* authoritative: for many things are included in the inspired record respecting God's kingdom and many things are excluded, because God would have it so; because he determined that, for the end which he was pursuing, the truth was to be placed in certain points of view,

* See Revelation and Inspiration by Prof. E. P. Barrows in *Bibl. Sacra*, Oct., 1867.

and was to be presented under selections which would secure to the whole record a truthfulness of effect, *i. e.*, a power of making truthful impressions which is above all human skill.)*

Confusion of thought upon this subject often arises from neglect to discriminate between Inspiration as (properly)† used in a broader, and as used in a stricter sense. A man must be, in an important sense, inspired, in order to receive a revelation. Some action of the Divine Spirit upon his internal faculties and whole‡ state is requisite, in order that he may discern and know that God is speaking to him or communicating with him. Furthermore—as a matter of fact—the spiritual vision of those who have been chosen as the media of God's Revelation has been greatly quickened by the agency of the Holy Spirit. In all the chief persons who have spoken in the name of God we discern a holy personality which is intimately blended with—showing the effects of action and reaction with—the divine message itself. God speaks through the personality as well as through the lips of his messengers.

These divine effects produced within the souls of inspired men are apt to be confounded with the

* This paragraph gathered from a slight hint of the author.

† There are "broad" senses ascribed to the word which are unjustifiable.

‡ This is a part of what is called *Illuminatio*—the other part being the inseparable effect upon the heart. Divine illumination may be doubtless found in high measure in the distinguished theologians of the Church and in her symbols and conferences, but in these it is not of the last authority, it is not infallible—not *normal*.

specific inspiration which renders them infallible in respect to communicating and setting forth the things pertaining to God's kingdom as God would have them set forth; *i. e.*, with a *divine* truthfulness of impression and effect, which may admit—may require—the use of human limitations of knowledge.

§ 2. *Theories of Inspiration.*

The extreme theories are: that all the contents of the Bible were dictated word for word, and syllable by syllable: and the naturalistic theory that the Bible has no other inspiration than that common to all works of genius.

The former theory may be compared to that view of the divine sovereignty which annuls human agency and makes every act to be from an immediate divine efficiency. It has now scarcely any advocates. But all who believe in the inspiration of the Scriptures in any valid sense, agree that in *many cases* the inspiration must be verbal; that the apostles often spoke in words which the Holy Ghost taught; and almost all grant that we cannot separate in consciousness between thoughts and language. The theory, however, that the dictation of thoughts and language was the exclusive mode in which the Holy Spirit operated to produce the entire word of God has to be explained so as to be consistent with different reports of the same sayings, and with different details of the same facts, and with different citations of the same passage, and after it has been subjected to these modifications, it is no longer a commanding theory.

1. The lowest of all theories is that which makes the Scriptures to be exclusively human. Inspiration is only the elevation of the soul in its natural functions and processes. A genius in any sphere of thought or activity and an inspired man are equivalents. Spinoza first openly advocated this position.* No debate upon the subject of Inspiration with such opponents is called for, as the question to be debated with them is that of the possibility and reality of a Revelation. (See Apologetics.)

2. There is next to be mentioned the view of those who accept a specific historical revelation, as given to prophets and apostles and centering in Christ, but who restrict inspiration to the effect produced by this revelation upon the mind and heart of those who received it, under the illuminating power of the Holy Spirit. That is, the inspiration is simply the subjective effect of the objective Revelation, secured by the power of the Holy Spirit. And the record of the revelation is the record of this subjective consciousness. There is no distinguishable inspiration of the

* Deists and all extreme rationalists concur. Thus the elder Fichte (*Kritik aller Offenbarung*, 173), "It is neither morally nor theoretically possible for a revelation to give us instructions, which our reason might not and ought not to arrive at without the revelation." F. W. Newman claims "that an authoritative external revelation is impossible to man." Theo. Parker defended the position, that "inspiration is the consequence of the faithful use of our faculties."

Deists may admit a natural revelation in the intuitive truths of reason and conscience; but beyond this they do not recognize any communication of the divine will. They can regard inspiration only as an exaltation of the natural faculties, a heightening of the consciousness in the contemplation of rational and moral intuitions.

Scriptures *as* scriptures. This is the view of Schleiermacher and De Wette; of Bunsen; of Scherer and Morell, in part. Thus Schleiermacher resolves the inspired authority of the New Testament into the "normal dignity" of the apostles, as the first recipients of the fullness of the Spirit. Morell makes revelation to be the presentation of the object, and inspiration the power of reciprocity in the subject; an influence by which the apostles were able to grasp the revelation. He says,* revelation is "the act of God, presenting to us the realities of the spiritual world." "Inspiration is that especial influence wrought upon the faculties of the subject, by virtue of which he is able to grasp these realities in their fullness and integrity." It is evident that in this theory, inspiration is not extricated or distinguished from revelation. The specific divine agency in respect to the production of the Scriptures is lost from view.

(3.) In another class of theories, revelation and inspiration begin to be more carefully distinguished, and inspiration is viewed more objectively and independently, as having specific reference to the record. Here comes in the formula: "The Scriptures *contain* the word of God," in distinction from the formula: "The Bible *is* the Word of God." It is acknowledged that the writers are inspired, divinely guided in what they write, yet not in such a way that all the Bible is inspired, so as to be free from error. Inspiration extends to what is essential, especially moral and religious truth; but the Bible is not inspired as

* Philosophy of Religion, pp. 149, 167.

to chronology, history, and science. Its details are not guaranteed. Thus are met the objections urged on the ground of discrepancies and inaccuracies. At the same time, the theory does not undertake to draw the line distinctly between the uninspired and the inspired portions of the sacred volume. This general view is held by most of the modern German commentators and theologians, even the more evangelical; though the latter usually say that the alleged errors are unimportant.* Tholuck's position,† that "the Bible as we have it cannot in any case be held to be verbally inspired, and hence the contents of Scripture, *in all its details*, cannot be regarded as externally guaranteed," has been defended by Rothe, Schenkel, Meyer, and many others in Germany; by Coleridge, Arnold, Alford, Stanley, and Jowett in England; and by the Unitarians in this country. Twisten, in his *Dogmatics*, views the Bible as inspired somewhat in proportion as its sayings refer directly to Christ and his kingdom.

(4.) The remaining view is that of those who accept the Bible as an infallible authority, free from error. Inspiration gives us a book, properly called the Word of God, *inspired in all its parts*. The inspiration is *plenary* in the sense of extending to all the parts and of extending also to the words.

* As Faustus Socinus had said. *De Auctoritate S. Scrip.* "Summa est, eos (Evangelistas) nihil prorsus inter se dissentire in iis historiæ partibus quæ alicujus sint momenti. Et quod in quibusdam rebus minimis inter se differant, hoc non solum illis non minuere, sed augere etiam debere auctoritatem et fidem."

† In his "Essay on the Doctrine of Inspiration."

Here, however, a distinction is made. Those who are embraced under this class hesitate to define Inspiration as meaning a dictation of the words of Scripture. It is rather viewed as a divine influence upon the writers, extending indeed to the selection of words, yet not necessarily, in all cases, dictating the words themselves. The inspiration has respect to the inspired person, the writer, and is not solely concerned about the word, or the things written. This view is adopted in order to account for the manifest diversities of style in the writers, and to save their individuality.*

But this general theory has likewise its diversities of statement, of which at least two may be distinguished. (*a*) That of degrees of inspiration, according to the subject matter; (*b*) A denial of degrees of inspiration, and the assertion of a divine guidance reaching to the words, the mode of this influence being left undetermined.

(*a*) The theory of degrees of inspiration was derived from the Jewish Doctors,† on the basis of the traditional threefold division of the Old Testament. Dr. John Dick‡ gave the most explicit statement of the theory. Inspiration, though “plenary” and consisting in the “infallible guidance and direction” of the sacred writers, has not “the same sense” in ap-

* E. Lord (Plenary Inspiration of the Holy Scs., 1858) defines plenary inspiration as “an infallible guidance of the writers instead of a conveyance to their minds of the infallible thoughts and words which they were to record.”

† See Lee on Inspiration, p. 402.

‡ Essay on Inspiration, 1820, reprinted in Boston, 1821.

plication to all parts of the Scriptures. He recognizes four degrees (as does Dr. Daniel Wilson),* which are: "Suggestion:" the Holy Spirit suggests or even dictates the truth; "Direction:" the writers are left to describe the matter revealed in their own way, the mind being only guided; "Elevation," which adds vigor to the natural powers; and "Superintendency," which is the watchful care exercised by the Spirit, so that nothing derogatory to the revelation be inserted.

(δ) The theory of an Infallible Guidance or Influence extending even to the words—yet not necessarily in all cases a dictation of the words. Prof. Lee† says: "The problem to be solved supplies two conditions; (1) The co-existence of human and divine elements in the Bible; and (2) The fact that certain portions of the Bible are not revelation. He meets the conditions by defining Inspiration as "that actuating energy of the Holy Spirit which guided the prophets and apostles in officially proclaiming the will of God by word of mouth, and in committing to *writing* the several portions of the Bible." "Even the form and language in which its truths are expressed bear the impress of its divine origin." Dr. Woods‡ says: "That the sacred writers had such a direction of the Holy Spirit, that they were secured against all liability to error, and enabled to write just what God pleased; so that what they wrote is,

* Lectures on the Evidences. Lect. xiii.

† The Inspiration of the Holy Scriptures, reprinted in New York, 1857.

‡ Lectures, i. 171.

in truth, the Word of God, and can never be subject to any charge of mistake, either as to matter or form. He dislikes the theory of "degrees," and does not advocate the theory of a dictation of language, but contends that "the work of the divine Spirit in the sacred penmen related to the language they used and their manner of expressing their ideas." Several of the later German writers, while denying dictation, concede the inherent connection between thoughts and words, and say that the words must virtually be included in the inspiring act. Thus Beck, in his *Introduction to the System of Christian Doctrine*, says: "This coalescence of the word with the thing, of the manifestation with the contents, in the one product of the revealing Spirit, lies in the nature of the case."

(5.) There remains one other theory which is sometimes termed "the mechanical"; though its real import is hardly denoted by this epithet, any more than "dynamical" expresses the peculiarity of the previous view. It differs from the last view, in being purely objective; making Inspiration, in its vital sense, to refer to the divine act alone—the act of imparting the Scriptures themselves, in language, to the writers. The Word is infallible, but not the man who writes the Word, and it is infallible because it is the very Word of God. There is no commingling of divine and human elements in the inspiration; for inspiration is simply a divine act and energy. In the previous theory, the divine inspiring agency is represented as acting through and in men, "guiding," "influencing," them in the choice of words; in this

theory the divine agency consists in giving to prophets and apostles the words themselves.

This theory undoubtedly expresses the simple and spontaneous faith of the church, both Jewish and Christian,* as to the sacred books, before speculation and Biblical criticism led to further distinctions.† It expresses what must be conceded as to large portions of the Bible, where God himself is introduced as speaking, where prophecies are directly imparted and where specific revelations are made.

PART III.

CONCLUSIONS FROM THE FOREGOING PARTS.—THE SCRIPTURES THE ONLY RULE OF FAITH.

The “formal principle” of Protestant Christianity: The Scriptures are the chief source and the only rule of the knowledge of revelation—“the only and sufficient rule of faith and practice.” Nothing which cannot be proved or fairly deduced from Scripture is to be deemed part of the Word of God. This is only saying in other words that the Scriptures are

* For a full collection of expressions on the subject, see Lee on Inspiration, and especially Westcott, Introduction to the Gospels, Appendix B.

† And after all sifting and distinctions, the theory is maintained by eminent theologians and scholars. Gaussen says: “The style of Moses, Ezekiel, and Luke, is the style of God.” Dr. Tregelles says: “I believe the sixty-six books of the Old and New Testaments to be verbally the Word of God as absolutely as were the Ten Commandments written by the finger of God upon two tables of stone.”

the comprehensive ("chief source") and the authoritative ("only rule") source of theology. The statement is made in opposition to three claims: (1) The Roman Catholic—that tradition is of equal, and in some cases, of superior authority to Scripture; (2) The theory of illumination of the indwelling Spirit, held by Mystics; (3) The rationalistic theory, that the Scriptures are to be received so far only as they contain what is approved by natural reason.

(A) What is implied of the Protestant principle—

(1.) That the Bible is the Word of God.

(2.) That the Bible alone is the Word of God. To tradition is allowed all proper force of testimony as to what the word is, but not authority as containing an additional word. Illumination of the Holy Spirit is firmly held, but as the light by which the word is read and understood, not as a new species of revelation to each man by which the word is practically superseded; and natural reason is not allowed as the test of divine teachings, which must be expected to go beyond the present reach of reason, as otherwise revelation would not be necessary.

(3.) The Bible is the infallible rule of faith and duty in contrast to the claim that the authority of the church is final. The church is a true witness to many things relating to the chief source of theology, but is not herself such a source.

(4.) It is implied that the Bible is "sufficient," *i. e.*, contains all that is necessary in order to salvation.

(5.) It is also implied that the Bible may be known

under the illumination of the same Spirit who guided in the writing. The doctrine of the "perspicuity" of Scripture. If there remain some things hard to be understood, yet these are not absolutely necessary in order to salvation.

(6.) As to the "right of private judgment." This is not an absolute, but a relative, right, as against the claim of authoritative interpretation on the part of the church. The record being proved divine, the Protestant claims that each reader should interpret the word for himself, using, of course, all available helps, and especially relying upon the inward illumination of the Holy Spirit. This claim is made: (*a*) From the nature of the case. We must decide for ourselves somewhere, and we may as well stop at the Bible as at the decrees and traditions of the church. (*b*) Protestantism makes the matter one of personal, moral responsibility; the opposing view tends to lower the sense of personal responsibility and the moral tone. (*c*) The promise of the Holy Spirit is given to all believers with respect to the Bible. (*d*) The Scriptures commend no other authority.*

(B) The Roman Catholic Rule of Faith.

In respect to the Scriptures, Romanists and Protestants agree that the Bible is of divine authority, is the Word of God. Romanists receive all that Protestants do. They differ: (*a*) The former hold that there were oral teachings of the Apostles which have been handed down, and these, they claim, are neces-

* See Brownson's Review, Oct., 1852.

sary to complete the Scriptures. The Protestant position of the "completeness" of Scripture is taken as against this claim. (*b*) That an infallible church is necessary to define what is true with reference to tradition and Scripture. (*c*) They make the Vulgate the authority in controversy. (*d*) They do not favor—rather, hinder—the general circulation of the Bible. (*e*) They ascribe divine authority to the Apocrypha of the Old Testament.

§ 1. *Of Tradition in the Roman Catholic sense.*

The question here is: "Can tradition as well as Scripture, be proved to be from God?" The decrees of the Council of Trent assert that "all should receive with equal reverence the Old and New Testaments and Tradition, as though proceeding from the mouth of Christ, and whosoever despises tradition shall be Anathema."

(1.) What is implied in this view: (*a*) That the word, originally unwritten, came from Christ and the Apostles, and has from them been handed down. (*b*) This tradition does not supersede or contradict Scripture; it is necessary to complete Scripture. (*c*) Consequently the Bible is incomplete in itself. (*d*) Hence it needs an infallible interpreter.

(2.) The original and true sense of tradition. Tradition originally meant any thing handed down, and was applicable to the Scriptures and to oral teaching. In II. Thess. ii. 15, we have an example of this usage: "Therefore, brethren, stand fast, and hold the traditions which ye have been taught, whether by

word, or our Epistle." Of tradition, in this sense, and of its value, there can be no question.

(3.) Difficulties in the way of handing down tradition. If we should grant that there was a body of truth to be handed down, how can we know that this was done, how can we get at the tradition? Only through testimony, by witnesses. The Apostles taught and preached, and the Fathers heard them. This oral word must at last be written. Hence it comes to pass that what was oral from the Apostles was written by the Fathers. But the Fathers testify many things which do not belong in "tradition"; then the assertion is, that "the consent of the Fathers" must decide the tradition. "That belongs to tradition which is believed always, everywhere, and by all." But this is either superfluous or insufficient; superfluous, if upon points which have never been questioned; insufficient, if upon other points; and as, upon controverted matters there is disagreement among Fathers, the necessity arises of the claim of an infallible church to tell us in what the Fathers agree. The stages of "tradition" then, are these: (a) Divine, (b) Apostolic, (c) Patristic, (d) Consent of Fathers; (e) That consent as expounded by the church. (f) Then, strife as to whether this consent is to be decided by a Pope and Councils, or ultimately by the Pope. (g) The Popes disagree.

(4.) Arguments of Roman Catholics for tradition.

(a) From Scripture. They quote such passages as I. Thess. ii. 13; II. Thess. ii. 2; John xvi. 12; xxi. 25; I. Cor. xi. 2. These texts only prove that there was a body of oral teaching, which no one questions.

(b) From the nature of the case. There must have been such teaching, and it would have been carefully preserved. This is true to a certain extent. But has it been so preserved that we can get at it?

(c) It is said that the Fathers recognize such tradition. In many cases, however, where the Fathers use the word "tradition," they refer to the recorded word of the apostles. Where tradition with them means something more, it does not necessarily mean that it is of equal authority and binding power with Scripture. On the contrary, the best of the Fathers, as Polycarp, Justin Martyr, Irenæus, Tertullian, witness in favor of the sole authority of Scripture.

(d) Romanists sometimes say that Protestants concede the insufficiency of the Scriptures, and use tradition in reference to proving certain points; *e. g.*, the practice of infant baptism and the perpetual obligation of the Eucharist. But Protestants find for the former a basis in the Bible, and quote the Fathers in support, and they prove the latter from I. Cor. xi. 26. Protestants argue against the Episcopal succession, the three-fold order of the priesthood, the descent into Hades, for all of which the Fathers are cited. Romanists also say that we must depend on the Fathers in order to establish the Canon. But we use the Fathers for testimony simply, to show that the books were thus received in their days.

§ 2. *The claim of Infallibility.*

The claim as to tradition must logically lead to this, as it is ultimately resolved into the doctrine respecting the church. "This one church cannot err

in its discipline, since it is directed by the Holy Ghost." The church is infallible as to all truth pertaining to religion. All that the church believes must be received; no distinction is made between essential and non-essential truths.

Roman Catholics differ as to the extent of infallibility. (a) As to whether it extends to faith alone or also to facts about faith. According to the Janenists, the Pope cannot err about doctrine, but may about facts. (b) As to the seat of infallibility, as to where it resides in the last resort. The Episcopal or Cismontane view maintains: that God gave the Pope power in cases of a spiritual, but not of a temporal, character; that the "Gallican customs" are to be observed; that the Pope is not supreme in matters of the church unless he has the sanction of the church. The Papal or Ultramontane system claims that the Pope is universal bishop; that the Episcopate derives its rights from him; that in the last resort the Pope has the final authority. Yet even here it is not held that the Pope is in all cases infallible, but only when speaking *ex cathedra*, i. e., deciding dogmatically.

(1.) Arguments of Roman Catholics for infallibility.

(a) The promise of divine guidance, as in John xvi. This is a general promise, however, to all disciples, and not in regard to the interpretation of Scripture. By pressing the Roman Catholic interpretation, all Christians would be proved to be inspired.

(b) Matt. xviii. 17, is urged: "If he shall neglect to hear them, tell it to the church; but if he neg-

lect to hear the church, let him be unto thee as an heathen man and a publican." But this passage refers to cases of discipline of private persons, and has no reference to the interpretation of Scripture.

(c) The promise to Peter, "upon this rock," Matt. xvi. 13-20, is alleged. But the most natural interpretation of this rock is to refer it to Peter's confession. Even if it refers to Peter, it does not contain a promise to any other, to any successors, nor does it declare that he shall have infallibility in interpreting.

(d) It is said that an infallible judge of controversy is needed. But as far as we need an infallible judge, we have it in the Scriptures. The final comparison is between the clearness of Scripture and the decrees of the church. It is as easy to decide on Scripture as on the decrees of the church.

(2.) Arguments against infallibility.

(a) It is against history, fairly interpreted, that there has been a centre of infallible truth. We find many divergencies. The Roman Catholic claim is denied by the Greek church. The decrees of one bishop are set aside by successors. The articles of the early councils are rejected or set aside by those of later days.

(b) Roman Catholics reason in a circle as far as concerns scriptural truth. They appeal to Scripture to give the proof of their infallibility, while only infallibility can give the interpretation of Scripture from which the proof is drawn. On Scriptural grounds there is much higher authority for the infallibility of the Jewish priest than for that of the Roman pontiffs. Deut. xvii. 9-12.

(c) We do not need an infallible church. We need

an infallible teacher, and we have it in writings conveying infallible truth, and in their interpretation involving the exercise of our reason and conscience.

(*d*) The claim, as made by the Roman Catholics, is an usurpation of God's prerogative.

(*e*) The practical effect is, to establish the despotic claims of a despotic church.

(C) The Mystical Theory of Illumination.

Protestants hold that believers are illuminated as well as sanctified by the Holy Ghost. See Edwards on the Affections, Introd. chap. The question with Mystics is, Which in the last resort is the arbiter, Scripture or illumination? The Protestant view is, that illumination is given to enable us to understand the Word. Mysticism agrees with Romanism in putting something as the ultimate arbiter besides Scripture, but finds this something in the inward light of each individual. Some Mystics distinguish between the inward light and inspiration, holding that inspiration is for the intellect.

Objections to this theory: (*a*) The Scriptures do not promise such a light. The promises are general. (*b*) The arguments for the sufficiency of Scripture are against this view; (*c*) The view leads to enthusiasm and fanaticism.

(D) The Rationalistic View.

Some rationalists, as Theo. Parker and F. W. Newman, assert that reason is the only source of divine truth, denying revelation. These we do not consider here. Others, granting a revelation, assert that those parts only can be received which agree with the dictates of reason.

Objections:

(1.) In strictness this position is not consistent with the ground taken by the advocates of it, viz., that a revelation is needed. If we grant that, then we must accept the teachings of the revelation, even if we cannot understand all of them.

(2.) This view sets up a claim for human reason in respect to divine truth which would be scouted in other departments of investigation, as, *e. g.*, in the Natural Sciences. When we go to a source to be taught, we must receive the truth as it is given, and not according to our theory of how it ought to be given.

(3.) This view practically claims that we cannot believe a truth until we fully understand it. But (a) This is not our course in other departments. We know that some things are true, though we do not see their ultimate grounds and ends. What is the connection between mind and body, between sensation and thought? How can motives affect the will? What is gravity? electricity? force? If this is true in the sphere of natural and mental science, how much more in respect to revealed truth? (b) The view is inconsistent with the nature of faith. Faith rests on the basis of sufficient authority as to the fact. (c) The nature of revelation refutes this theory. We should expect that in a revelation from God there will be a dark and mysterious background. When again we consider the objects of a revelation, we have still stronger reason for accepting what we cannot understand.

The only consistent rationalism is that which denies the need of a revelation.

CONCLUSION FROM ALL THE FOREGOING.

The Use of Revelation in the Theological System.

(1.) Each doctrine is to be established by Scripture. No doctrine can have place in a system which may not be thus proved. More particularly, it should appear—

(a) That the final form of statement is scriptural, is the result of the fair sum of what Scripture says.

(b) That each doctrine is an integral part of the Scripture itself.

(c) That it has the same place as in Scripture, *i. e.*, that no more stress be laid upon it in the system than it has in the Scriptures.

(2.) Scriptural proof is to be conducted :

(a) In accordance with the fundamental rules of correct interpretation. The historico-grammatical sense of each passage is to be given. The Scriptures are to be interpreted in the spirit in which they were written. What is called “two senses” of Scripture is not allowable. Scripture may have a double application, but grammatically only one sense.

(b) The doctrine should have in its favor the consent of Scripture, or “the analogy of faith.” For each doctrine and truth we should seek not merely incidental statements, but the consent of the Old and New Testaments ; so that it shall be seen to run through the Bible.

(3.) The Ideal of a complete scriptural proof of the Theological System.

(a) That the same facts and truths which are fundamental and central in the Bible be so in the system.

224 INTRODUCTION TO CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY.

(*b*) That the array of scriptural evidence for each fact and truth be such as to show that it has the consent of Scripture both as to substance and mode of expression.

(*c*) That it be brought under scientific form.

CHAPTER VI.

THE DIVISIONS OF THEOLOGY.—OUTLINE OF THE THEOLOGICAL SYSTEM.

There are three main divisions :

- I. The Antecedents of Redemption.
- II. The Redemption itself, comprising the doctrine of the Person of the Redeemer and His work.
- III. The Consequents of Redemption.

Division I. THE ANTECEDENTS OF REDEMPTION.

We have here four chief topics.

Part I.—*Theology* proper. The doctrine of God.

A. Of God as known by the light of nature and of revelation, as the absolute, infinite, personal Spirit, perfect in wisdom, power, and holiness. The doctrine of the divine being and attributes.

B. Of God as Triune. The Father, Son, and Spirit. The Manifested Trinity. The Essential Trinity. The Revelation of God as Father, Son, and Spirit in the work of Redemption, based upon the eternal Tri-Personality. The Doctrine of the Eternal Generation of the Son.

Part II.—*Christian Cosmology*. The doctrine of the works of God. His Relation to the Finite Universe. The Plan (or "decrees") of God. Creation by Fiat. The Government of God. The End of God in Creation. The Theodicy.

Part III.—*Christian Anthropology*. The doctrine of Man, his endowments; the constituents of his being. Man in his origin, capabilities, and destiny. Man as a moral being, embracing the discussion of the powers of conscience, of the law of God in its general bearings, and of the Nature of Virtue. Also, the origin of the Human Race, whether by Creation or development,* and the origin of individual souls. Creationism, Traducianism, Pre-Existence. The primitive moral state of man.

Part IV.—*Christian Hamartology*. The Christian doctrine of sin. Of man as we now find him, in a state of sin. Here the discussion of the Will,† of Ability, of Liberty, and Necessity. Of the origin and nature of this state of depravity. The Temptation and Fall. The consequences of the Fall. The penalty of transgression, "Death." The Sinfulness of mankind. Original Sin. The Imputation of the Sin of the First Man.

The whole subject of the antecedents of redemption concludes with exhibiting man, a moral being, made for God and his service, lying under the penalty and the power of sin, from which he cannot deliver himself. Hence the transition to the Saviour and his work.

* The author preferred to discuss this and the question of the antiquity of man under Apologetics.

† This would come most properly under the general title of man's endowments, but practically, as the urgent questions come up in connection with man's depravity, the subject is most conveniently considered here.

Division II.—THE PERSON AND WORK OF THE REDEEMER.

This in three chief parts.

Part I.—*The Incarnation in its general nature and objects*, on scriptural, historical, and philosophical grounds.

Part II.—*The Person of the Redeemer*. The doctrine of the two natures and of their union.

Part III.—*The Work of the Mediator*. Christ as prophet, priest, and king.

Part I.—*The Incarnation in its general nature and objects*. (1) The points presupposed, viz., the doctrine respecting sin and such a view of the Godhead as makes the Incarnation possible. (2) The Incarnation as a fact. (3) The relation of the Incarnation to man's moral wants. (4) How far the Incarnation may be said to be necessary on the part of God. (5) The historical evidence that all forms of religion have sought to arrive at some union between God and man. (6) The Incarnation on philosophical grounds. (7) The Incarnation as seen in different ecclesiastical and theological systems. (8) The work of Christ as represented under the form of a covenant.

Part II.—*The Person of Christ*. The doctrine of the Son of God as manifested in the flesh. The God-Man. (1) The scriptural teachings as to the Person of Christ. (2) The discussions and conclusions of the earlier times. (3) The later doctrinal differences (since the Reformation). (4) Reaffirmation of the ancient conclusions after discussion of objections and difficulties.

Part III.—*The Work of the Mediator.* Here especially of *The Atonement.* (1) The general object of Christ's coming; He came chiefly to redeem. (And Redemption involves (a) removal of the condemnation of sin; (b) renewing of our moral natures; (c) giving title to eternal life.) (2) The necessity of the atonement,—not metaphysical, but moral. (3) Scriptural teachings as to Christ's work. (4) Incidental questions as to the nature of the atoning work. (5) Theories of the atonement. (6) A comprehensive statement of the nature of the atonement. (7) The extent of the atonement.

Division III.—THE CONSEQUENTS OF REDEMPTION.

We have here to consider God as renewing and sanctifying his chosen, through the work of the Holy Spirit, as applying what Christ has done for men. The governing fact in all this division is the union between Christ and the believer, through the Holy Spirit.

As a preliminary, the fact that some are chosen of God is to be considered, giving us the subject of *election.*

Then the division has three parts.

Part I.—*The Union between Christ and the Individual.*

Part II.—*The Union between Christ and the Church. The Fellowship of Souls in Him.*

Part III.—*The Consummation of this Union in the kingdom of Redemption. The Eschatology.*

Preliminary. PREDESTINATION AND ELECTION.

(1.) Calvinistic doctrine neither precludes nor requires the holding of the doctrine of philosophical necessity. (2) The Scriptural teaching. (3) Election is the application of the law of causality to the religious life.* (4) The Gospel Call.

Part I.—*The Union between Christ and the Individual.*

(A) Justification. (We speak here of the provision for Justification. Regeneration presupposes this. The act of Justification is subsequent to Regeneration. But Regeneration has the provision for Justification as its basis, hence our order.) (1) Terms and their usage. (2) Justification involves a righteousness as its ground, which cannot be the personal righteousness of the sinner. (3) Faith, the instrumental cause of Justification. (4) The difference between Roman Catholic and Protestant views. (5) Imputation and Justification. The union with Christ, the ground of the imputation.

(B) Regeneration. (1) Statements here must not be too abstract. Real regeneration allies the soul with Christ. (2) Necessity of regeneration. (3) Regeneration subjectively considered. (4) The author of regeneration. (5) The ultimate regenerating act of the Holy Spirit. (6) Means of regeneration. (7) The conscious processes of the soul in regeneration. Repentance (Conversion).

(C) Sanctification. (1) General idea. Carrying to completion the work begun in regeneration of mak-

* "As all events have their appropriate causes, so for our religious life we are dependent on God as the cause." And what God does in time He purposed to do from eternity.

ing the individual like Christ. The process of subduing nature by grace. (2) The means of sanctification. (3) Perfectionism. (4) Perseverance of the Saints.

Part II. — *The Union between Christ and the Church.**

(A) The Nature of the Church.

(B) The Sacraments of the Church.

(C) The Ministry of the Church.

Part III.—*The Consummation of the Union with Christ in Time and in Eternity. The Eschatology.*

(A) The course of things in the progress of the Church. Millenarianism. The Advent.

(B) The course of things in the history of the individual soul. (1) Death and immortality. (2) Intermediate state. (3) Resurrection. (4) The last judgment. (5) The awards of the last day. (a) Eternity of punishment one of time not of degree, is plainly taught in the Bible; the question is one of scriptural revelation, which speculation cannot answer. (b) The award of eternal life to the righteous. More will be saved than lost, probably. The Eternal Heaven.

And thus does Christian theology end in a song of thanksgiving and praise. It is a temple filled with the glory of God and of the Lamb.

We have attempted to sketch and follow out its course from the beginning to the end—through all the stadia of its development. The whole system is

* This was never discussed by the author.

concentrated in the principle of Incarnation in order to Redemption. It is holy, thrice holy; in view of it we must ever repeat the Trisagion—*Sancte, sancte, sancte*; for it is holy in its inception, holy in its methods and workings, and also holy in its results. The basis is laid in the wisdom, power, and love of God the Father; the method of it is set forth in the incarnation and atonement of God the Son; the end is secured by the effectual workings of God the Holy Ghost. And these three are one; the whole system is a Trinity, a Triunity. In the Triad, the whole of theology is recapitulated. It all redounds to the glory of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost. And in it is completed and realized that magnificent promise and prophecy—that in the dispensation of the fullness of times all things shall be gathered together in Christ. “For it pleased the Father that in Him should all fullness dwell.”

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APOLOGETICS:
A COURSE OF LECTURES

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INTRODUCTORY NOTE.

THE pages of this book are drawn up from briefs and notes made by Professor Smith in preparation for his lectures on Apologetics, which were given in Union Theological Seminary in the years 1874-5 and 1875-6. The lectures referred to were the last work of this distinguished teacher, and consequently the little volume now sent forth exhibits his final judgment on the chief points in the conflict with unbelief. On this account it is believed that the outline of Apologetics which the following chapters present will be valued by all who knew the author. The projection of a work by him on a subject where he was an acknowledged master is likely to give intimations and clues which a complete volume by a less accomplished mind could not furnish.

It has been thought best to give in this volume only the author's last survey of the field of debate between Christianity and its adversaries. Yet it will

be observed that the work now presented relates to the three fundamental points of Apologetics, viz., the question of the *Supernatural* in its various aspects, the question, *Can God be known?* and the question of *Miracles*.*

HARTFORD THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY, *October, 1881.*

* *Evolution* also is discussed in APPENDIX III.

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APOLOGETICS

WITHIN the limits of these lectures it will not be practicable to go over all the ground which is indicated by this word. The attempt will rather be to lay out a general scheme, and to discuss some of the fundamental questions, especially the urgent ones of the present day. This branch of theology has been developed into a system only in recent times, and chiefly through the labors of German scholars. But the materials for it are found running through the whole history of the Church. There have always been apologies. The earliest Christian literature of the Church, especially the Western or Latin, was preëminently apologetic. The present Christian literature, in all civilized and Christian countries, takes on the same general character. The same questions about man, about each individual man, about the world—whence is it, what is it, for what is it—have always been agitated. They come up in new forms for each generation, and with them comes the necessity for renewed, honest, and patient investigation for every new age. The substance of the matter at

issue remains the same, but the forms of attack and the methods of defense constantly change.

Christianity has never been assailed so vigorously and persistently, and from so many sides, as now. Hence the special need of giving prominence to its grounds and reasons, to its establishment and defense. The whole of human civilization is bound up in the inquiry whether Christianity is to stand or fall. Its fall would be the most disastrous moral and spiritual wreck the world has ever known. Its victory in such a contest is to be the sublimest victory in the annals of time.

CHAPTER I.

THE SPHERE OF APOLOGETICS.—THE NATURE AND ELEMENTS OF THE CONFLICT.

THE term is derived from the old Greek word first used by Justin Martyr. Its significance is not only Defense against assault, but Vindication which is completed in the counter-attack and dislodgment of the adversary. In order to refute, Christian Apologetics must assail in turn. For the Christian faith, if it is anything, is everything, so far as man's highest interest and welfare are concerned. To define more sharply: Christian Apologetics is (1) Vindication against assault; (2) Vindication which establishes the truth of Christianity and shows the falsity and error of the opponents; *i. e.*, which not only defends Christianity but attacks its foes. (3) It is a scientific vindication. It vindicates in a scientific way, so as to include the apologies, so as to bring out the ultimate general principles in the case. (4) It gets from the whole course of conflict a brighter light in which to exhibit Christianity as the absolute religion.

The development of the race—the development of all truth—involves progress, but progress by and through conflicts, by antagonisms working out into a higher unity. The antagonisms with which we have

to do, the elements of the constant conflict in which Christianity advances, arise chiefly from the following sources :

1. The dualism between the Natural and the Supernatural. Is human life to be understood *sub specie mundi* alone, or *sub specie æterni* also? Infidelity tends to say this world is all. Its latest form makes the height of wisdom to be contentment with the present life. This element is in all infidelity. The question here is as to the Reality of the Supernatural.

2. The dualism between the Natural and the Spiritual. Is man essentially a body, or has he a spiritual essence, allying him with the Infinite and the Eternal? If he is a spirit, then he is a moral being; he is subject to a moral law, and may have an eternal destiny. Is there a dualism of Physical and Moral Law, or can the one be resolved into the other? Can mind be evolved from matter, and man from the brute?

3. The antagonism between Reason and Revelation, or Philosophy and Faith.

Both have their spheres and their rights. Both are necessary to man; neither is to be denied. Both, too, are employed essentially about the same fundamental questions—God, man, and the relation between them. Both run back into the mystery of the Infinite and the Eternal. The object of the contest has been to secure the sole sovereignty of the one or the other. The object of Apologetics must be to put them in their true relation, from the general point of view, that while Reason states the problems,

Revelation gives the true answer—the Ariadne's clue.

4. The antagonism between Sin and Holiness. Here we have a sliding scale, or a contrast. Everything in the contest which Apologetics has to meet centers here: Is sin a reality, an abnormal condition, or a stage of education, a process of development, a lesser good? Wherever sin is, there will be opposition to holiness. It is natural for sin to oppose holiness, and to deny a holy God.

The felt reality of sin is necessary to the possibility of redemption. Christianity is essentially a redemptive system. Incarnate love was crucified. A man with no sense of sin must oppose Christianity, in its doctrine of grace as well as of sin.

In this statement it is by no means asserted or implied that all objections to the Bible and Christianity are only the signs and manifestations of man's inborn and inbred corruption; that historical, philological, and doctrinal criticism come invariably from a sinful unbelief—still less, that when reason thinks and speaks, its utterances are to be set down to the account of a godless rationalism. Far from it. There are undeniable difficulties in respect to history and science which must be investigated. There are signs and wonders which would stagger any one, unless the need of them and their historic reality can be clearly evinced. Conscience and reason have their rights. Science has its lawful sphere. We are to prove (test, try) all things—even the Scriptures, even the doctrines of our faith—and hold fast that which is good.

If the Christian system cannot establish its claims and authority in the view of reason and conscience (their rights being carefully weighed and defined), it will be in vain for Church or Pope to call upon the nations to believe in their own infallible authority, as settling all questions of right and wrong, truth and falsehood, for time and for eternity. No; we are in the conflict, and it is only by going through it that we can get the victory.

5. The sense of sin and need of redemption lead to another contrast and point of conflict: that between the absolute revelation of *God in CHRIST*, and any and all other revelations of God to man, in nature, in history, and in other religions. Now, as in ancient times, the Christology of our system of faith is made prominent, both in the attack and in the defense. From the very necessity of the case there has been a revival of Christology. Christian realism, that which finds the reality of Christianity in the facts that center in the person and work of Christ, stands now in direct and fully developed opposition to the nescience and the nihilism, which must else be man's last word upon the vital question of his destiny.

6. This revelation in Christ is gathered up, says the Christian Church, in a final, inspired form in the canonical books of *the Old and New Testaments*; and these, of course, have always been a central object of attack and defense, entering largely, though not as exclusively as some suppose, into the decision of the great debate.

The full arguments on this point are exhibited in

the Introductions to the Old and New Testaments, or, rather, in a history of them, showing their genuineness, authenticity, and credibility. It is necessary to note here only the chief points of present attack.

(1) In respect to History : (a) Of the Old Testament, involving the palæontological and prehistoric discussions as to the primeval state of the world and of man, and archæological questions as to his progressive culture (Egypt, Assyria, Chaldæa, and ancient empires). (b) As to the New Testament, chiefly upon the question whether it is authentic, bringing under scrutiny the testimony as to the life and character of Christ, and as to the life and course of the Apostles (Strauss ; Baur ; Renan. The Gospels ; Paul's Epistles ; The Apocalypse). (2) In respect to Science (modern). Astronomy, Geology ; the Origin and Unity of the Race ; the Primeval History of Mankind. In all a bias of evolution.

7. The highest antagonism—that as to *the System of the Universe*. The fundamental question here is between Monism and Theism. Monism has two forms, the one asserting that all is God—Pantheism ; the other, that all is matter—Materialism. Theism asserts a duality of the Infinite and the Finite, of the Creator and the Creature.

Is that which is Ultimate in Being an unconscious force—call it Matter or Spirit—or an Intelligent and Personal Power ?

Is the Finite from the Infinite by emanation, or by the act of an Omnipotent and Wise Being ?

Hence upon the question of the system of the

universe three theories in opposition to Christian Theism are advanced: Pantheism, Materialism, and Pantheistic Materialism (evolution *).

* The power of evolution lies not in its details, but in its general theory.

CHAPTER II.

DIVISIONS OF APOLOGETICS.

§ 1. *General Divisions.*

OUR previous account of the elements and stages of this intense spiritual conflict between Christianity and its opponents—Christ and Anti-Christ—has indicated the general conclusion that all the lines and forces are concentrating upon three decisive questions: (*a*) a Personal God and his Moral Law and Government: (*b*) a Living Christ and his Redemptive Work: (*c*) the Christian System, Church, and Life as the highest and best form of Religion—the absolute Religion for man. Hence Apologetics embraces not only the person of Christ and his testimony, but also presupposes as a part of it a personal God and a moral government, and likewise has to do with what arises from and after Christ, the whole system radiating from him to bless and save the race.

The materials of which Apologetics must make use may perhaps be best distributed in the following general scheme:

FIRST: *Fundamental Apologetics*—comprising the questions embraced in Natural Theology—the Being and Nature of God and his relations to us; the spiritual and moral nature of man; with an examina-

tion of the Anti-Christian schemes of philosophy—materialistic, pantheistic, or mixed.

SECOND: *Historical Apologetics*, comprising the evidences of the divine origin and authority of the Christian faith.

THIRD: *Philosophical Apologetics*, taking its materials (1) from the Philosophy of Religion, proving by the history of religion, and a comparison of its various forms, that Christianity is the one absolute religion; (2) from the Philosophy of History, showing that Christianity is the key to the enigmas of man's destiny; (3) from the Nature (or Philosophy) of Christianity itself, especially as compared with philosophy in general: making it evident that Christianity as a system of truth is higher and better than any scheme of philosophy—is the sum of wisdom for the human race.

These main divisions given in the idea of Apologetics as a science correspond also to the forms which the assaults in our day are taking. These are: *first*, the theory of naturalistic development—that all things go on according to a fixed and necessary order, without the breaking forth at any point of a strictly creative power, or supermundane will. The *second* is, from the sphere of historical criticism, striving to show that the ancient documents of our faith, Jewish and Christian, will not stand the test of historical inquiry, but that both Jewish and Christian history must be reconstructed, according to the hypothesis of a simple development from lower to higher forms, involving of course, the elimination of all miraculous and prophetic elements. And the

third is, the presenting a system that is to be pantheistico-materialistic, which, it is claimed, is a more complete and satisfactory system for the race, meeting all their wants, than that which is given us in the Christian creed.

The main characteristic of the present attack upon, and defense of, Christianity is, that it is all along the line. Forces that have been gathering for centuries are concentrating simultaneously. Systems of science and philosophy hitherto at war have made peace with each other that they may attack the common foe, viz., Christianity. History, in its process of recovering all the records of the past, and of criticising the Biblical records, is in many quarters trying to undermine our historic basis: and many of the so-called philosophies of history and civilization attempt to explain the whole course of human history without God and Christ.* The followers of Strauss and the school of Tübingen, and many critics of no special philosophical school, are ransacking early Christian and Pagan literature to disprove the Gospels and the Acts, and to explain the rise and growth of Christianity without supernaturalism. Almost all the sciences, in some of their representations, are constructing a theory of the earth and the heavens, of the origin and growth of all life, at war not only with the Scriptures, but also with the first principles of natural theology, of ethics, and of all rational psychology—scouting not only the dogmas of faith, but the very dictates of reason; rejecting not theol-

* See Buckle, Lecky, etc.

ogy alone, but all metaphysics; denying all final causes, all consciousness, all intelligence in the first cause of finite being, and leaving only a blind unconscious force as the source of an unconscious development, whereby everything is educed out of an inscrutable void in which all is to end. All efficient and final causes being denied, matter and force are feigned to produce vegetable and animal life and organisms; a blind principle of natural selection takes the place of creation by a law and a lawgiver; the soul is a mode of matter; thought is a secretion of the brain; the moral law is made by physical laws; ideas are generated out of sensations; immortality is true only of the race, and not of individuals; there is no hereafter for us—no judgment nor heaven nor hell; sin is a necessity, free-will a fiction, a personal God a subjective delusion.

Against these Christianity has to vindicate the reality of its revelation—the authority of its records—the completeness and harmony of its system—its superiority to any other system of truth in its individual doctrines—and its adaptation to man's needs, man's conscience, man's reason, and man's highest welfare. It has to show that it is the wisest and best system for man—the true wisdom. It is to do this, not by denying any truth of science or of reason, but by appropriating every such truth, and giving it its due place.

It is to show this comprehensively by proving that the true—

Philosophy of Religion leads to and rests in Christianity; and that the true—

Philosophy of all History can only be found in that which forms the center and head of Christianity, viz.,

That in the Person and Work and Church of the Incarnate God all the vital problems of Human Nature and Destiny find their best and only real solution—that Christianity is, in short, the one Absolute System of Truth.

Such a vindication of Christianity forms the scope of Apologetics.*

§ 2. *Fuller Distribution of the Subject.*

FIRST DIVISION.—*Fundamental Apologetics. Preambula Fidei*, or Rational Theology.

This comprises the essential truths of Religion and Ethics against the anti-religious schemes of speculation.

Book A.—The Underlying Religious Question. The Being and Nature of God as a Conscious Intelligence, personal and ethical, against anti-theistic and anti-religious theories: Materialism, Atheism, Pantheism. Or, the Being and Nature of God: with the arguments *a priori* and *a posteriori* against the objections of anti-theists. Here efficient and final causes are to be vindicated.

Book B.—The Cosmological Question. Creation by Fiat: its order and end.

* It is not to be expected that a complete vindication on all of these points will be brought within any one course, or be given by any one man. But this *scope* is forced on us by the present attitude of the subject and of infidelity, in its last forms and battles—the real battle of Armageddon and the true Anti-Christ.

Creation against anti-theistic Evolution and Development—as emanation—development by matter and motion.

Creation against the Infinite Series.

Successive Creations. There may be development and evolution as well as fiat.

Book C.—The Anthropological Question.

Man's nature—as spiritual or only material.

Relation of man to nature and the brutes that perish.

Man as free agent.

Man as a religious being, essentially made for worship. Chief end of man.

Book D.—The Ethical Question. (The aim and end of what is set forth in Books B and C is in that which is moral or spiritual. Nature and man have a moral and religious end, and can only so be understood.)

The Reality of the Moral Idea and of Moral Order.

1. In relation to the Divine Nature and Government.

2. In relation to Man—a being essentially moral—existing for moral ends.

Infer : Man as sinful, standing in conflict with the moral law and order, and needing salvation. All bearing on—

Book E.—The question of Man's Immortality. (Perhaps also *Book F.* The chief Anti-Theistic and Anti-Christian schemes of modern speculation in their relations to religion in general and Christianity in particular.)

SECOND DIVISION.—*Historical Apologetics.*—(This Division on historic grounds and the historic method, as the FIRST was on rational grounds.

The appeal is to certified Fact).

The proof on historical grounds of the Divine Origin and Authority of the Christian Faith.

Book A.—The Supernatural in History in general. Idea and Need of a Specific Revelation to solve the problems, left by what has gone before, of man as a moral being. Revelation and Inspiration.

Book B.—The Special Forms of the Supernatural in History. Especially—

1. In Prophecy—the Supernatural in Word.

2. In Miracle—the Supernatural in Act.

Place of Miracles in Evidences.

Truth proves Miracles, and converse.

Miracle and Natural Law.

Book C.—The Bible in History.

Its Inspiration, Unity, and Authority as a Record.

Its Testimony.

Book D.—Christ in History. The Supernatural in the Highest Personal Form and Authority. The Center of Testimony: the Source of the new Spiritual Life.

Book E.—The Church in History: its perpetual witness to the Truth; its world-wide Power; its beneficent Working.

THIRD DIVISION.—*Philosophical Apologetics.*—(Contents already sufficiently noted.)

Book A.—Philosophy of Religion.

Book B.—Philosophy of History.

Book C.—Philosophy of Christianity.

In sum : The general object is to give the full proof that Christianity is from God for man ; to defend the system and its record against philosophical speculation and criticism ; to appropriate all truth found elsewhere ; and to carry the war into the enemy's camp, by showing that Christianity is, as far as we know, the best and final system.

§ 3. *What is the place of Apologetics in the Encyclopedia of Theology ?*

This is a thoroughly German question.*

Schleiermacher, Sack, and others assign it to the First or Philosophic part ; Hagenbach, to Dogmatics ; others, to Practical Theology, inasmuch as it leads to defense.

It is best to regard it as historico-philosophical Dogmatics. It is the whole contents and substance of the Christian faith, arrayed for defense and for (defensive) assault.

Each part of doctrine must have a rational side or relation, historical evidence, and an attitude of defense.

Hence, Apologetics is to be put, most conveniently, though not strictly, under Dogmatics.

There are special difficulties to be met under each head. Apologetics surveys the combined defense and assault of the whole, while details are treated under the subordinate divisions as these are unfolded.

* See APPENDIX II., Recent German Works on Apologetics.

FIRST DIVISION.

FUNDAMENTAL APOLOGETICS.—*Preambula Fidei.**Rational Theology.*

Vindication of the Essential Truths of Religion and Ethics, against the Anti-Religious Schemes of Philosophical Speculation. God and Man, and their Relations on grounds of Reason and Conscience.

CHAPTER I.

SUPERNATURALISM *vs.* ANTI-SUPERNATURALISM.

THE roots of Infidelity are doubtless in Sin and the consequent blindness of man to spiritual truth.

But it is equally true that, in discussion and in thought, there are certain theoretical positions about God, man, nature, and a future life, which prevent a believing acceptance of the religion of Christ: *i. e.* if thinking be *consistent*. For example: that all which we can know is the natural world (so called); that the infinite and supernatural are not objects of knowledge; that God cannot be known; that the knowledge of God, of the supernatural, is negative; that all knowledge is relative; that all science is about phenomena, external and sensible; that it is all generalized sensations; that the course of nature is uniform, unbroken—natural law being all; that the supernatural rests on credulity, blind faith.*

* The subsoil of the Natural is in the Supernatural.

The subsoil of Anti-Supernaturalism is in the denial.

The particular objections to special truths and doctrines run back into this general denial of the supernatural, *e. g.* the whole criticism on prophecy, miracles, the incarnation.

*Order of the discussion.**

§ 1. Nature (Idea) of the Supernatural *per se*.

§ 2. Real Being (Reality) of the Supernatural.

§ 3. Possibility of its Manifestation.

§ 4. Possibility of our knowing and testing this Manifestation. (The Proof of Manifestations coming subsequently. Here discussion only of the *a priori* possibility.)

§ 5. Objections.

§ I. *Nature (Idea) of the Supernatural.*

The idea of the supernatural is differently grasped and defined in different ages, and in different systems. Rude tribes find it in meteors, eclipses, portents and prodigies, ghosts and witches, the general idea being that of events which have a super-

* The following scheme is also proposed :

§ 1. The Supernatural in its Eternal Being (Necessity).

§ 2. The Supernatural in the Possibility of its Manifestation.

§ 3. The Supernatural in its actual Manifestations in Historic Time.

(a.) The Creative Act (original transition from Infinite to Finite—Absolute to Relative). This must have occurred, as all concede.

Subordinate epochs of creation, new forces, etc.

These once introduced become a permanent order—the introduction is supernatural.

(b.) Especial Manifestation in Man and his Endowments.

(c.) In Revelation in General. Inspiration, Prophecy, Miracles.

(d.) The Incarnation.

(e.) The Church. Regeneration, Sanctification, and Final Victory.

human and super-mundane origin. In all its forms it involves a belief in the reality of such a *power*, controlling the world and human destiny. Examples: the Greek Fate above the gods; the East Indian Buddha; the American Indian's Great Spirit; the Creator, Incarnate God, worker of miracles of the Christian Faith: the Materialistic Fate; the Pantheistic Substance or Spirit. In all forms of faith, and almost all schemes of philosophy the supernatural is recognized, more or less dimly, more or less definitely.

In its highest and most abstract form of statement it is defined, in comparison and in contrast with what is called Nature—Naturalism.

By Nature is meant: the finite universe, with its constitution, order, and laws (which, it is supposed, can be detected and stated)—the finite, limited, dependent (interdependent) in a chain of effects and causes. Hence the so-called uniformity of nature.

(a.) Meaning of the Supernatural *per se*.

By the Supernatural, in contrast and comparison, is properly signified: what is before and above—in its being and nature independent of—Nature; the Absolute and Infinite; what is above the sequences (causes and effects) in Nature; what is the cause or source thereof; the substratum and *substantia* of Nature; standing under and producing, so that the natural has its ground in, and is caused by, the supernatural.*

* *Natura naturans—natura naturata*, is the like distinction under the term Nature, which is here the equivalent of the Universe. But

(b.) Some, and Christian thinkers too, draw the line upon a different point. They embrace in the supernatural the human personality and will, all that is truly spiritual, all that is not included in the chain of causes and effects in the natural order. Man's will is supernatural, because it can break through and over the chain of causes and effects.

But the distinction here is not strictly between the Natural and the Supernatural, but between Physical Necessity and Moral Freedom, between Nature and Spirit. This view says, in effect, all that is *spiritual* is *supernatural*.

Dr. Bushnell defines the Supernatural,* "whatever it be that is either not in the chain of natural cause and effect, or which acts on the chain of causes and effects, in nature, from without the chain."

Dr. Hickok, on the Valid Being of the Soul,† says, "the facts of a comprehending—not merely conjoining, nor connecting—power over nature, and of an ethical experience, prove the soul to be supernatural."

Remarks and Criticisms on the Soul as Supernatural.

1. The statements given in evidence establish the valid being of the soul, as free and moral—above the

it is better to say, the universe is the whole, divided into the Intelligible and the Material, the Ideal and the Natural, the *Supernatural* and the *Natural*. This is the most comprehensive view and the fairest statement of the case. Spinoza's division of the "universe" into the productive and the produced is right, if the meaning of terms is kept in view, but confusion results from making "nature" the equivalent of all being.

* Nature and the Supernatural, p. 37.

† In Rational Psychology, pp. 540, 541.

control of physical necessity—of *cause and effect* as seen and found in physical sequences. So much is valid and valuable. Will, personality, free spirit, cannot be explained by the laws of the physical creation, in terms of matter, force, and motion.

2. The implication or tacit assertion that the supernatural and the spiritual are identical—that all which is truly spiritual is also supernatural—that moral freedom is, wherever found, also supernatural, is the unproved and disputable position. If man be essentially supernatural, how shall we distinguish between God and man radically? The barrier is broken down, if every act of man's moral freedom be a supernatural act.

3. The position does not reach to the matter in dispute: for the opponents of the supernatural say they refer to something super-human and super-mundane. Is there such a mode of being? It is replied: Yes, because man is above nature. But, is there not something above man too—essentially so? If not, then no argument is advanced by this position; if there is, then the position contains no reply.

4. So that, besides saying that man can control nature, we must also say that there is a supernatural above man, in order to make any headway. It is not enough to say: Man can comprehend and control nature, and hence God may. All that is thus proved is an analogy, that man is like God; the true and real supernatural is not obtained.*

* The argument from man's will to the supernatural has another relation, viz.: If man's will can use the sequences of nature for other ends

5. The law of cause and effect does *not* break down when applied to man's free will. If it did, then there would be pure contingency, and the element of no-law pervading the system. It is a universal law of finite being, that every beginning or change must have a cause. All that is finite is under this law. If this is not a universal law, no Natural Theology is possible; the basis of the whole argument is uprooted.

6. The real question is this: Is there a Supernatural which is absolute, and absolute Power and Will, at the basis and the source of all that is phenomenal?

To answer this we may be *helped* by the analogy, but it can only be subsidiary.

It is easier to prove that there is an absolute supernatural, than that the human will is absolutely supernatural. To attempt the latter would lead to a long discussion with naturalism on a side issue—whether the acts of man's will can be explained as non-supernatural. The opponent would say: If that is all the supernatural which you claim, my task is easy.

7. Perhaps we may even go farther, and say that the supernatural, in its manifestations, in its workings, is under the law of causation—not physical causation, but *real* causation. The manifested supernatural is orderly, is successive, makes a system, a historic system in fact, the whole of the Historic

than the mechanical, etc., *a fortiori* God may, and equally without violating the uniformity of nature.

Revelation, which is a sublime manifestation of power and intelligence, of cause and effect on the widest scale.

8. Though the human will be not directly supernatural, yet the highest form of the Supernatural is doubtless in Will, viz., Absolute Personality, which implies will and moral perfection. (But this is only *stated* here, not proved: it is the result of the whole argument on the Being and Nature of God.)

It may be also said, that the Human Personality, the Human Will, is the highest manifestation of the Supernatural in the natural world (not including miracles, the incarnation, etc.). Here, chiefly, man is in the image of God.

9. But the true real Supernatural, in its essence, is the Absolute, the Divine.

§ 2. *The Reality of the Supernatural.*

(References for American theological students.

The Denial of the Supernatural. Tayler Lewis, in Vedder Lectures, 1875. Ref. (D.) Board.

The Sensible, the Extra-Sensible, the Super-Sensible. Lewes. Problems of Life and Mind, 229-253.

Van Oosterzee. Dogmatics, i. 160.

Dr. Dabney. The Sensualistic Philosophy, etc. Philosophy and the Supernatural. 1875.

McCosh. The Supernatural in Relation to the Natural. 1862.

Bushnell. Natural and Supernatural.

Hickok. Rational Psychology. Appendix.)

Having considered the Nature (True Idea) of the Supernatural, we come now to the Real Being of it, with which is involved its Necessary Being.

The Real and Necessary Being of the Supernatural may be evinced from various sources of evidence.

1. It is a necessity of Religion (and if man was made for religion, it follows that he was made to stand in relation to the Supernatural).

2. It is a necessity of Thought.

3. It is confirmed by a well-nigh universal testimony; there are exceptions, but these are about as numerous relatively as those of thinkers who deny an external world. Only those who deny reality to anything but immediate experience through sensation deny the Supernatural.

1. The evidence for the Necessity of the Supernatural is to be viewed in connection with the evidence for the Necessity of Religion: they cover the same ground.

There can be no religion without an underlying sense of the reality of the super-human and the super-sensible. From the highest religion to the lowest this is the one universal and common element.

Take this away, and all religion vanishes; accept it, and religion is possible, however vague the form of faith or feeling may be.

Take this away from the history of the race; just eliminate the sense of worship—the dependence on an Unseen yet Real Presence—and the history of the world becomes a vain show, without inward truth or rational basis or moral end: it is a chapter

in the laws of motion, an appendix to the physiology of the senses. It leaves man without a solid past or a valuable future—in a condition worse than that of the Stoics, of whom it is said their philosophy is above suicide-mark, and yet continually dropped below it.

Just as far, then, as there is evidence from history and consciousness that man is a religious being (even *animal*), that religion is a necessity of his spiritual nature as truly as air is vital to his physical growth and being—so far forth, conterminous with this at every point, is the evidence to man of the necessity of the supernatural.

To disprove this it is necessary to disprove and undermine the deepest faith of the race, its profoundest conviction.

Even where there is nothing left of religion but a vague sentiment, an undefined aspiration, an unintelligent impulse; still, so far forth as this goes, so far is the need of a belief in the supernatural recognized, dimly, it may be, but really.

Even those thinkers who have yielded themselves to an intense and all-absorbing intellectual scepticism, confess the moral and spiritual necessity of religion, and their scepticism makes the reluctant confession all the more impressive. Denying all present religions, they look for another, higher, because they feel the native majesty and authority of the Supernatural.*

* *E. g.*, Comte, Tyndall, Huxley, and, in an eminent degree, Mill. The whole spirit of Mill's Inductive Philosophy was, to say the least,

2. The Supernatural viewed as a Necessity of Thought.

In relation to thought, the only alternative here is a denial of the possibility of any ultimate Truth—or rather any basis of Being—of any inherent reality in the universe. This alternative is Nihilism in respect to being, Nescience in respect to knowledge, Pessimism in respect to the end of being. It is saying, change is all; the flow of time and events is all; the stream of events in time has no beginning; casualty, not causality, rules; there is no order, no law, physical or moral; for as soon as you say, *law, uniformity*, you have something above the flow directing it. As between Fate and Chance, it says, Chance; for Fate has in it a principle and a method. To deny real and absolute Being is to deny the very essential ideas of reason itself. We take this ground—in respect to which we do not now argue, but claim—that all minds believe and must believe in the Supernatural, unless they proclaim all Truth and all Being to be a mockery and a delusion.

Discernment upon this fundamental point depends upon the invaluable mental habit of seeing *things* as they are—not seeing words instead of things—not

non-religious (Sir James Stephens says 'that Mill's Logic has done more for atheism than any other book of the century). But in his last essay on Theism he confesses that "in the present state of our knowledge the adaptations in nature afford a large balance of probability in favor of *causation by intelligence*." Three Essays, pp. 168-70. (Even in his "Logic" he allows the possibility of miracles.) In Christianity he finds the high service of "inculcating the belief that our highest conceptions of combined wisdom and goodness exist in the concrete, in a living being, who has his eyes on us and cares for our good."

the vestigia nor the simulacra nor the larvæ of things, but the actual realities. All the "idola" of Bacon stand in the way of this immediate vision of the reality; yet it is the first condition of all true knowledge.

We speak of Thought and of what is involved in the Necessity of Thought. All thought, every proposition, affirms or denies; it affirms Being or something about it. Fundamental, metaphysical, necessary thought is affirmation of being. I am. Space is. Time is. The world is. Phenomena are. Substance is. The testimony of consciousness is absolute and final. Sensations, imaginations, conceptions, ideas, feelings—all states and modes of the mind *are*. The ego, self, also *is*. Here is absolute certainty. "Only subjective certainty," it may be said. That may be, but the suggestion is an afterthought—a reflected thought. The contents of consciousness, to us, simply *are*. In its primary affirmations there are no distinctions.

The essence of knowledge consists:

- (1) In the affirmation of Being.
- (2) The analysis into subject and object, thought and being. How far we have certainty of the latter.
- (3) The union of the two.

Further: (*a*) There is Thought; (*b*) there is the Necessity of Thought (our minds *must* view things under certain rational principles; mental action must proceed in accordance with these principles, or it must be suppressed altogether); (*c*) these rational principles enforce that our thinking and discernment of Being shall be thus and not otherwise, and thus

we have also enforced the Necessity to Thought of the Supernatural.

The principles referred to are such as these:

(a) The radical belief in a universal being—being unlimited and unconditioned.

(b) The universality of the law of cause and effect (*viz.*, a sufficient cause for all the changes, every change implying a previous and adequate cause).*

(c) The category of the substantial and phenomenal.

(d) The practical (rational) necessity of choosing between order and chance; and the fact that reason is "informed" and "ensouled" only by order, law.†

(e) Even on the development theory, a sufficient ground or source for the development must be assumed—the law of Ground and Consequence.

(f) The undeniable idea and law of motion, change, and a *Primum Mobile*, as in Aristotle.

* Under this, too, the argument from design. See Mill's Concessions, and even Comte's.

† The *knowledge of Reason* consists of the vision (intuition) of the absolute Idea in the beginning—of the absolute Ideal at the end. Herein, if anywhere, lies man's intellectual likeness to God and the prepledge of his immortality. Gazing with open eye upon the Infinite and Eternal, full of awe but full of knowledge (and of love), constitutes the fullness of our being. The idea of Pure Being, of an Infinite Kosmos, is the object of profound wonder to every great thinker or sage. This is evident in all the schools from East to West, and the sentiment underlies all our scientific researches to-day. It is also the elemental idea of the Christian "new-birth"—the "new simple idea" of Edwards—yet here more *concrete*, *viz.*, the knowledge of God face to face—the sense of the *Supreme Reality*. It is a perpetual possession of the religious mind, avouched by all experience, and of it no scepticism can rob the believer. And more than this: the glory of God shines in the face of Jesus Christ our Lord—the knowledge of God Incarnate is real knowledge.

As man must think under these conditions, and as the conditions presuppose a Supernatural Power—so it follows that the Supernatural is a Necessity of Thought.

It may be added that as all truth is the conformity between thought and being (which conformity is ascertained by a variety of inter-measurements), so what is necessary to our thought in the supernatural is attested, and becomes the object of new conviction, by our examination of it under different points of view and different relations.

What is truth? How do we reach certainty?

There is—being.

There is—thought.

As is thought so is being—as is being so is thought; the equation of the two, duly ascertained, gives certainty, constitutes truth.

We find that whatever is necessary to thought in the sphere of the natural has its correspondent reality in being; whatever is necessary to thought in the supernatural has a similar reality, as we should justly infer; and testing the supernatural as we do the natural (not by the same tests but by real tests), we find all the signs of the equation between being and thought, and arrive at truth, at certainty.

3. The reality of the supernatural element is confirmed by the history of thought in all the schools of philosophical speculation.

This statement applies not only to all the ancient and accredited systems and schools, but also—and in a marked way—to the most modern schools of atheistic and even materialistic speculation.

The Supernatural is in them all more or less—expelled with a fork, it ever forces itself back.

The law of gravitation might seem to be defied when a column of water is thrown up into the air—until it all flows back again to its source, and it is evident that the same law governed the discharge and the return, that the law was served by the seeming violation. And so the very necessities of thought which seemed to lead to a denial of the Supernatural and the Eternal bring it back again in some other form, as resistlessly as the air rushes in to fill a vacuum.

Mr. J. S. Mill, in a remarkable passage in his *Three Essays*,* says : “ Science contains nothing repugnant to the position that every event which takes place results from a *specific volition* of the presiding power, provided that power adheres in its particular volition to general laws laid down by itself.”

Elsewhere † he says : “ One only form of belief in the supernatural, one only theory respecting the origin and government of the universe, starts wholly clear, both of intellectual contradiction and of moral obliquity. It is that which, resigning irrevocably the idea of an omnipotent Creator, regards nature and life, not as the expression throughout of the moral character and purpose of the Deity, but as the product of a struggle between continuing goodness and an intractable material, as was believed by Plato, or a principle of evil, as was the doctrine of the Manichæans.”

* Posthumous Papers, 136.

† Essays on Religion, pp. 116, 117.

Herbert Spencer says: "That which persists unchanging in quantity, but ever changing in form under these sensible appearances which the universe presents to us, transcends human knowledge and conception; is an unknown and unknowable power which we are *obliged* to recognize as without limit in space, and without beginning or end in time.

"The sincere philosopher alone can know how high—we say not above human knowledge, but above human conception—is the universal power, whereof nature, life, thought, are manifestations.*

"Our knowledge of noumenal existence has a certainty which our knowledge of phenomenal existence cannot approach; in other words, in the view of logic as well as of common sense, realism is the only rational thesis; all the others are doomed to fall." †

Of Matter and Spirit, Spencer says: ‡ "The one no less than the other is to be regarded as but a sign of the Unknown Reality which underlies both."

G. H. Lewes distinguishes; § "the sensible, the extra-sensible, and the super-sensible." (The extra-sensible is real and may be known, *e. g.*, ether). The super-sensible is the domain of theology and "Metempsychics," which is "closed against the method of science, but is *open to faith and intellectual intuition*." ¶

With Lewes the cardinal point of the Positive Philosophy is its ignoring of what is beyond the method

* Spencer on Education, p. 109 (new edition).

† Spencer on Principles of Psychology (new edition), 32.

‡ Spencer on First Principles, p. 503.

§ Lewes' Problems of Life and Mind, i. 229.

¶ Lewes' Problems of Life and Mind, i. 243.

of science. He designates all this as "The Metempirical." Yet "admits much that is called Metaphysics," viz.: the highest generalizations of the several sciences; though "it excludes the problems of Matter, Force, Cause, Life, Mind, Object and Subject," as "insoluble, metempirical." *

He allows "efficient causes," and says we "know essences," etc., properly understood, *i. e.*, as far as they come into manifestation or experience. So, too, in ontology we may know much.† A metaphysician may have a knowledge of being as certain as the mathematician's knowledge of magnitude, or the chemist's knowledge of affinity, the biologist's of life, the sociologist's of society—and this knowledge may be gained in the same way.‡

The position taken by Positivism, as to a First Cause, is thus stated by Littré, in a *discours* at his reception in the Masonic Lodge, Paris: § "Que faut il penser de la notion de cause première, de causalité suprême? Aucune science ne nie une cause première, n'ayant jamais rien rencontré qui la démentit; mais aucune ne l'affirme, n'ayant jamais rien rencontré qui la lui montrât. Toute science est enfermée dans le relatif; partout on arrive à des existences et à des lois irréductibles, dont on ne connaît pas l'essence."

With these impoverished abstractions of matter

* Problems, etc., p. 57.

† Problems, etc., p. 60.

‡ This is emphatically true. In both cases the knowledge is ultimate. Magnitude is—magnitude. Being is—being.

§ Quoted in Rev. Chrét., by de Pressensé, 1875, Sept., p. 259.

(and physics in general), compare the lofty ideal, *e. g.*, of Plato—which is profounder, which is truer?

He asserts the reality of the *eternal ideas*. He speaks of rising out of “the sea of change” to the sea of beauty; * of “participating in ideas;” of rising to the highest by abstracting, stripping off the finite till the real is left.† *The idea of the good* is the highest and last. “The idea of the good, last of all, is seen, and, when discerned, it is as the universal author of all things beautiful and right—parent of light and law of light in this world, and the source of truth and reason in the other.‡ This is the First Great Cause,§ which he must behold who would act reasonably, either in public or private life.” || It “gives truth to the object and knowledge to the subject.”

With Plato *the ethical*, the good, is the source of all—no abstract substance, no undefined force. “Can we ever believe that motion, and life, and mind, are not present with absolute being?” ¶ Protagoras said: “Man is the measure of all;” Plato, “God is the measure of all.” **

With Plato, the Perfect One is the only intelligible reality (that can be truly known), and matter—the phenomenal—is unintelligible. With modern science

* Banquet, 210.

† Republic, x. 597.

‡ In Rep., Bks. vi. vii.

§ “Not personal in Plato’s view,” it is said. But the question is not up.

|| Rep., vii. 517.

¶ Sophist, 249.

** Laws, ii. 715.

matter and its changes comprise all that we can know or understand. Pure Being is "inscrutable," negative.

Aristotle affirms that nothing is moved by chance: movement must always have a principle. In order that it may energize (produce) it must have another principle eternally acting. There must then be that (something) which moves without being moved—eternal being, pure essence, pure actuality. The unmovable mover is necessary being, and because necessary, it is the good, and hence a principle.*

Aristotle's principle is,† that all transition, *Kίνησις*, from the potential to the actual depends on an *actual* cause (not merely *potential*). As every particular object demands an actual moving (efficient) cause, so the world as a whole demands an absolutely first mover to shape (give form to) the passive matter.‡ This first mover is pure energy—eternal, pure, immaterial form—without parts—absolute spirit, mind (*νοῦς*), which thinks itself, and when thought, therefore, is the thought of thought. It is the cause of motion—the *good per se*—the end to which all tends—it acts by virtue of the attraction which the loved exerts upon the loving—it is the eternal *prius* of all development. Thought, which is the mode of its activity, constitutes the highest, best, and most blessed life.§

"The world has its principle in God, and this principle exists not merely as a form immanent in the

* Others assume two principles—(1) inertia, matter, (2) sufficient reason of movement (not matter)—God.

† Met., ix. 8.

‡ Met., xii. 6.

§ Met., xii. 7.

world, like the *order of an army*, but also as an absolute self-existent substance, like *the general of an army*." *

There is no need to multiply instances. The reality of the ultimate, absolute Being is affirmed in all the schools, ancient and modern, excepting the purely materialistic and casual, and, as we have seen, with many partial recognitions and concessions of it here.

Even if it is declared to be unknowable, still it is recognized.

Bacon, Descartes, Leibnitz lay it at the basis. Kant builds upon the Ding-an-sich—as existing—necessary to thought, even though not demonstrated as being.

We find it in all the Pantheists—in Spinoza's Substance, Fichte's absolute Ego, Schelling's Idealism, Hegel's Idea and Being.

§ 3. *On the Manifestation of the Supernatural.*

There is hardly need of arguing this point, after what has been already said about the nature of the supernatural. If the supernatural be, and be what we have indicated, there can be no doubt, not only that it may, but that it *must* be manifested.

The supernatural is the ground and source of the natural: so that in one sense *all* the natural is but its manifestation.

The position that it *cannot* be manifested (even if it exist) is irrational and illogical. It may be the unknowable, but it still must issue forth in know-

* Ueberweg on Aristotle. History of Phil., i. 162-3.

able forms and relations. The *a priori* impossibility of its manifestation, which some assert, is wholly groundless.

The supernatural, in general, is what is before, above, in its being and nature independent of nature—what produces the natural and sustains its being and going. It may, however, be manifested *in and through* nature (such manifestation originating not in nature—found in it, but not of it).

The supernatural, it is claimed by supernaturalists, can manifest itself in and through the finite, but it is the influx of a new power into the flow of time—it is the incoming of a new force, to modify, elevate, transform the finite for some higher end or purpose.

The distinguishable cases of manifestation are three.

(a) Cases where the supernatural comes and *stays as the natural*.

What thus comes in may afterward become permanent in the finite—as, *e. g.*, life among the lifeless. What is here claimed is that this life cannot be explained or deduced from any finite forces or forms that went before, but requires (to explain its origin) the incurrence or inflow of a higher power than has as yet been seen or known. For instance, man with his endowments above the animals; the materials may be found in nature, and may be used, but they are transformed by a higher power and for a higher use.

(b) Cases where the supernatural comes *and goes*.
For example, when a prophecy is uttered, the means and instrumentalities are found in nature—a

man, a speech, a people—but the words show an omniscience which was not before there, and require a supernatural source or origin. Here the prophecy abides, but the power in which it was uttered is not inherited. While (above, in the case of life) the life *once* imparted goes on and becomes *natural*, yet its source is supernatural (*i. e.*, above all the nature there was there).

So with miracles : they come and are not perpetuated.

(c) Cases where the Supernatural is both *staying and going*.* (Operating upon a *system*.)

For example, revelation, the inspiration of Scripture. Here truths are revealed, not known before. They are not to be explained by, or as growing out of, what is before known. They have a *supernatural* source.

The Bible remains. The supernatural in it stays—as natural, it may be said. But its truths are ever upheld and applied by the same omniscient power that first announced them—to illumine and to sanctify mankind. Christ is in the incarnation and in the church. God acts in regeneration and in sanctification. There are revivals in the religious sphere. And thus there is a system of supernatural operations where what has once been revealed is revealed anew, and is carried out by supernatural agency to its practical design.†

* *I. e.*, returning.

† See McCosh, *Nature and the Supernatural*, Chapter II. "The System of the Supernatural." Also Bushnell, *Nature and the Supernatural*, Chapter IX. "The Supernatural Compatible with Nature and subject to Fixed Laws."

Note.—How do we know anything about this supernatural Being? Is it not all unknowable and incognizable? This is thought to be the question of questions, and enough to silence anybody. But it just begins the debate. How does any one know aught about anything? In two points or stages. (a) He knows, somehow, that it is. (b) He knows, further, *what* it is, by its manifestations, its phenomena, and does not and cannot know in any other way.

§ 4. *The Course and Conclusion of the Argument.*

1. The heart of the question, the first point to be established is, the Valid Being (Reality) of the Supernatural, *i. e.*, some mode of being (call it force, substance, the absolute, or what one will), above and controlling all events, *phenomena*, in time and space.

All religions agree in this, and all philosophies, excepting only that form of philosophy which is essentially materialistic, knowing only phenomena, sensations, their possibilities and their inductions, a mere mathematically infinite (indefinite) flow of events as successive; or, which denies the existence of anything infinite, eternal, absolute.

Even those who deny that we know of such being, but grant that there is something incognizable (still saying that it IS), are not excluded; for they concede an element of the supernatural in conceding the existence of what is incognizable.

All others * recognize more or less clearly the real

* The class of absolute sceptics, Nescients and Nihilists, are to be

Being of what is above and beyond mere nature—mere succession of phenomena in time. This being conceded and established—

2. The next point is, that in this supernatural mode of being, whatever it may be, and however we may define it, we have and must have, by an irresistible logic (the law of cause and effect is conceded by all in some form), the ground, the cause, the original of all phenomenal and temporal being. We ask not yet how, but affirm *that*, be it by emanation, logic, or fiat.

That is, the Supernatural does and must *manifest*, unfold itself in the phenomena and processes of the finite universe, under the law of cause and effect. Even if it be only a universal Force, or an aboriginal Substance, it does this, whenever and however a *transition* is made into the realm of time and history. So that we have not only the Supernatural, but the *manifestation* of it—as necessary fact and truth—which must be conceded as real.

Not only the real being of the Supernatural, but the real manifestation of it, in the initial act of procession—call it creation or emanation—is necessary. Get rid of all miracles, and the one great miracle of creation or self-manifestation of the Absolute remains necessary on any rational theory of the universe. The possibility of such a manifestation must be conceded by all who hold to *Evolution, Development, Progress*, in any form, or else these words have no

met in the proper place on their special grounds. But they are exceedingly sparse, and of no real weight.

meaning : Evolution—of what? Development—of what? Mere evolution and development in the abstract is nothing but a name for a possibility. A law of cause and effect, when there are no substances, real existences, to which it is applied, is sterile—an abstract method.

So we have not merely the *possibility* of a manifestation (self-revelation) of the Supernatural, but also its reality, as an underlying *fact*—for all the theories of the universe—of evolution, of development, or however they may be named. They all take this for granted. This must hold good for philosophers as well as for theologians, for science as well as religion.*

This cuts the roots of the theory that the Supernatural is simply something in itself inscrutable, remote, isolated—an unintelligible abstraction—for we have obtained not only *the Supernatural itself*, as a datum of reason and philosophy, but also the *Supernatural manifested*, as necessary to any evolution, development, progress, or construction of a universal system.

* As to the manifested Supernatural, three points may be stated. (a) The Supernatural produces the natural. *Gioherti*: “*Ens creat existentias*—the formula of creation.” This production—if not creation—is recognized in all systems which allow anything but the finite. This is the first miracle. (b) The Supernatural abides in the natural; the First Cause in second causes—the primal force in all secondary forces. (c) All that revelation adds is, the Supernatural may, and does at times, enter by a new illapse or influx into the natural, producing forms, forces, modes of manifestation before unknown. *E.g.* Man—in nature; Moses, a prophet—among men; Christ, the Son of God—among all things.

3. Thus, and only thus, is the ground cleared, and *common ground* found for both religion and philosophy, in respect to the question about the Supernatural in manifestation, or Miracle in history.*

All historic time, whether of the visible heavens or of the earth, of the earth or of man, must begin with a manifestation or act which is essentially supernatural—in short, a *miracle*—an act the most stupendous and wonderful we can conceive; or, if not conceive, which we can know and see to be necessary, logically, or in the logic of fact.

And, if it may and must be so, what sufficient reason can be assigned for denying that it may so go on, that the Supernatural may still continue its manifestations, at other points and junctures, according to the exigencies of the vast unfolding plan of Creation and Providence? Why may there not be a progressive unfolding and revelation, in which the same Supernatural shall manifest itself afterward as at the beginning? For the Supernatural still remains what and as it is: it is its nature to go forth, proceed, reveal (whether as force or as love); and who can set to it limits, or say that it must proceed according to a uniform succession of blind natural causes called matter, energy, and motion? †

* The distinction between the Supernatural in itself and its manifestation is to be emphasized. Usually only the last, the Supernatural in history, is discussed. But we have aimed to go to its roots, and to find the fulcrum for the lever—the *pou sto*—in the nature and necessity of the case.

† We have the first great manifestation of the Supernatural in the

4. The only doctrine or theory that stands in the way of accepting the supernatural in history (on the ground of adequate testimony) is this: viz., that all things continue as from the beginning; or the uniformity of nature, expressed by the further theory, the conservation of forces, the law of evolution, and the principle of natural selection.*

This theory will come up for consideration at various points hereafter. Here it is necessary only to indicate the way to clear the *a priori* ground, and make fair place and verge for the *testimony* to the miraculous. All we now want to claim or argue is that there is no *a priori* impossibility of the manifestation of the Supernatural in history. Three points may be noted:

(a) The uniformity of nature is no ultimate law. All it means is, that the same causes, acting under the same conditions, produce the same results. If a new cause comes in, there is nothing in the uniformity of nature to prevent its producing its proper effects, as even Mill grants.

(b) The laws of nature give no real principle, they are only names for modes of action. These laws are

very being, production, of nature itself, in creation (*sit venia verbo*) ; for if any act be essentially supernatural, it is the creation. Hence the miracle of the incarnation does not stand alone : it is the sequence of creation, and the one is as supernatural as the other. It is significant that in the theology of Christianity the Logos is both in creation and in the incarnation (Proem of John's Gospel). The miracles in the system of redemption are easier to grasp and believe if we accept the primal miracle of creation. Deny the one—and either one—and the other logically goes.

* This last is simply a regulative principle.

flexible; the higher control the lower; man subdues the earth.

(c) In the theory of the conservation (and correlation) of force, there is a fallacy. If force be all there is in the *universe*, the theory is true: but that includes the supernatural fountain; if the term is used of any finite forces, the theory is not proved: these may be changed and dispersed, and they do pass away (as Herschel said of *vis viva*). This theory only holds good as there is supposed to be Infinite and Absolute Force, ever *reënforcing* finite waste, change, and decay.

Hence, if the theory includes under force the supernatural fountain, it proves nothing to the purpose; if it is restricted to finite forces, it stands unproved and disproved.

5. All the theories about the universe, except that of the Nihilists and Nescients, turn upon the question of the transition from the primal essence to the forms of space and time, from the supernatural to the natural, the infinite to the finite. With the exception of Nescience, which denies all possible thought in respect to the matter, all theories may be brought into the following scheme:

(1) Rude Materialism. Lucretius, in "*De Natura Rerum*," is the best exponent of this. Atoms and motion given, all things may be engendered, in time enough and with chances enough. An atom is an impenetrable point in space, and with motion to set it going, it will in time produce the universe.

But what is an atom? No scientist can tell us.

And how does motion come to be mated with atoms? Neither can be gotten out of the other.

(2) More refined Materialism. Here physical force is taken as primary. From this force matter is in some way developed. Pile up forces enough, and in some way atoms are produced. Perhaps a diffused ether in oscillation is the nearest to the conception.

(3) The theory of some mode of being, inscrutable, but which can be stated, which is neither matter nor force, but from which matter and force come, or in which they are, or forms of which they are—as the inside and outside of a bowl. This is what Tyndall and Huxley have been seeking. Just as we are beings partly spiritual and partly material, produced from that which can produce both. Mill's theory, in general, comes here. He was too wise a man to construct the universe, but he says that as far as we can go in our thoughts we come to this. We have sensations, and refer them to an outer world. Before we had sensation there was a possibility of sensation, and in the world there was a possibility of producing sensation. So he says, Spirit is that in me which gives the possibility of sensation, and the world is that outside of me which has the power to produce sensation in me. This is his ultimate theory.

(4) The theory that spirit, as abstract and undefined, is primary, and from this the universe is derived by emanation, in successive grades. The East Indian Pantheism.

(5) Spirit is primary, not as abstract and undefined, but as thought, with logical law, law of logos or general reason. The development of this spirit by logi-

cal laws gives the universe. This is the Pantheism of Hegel.

(6) Spirit as will is the basis, but as unconscious will, producing the universe. This is the latest German philosophy.

(7) Spirit as personal will and intelligence, producing the finite universe by an act. Schelling's philosophy in its latest form. This contains the essential points of the Theistic theory of the universe.

All have the same problem. All grant, in some sense, a supernatural, a *prius* to creation—some mode of primal being, even if unknown. All philosophy raises an altar to the unknown God. Whom ye ignorantly worship Him declares Christianity to you.

“ He hides himself behind eternal laws,
Which and not Him, the sceptic, seeing, exclaims
There is no God :
And never did a Christian's adoration
So praise Him as this sceptic's blasphemy.”*

SUMMARY :

By this line of argument the following points are made :

(1) An irresistible (necessary) belief in the reality of the supernatural—the absolute.†

(2) As a necessary consequence, a belief in the possibility of its being *manifested*. The alleged *a priori* impossibility of its being manifested is baseless.

(3) A belief, equally irresistible and equally univer-

* Schiller. Don Carlos, Act iii. Sc. x.

† In all recent physics there is a metaphysical background. This is seen in Huxley, Spencer, Tyndall.

sal, that the supernatural, *so far as it is manifested*, is known, and cannot but be known: *so far forth*, and that is enough.

CHAPTER II.

CAN THE SUPERNATURAL BE KNOWN? OR (EXPRESSED MORE CONCRETELY—NOT AS EXACTLY EQUIVALENT, BUT NEARLY ENOUGH SO), CAN GOD BE KNOWN?

THIS is the second chief introductory topic, before considering the proof of the Being of God.

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(These include what belongs to the involved questions: Is all knowledge relative? Is all our knowledge only from and by Induction? Can faith and knowledge be sundered in this matter? The difference between absolute knowledge and knowledge of the absolute.)

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§ 1. *What is it "To Know?"*

It is the affirmation of being in some form which is in relation to our knowing capacities. These capacities are various, and so the different kinds of knowledge are thus determined; as,

(a) What is in immediate consciousness.

(b) What is perceived by and through the senses;
and

(c) What is derived by induction or by inference.

(d) What comes under the categories of cause and effect, of substance and phenomena, etc. We know

* He argues against Spencer, on the ground of Spencer, viz., the Absolute or Unknowable is beyond classification (*i. e.*, by parts and whole, genera and species). Better ground is: There is a *knowledge* of being, of truth (objective), which is *above* and beyond this, viz., what is universal and necessary, *per se*—*Causa sui*; and that Spencer himself is a witness to this in his Doctrine of Force and its Persistency.

there *must be* causes and substances, even if we cannot grasp them.

(e) What stands as universal and necessary; what is known in and of itself, and not merely as conjoined, or as deduced by any process. Under this: (1) Axiomatic certainties—as those of mathematics: (2) Intuitions, which are irresolvable. Space and time. Being as infinite and absolute. The affirmation of ultimate fact, ultimate truth, ultimate being.

Or, knowledge may be viewed in its elements and forms.

THE ELEMENTS.—1. What is in distinct consciousness.

2. Sensible perception. Anschauungen.

This is knowledge elementary.

THE FORMS OF KNOWLEDGE as completed.

A. Knowledge by processes. The cognitive understanding.

1. Knowledge by induction and deduction from the facts or data of consciousness and sensations.

2. — by Categories: cause and effect, substances and phenomena. Abstraction, generalization, etc.

B. Knowledge in its wholeness and unity. All phenomena (a) from one source, (b) one in many (substance, force), or (c) under *one law*—of evolution, development.

This knowledge is only of the reason: reaching to Unity of Being; Unity of Law; Unity of Thought—and Being.

Or, in still another light, The Constituents of all Knowledge are:

1. The affirmation of fact, or being, or thought (positive or negative).

2. The joining of subject and predicate in either (a) an analytic or (b) a synthetic judgment.

§ 2. *The various Theories as to the Knowledge which Man can have of God.*

1. Absolute knowledge is claimed, as in the Pantheistic schools. We know God because we are a part of God. This, however, is simply a knowledge of abstract being.

2. Absolute knowledge is claimed at the other extreme. We have no knowledge of God because we have no faculties by which we may know Him. All we can know is that which comes through sense, and the inferences from it. The whole process of knowledge is induction. This is the ground of Positivism.

3. We know God as an innate idea ; by immediate intuition of his being—of his personal being—as we know nature by the senses, and space by reason. A sub-mystic view.

4. The mystic view : God is supersubstantial, ὑπερ-ούσιος.*

5. In no way can we attain to a knowledge of God, by the intellect, by the reason or by reasoning. Logic and metaphysics lead only to contradictions—to (a) Negative knowledge ; (b) Relative knowledge. But we may and must lay hold of Him by faith—may and must believe in Him and obey Him.

* See Anselm in Monologue, 26.

We can never *know* the Absolute and Infinite One ; we fall into antinomies ; we are baffled by lack of capacity ; reason lands us in contradictions.

6. To know is not equivalent to, or limited to,

- (a) Absolute knowledge,
- (b) Immediate intuition, or,
- (c) Definite conception.*

In order to know God truly we do not need to claim a knowledge of the essence of being ; nor an innate idea—as complete and finished ; nor to define him so as to limit him.

There is a knowledge of reason as well as of sense and the understanding. We may know *that*, without knowing what ; may know quality without knowing quantity ; may have a true knowledge, as far as it goes, though it is inadequate as to the full measure of being ; we may have *γνώσις*, though not *κατάληψις* ; † we may know by revelation (natural in us), when we do not grasp the unrevealed essence ; and also by a special revelation (God in his word, God in Christ), while the essence lies beyond us. ‡

Also, we may attain full knowledge and conviction

* Des Cartes. “ *Comprehendere enim est cogitatione complecti ; ad hoc autem, ut sciamus aliquid, sufficit, ut illud cogitatione attingamus.*” We know God “ *eodem modo quo montem manibus tangere possumus, sed non ut arborem, aut aliam quampiam rem brachiis nostris non majorem amplecti.*”

† So John of Damascus. “ Neither are all things unsaid, nor is all said ; neither are all unknown, nor are all known.”

‡ Aquinas. “ *Comprehendere Deum impossibile est cuique intellectui creato ; attingere vero mente Deum qualitercumque magna est beatitudo.*”

Leibnitz (Theod. Pref.). “ Les perfections de Dieu sont celles de

by the combination of the different modes of knowledge in one result. *E. g.* Intuitions and universal truths combine and harmonize with the results of experience.

Induction and deduction coincide—

—where ontological and *a posteriori* proofs combine;

—where proofs from all the sources converge to one result;

—where the subjective idea and the objective law correspond—

As when—Newton deduced gravitation and applied it;

As when—Leverrier deduced Neptune and found it;

As when—by ontology we are led to the idea of pure being, and find it verified in the order and harmony of the universe—thought standing over against being—binding all in one—so that the infinite and finite make up one system.

In one respect Aristotle has greatly troubled speculation—in his doctrine that the *ὑλη* is the ground of all potentiality and finiteness, while the *εἶδος*, the principle of form, is divine and eternal; the two together making up the individual (*σύνολον*). (The assertion respecting the *εἶδος* places Aristotle—with Socrates and Plato—among the idealists, as distinguished from the old Greek materialists.) * The

nos âmes, mais il les possède sans bornes ; il est un océan, dont nous n'avons reçu que les gouttes ; il y a en nous quelque puissance, quelque connaissance, quelque bonté ; mais elles sont entières en Dieu."

* All philosophy lies between the flux and chaos of Heraclitus (Ionic) and the Absolute One of Parmenides (Eleatic). Plato's "ideas" came between.

philosophy which is evolved by the Christian view, viz., all that is not God has its substance (*ὕλη* as well as *εἶδος*) from God ; * all creatures *must* come from *potence* to *act* † (or be brought). God alone is under no category—being *actus purus* ; he categorizes all that is finite. All that is finite must be under categories, and so can be known. Of God, only an *analogous* knowledge can be obtained ; because the universe is not of his nature, but is only an analogy of the divine being.

(Cf. Prof. Katzenberger of Bamberg, in *Theol. Quartalschrift*, 1864, pp. 168-174.)

Can we think that which is not in its essence a thought ? This is the question in Pantheism of the logical, Hegelian kind, the assertion underlying, that the essence of thought (*idea*) and being are one—and that *idea* precedes.

But : Is not being before thought—logically and in fact ? Does not a thinking—an activity—presuppose a being ? If so, then the laws of being may be more and other than the laws of thought.

(Laws of thought :

1. Judgment, subj. pred. copula.
2. Contradiction, negativity.
3. Inference.

Laws of being :

1. Being *is*—existence affirmed ; and has movement—activity—development—a process.

* Augustine : " Omnis substantia, quæ Deus non est, creatura est."

† This statement involves a reference to the Aristotelian distinctions as to being. See F. Brentano (a pupil of Trendelenburg), *Die mannigfache Bedeutung des Seienden nach Arist.*, 1862.

2. Law of process—development by antagonisms.

3. Issue—end—ad quem.

How far agree—and disagree?)

§ 3. *Discussion of the Theories.*

(In this discussion the theory that God is known as an Innate Idea will not be considered. It cannot be reasoned about. It states no process which can be apprehended. If a man says he has it, and can give no account of it, there is no more to be said.)

I. *Positivism and the Inductive Philosophy.*

The inductive theory says that all knowledge comes by observation of phenomena (sensations) and by generalizing those phenomena; in other words, putting into a general statement what is true of a particular case, and affirming that this is true of all similar cases.

This is the root of Nescience in respect to God. If we can only know sensations and generalize them, of course we cannot come to the cause of those sensations. All beyond must be pure zero.

Not to anticipate subsequent discussions, some general objections to the above view are here stated.

(1) In sensation itself there is given more than mere sensation. There is a material impact, *and also* a feeling of resistance, not material, but conscious—a resisting self, a person, an Ego—involved (whether or not this is given in the sensation itself is not material, it is certainly implied). And this *conscious knowledge* cannot be derived from the external phenomena, but is a distinguishable state of the ego.

The ego cannot be derived from the non-ego. It is Mill's confession that "a series of sensations, conscious of itself, is the ineffable mystery." The inductive philosophy gives account of the successive sensations. But that something whereby we know them cannot come out of these sensations. Leibnitz says: "*Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius in sensu, nisi intellectus ipse.*"

The fact is, that in our knowledge, after all, we know mind by the First Intention, and matter only derivatively.

(2) The process of Induction—from particulars to a whole or wholes—is not a sensation, but a purely mental process, not to be derived from any forces or forms of matter. There is nothing in nature corresponding to an induction from particulars to generals. The facts are in nature, but the process is in the mind; it is a procedure in thought-knowledge, which has its own laws.

(3) Still more emphatically must we make this statement when we apply mathematics (the principles involved in our necessary ideas of space and time—geometry and arithmetic) to the matters brought under induction. In doing this we bring all the shifting phenomena of sense under invariable laws (inviolable laws, some are fond of saying, whenever a question of the supernatural comes in). Astronomers, from observing certain phenomena, concluded that a disturbing cause must be found in a planet never yet seen, because they held the uniformity of nature. What observation of mere sense ever led to such a conclusion?

(4) If induction be all, we are involved at the end, by the process itself, in inconceivable ignorance even of what we do know. The theory is that we know only antecedents and consequents, and know the consequents only as modes of the antecedents. Scientific knowledge is the knowledge of these differing modes.

Suppose then that we trace back to the utmost point within our reach the last *inspected* consequences; these can be known "only as we know the antecedents," only as "modes of the antecedents." Then they cannot be known at all, for by the supposition we cannot reach *their* antecedents.

Hence, the whole process of knowing fails at the end. Not knowing the ultimate antecedent, all our seeming knowledge becomes a chain of total ignorance. It is a chain which is all hanging, and nowhere hangs. The invisible things being unknown, we cannot and do not know the visible. Without the noumena there are no intelligible phenomena.

(5) In all induction, too, theory *leads*. No great discovery takes place without anticipation—a mental process. A sense of unity, law, power, order, presides over all the special investigations.

(6) With induction alone no knowledge of ultimate law, truth, being, is possible. Induction cannot conclude beyond its sphere. If all facts are of sensible phenomena, no conclusion can be reached to anything beyond time and space. Universally applied, the "Inductive Method" must be atheistic.

II. *The position that all knowledge is of the Relative, and hence we cannot know the Absolute.*

The Absolute and Infinite, being out of all relations, cannot be an object of knowledge : * Man is, on every side, in relations, and can know only what he is and what he is in. The relative contradicts the absolute ; God cannot be both relative and absolute.

Remarks—

(1) Upon the terms Unconditioned, Absolute, Infinite (especially in Hamilton's usage of them).

Hamilton uses "infinite" in the sense of that which never can be completed, "absolute" in the sense of that which is complete in and of itself, and is also unrelated. God then cannot be absolute and infinite at the same time.

This is peculiar to Hamilton's theory. It is not warranted by previous usage of terms.

A better definition of the Absolute is: that which is complete in and of itself, having no necessary dependence upon, or relation to, any other thing ; and of the Infinite—that which never can be completed by finite terms or increments (Hamilton's infinite is the mathematical infinite—the infinite series, infinite time and space). The proper positive sense of the

* Sir Wm. Hamilton : "To think is to *condition*." "We can know only the limited," and "the conditionally limited." "We cannot know the unconditionally unlimited = the Infinite ; nor the unconditionally limited = the Absolute." In other words, "unconditional negation of limitation = the Infinite ; unconditional affirmation of limitation = the Absolute." "All that we can know is only known as 'won from the void and formless *infinite*.'"

Hamilton's views are wonderfully well put ; his work is a triumph of citation and application. But it is, nevertheless, one of the most puzzling of questions what Hamilton and Mansel really mean by "Relative," "Knowledge of Relations," etc.

term is: There is something in the nature of the Infinite which prevents its being completed by any finite additions. The Infinite is not to be contrasted with the Absolute: it *is* the Absolute, brought into relation to (standing over against) the Finite.

It is to be noted also that these words, Infinite, Absolute, Unconditioned, are adjectives, not substantives. They have meaning only when some such proposition as the following is understood: All being, all substances may, must be analyzed into absolute and relative (being), infinite and finite (being), unconditioned and conditioned (being, etc.). It is a pantheistic conception which takes these terms by themselves and puts abstractions at the basis of the universe. In fact, it is the radical defect of Hamilton and Mansel that they have taken definitions from Pantheism and applied them to theistic views. Because we cannot grasp the Absolute by itself, therefore we cannot know the absolute God.

It should be observed also that while Hamilton asserts that the knowledge of the Absolute and Infinite is a blank, he nevertheless proceeds to distinguish them. Denying that there is anything positive in our knowledge of the Infinite, he yet makes definitions in that field.

(2) As to the sense of Relative and In Relation.

(Hamilton argues upon these at length, but the final sense which he would give to them cannot be extracted from his writings.)

(a) Of their possible meanings.

(a') They may mean that all things in the universe are in relation among themselves, so that if we are

to know them truly, we must know them as they exist in those relations.

This is indisputably true.

(b') The meaning may be, that as we are related to other things (and all things), we cannot know them unless as and thus related to them.

This is also true. We cannot know anything unless we have such a relation to it that we can know it. Anything out of all relation to us we cannot possibly know.

(c') It may be meant that the Absolute and Infinite are out of all relations to us and to anything else, and hence we cannot know them.

But such an Absolute does not exist. The term, as has been said, is an adjective. God is not, cannot be such a being. Whatever He may have been in the beginning, He certainly is not such a being now. Even the pantheist does not claim this.

(d') Because we are relative and related beings, we cannot in any way know anything about the Absolute and Infinite Spirit.

This is the real point of debate, and on this we join issue.

(b) The force and propriety of the terms as defined.

(This will be considered in relation to Dr. Mansel's exposition, as that is the clearest and fairest.)

The fundamental and fallacious maxim involved in Mansel's position is: *Quantum sumus scimus; Simile simili cognoscitur*.*

* Less definitely, Boethius, who is approved by Hamilton: "Omne quod cognoscitur non secundum sui vim, sed secundum cognoscentium potius comprehenditur facultatem."

One of the Neo-Platonists (Plotinus?) said: "He that sees the sun

This is thought to lead to the conclusion that if we can know God, we are a part of Him, and if we are not a part of him, we cannot know Him. Pantheism *or* Nescience: it is on this alternative that Hamilton and Mansel have discussed the question, and capitulated to the pantheist.

This must be affirmed to be a radically vicious theory of knowledge, with just enough truth in it to make it seem plausible. Knowledge does not depend on identity of nature. If we can know only what we are, how can we know the external world? We can certainly know the non-ego. Further, we know that space is boundless; but does this show that *we* are boundless?

The true doctrine is the Christian doctrine—that because man is made in the image of God, he may therefore know something of Him. He is spiritual, like God; and may know and worship God as spirit—which is denied to brutes. But this does not make him to be one with God, “of the same substance, power, and glory.” *

Knowledge requires a capacity—a kinship, not an identity. Man, as spirit, knows matter, not because he is material. The ego knows the non-ego. The holy knows the sinful. God, in knowing man, does not un-deify himself.

(c) The argument from “Consciousness.”

Mansel gives four conditions of all consciousness :

must be solar.” This answers to, “A triangle would conceive of God as triangular.”

* This, in the Creed, marks off Christ from the creature.

(1) In all consciousness there is a distinction between one object and another, (2) there is a relation of subject and object, (3) there is succession and duration—time between different ideas, (4) personality. All these, he says, are to be denied of the Infinite and Absolute; and as they limit our consciousness, it follows that “the Infinite and Absolute cannot be known in our consciousness.”

But this again imposes the conditions of consciousness on the objects of consciousness. Those conditions are inconsistent with our *being* absolute and infinite, but not with our knowing the reality of the Absolute and Infinite.*

(d) We must argue against this theory of the relativity of knowledge, on the ground that we cannot know relations, without some adequate knowledge of the things related.

* The theory applies, likewise, as we have seen, to the knowledge of space and time, as unending and illimitable. It applies also to the ideas of substance, first cause, and personality. Mansel gives up even the personality of God, on the ground that He cannot be both absolute and personal. (He accepts God's personality on grounds of “faith,” but his position on grounds of reason is perilous in the extreme.)

He applies the theory to morality also, saying that in God's mind moral ideas, laws, and truth may be utterly different from the things of the same name in us. “Morality,” he says, “consists essentially in our obligation to obey a superior being.” But, against this, (1) though morality is obligation, it is obligation to be *right* and do right. Unless the idea of right comes in, there is no *moral* obligation, only physical; (2) morality *is* “obligation to the will of a superior being,” but the superior being must have in himself (and there must be in our knowledge of him) a moral quality, appealing to the “categorical imperative” within us. “Be ye holy, for I am holy.”

Only as far as we know the things can we know the relations.

Relatives, relations—are copulas of discourse. We cannot understand the copula without knowing the subject and predicate (*e. g.*, the sun, earth, moon—if we did not know something about *them*, we should have a very vague knowledge of the solar system and astronomy—the tides, eclipses, etc.). God and man—what can we know of their relations, if we do not know *them*? The relations are made by the beings and things and facts related. A relation is an abstract phrase, without sense or contents, until we know the related objects.

(*e*) The most difficult and obscure part of our knowledge—*where we in fact know the least*—is in the relations of being, of the parts of the universe to each other. *E. g.* The relations of God to man; of the infinite to the finite; of eternity and time; of space and its parts; of soul to body; of matter to mind; of sensation to consciousness. The mystery of things is chiefly here.

(*f*) The advocates of this doctrine affirm, notwithstanding the position they take, the possibility of a rational “faith” in God; but in fact the doctrine annuls the possibility of faith in God as truly as of the knowledge of Him.

For (1) faith is limited by consciousness, equally with knowledge. All the reasons equally apply. Faith cannot transcend consciousness. (2) Faith must have an apprehended object—a discerned, known object. Else it is vain.

(*g*) The theory restricts knowledge unduly.

It says: Knowledge is (1) something of which we have a clear *finite* conception; or, (2) it is the product of the image-making power, and does not include all that we are convinced of; or, (3) it must be a grasping of all the causes and conditions of phenomena—which is absolute knowledge.

(h) The theory leaves for the sphere of Christianity (and all religion) mere feeling, sentiment, or a blind impulse. This would drive Christianity out of the field, with all cool heads and consecutive thinkers.

III. *Is our knowledge of the Infinite and Absolute merely negative?*

(1) The idea of "negative" is superficially favored by the form of the word Infinite = non-finite; but take the parallel case of the word *immortal*, where the meaning is certainly positive.

Kant (Logic, Introd., c. 8) says: "Negative notions guard us from error. They are not needed in cases where it is impossible to be deceived. But they are very important in relation to the conceptions we form of such a being as God." They are of use to exclude from our thoughts of Him all that is *not* infinite; but not to exclude the Infinite itself!

(2) It should be remarked that no one means by the assertion, "our knowledge of God is negative," to affirm a pure negation of being—to say that the Infinite = 0.

The German distinction between Nichtswissen (knowing that nothing is) and Nichtwissen (not knowing in certain relations what is or is not), is applicable here. To affirm the former of God is Nihil-

ism, is atheism. The philosophy of Nescience is not—Nihilism.

(3) The term "negative," then, in the proposition, "our knowledge of God is negative," must be taken in a relative sense, and must refer to our knowledge.

Granting that the Infinite and Absolute Being exists—our idea of it is, and must be, purely negative—the result of "impotence of the mind."

The question eludes our grasp when it is said that the negativity of our knowledge of God means, that though we know that an Infinite and Absolute Being exists, yet we cannot do two things more in the process of knowledge; (1) exhaust the scope of the predicates Infinite and Absolute; or, (2) define the limits of the Being. We grant both positions, and say further, that if we should "define the limits" of the Infinite Being, we should un-define it—turn it into its contradictory. If we have a clear, definite conception of it, we have no idea of *it* at all. To define it thus, is to deny its being.

The question to be held fast is, whether our knowledge, our ideas, refer only to the Finite and Limited; whether they consist exclusively of clear logical conceptions, existences with determinate boundaries. To *say* that this exhausts all knowledge, is to beg the question: the affirmation must be proved.*

(4) Our knowledge of the Infinite may properly be said to be negative in the sense that it involves negative definitions; *i. e.*, denying something of any-

* If it *could* be proved, we should come ultimately to Hegel's position, "Sein u. Nichts," as identical.

thing. We affirm that it is non-finite, that no limits can be assigned to it. But such a definition gives us the idea in *relation to the Finite*, and not in itself.

(5) The Finite involves the real negation—negation of being—by limitation. Here the maxim fully applies: “*Omnis determinatio est negatio.*” There is a vast deal that the Finite is *not*. All besides its limited self is denied of it. Hence the positive is really upon the other side, viz.:

(6) The Infinite is the positive in thought, in the highest sense.

Trendelenburg (Log., ii. 452) says: “The Absolute is not a negative notion. We reach it by a negative process. We remove everything which limits it, but the notion itself is positive, and if it be correctly thought is the most positive of all notions, because not limited.”

Herbert Spencer (in *First Principles*, ch. 2) says: “The Absolute is positive, for in the very denial of our power to know what it is lies the affirmation that it is. Our conception of the Relative disappears, if our idea of the Absolute is a pure negation.”

Hamilton himself has said: “That is a positive idea which affirms existence.”

CONCLUDING STATEMENTS:

1. We can give a positive as well as negative statement of the Infinite.

In the way of negation: The Infinite is that (*e. g.*, space and time) to which no limits *can be assigned*. Positively: The Infinite is that which is complete in itself, perfect, absolute, unconditioned.

2. We have an idea—though not a conception—
notion—of the Infinite.

An idea is that which we know to be, as having a real and necessary being. It refers to pure being.

A conception is that which we know to be under the forms and limitations of time and sense.

If we had a conception of the Infinite we should make it finite.

IV. *The position that we can have an absolute knowledge of God.*

We have affirmed that, as far as such predicates as Infinite and Absolute are concerned, we can know, positively, that they belong to God, without being able to grasp or comprehend them.

But though we know the Infinite and Absolute in this sense, it does not at all follow that from it we are able to deduce the Finite and Relative—as Pantheism asserts.

A knowledge of the Absolute is not absolute knowledge.

PANTHEISM—to which the position now under consideration brings us—is recommended to many minds by its simplicity (being Monism) and its universality. Exalting the immanence of God, in nature and history, it has, however, sacrificed to this immanence the transcendence of God above all nature and history. It has doubtless helped to break the power of a mere deistic notion of God, as an abstract deity, sundered from the world. But it has done this by a theory which identifies the substance of the world with the substance of the Godhead.

The fundamental postulate of Pantheism is—that

there is one infinite and absolute substance (spirit), of which all relative and finite phenomena are but modifications. Its assumption as to method is—that the development of the Relative and Finite from the Absolute and Infinite can be demonstrated as necessary. And this, of course, implies the further claim, that man can know this Absolute and its processes, because he is kindred thereto.

To show that Pantheism is the final and exclusive system for man would involve the proof of the following three points at least :

(1) That man knows the Absolute ; not as knowing *that* it is, but, *what* it is. Such knowledge can be proved only on the bold assumption that our subjective thought and objective being are identical. With God, thought and being are doubtless coincident. But, in a finite creature, thought can only be the reflex and the echo of being ; and the measure of the thought is not the measure of being, but only of the capacity of the thinker. “Alas for the universe, if it is only as, and what, we know it to be !” (And the radically fallacious theory of knowledge, referred to before, is also here assumed, viz., that we can know only what we are.)

(2) That man can develop the Relative from the Absolute, the Finite from the Infinite, and this by a necessary or demonstrative process. But, in fact, the Absolute and Relative, the Infinite and Finite, are incommensurable ratios ; the idea of the one is contrasted with, rather than deduced from, the other. The relation of the two, in human thought, is neither that of cause or ground to effect, nor that of

a whole to its parts, nor that of the generic to the individual. It being none of these, the process of demonstration (deduction) cannot be logically complete. And besides, the logical law of contradiction, by which alone, in the most consistent systems, this demonstration is attempted, cannot be claimed, without further evidence, to be a law of being as well as of thought. For the principle of negativity is not an efficient agent; it has no productive or generating capacity. Therefore it cannot be the principle of a *real* development. It is not applicable even to physical processes; it cannot explain a spontaneous energy; we cannot by it construct the acts of a personal will. If inapplicable even to the Finite, its scope must be too narrow to embrace the Infinite.

(3) The prime postulate of the system would also require to be proved, viz., that there is only one spirit (absolute and infinite) in the universe, and that all other existences are its modes or modifications; itself unconscious, it is the source of all specific material and spiritual modes of being. The proof of this involves also the proof of the second position, just considered. But it is attended with other difficulties. All that is, the Absolute and Relative, the Infinite and Finite, may doubtless be included in one category, viz., that of *being*. Herein is the truth, and here may perhaps be also found the fallacy of the pantheistic assumption. For as soon as we attempt to pass from the abstract and indeterminate idea of being, to any of its modes, *e. g.*, the material and spiritual, the real and the ideal, we need some *primum mobile*, some developing power, to account for the

developing process. Whence this power? It cannot be deduced from the idea of being; it must then be hypostatized as inherent in being. That is, in order to start, we must have a principle of movement, an act, as well as being. And as it must be an activity equal to all the effects; the Absolute Being itself must contain a causality adequate to each and all the specific effects, of wisdom, power, and moral order manifest in the universe; and how can it contain this, without itself being wise, powerful, and good, *i. e.*, a conscious moral intelligence?

Still further, when we come to the modes or modifications of being, we cannot construe them in thought as having only one identical substance. Take, *e. g.*, spirit and matter; they are defined by contrasted properties; the properties cannot be deduced either from each other, or from one and the same substance. Substance and attributes are correlative. If there are different attributes, we have no warrant for asserting identity of substance. Matter can be derived from spirit only by an act, not by emanation. But Pantheism must make this deduction—by emanation—must prove the identity of substance, or else it rests on a mere assumption.

Nor does it avail for the pantheist to say that an Infinite which does not embrace the Finite is not infinite but finite, since it has the Finite for its limit; and so of the Absolute. For whatever difficulty there may be about it, it is equally difficult, on the other hand, for the pantheist or any one else to conceive that the Infinite includes the Finite, that the Absolute includes the Relative, and that the Perfect includes

the Imperfect, without equally annulling the Infinite, the Absolute, and the Perfect. The real problem—equally a problem with pantheist and theist—is not to show that the one includes the other, but rather to show how the transition *must or may be made* from the one to the other. The theist says, by creation—the act of a self-conscious will; the pantheist must say, by emanation—the outflowing of an unconscious substance. Both find here the knot of speculation. But the pantheist is *obliged to demonstrate* the transition; the theist need only show that it is possible to an absolute will, and may grant that the mode is beyond the scrutiny of human science. And while the theist refers all the order and harmony of the universe to a wise and intelligent author, all final causes to the one efficient cause, the pantheist is burdened with the difficulty of explaining how the Intelligent can be derived from the Unintelligent, the Personal from the Impersonal, the Moral from the Neutral, and the whole fair order of the kosmos from a blind, unconscious spirit, which becomes conscious of its rational and moral powers only in and by these products themselves.

(Further: as to the Infinite including the Finite, or else not being the Infinite, it is to be noticed (1) that this could apply only when what is excluded would add to the perfection of the being, (2) that it applies to *quantity* [space and time], not to quality.)

Hence, upon the whole question as to our knowledge of the Infinite and Absolute, it is to be affirmed that our knowledge is neither negative nor absolute, not of the Finite only, nor of the Infinite wholly, but lies between, having elements of both.

CHAPTER III.

THE SENSE IN WHICH WE CAN BE SAID TO KNOW THE
ABSOLUTE AND INFINITE—GOD.

THE general result (of the discussion in Chap. II.)—or the theistic position—is that—

1. All our knowledge is not derived by induction from the phenomena of sensation ; otherwise no God is reached, or only an imagination, a being made in *our* image, an anthropomorphic deity, an illusion—no reality.

2. That man can know the Absolute as well as the Relative, and knows the Relative as relative only because he has a presentiment—a knowledge of the real being of the Absolute.

3. This knowledge is not a negative knowledge, excepting in the sense that it declares that the Infinite is *not* the Finite, the Absolute is not the Relative. It is positive in the sense of the affirmation of real being.

4. While our knowledge is not an absolute knowledge, it is a knowledge of the Absolute. *We can know the real being* of what we are not, know that—not *what*—know, not comprehend. *E. g.* We can know that space is illimitable without grasping the illimitable, or being ourselves illimitable.

God may have some modes or attributes of which we know nothing. Spinoza here is right, and cau-

tious, when he says : " The infinite substance may have infinite modes ; of these we know two, thought and extension."

Hence, if we know God, this cannot be by induction, which would give only the sum of the finite ; nor by intuition (direct), else no proof could be demanded ; nor by identification, else we should know no God above the world.

If we know God at all, it is not as we know a stone, or tree, or man ; not as we know a class, an abstract notion, a general idea ; not as we know a nothing or an inconceivability ; but as we can and may know a perfect absolute being—intelligent and personal—the author of the world, and the appropriate object of our love and worship.

We have now the question : *How man comes to the knowledge of God.* In what sense we know Him ; and how we arrive at such knowledge.

§ 1. *Explanatory.* The question is, *How can we know God ?*

This very question implies some knowledge. Unless we had some conception of God we could and would nevermore ask, How can and do we know God ? Unless man had some belief in God he would not ask, any more than an animal, Can you prove His being—can you demonstrate His existence ?

The question implies a need, a craving—seeks for an answer to a demand of our rational and moral being. This is the very least that can be said. There is a strong subjective belief—that is the starting-

point ; and the question is, Is there a corresponding objective reality ? Are there sufficient grounds for full belief, binding on all rational and moral beings ? *

Hence the question is not at all about knowing some unknown thing, about proving the existence of a mere abstraction—as a theorem in geometry. It is as to the proving the existence of a being in whom, somehow, in some wise, we already believe. It is not going from the known to the unknown—but showing that there are valid and final reasons for a strong, universal, native, human belief.

Proof, in this case, means—and can only mean—that the ultimate truths of our mental and moral being, that all the facts we know about the world without and the world within, that the ultimate ideas and laws of the mind, and the rationale of matter as well—that all our ideas, all our knowledge, all the categories of thought, all the processes of knowledge—agree with, lead to, rest in, the knowledge and worship of the one only living and true God.

So that if we give up God, we give up all that is highest and best in knowledge, the very life of the soul.

To illustrate the character of the proof required, take the case of the parallel (in some sense) belief in an external world. Everybody believes in an ex-

* In some respects like, *e. g.*, the question of the real existence of the sun and fixed stars. We believe them—see them. But, it is objected, our senses deceive us ; there may be no external world. You think you see it ; it is only a sensation—an image—a nervous impression—a motion of the molecules—an irre recognizable source of transient impression. *Prove* that the sun exists.

ternal world.* But some sceptic says, there is none; it is all a fleeting shadow, ideas, sensations. *Prove*, if you can, that such a world exists. Then we will believe it, when you demonstrate it by means of some ultimate idea or crucial experiment. How, now, are you to set about *proving* this to him, especially when he says that if you do not, all the natural sciences must be given up as unreal and visionary.†

We tell him there is an irresistible, universal, inexpugnable belief. Yes, he replies, but that is only an idea, a sensation, something purely subjective. Prove, demonstrate your *objective reality*.

How, we ask him, can any one go to work to conduct such a proof in the way you propose? Everything that you know, that you are conscious of, you call a subjective sensation, and demand that we pass from that to something objective. You deny all objectivity, all reality to the object, and then ask us to put that idea into you as a development of the subjective. That *cannot* be done. Nobody can deduce the objective from the subjective. The objective *can only be known*, not deduced.

If you admit the reality of *any objectivity whatever*, there is a basis of argument; but if you do this, you give up the opinion that the objective is to be proved by a process, and confess that it may be known as a fact and ultimate.

We may, can, and must know nature (and God),

* Especially do the naturalists who doubt about everything else; else were their vocation emptier than that which they ascribe to the theologians.

† This is what *they* say about *religion*.

because we may, can, and must recognize an objective reality corresponding to some—say only at first some one—of our ideas. Grant this, and the rest follows: deny this, and you fall into metaphysical insanity.

The idea of being as objective is the source and test of all true philosophy.

Admit anywhere, at any point—the smallest—that the subject and object are together in an act of consciousness, and the question is settled. For there, at that point, in that consciousness, idea and reality, thought and being, coalesce. If such objective reality of some of our ideas or beliefs be wholly denied, no proof is possible. Thus, if the barest objective be admitted (the least ray of light), it is inclusively admitted that the two coalesce in a single conscious act somewhere. Hence the belief in the objective world is given directly in consciousness, be that world atoms, or forces, or what it may.

Then to carry on the argument proving the reality, the proof will consist (on the basis of the above admission), in showing that the facts of external and internal experience agree, are counterparts, outside and inside, idea and law, all making up one system.

So, in respect to the proof of the being of God. The reality of being (objective) is the primal consciousness.

In sum : There are two grand spheres, Nature and Spirit. Man belongs to both. In the spiritual, as spirit, he knows God ; in the natural, he knows nature. There are two fundamental metaphysical questions: (1) Does nature exist ; has it a real being?

(2) Does God (the spiritual in essence) exist, and has God real being? *There is the same question for both. There are the same objections to both.* Man, developed, knows both. What are the grounds of his knowledge? Is there an object corresponding to the subjective belief? Nature *is*, says the naturalist. God *is*, says the spiritualist. *Prove* the existence of nature, says the idealist. *Prove* the existence of God, says the naturalist. The method of proof (so called) must be essentially the same in the one as in the other. Track, know the mode of proof in the one, and in the other is its parallel. What does, or can, *proof* here mean? Disprove God, and by the same argument I will disprove the world. Prove the world, and in a way akin I will prove God.

§ 2. *First Point in the Ascensio Mentis ad Deum.*

The starting-point, the *point d'appui*, the fulcrum is in man's native belief, in the fact that *man is made in the image of God*.

Hence what the mystics call the *ascensio mentis ad Deum*; and there is a natural ascension here as well as a spiritual, an instinctive as well as a reflective knowledge, as is proved by the history of all nations.

What is implied in native knowledge?

Man is made for God—must believe in Him, must know Him. The image seeks its archetype; the reflected light is to be traced back to its source. In this native knowledge of God we have the profoundest instinct, the deepest bent of the human soul.

This does not by itself prove the being of God, objectively. It sets us on the proof: it makes the evidence a matter of the highest concern. It haunts us, as Columbus was haunted and inspired by the vision of the Atlantis beyond the seas. It shapes the question thus: Is there valid and sufficient evidence of the real being of Him whom we worship, of a Reality corresponding with the aboriginal instinct of the human soul?

This instinct, we say, is native to the soul, implanted, *vis insita*.* Religion is impossible without it; the actual religions prove the belief, as much as works of art prove the existence of the sentiment and idea of beauty; as much as social order, and law, and courts of justice prove the reality of duty and obligation; as much as the existence of governments, states, and nations proves the existence of a social instinct, that government is not by contract, but by necessity.

We call this—and may well call it—a native belief.† We mean by this, that man is *made for God*;

* Dr. Owen (cited in Haliburton's *Rat. Inq.*, c. 3): "We do not say that men are born with any natural knowledge of God, as they have no knowledge at all when they are born; but we say that they are born with a capacity of knowing him, and that they do not so naturally *know*, as they *feel* this implanted capacity of knowing God, which stirs them up to worship him in some manner. And that this capacity will not less naturally and spontaneously exert itself in adults that are possessed of reason than reason itself."

† In Latin we can say, *Conscientia Dei*; in German, *Gottesbewusstsein*; in French even, *la conscience de Dieu*; not quite yet in English, *consciousness of God*. "Innate idea" also is too definite; it came from the Cartesian metaphysics of simple ideas—clear, distinct—as ultimate.

that all his powers tend to Him; that the right use of all his powers leads to Him; that man's reason, conscience, and affections are satisfied only in Him, that He is the complement of our being; that we, in fact, know ourselves only as we know Him.

The evidence for this "native belief" is—

I. Historical.

II. Psychological (analyzing our powers we find that the highest exercise of all is in religion).

III. Philosophical.

As to I., the *consensus gentium*, the proof of which must of course be derived from history, we cite a few instances and illustrations.

The historical testimony is well summed up in Calvin's Inst., lib. i. ch. 3. Caption: "Dei notitiam hominum mentibus naturaliter esse insitam."

The first sentence: "Quendam inesse humanæ menti, et quidem naturali instinctu, divinitatis sensum, extra controversiam ponimus."

Aristotle (de Cælo, i. 3) says: πάντες ἄνθρωποι περὶ θεῶν ἔχουσιν ὑπόληψιν.

Plato (de Legibus x. contra Atheos) often asserts that "the belief in the god or the gods is a natural, an universal instinct."

Cicero (Tusc. Disp., i. 27) says: "Nec vero Deus ipse, qui intelligitur a nobis, alio modo intelligi potest, nisi mens soluta quædam et libera, segregata ab omni concretionem mortali, omnia sentiens et movens, ipsaque prædita motu sempiterno."

Cicero (de Nat. Deor., i. 16), "Quæ est enim gens, aut quod genus hominum, quod non habeat, sine doctrina, anticipationem quandam Deorum, quam

appellat *πρόληψιν* Epicurus, *i. e.*, anteceptam animo rei quandam informationem, sine qua non intelligi quidquam, nec quæri, nec disputari potest." *

Maximinus Tyrius (cited by Grotius, *de Veritate*, i. § 15) says: "Notwithstanding the great discord, confusion, and debates among men, the whole world agree in this one constant opinion, that God is the king and father of all; but that there are many other gods who are but sent and share in his government. This is affirmed by Greeks and barbarians, by the dweller on the continent and the dweller on the shore."

Prichard (Egypt. Mythol.) shows that the Egyptians believed in a First Cause which was spiritual.

Sharon Turner (History Angl. Sax., App. to Bk. II. ch. 3) says: "Odin's first name was All-Father, though many others were subjoined in process of time."

The universality of belief in God is hardly contested. The array of evidence would fill volumes. As soon as society exists anywhere we find something like forms of worship. The most primitive and most degraded tribes are most *exclusively* under this religious control.†

The general evidence from the *consensus gentium* also contains an objective element (besides the sub-

* Conf. de Leg., i. 8; Tusc. Q., i. 13; de Nat., x. 17; Seneca, Epist. 117.

† In reviewing the evidence Benjamin Constant (born at Lausanne, 1767) had a remarkable experience. He set out to write a book to disprove the universal belief in deity, but as he proceeded became convinced of the opposite. He was a disciple of the Encyclopædists. "My work," he says, "is a singular proof of the remark of Bacon, that a little philosophy leads a man to atheism, but a good deal to religion." His book, *de la Religion*, published at Paris, 1824.

jective) that, as a matter of fact, men not only have this internal religious sentiment, but have also believed in the existence of deities, and ultimately of one supreme, divine power. Man's religious feeling is not a mere subjective state, but an aiming ever after an object; as if there were an objective reality corresponding. (This would not directly prove the existence of such an object; but it does prove the fact that men have believed in such.) The religious sentiment aims after and needs an object, just as much as the eyes need light, as the body craves food. That there should be in man such a craving for divinity, and no object corresponding, is as unnatural, as incredible, as that there should be a craving for food and no food to satisfy it. And, in point of fact, we cannot conceive (metaphysically) of an exercise of the religious sentiment without the belief in the objective existence of deities.*

The most primitive belief of India, seen in the older Sanskrit writings, was doubtless such.† Such was the most ancient Egyptian. (See Kenrick and Prichard.) Cicero, Plato, and Aristotle all confess such, not only as being their own faith, but as being the primitive faith of man. The Indians of America believed in one spirit: Dr. Livingstone finds a similar belief among the tribes of Central Africa. The Mosaic monotheism was a revelation, but it *completed*, unfolded the idea of God; and man's reason, when

* As of the question of beauty, etc.

† Cf. Prof. H. H. Wilson, Ed. Rev., Oct., 1860, The old Vedic Religions. Diestel, Der Monotheismus des ältesten Heidenthums, Jahrb. f. d. Theol., 1860.

the idea of God is understood—however received—welcomes it as the truth. So that *ultimately* the belief is in one God.* So the Mohammedan religion. So of the Christian monotheism. The religious sentiment leads naturally, logically, and only to this one God, where it is rightly educated.

To give specimens of the evidence,† we mention:

The fate behind the Greek drama, and behind the Parsee conflict of Ormuzd and Ahriman.

Athens with thirty thousand deities, longing for the unknown God.

The Eleusinian mysteries.

Eusebius (Præp. Evang.) cites from a lost tragedy of Euripides:

“Thou self-sprung being, that dost all infold
And in thine arms heaven’s whirling fabric hold.”

On the Sibylline Oracles, see Neand. Ch. H., i. 35.
Justin Martyr cites from them this passage:

“One God there is alone, great, uncreate,
Omnipotent, invisible, seeing all,
Himself unseen by mortal flesh.”

The passage from the Cilician poet Aratus, to

* A. H. v. Schlegel. “The more I investigate the ancient history of the world, the more I am convinced that the civilized nations set out from a purer worship of the Supreme Being”—that polytheism was a corruption of this, and that the wise preserved the memory of it.

† See Cudworth’s Intel. Syst.; Warburton’s Div. Leg.; Müller’s Introd. to Mythology; F. W. Schlegel’s Lang. and Wisd. of the Indians; Mosheim’s Early History of Chr’y, i. 17; Neander’s Ch. Hist., i. 536; Kenrick’s Ancient Egypt, i. 302; Ritter, vol. i.; and especially Schelling’s Philos. d. Mythologie, 1856.

which the Apostle Paul is supposed to have referred (Acts xvii.), has been thus translated :

“ From Jove begin we—who can touch the string,
And not harp praise to heaven's Eternal King?
He animates the mart and crowded way,
The restless ocean and the sheltered bay.
Doth care perplex? Is lowering danger nigh?
We are Jove's offspring, and to Jove we fly.”*

These phenomena of religion can only be ascribed to this: that there is a subjective religious sentiment or feeling belonging to human nature as such (simple and ultimate), prompting man to seek for God.

No mere external authority could have produced these phenomena and facts of religion in human history.

No “invention” theory will account for them. Men do not invent *what* IS, on such a grand scale. The religions of history are the grand facts of history. And besides, why are the “inventions” received?

The assertion that religion springs from fear does not answer. Whence the fear?

Nor that it is from education. It is through education, not from it.†

Only some native, common religious sentiment can account for the sum of the phenomena.

The very universality of superstition demands of us that we recognize such a ground for it.

* But see a different version in Turnbull, p. 45.

† The difference between what is given by nature and education is seen in the act of talking and learning the alphabet. Religion is learning to talk.

The native belief in God is equally proved by man's conscious internal experience. All men, at times, have the feeling of reverence and worship springing up in them. They cannot suppress it always; its voice is heard in the great emergencies and changes of life. It shows itself in all men, chiefly in the following forms:

(a) A profound sense of dependence on some unseen and higher power.*

(b) In the monitions of conscience, suggesting divine judgments for our deeds. This is in all men. So that the divine being is recognized as a moral ruler.

(c) It is also seen in the fact that man will sacrifice to religion all other ties and affections.

II. The second source of proof that the knowledge of God is connatural, is derived from an analysis of human nature itself, showing that the highest exercises of each and all of man's powers is in religion.

There are two points here: (a) The highest exercise of each is in religion; (b) The combined exercise of all is in religion.†

(a) The highest exercise of each.

(1) The intellect. The ultimate analysis here is into the two elements, the infinite and the finite, or the absolute and the relative. These comprehend, in the last analysis, the two extreme terms of our knowledge. We cannot, in thought, either escape or go beyond them. Take away, in thought, all that

* Schleiermacher makes this the only element. It is not that—but it is one.

† The first source being the consensus itself, the second, the analysis of this into its subjective and objective elements.

comes from the finite and the limited, and we go back upon and rest in something which is infinite. Take away what is fleeting, and we cannot but think of and believe in something which is absolute.

Whether this infinite, this absolute, be *conceived* of as positive or as negative (which we must by and by ask about), it is still a fact of man's intellect that he believes, and cannot but believe, that there *is* that which is infinite, which is boundless, which is unlimited. The necessity of thought compels to this; we cannot escape it. Everybody who thinks about it believes that as a matter of fact there is something which is not finite, not limited, *e. g.*, space and time. Exceptions *are* exceptions. They arise from yielding the mind too exclusively to physics, or to too much metaphysics. Instances given are such as La Place, some French Encyclopædists,* Harriet Martineau, Comte,† Epicurus, Leucippus, etc., to show that a number of highly intellectual persons have disavowed belief in God.

The only object of a reply to this objection is to show that the unbelief of such persons does not involve disproof of the general fact.

(a) These are exceptions in their *own* class of

* Not Voltaire.

† Comte, however, grants, that if an answer *must be had* to the question of the origin of things, the best answer would be an intelligent will; but he says the problem is insoluble. He repudiates the name of atheist, saying that "atheism is the most irrational form of theology."

minds. The greatest minds of all times have been on the other side.

(*b*) Even these concede the existence of an ultimate power, energy, etc., in unity of action—the most general notion of divinity. Their denial is that of a single personal agency.*

(*c*) As degradation may suppress nature, so may a one-sided intellectual or metaphysical cultivation dry up, stifle the soul. This is doubtless possible.

(*d*) Their scepticism does not at all impair the argument for the point to be established, viz., that a belief in God is native to man. They have suppressed the voice of nature. Their unbelief no more disproves that belief is native than the solitary cases of misanthropes disprove the position that man was made to love his fellows; nor than the case of the idealists disproves the fact that men are by nature impelled to a belief in the independent existence of the material world.†

(*e*) The reply to this scepticism is in the general argument.

III. The Philosophical Evidence.

God is the sum of the categories. God is the idea of ideas. God is that which is ultimate in human thought.

The rudiments of the IDEA: being, force, cause,

* The ancient *atheists* were against the *gods many*; the modern are against one God.

† Cf. Cudworth's *Intel. Syst.*, ch. iv.

Hume's *Essays on the Natural History of Rel.* acknowledge the feeling of dependence on God, but ascribe it to education, disease, etc.

substance—eternal and infinite—truth, beauty, goodness—all in one.

None doubt this except those bound up in sense.

Man may think away external nature, but not infinite and absolute being, in some form.

The only real question to-day is as to personal intelligence and consciousness. The force of force, idea of ideas, sum of the categories—that is confessed by unbelievers to be their God.

The theist claims all this, and more too.

§ 3. *The Shaping of the Argument.*

We have thus our basis in the argument—a primary, universal, instinctive belief, *conscientia Dei*. This is the fulcrum of the lever. Now to frame the argument. What is its nature? What its best form? What is the sense of the argument?

We must come to the knowledge of God as we do to all other real and ultimate knowledge, by the combination of two factors—the intuitional and the experiential; by the union of two methods, the *a priori* (ontological, demonstrative) and the *a posteriori*, the inquisition into the grounds and causes of facts and phenomena.

The meaning of “Argument for the Being of God—”

Not, arguing from the known to the unknown.

The object is to evince the certainty, reality of the idea of God's being.

The idea is innate: not as complete and distinct, but irresistible mental and moral tendency. It ap-

pears first in the form of feeling, anticipation. Education develops it.

The proofs are the development of this idea, in all its necessity and relations.

The proofs are various ; not because any of them is unconvincing, but on account of the universality of the idea.

All the proofs are one proof or chain of argument. The progress in the proofs is from the more abstract to the most concrete. Ontological, cosmological, teleological, moral, etc., exhibiting it on all sides.

The proof is not of a mere abstract being, but of the existence of the fullness of absolute being.

What, now, are we to prove ?

The existence of an infinite personal Spirit, the author (or Creator) of the world. This is the least we can propose ; it presents the demand in its lowest terms. Two points are involved : (1) The infinitude and personality of this Spirit ; (2) this world (all that is finite) is by and through him. To prove the one without the other is not to prove God. To prove an infinite personal spirit alone is not enough ; to prove an author of the world is not enough ; we must do both to have God, *i. e.*, a being in whom we may trust, who is our God. The two conceptions may be sundered in thought and proof ; there might be an infinite personal being who had no relation to the world ; there might, possibly, be an author of finite phenomena, not an infinite spirit. We need both if the proof is to be adequate.

How, then, shall this proof be conducted ?

It can only be, it seems to me, in the following order and manner :

1. As the starting-point show that man's whole nature and man's whole history prove the need to him of a God; that man by nature and reason is irresistibly prompted to seek for Deity, and cannot else be satisfied. This is not the proof of God's being, but the basis of proof.*

2. That all the phenomena and facts of the universe (so far as known) demand the recognition of a God as their source and unity—a personal God, the necessary complement of the world.

3. That man's reason (*a priori*) demonstrates the existence of a real, infinite, absolute being.

4. The combination of 2 and 3 gives us the result and proof.

In its ultimate philosophical principles the proof for the being of God consists of three arguments, resting upon three ideas :

(a) The ontological argument, on the idea of being.

(b) The cosmological argument, on the idea of cause.

(c) The teleological argument, on the idea of design.

The so-called ontological is not *a priori* in the sense of from cause to effect, as if the cause of God's

* There is a kind of parallel here to Kant's procedure in his Critique of the Pure Reason, against the sceptics, to show, first of all, the necessity and universality of the judgments of pure reason, against sceptics, not yet asking for their objective validity (which is to be established on other grounds). He cuts off, thus, the appeal of sceptics to *reason*, etc., etc.

existence were grasped. It is the argument from being, from the idea of being. *Not a syllogism, rather an analysis.* The only assumption is that of being. The only conclusion—the attributes of being.

In the cosmological argument, the eye is not now on being, but on successions of being; so that all temporal is seen to depend on the eternal, all finite on the infinite, etc.

In the teleological argument, nature, mind, morals, history, reveal the pursuit of ends, above all, of an end.

The contradictory proposition never can be proved.

To *prove* the atheist's position would imply omnipresence, omniscience, eternity, self-existence in him who established the conclusion.*

All the proofs make one proof; all the arguments make one argument. All are intended to establish the necessity of the divine existence, to explain the universe, so far as we know it.

The proofs need to be enumerated *seriatim* and independently: *e. g.*, in Melancthon's *Loci*, 9, they are reduced to five or six. But all these are only successive aspects and enlargements of the idea of God. Thus, the ontological argument gives the idea of the being of God and its abstract elements as necessary to human thought, the idea of one absolute, infinite Being as the cause of all that is.†

Then the cosmological argument stands between

* Cf. Pearson. Infidelity.

† See Herbert Spencer's reasonings and concessions; his attempt to reconcile philosophy and theology.

the *a priori* and *a posteriori*, giving the connecting link, the bridge, in the idea of cause.

And then follows the *a posteriori* argument, showing that there is an all-powerful, wise, and good author of the world (all that is finite). The natural sciences, mental and moral constitution of man, history, *consensus gentium* (not *hominum*) testify here.

The decisive force of the argument lies in the combination of the two main aspects of it.

The ontological proves, from our necessary ideas, that there is a Being, infinite, unconditioned, spiritual, the ground and cause of all that is. But it has failed to demonstrate conscious intelligence or personality.

The different forms of the *a posteriori* argument prove that the adequate cause of all that is must be (a) intelligent, rational, wise—because there is intelligence, reason, wisdom, in the whole of creation; (b) must be moral, because there are moral ideas and a moral order in the world itself. But this argument fails to show the infinitude of this cause, and fails to demonstrate that only one personal agency is concerned in all.

Combining the two, we have one substance, infinite, spiritual, and the ground and cause of all that is; also, intelligent and moral, or the source of rational ends and a moral order.

The question may arise, what warrants us in making the combination, and saying that the one infinite substance (demonstrated ontologically) is also the cause or source of the rational ends and moral order in creation? We are warranted in doing this for two

reasons: (a) The law of parsimony; requiring a simplicity of ultimate causes. But this is not enough. (b) By the nature of the causative agency, which enters into both arguments equally. Ontologically, we see the necessity of one ultimate causative energy for all that is; and, in the series of *causes* produced by this energy, we find intelligence, reason, and moral order. Hence the causality in the case must be rational and moral.

After all, true knowledge of God is a living, vital knowledge, gained only from communion with Him. It is the highest spiritual vision of the soul. The loss of it is spiritual darkness and death. This we are never to forget and never deny. Religion is not a theory, not metaphysics, not demonstrations—but a life, the life of God in the soul of man.

CHAPTER IV.

THE SUPERNATURAL AS THE MIRACULOUS.—THE DOCTRINE OF MIRACLES: * HERE CHIEFLY PHILOSOPHICAL.

THE Supernatural and the Miraculous are not identical.

* References to works. Hume, of course. Campbell, Dissertation on Miracles. Mill's Logic (concedes that a miracle is not against the law of cause and effect). Article by Prof. Smith in Appletons' Cyclopædia. Mozley, 1865 (3d ed., 1872). Wardlaw, 1852. Trench, 1850 (and later). Leslie, Truth of Christianity. Powell, Essays and Reviews (cf. Goodwin, Am. Theol. Rev.). N. W. Taylor, Sects. on Mor. Gov. Mansel, Aids to Faith, 1861. Butler, Anal., Pt. II., c. 2. Whately, Historic Doubts. Douglass, Criteria of Miracles.

The miraculous is one mode or manifestation of the supernatural, as we have already seen. In one sense, in the highest sense, all nature is a manifestation of the supernatural. Creation is the highest miracle (in a general sense). The incarnation and resurrection of Christ are also manifestations of the supernatural. Take the resurrection of Christ and the raising of Lazarus, and the latter is a miracle in the stricter sense. But really, fundamentally, there is the same power, the same idea, the same moral end in both. Unbelief creates a sliding scale as to the whole manifestation of the supernatural. Give up the Scripture miracles, and logically you give up Creation. This is Strauss's position (Old and New Faith), Renan's, and that of the whole modern school. Belief in a personal God and in miracles really stand or fall together in any consecutive logic or theory. Miracles are the revelation of the supernatural in *deed*, as the Bible is in *word*, as Christ is in the incarnation.

Further, miracles are usually discussed only in relation to the evidences—the question being, How far, and in what sense they give evidence of the divine commission of those who claim to be messengers of God. Christ says: "The works that I do bear witness to me." This, undoubtedly, is the strict sense of "miracles." It is necessary, however, to take

Steinmeyer, *Miracles* (translated, 1875). Dr. A. Hovey, *Miracles of Christ as attested*, 1863. Barnes, *Ely Lectures*. Dr. A. P. Peabody, *Ely Lectures*. Dr. Skinner, *Presb. Rev.*, Jan., 1865. Newman's *Essays*

them—before they are viewed as evidences—in their most general aspects. Here is the battle ground on the question of the *Supernatural in History*.

Here, moreover, both Christianity and Theism are in the sharpest contrast and contest with the two reigning schools of modern anti-Christian thought—the pantheistic and materialistic—the idealistic and the positive (materialistic—realistic). The impossibility of miracles is with them as an axiom—is the one unproved datum of all their criticism and philosophy. The same is true of evolutionists of every variety. Strauss and Renan both assume this as the basis of their criticism of the life of Christ, rejecting as unhistorical all that is miraculous (without any exception). This unproved postulate we are now to examine.

On philosophical grounds the proposition: A miracle in the nature of the case is impossible, is to be met with the proposition: A miracle is possible, and, on sufficient evidence, credible.

Hume was cautious, arguing against the proof or the possibility of *proving* a miracle; now, opponents are more daring, asserting the impossibility of the miraculous intervention itself. Of course, one who does not believe in a God cannot believe in a miracle as a work of God; as an event it may confound, but cannot convince him.

Strauss says: "The absolute cause never disturbs the chain of second causes by single arbitrary acts, but rather manifests itself in the production of the aggregate of final causalities, and of their reciprocal action." This is well put. (1) He allows that the

absolute cause manifests itself in second causes—which is true. (2) Allows that it produces the chain and all in it—in which he is right. (3) Asserts that the absolute cause produces not as an arbitrary act, that is, not without cause, ground, reason—which is granted. But (4) can we tell *a priori* what and what not the absolute cause may or may not do? If not, it is a question of fact, history, testimony, and the miraculous is not *a priori* impossible.

In the discussion all depends on getting

1. The True Idea of the Miracle.
2. The Possibility of it.
3. Determining when it is Probable.
4. Determining the Actual Proof.

§ 1. *The True Idea of the Miracle.*

As prodigies, wonders, marvels, miracles are almost universally recognized, in all religions.

In the early apologies for Christianity they were not contested in general; objections were made to particular miracles and their proof—not to miracles in general. This mode of viewing the matter prevailed for a long time in the early church; no sharp lines were drawn.

Augustine first brought the idea of miracles under the general notion of order—a part of Providence—a mode of divine working.*

* De Civ., x. 12. "Is not the world a miracle, yet visible, of God's working? Nay, all the miracles done in the world are less than the world itself, the heavens and earth and all that in them is; yet God made them all, and after a manner we cannot conceive."

De Civ., xxi. 8. Miracles are not against nature in her highest

In the New Testament, three words are chiefly used, which may serve as criteria of a miracle :

1. *τέρας*. Marvels, prodigies (never *θαῦμα*).
מוֹפֵת, marking the effect on the *beholder*.

2. *δύναμις*. Mighty work, marking the *efficiency*, the supernatural element.

3. *σημεῖον*, *אֵיז*, Sign, marking the *purpose* or object, the moral end, placing the event in connection with revelation.

Miracles thus are

Wonderful phenomena, not explicable by known laws or natural agencies (second causes) ;

The product and evidence of superhuman, divine power ;

Designed to give attestation to a divine revelation.

More particularly :

1. A miracle is some event or phenomenon which (in common with all other events) is a fact, an occurrence, subject to observation and testimony. Else there could be no proof of it. The presumption is against it; but this may be overborne by evidence, as far as the alleged fact is concerned. *E.g.* Raising the dead.

The miraculous is doubtless used always in contrast with nature or the natural; but it is not prop-

aspect. "How is that against nature which comes from the will of God, since the will of such a great Creator is what makes the nature of everything? In miracles God does nothing against nature: what is unaccustomed may appear to us to be against nature, but not so to God who constituted nature."

So Abelard: "In relation to God nothing is miraculous."

erly or best defined as a *violation* of the laws of nature, or a suspension. This is, at the best, a negative description, and does not give the attributes of the miracle. It exposes to needless objections. Miracles are *in contrast* with the ordinary laws of nature, are not explicable by them,* are above them; that is all.

In relation to nature, a miracle is in it, yet not of it, is from a higher source, another power than is seen in the sequence strictly natural.†

It is not necessary to say that *all* the signs and wonders in the Bible are of this decisive, indubitable character; there may be, and is, a great difference among them, and some "wonders" may be explained by natural laws.

Only—There *are* some indubitable ones, some manifestations of divine power which no possible advance of science can explain. There are *Test Miracles*, which admit only of the alternative: Miracle or Fraud. *E. g.* The raising of Lazarus. We should not care if there were only one—that is enough.‡

* Thus Spinoza, Tract. Theol.-politicus: "A miracle signifies any work, the natural cause of which we cannot explain after the example of anything else to which we are accustomed: at least he who writes about or relates the miracle cannot explain it."

† As to the ambiguity of "Nature" and "Laws of Nature," see Mill in his "Essays on Religion" (last work).

(a) Nature means: all phenomena and their *causes*. In this sense miracles would belong to nature.

(b) It may mean: second causes—the ordinary course. In this sense the cause of miracles lies outside of second causes.

(c) It may mean: the uniformity of nature, allowing no changes. But this, as we shall see, is no final principle, no absolute law.

‡ As Renan plainly sees and grants.

The question arises : Can God only perform miracles? Wm. Fleetwood (1656-1723, Bp. St. Asaph) in his Essay on Miracles, 1701, takes the ground that none but God performs *true* miracles : " No true miracle was ever performed in opposition to truth." He was replied to by Bp. Hoadley, 1702 (and by Gilbert).*

Chalmers has taken the position that created agents may work miracles ; that miracles are to be distinguished by their design, not their source, to be tested by the falsehood or truth of the doctrine which they seal.

This evidently denudes the miracle of its value—as an interposition of God.

On the whole, the weight of evidence goes to show that bad men and demons have not wrought real miracles.

The Egyptian enchantments were probably impositions ; the man of sin produces *lying* wonders ; Samuel may be best assumed to have been raised by divine power, etc.†

It is difficult to believe that God would give a direct power over nature—power to set aside his own ordinances—to evil beings. If the power in question be creative—the power of raising the dead—this would seem to be impossible to be communicated.

* The reading of these led Locke to write his Disc. on Miracles.

† The prohibitions of necromancy and witchcraft do not necessarily involve the recognition of a real control over nature similar to the divine, exercised by demons. Yet it need not be denied that evil spirits have access to some secrets of nature which human science has not reached, and may never reach. Man (and demons) may work the "mirabile," but not the "miraculum."

The Scriptures afford the following intimations on both sides of the question :

Only God performs real miracles :

John iii. 2. "No man can do these miracles that thou doest, except God be with him." (This, of course, being the opinion of Nicodemus, is not decisive.)

Acts x. 38-40. "Jesus of Nazareth . . . who went about doing good, and healing all that were possessed of the devil ; for God was with him."

John v. 36. "The same works that I do bear witness of me, that the Father hath sent me."

John x. 38. "Though ye believe not me, believe the works."

Matt. xii. 26, 28. —"if Satan cast out Satan"—"if I by the Spirit of God"—

Per contra :

Matt. vii. 22. —"and in thy name have cast out devils," *i. e.*, men rejected at the last have exercised this power. But mark—"in thy name."

Matt. xxiv. 24. —"shall arise . . . false prophets, and shall shew great signs and wonders." Yet there is no reason why these should not belong only to the class of "mirabilia," and not of "miracula."

Rev. xiii. 13 ; xvi. 14. The same remark applies.

2. Does the progress of science, continually explaining what have heretofore been marvels, establish a probability that the wonders related in Scripture were susceptible of such explanation?

Matthew Arnold * says : "That miracles cannot

* In his *God and Bible*, 1876.

happen, we do not attempt to prove; the demonstration is too ambitious. *That they do NOT happen*—that what are called miracles are not what the believers in them fancy, but have a natural history of which we can follow the course—the slow action of experience, we say, more and more shows; and shows, too, that there is *no exception to be made* in favor of the Bible.”

Further: “We have to renounce impossible attempts to receive the legendary and miraculous matter of the Scripture as grave, historical, scientific fact. We have to accustom ourselves to regard henceforth all this part as poetry and legend.” *

We deny the main point above, viz. :

That the progress of *science* and *experience* does or can show that the miracles recorded in the Bible can be resolved into myths, legends, natural causes, and imagination. Especially will this be impossible in regard to the chief, the *test miracles*; .e. g., the raising of Lazarus. The progress of science, so far from favoring the view that this can be explained by natural laws, demonstrates more and more the utter impossibility of doing this. The more we know of nature and science, the more impossible it will be to account for this by second causes.

The progress of science does not leave the alternative, miracle or imagination; it leaves only the alternative, *miracle or imposition*.

* Yet Arnold is anxious to keep the Bible, and its hold, after giving up all miracles—the vainest of attempts. Keep Christ and the Apostles, and reject miracles!

3. How is a miracle related to the law of cause and effect?

It does not contradict—is not inconsistent with that law.

The idea of cause is that of power, efficiency—not mere sequence.* The law of causality demands that for every event or change in nature there must be an adequate cause, ground, or reason. This is universal—co-extensive with phenomena.†

This law is not violated in a miracle; there is a cause assigned. Brown ‡ says: "A miracle is a new effect, supposed to be produced by a new cause." Mill § concedes, "that in the alleged miracles, the law of causation is not contradicted."

Instead of impugning the law of cause and effect, a miracle only postulates a higher than the ordinary causes—a divine power.

4. How are miracles related to the dogma of the uniformity of nature?

This is the chief point in the debate.‖

Proposition: "Natural laws are elastic."

So far as the uniformity of nature implies or involves any *absolute* truth, a miracle does not violate that uniformity:

And, so far as a miracle *does* violate the uniformity of nature, it does not conflict with any absolute truth.

* The simplest idea of it is seen in the case of willing.

† It does not apply to substance, or first cause.

‡ Notes to Essay on Cause and Effect.

§ Quoted above.

‖ The ablest statement of opponents is Baden Powell's *Order of Nature*. Reply by Goodwin, *Amer. Theol. Rev.*, 1862.

The uniformity of nature has at least five distinct meanings:

(a) It may mean that the total sum of causes and effects is always the same. This may be true, if in the causes *all* is included—the supernatural, absolute force, God. Miracles are not against this.

(b) It may mean that the ultimate causality always pursues the same order and method of manifestation. This is the *common* view of it, and false, radically opposed to astronomy, geology, history—to all evolution.

(c) It may mean that the same series of merely *physical* causes and phenomena continue invariably the same. This begs the question (materialism), and is refuted by human agency using physical sequences, *destroying* them for use, for beauty, for law, for worship.

(d) It may mean that physical and human sequences together are invariably the same. This is refuted by providence and history.

(e) It may mean that the same causes in the same circumstances will always produce the same effects. This is true, *and the whole truth*. And a miracle does not contradict this. This is all there is to induction and positivism. And who knows all the causes? *

* Mr. Lewes (Problems, ii., 99) calls it an "identical proposition;" viz., "the assertion of identity under identical conditions; whatever *is*, *is* and *will be*, so long as the conditions are *unchanged*; and this is not an assumption, but an identical proposition."

A. Bain (Log. of Deduction, 273) lays it down "as essential that we should postulate or beg the uniformity of nature;" maintaining

The Scotch school has done great harm to all metaphysics and theology, by hypostatizing the so-called uniformity of nature as an ultimate datum or principle, as an irreducible idea. Whereas, instead of being simple, it is both complex and vague. It has been allowed to play the part of a second god, and finally to many it has become a god.*

Generally admitted and advanced by Theists, it has proved tolerably safe *with the background of Theism*; but it can be, and has been, used in the interests of modern materialism. Now it is supplanted, in the idealistic schools, by *spirit*, being, force; in the materialistic schools by atoms and forces, or *force*.

The ultimate ideas are: being and cause—being as causal (force, energy). Force is not *final*, it demands a substratum; being (substance) is presupposed. And ultimately all we know of force is from the consciousness of *power* (or causal energy) in ourselves, in *mind*: as applied to external events it is *derivative, symbolic*. And so the uniformity of nature is simply that the same causes in the same circumstances will produce the same effects (as above). "*The logic of unbelief wants a universal*. But no real universal is forthcoming, and it

that *we could give no reason* for the future resembling the past, but must simply *risk it*, and see if it does not come out so.

Bain (in *Mind*, No. I., '76, p. 146), *vs.* Lewes, says: Lewes "takes no account of differences in space and time," as among "*the conditions*," etc., etc. As if *mere* space and time could alter the real conditions!

* Cf. Mill in his *Three Essays* (on Nature, Laws of Nature, etc.).

only wastes its strength in wielding a fictitious one." *

In Hume's noted argument the required universal is silently assumed in the phrase, "unalterable experience." The word "unalterable" begs the whole question. (Hume's objection, however, is really to the *proof*, and not the possibility, of miracles.) "Experience" is indefinite; there is no law in it. Up to a recent period, a train drawn by a steam-engine was contrary to all experience. To affirm that a certain experience is "unalterable," it is necessary to know all the possibilities of experience—which involves omniscience—or to grasp a law which involves the unalterableness.

5. What is the relation of miracles to doctrine, or to the sum of our knowledge of God and his designs?

Besides having an adequate cause, miracles have also a sufficient end or object, and are never to be considered apart from, or dissociated from that.

The Scriptural miracles always stand in this point of view. "Jesus . . . manifested forth his glory." † "The works that I do in my Father's name, they bear witness of me." ‡ "God also bearing them wit-

* Mozley on Miracles, p. 61. The following are also instances of the futile attempt to establish such a universal: Spinoza—"Nothing can take place in nature which is contrary to the laws of nature." Powell (Study of Evid., p. 107)—"No testimony can reach to the supernatural." As to the latter position, see Mansel (Aids to Faith, pp. 14, 15, Eng. ed.). One kind of testimony certainly reaches to the supernatural, viz., that of him who performs the work.

† John ii. 11.

‡ John x. 25.

ness, both with signs and wonders, and with divers miracles." *

Much of the speciousness of modern infidelity is gained just here, by conceiving of the miracle as a mere prodigy, as that which breaks up the order of nature for no object, something altogether baffling to thought in any consistent view of the universe.

There is no greater conceivable object than that which is disclosed in the Christian system of redemption.† A supernatural doctrine may well be attested by a supernatural fact. A supernatural fact not connected in any way with a course of revelation of supernatural doctrine would lack one of the most important marks of the "miracle." ‡

6. What is the relation of miracles to the ordinary exertion of divine power, and to the divine plan?

They are not "single" acts—arbitrary—but are in

* Heb. ii. 4.

† Mozley (Bampton Lect's, '66) defines a miracle as "a visible suspension of the order of nature for a providential purpose" (p. 6). There must be a purpose; no mere prodigy amounts to a miracle. Miracles differ from special providences, as the latter are "a less obvious intervention of the supernatural" (pp. 8, 211); and special providences are also deficient in the coincidence between the prediction and the fulfillment (pp. 7, 148), which makes up the complete proof of a miracle.

‡ Wardlaw makes *τέρας* chief, *σημεῖον* incidental; Trench reverses this, testing miracle by doctrine.

In the apologetic age of Christianity, its divine origin was argued chiefly from its moral effects, though this would not show what weighed the most with Christian thinkers, but only what they thought the best adapted to impress their heathen readers. Christ, in vindicating the divine character of miracles, appeals to the whole tenor of his doctrine and work. "If Satan cast out Satan"—

the whole plan of God from the beginning. No new power is required for them, only the same power which produces and sustains all things in another form. They involve no greater power—not so great—as that which built the worlds.

In this view they are not against law, but a manifestation of the very highest law. They argue no want of foresight ; they are no afterthoughts. They are Promethean, not Epimethean.

Summary :

The Idea of Miracles is that they have :

An efficient cause—God ;

A final cause or object—to authenticate a revelation ; .

A possible attestation—being sensible phenomena, capable of being apprehended and known by men.

Miracles are :

possible, if there is a God ;

probable, if a positive revelation is needed ; and

they have been, if Christ and his apostles can be believed.

Miracles are : direct works of divine power, superseding or using second causes (the ordinary course of nature) for a higher end—for a higher and better manifestation of God—the end for which God made the world.

Definitions of The Miracle.

Mozley : * “ The chief characteristic of miracles,

* On Miracles, p. 149.

and that which distinguishes them from mere marvels, is the correspondence of the *fact with the notification*; what we may call the prophetic principle. For, indeed, if a prophecy is a miracle, a miracle, too, is in essence a prophecy; the essence of which is the correspondence, not the futurity, of the event."

Bacon: * "There never was a miracle wrought by God to convert an atheist; because the light of nature might have led him to confess a God; but miracles are designed to convert idolaters and the superstitious, who have acknowledged a Deity, but erred in his adoration; because no light of nature extends to declare the will and worship of God."

Spinoza: † "Miraculum significat opus cujus causam naturalem exemplo alterius rei solitæ explicare non possumus, vel saltem ipse non potest qui miraculum scribit aut narrat." ‡

Alexander § gives the following *classification* of all the definitions which have been framed:

1. From the point of view of the agency employed in their production.

a. Divine, only.

b. Superhuman.

2. From that of their relation to the course of nature.

a. As violating all natural laws.

b. As not violating but superseding laws.

* Adv. Learning, B. 3, c. 2.

† Tract. Theol., c. iv., 67.

‡ So Wegscheider, De Wette. Schleiermacher denied that miracles proved truth or the commission of the worker.

§ Christ and Christianity, App. D.

3. From the view of their effect or design.
 - a. As producing wonder.
 - b. As producing faith (religion being the test).
4. From their relation to our ignorance.

Aquinas (one of the best as far as it goes): "Nothing can be contrary to the order of the world, as it proceeds from the primal cause;" but if we look at the order as it is grounded in the cosmical chain of causes and effects, then God may bring something to pass *præter ordinem rerum*; for he is not limited to this series of causes and effects. Hence: "*Miracula sunt omnia quæ divinitus fiunt præter ordinem communiter servatum in rebus.*"

A sufficient definition: A miracle proper is an event in the course of nature—not to be accounted for by natural laws—produced by divine power, in attestation of the personal divine commission of him who works it.*

§ 2. *The Possibility of Miracles.*

This *possibility* is exactly measured by the real belief in the Being of God—as a Personal, Conscious

* On the question, How does the miracle prove the credibility of the worker? see Dr. Thornwell (So. Presb. Rev., Aug., '56, p. 355). The worker appeals to God as a witness.

(a) It is an example of the supernatural.

(b) It is an example of the precise kind of the supernatural which it is advanced to confirm. Wardlaw (p. 32-3), "The prophecy is a miracle of knowledge—the miracle is a prophecy of power."

(c) God's character would not permit such audacity as is implied in working miracles by a bad man.

"That ye may know that the Son of Man hath power on earth to forgive sins"—prophecy of power. Mark ii. 10.

Intelligence. It is as vital as religion itself—or prayer; though prayer be not a miracle, yet both belong to the same order of conceptions—both involve belief in the reality, presence, and power of the *Supernatural* in History. The degree is different, but the order of facts is the same, *i. e.*, the supernatural order, a *living sense* of God's presence and power.

If there be a Personal, Intelligent, Omnipotent, and Holy God—the author and governor of the world—it is possible that, to answer the end for which the world was made, he may intervene by miracles. If the being of God is on the whole only the most credible hypothesis as to the origin, course, and end of the universe, miracles may be congruous therewith.

In such a universe the physical must be in and for moral and spiritual ends—the world for God—man for God—God the end of creation. To manifest his full power and glory, for, in, and by his creatures, there may be need of supernatural intervention, or, at any rate, such an intervention is possible.

This does not here require further illustration.

The anti-Christian theories, on this point, either wholly beg the question, or come under the necessity of establishing the inherent incredibility, the physical and metaphysical *impossibility of the miraculous*. In the face of the general belief, the impossibility must be proved if the possibility is denied. (We do not yet speak of the probability or the actuality, but only of the general possibility.)

This proof cannot be conducted: the claim is only an assumption, as violent and arbitrary as any that

can be made; involving a *denial* of all supernaturalism—the affirmation of Nihilism and Nescience at the root, not only of our knowledge, but also of the universe itself. Even if God be only possible, miracles have a derivative possibility.

These anti-Theistic theories—materialistic or pantheistic—or both—or neither—assume, in common, the following points:

1. That all we can directly know is, certain sensations or subjective phenomena. This is the indubitable.

2. That all we can do with these sensations or phenomena is, to state them in some general rule or so-called law—which only means, that we combine the separate facts in one general statement.

3. That as to the cause or source of these phenomena or facts, all that we can do, “scientifically,” at the utmost, is to refer them to some unknown, inconceivable, indefinable substance, cause, or source. Some deny even this.

4. That this ultimate substance, cause, or source evolves or develops the phenomena by a necessary law—evolution—which is always at work in the same order. Here is a difference. *A* says: This evolution is of atoms and forces, but both material; *B* says: This evolution (development) is not material (atomic), but spiritual—as force. Yet it is an unconscious force.* *C* says: It is neither spiritual nor material, but some *tertium quid*, hybrid, both in one: that spirit and matter are different sides of the same

* Von Hartmann.

facts. But all say : It is a Mode of Being, unconscious, non-intelligent, non-ethical.

5. That this evolution is for some end. There is a question here among anti-theistic theorists. Positivists deny (in terms, while their position all the while demands) final cause or end ; Mill hesitates. But all who admit radical evolution virtually admit final cause : for what is *evolution* without end or beginning ? It is simply atoms in motion, and time and space. The end, however, is not contained in thought, in plan, in the original sense, but just comes to be, somehow or other, because it could not help it.

This is the sum and substance of the present theory against the possibility of miracles.

Now, if this theory is not true, miracles are possible. Hence we go on to consider the dogma of *Evolution* in relation to the origin and end of creation.* [The author intended to do this in the Ely Lectures for 1876.] See APPENDIX III., Outline of Prof. Smith's Intended Lectures on Evolution.

§ 3. *The Probability of Miracles.*

Only the outline of discussions will be given here ; the full treatment belongs to Historical Apologetics.

* If there is a Personal God,
 if Nature is not God,
 if Atoms and Forces are not all,
 if the spiritual is as real as the natural,
 if the moral is above the natural,
 if there is a moral government,
 and a moral end (even if only "generally tending to Righteousness," in Matthew Arnold's phrase) ; then
 Miracles are possible.

The argument is manifold and combined :

1. The two general positions ; Theory of the Universe :

a. God is Holy and a God of Law ;

b. Man is a moral being, made for God ; and this world is for moral ends, under a moral government.

2. The Actual Condition ; the Historical State of Mankind :

The end is not reached, yet is in process and progress.

The two great facts of sin and of the need of redemption. Man's moral nature, though perverted, asserts itself. Conscience testifies to his sin and need. The need is of God's interposition. It is met in the Incarnation, the Atonement, the Redemption in Christ.

3. The special state of the world at Christ's coming, and preparation for that coming.

4. History since : Christianity the center of History. Christianity beneficent.

The evils of Christianity are the evils of human nature contesting against it.

The probability of miracles is of the same order and degree as the probability of the truth and need of the Christian system.*

* Butler, Anal., Pt. ii., c. 1, 2.

Paley's position : There is the same probability of miracles as of a revelation.

§ 4. *The Proof of Miracles.* (Here only outlined.)

The witnesses—numerous—had full opportunity of observing, were honest, unimpeachable—give full details (no thaumaturgic reserve), shaped their whole lives by the supernatural facts and doctrines which they relate, suffered, and (many of them) died in attestation, which is notably true of Christ and the apostles.

The miracles were visible, audible—public in the face of foes, of many witnesses.

The question coming up here is as to the possibility of proving miracles and the nature of the proof actually afforded; whether, *on general grounds*, it is to be deemed valid.

The real question is, not whether there is enough testimony, but whether any possible degree of testimony can prove a miracle.

The testimony of the miracle-worker is the decisive element. He *testifies* to the supernatural. Is he then credible?

As miracles are appeals to the senses, to “experience,” testimony is the only mode of proving them *to us*. The proof to those who witness them is the evidence of the senses; the proof to us, their testimony. The Scriptures *say* that the miracles are from God. Testimony here may be valid, unless one assumes that it is not, and if this *be* assumed, the procedure is suicidal; “going to testimony to show that testimony cannot be depended on.”*

* The assumption can only be based upon the fact that the mass of human testimony goes to show that miracles have not occurred within

The proof of miracles, *as far as testimony goes*, is complete.

The two chief objections to the proof:

(a) It does not reach to the divine agency. To show that an event lies out of the range of the causes which man knows of, is not to show that it lies beyond the range of all second causes, and to trace it to the direct energy of God. (b) Testimony, from the nature of the case, cannot prove a miracle. The evidence that the sequences of nature are unbroken is stronger than mere human testimony to any facts can be.

(a) Such proof as we have respecting miracles does not reach to the divine agency.

(1) It is said that in affirming the occurrence of a miracle, we virtually claim that we know all the laws of nature,* since the miracle is defined as being above or contrary to all those laws.

Reply: We need not know all nature to be certain that *some events* are entirely above nature; *e. g.*, raising the dead, curing the blind with a word. Observation and experience have given us the limitations of nature in *certain directions*, though not in all.

If *we* do not know enough of the laws of nature to decide that a miracle has occurred, infidelity does not know enough of them to decide that it has not.

the experience of the vast majority of men. If the (unimpeachable) testimony of those who have observed miracles is to be rejected, the testimony of those who say they have not seen them is to be neglected.

* The substance of Rousseau's objection to miracles.

There may be direct proof that the miracle is from divine power, in the way of the testimony of the miracle-worker, he being entirely credible; *e. g.*, Christ and apostles.

(2) It is said that what are deemed miracles may be due to occult agencies in nature merely, as magnetism, etc.

Reply: No such are proved to be available, or are even conceivable in, *e. g.*, the raising of the dead.

If occult natural agencies were employed, the efficiency would not be in them, but in the will which controlled them.

The testimony of Christ is explicit. "If I by the finger of God"—"Father, I thank thee that *thou* hast heard me." *

(3) Another form of (2). It is said that the Scriptures recognize the fact that the miracle-worker may do what to others is miraculous, yet not by divine aid; may know secret powers, etc. Deut. xiii. 1-3. "If there arise among you a prophet . . . and giveth thee a sign, . . . and the sign *come to pass*, whereof he spake unto thee, saying, Let us go after other gods, . . . thou shalt not hearken." (So Matt. vii. 27; xxiv. 24; 2 Thess. ii. 9, quoted before.)

Reply: The Scriptures describe these as lying wonders, false signs.

The criterion is, that they are against the truth. Then—

(4) It is said that the Scriptures would prove truth by miracles, and miracles by truth. No, we reply:

* At the raising of Lazarus. John xi. 41.

the evidence that these are not true miracles is that they undertake to support false doctrine. It is a part of the evidence—*not the whole*—of true miracles, that they are “for the truth.” It is a part—not the whole—of the evidence for the truth that it is attested by miracles. The single circumstance that alleged miracles are for the truth does not prove them to be true miracles; but their being against the truth proves them to be false.*

On the whole, under Obj. (a).

That the proof does reach to the divine agency is involved in the testimony, especially of Christ; all centers there in him, and his disciples derivatively.

Obj. (b). No amount of testimony can prove a miracle. This is Hume’s noted objection: No evidence can establish the fact of a miraculous occurrence; there is always greater probability that men are deceived or deceivers, than that a miracle has taken place; for testimony has, nature has not, deceived.† He says: “A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature, and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined.”‡ (It follows that the progress of science has nothing

* The excellency of doctrine agrees with—does not prove—the divinity of the miracle; the divinity of the miracle establishes the excellency of the doctrine, yet never so but that the excellency is also seen in its own light.

† Hume does not deny the abstract possibility of miracles. Admits this in *Essays*, ii., pp. 131, 132. (Edinb. ed., 1788.)

‡ *Phil. Works*, iv., 133.

to do with the argument—it is the same always; *i.e.*, there is a metaphysical impossibility of proving miracles. But the progress of science, in fact, makes Christ's miracles appear still more supernatural, since nothing adequate to perform them is discovered.) *

The best replies † to Hume :

If "experience" means universal experience, it begs the question. ‡

The objection proves too much. Proves the impossibility of establishing any new event. Proves that the fact of creation cannot be believed on any testimony of God, *coming through men*.

The objection assumes a violent probability against miracles. But "under the circumstances," etc., the fact is the reverse.

Hume separates the miracle from its object. A miracle with him is a miracle merely, not a miracle of Christ for the redemption of men.

Hence the probability against the Christian miracles is based upon sceptical ground, *taken in advance*.

His objections to testimony cannot apply to Christ and his apostles. It is more difficult to believe that *such men* § were deceivers than that the sequences of nature are "alterable."

* So Mansel, *Aids to Faith*, p. 13.

† See Campbell, Paley, *Encycl. Brit.*, Babbage, Vaughan, Chalmers (*Evid.*, Bk. I., c. 3), Rogers (*Edin. Rev.*, 1849).

‡ The experience of any *who were present* when unimpeachable witnesses testify that miracles were wrought, and did not see them, might be brought forward with effect.

§ Archb. Whately has written with force upon this point. On the

Newton, certainly equal to Hume in his power of estimating what is involved in the uniformity of nature, thus qualifies the "immutability of the laws of nature:" "nisi ubi aliter agere bonum est." * The "uniformity of nature" is not a rational, necessary truth. The uniformity of physical law gives way under the impulse of man's free will, whenever this is duly put into the line of causes; *a fortiori* it will under God's.†

other hand, a singular proof of the incapacity of some minds to see the decisive feature in testimony is afforded in the writings of one Craig, a Scotchman, who wrote, in 1699, a 4to pamphlet, "Theologiæ Christianiæ, Principia Mathematica," proving that on its present evidence Christianity could be received until A. D. 3153.

* See paper on the Immutability of the Laws of Nature, in Lond. Quart. Rev., Oct., 1861.

† So, in substance, Mansel, *Aids to Faith*, pp. 18, 19; see, also, Dr. A. P. Peabody, *Chris. Exam.*, Nov., 1856.

APPENDIX I.

SKETCH OF THE HISTORY OF APOLOGETICS.*

From an Article by Prof. Smith in the "Presbyterian Quarterly and Princeton Review," July, 1876.

THE Italian philosopher, Giovanni Battista Vico, the founder of the modern philosophy of history, and one of the ablest and most comprehensive of the

* Works. *Apologetik. Wissenschaftliche Rechtfertigung des Christenthums.* Von J. H. A. Ebrard, Dr. Phil. et Theol. 2 Theile. Gütersloh, 1874-5.

System der christlichen Apologetik. Von Franz Delitzsch. Leipzig, 1869.

Christliche Apologetik auf anthropologischer Grundlage. Von Christ. Ed. Baumstark. Erster Band [all published], Frankft. a. M., 1872.

K. H. Sack, *Christliche Apologetik.* Hamburg, 1829. [Second edition, 1841.]

Von Drey, *Apologetik als wissenschaftliche Nachweisung des Christenthums in seiner Erscheinung.* Mainz, 3 Bde. 1844-1847. (Roman Catholic.)

Werner, *Geschichte der apologetischen und polemischen Literatur.* 5 Bde. 1861-67. (Roman Catholic.)

Dr. Fr. Düsterdieck, *Der Begriff und die encyclopädische Stellung der Apologetik*, two instructive articles in the *Jahrbücher für deutsche Theologie*, 1866. Dr. Düsterdieck is a Consistorial Counsellor in Hannover.

Theod. Christlieb, *Modern Doubt and Christian Belief.* Transl. by Rev. H. U. Weitbrecht, etc. New York, 1874.

Luthardt, *Apologetic Lectures.* Three series: *On the Fundamental, the Saving, and the Moral Truths.* Transl. Edinb.

philosophers of the eighteenth century, develops, in his *Principles of the New Science*, a theory of civilization embracing what he calls the *Law of Returns*. Each age runs its appointed course and dies; and after a long period there will be a return of the same process. Though this cannot be called a final law of history (since it neglects too much the law of progress), yet it shows us one of its marked conditions. At different periods, widely sundered, we find similar historic laws, though working under different conditions. The early literature of Christianity was apologetic. The same is true of the present literature of Christianity in almost all its departments. We, like the early church, live in an apologetic era. There is hardly an effective theological work, we might almost say, hardly any great Christian discourse, which does not take on an apologetic stamp.

I.

As has been said, Christian Apologetics is essentially Vindication. It seeks to vindicate, and in vindicating to establish, the value and authority of the Christian faith. It begins, in fact, with the Scriptures, the epistles, and especially the discourses of Paul. In Justin Martyr, Athenagoras, and other Christian writers, it received more distinct form, proposing to defend Christianity against all gainsayers. All that belongs to the proof of the Christian religion, and all that belongs to its defense, and all that belongs to its counter-attack against its foes, is a part of Apologetics.

We sometimes think it strange—it almost alarms

us—that Christianity should be so desperately assailed ; but when we come to think about it, it is the most natural thing in the world. Evil will always attack good ; error instinctively assails the truth ; sin, by its very nature, is opposite and opposed to holiness. Incarnate Love was crucified between two thieves ; and the church cannot expect to be better treated than its Head and Lord—it is surely enough for the servant that he be as his Master. Men who cannot find God in nature cannot find God in the Bible. Men who deny the supernatural must consider all religious faith a delusion. Even a heathen might *go on* and find God, but a materialist must *go back*, deny himself, in order to find him. As long as there are sin and unbelief, so long there will be attacks on Christianity ; and there must needs be a defense also.

And this, too, is to be considered : that as knowledge grows, as science extends, as the boundaries of investigation and thought are enlarged, man's restless and inquisitive intellect will always be framing new theories about something or other, or about everything. And each infant Hercules must first fight it out with his nurse. Christianity has bred all the new aspirants for omniscience ; and the young men and women wish to show that they are wiser and stronger than the authors of their being. This, too, is quite natural. Nor is it all wholly sinful. These sciences and philosophies and criticisms have a right to be ; and if Christianity cannot make good its ground against them—where they oppose it—cannot approve itself as wiser, stronger, and better—it

must so far forth give place to them. If it cannot appropriate all that is good and true in them (however *new* it may be), and still preserve its lordly sway, then it is *not* the wisest and best system for mankind, and will give place to what is better. But it has the prescriptive right of possession and favor; its roots are imbedded in the depths of the broad earth, and wind round among its ribbed rocks, and its branches wave high, overshadowing and fruitful, so that the nations of the earth lodge beneath them. And infidelity has got to dislodge them before it can even begin to build its own temple on and with the ruins. Neither the end of the world nor the end of Christianity seems to be very near yet; and there is still a fair chance that the world may end first.

The necessity and importance, now, of the diligent and specific study of Apologetics is seen in part just here, viz.: in this constant progress of the human race in knowledge and in aspiration; in the advance of the sciences and arts, of culture and civilization; in the successive and comprehensive schemes of philosophic speculation, wherein thoughtful men struggle with the grand problems of nature and of humanity, and try to solve them. What is the world? Whence is the world? For what is the world? Whence is man? What is man? and for what? These questions have stirred men's minds from the dawn of thought—elevating, perplexing, often confounding, yet always impelling them. In the darkness of the labyrinth which we call life, the groping hand has been ever in search of the clue no eye could see—feeling after God, if haply it might find him.

What wonder if here many go astray, especially those whose eyes are blinded by reason of sin. What a marvel, that, in spite of every defeat, and of innumerable false lights, the same search is going on from age to age! A new question for every new generation! Yea, a new question for every new soul, struggling in the throes of its higher spiritual birth.

And every new science and every new philosophy—still dealing with the same old, old questions—views them in some new light. And hence the necessity of a renewed, an honest, a patient investigation.

It *is* true that the questions are ever essentially the same: for God and man and the universe remain essentially the same from age to age; and the questions are ultimately about them and their relations. It is true that the substance of faith and the formal nature of unbelief remain the same, and that sin is sin, and holiness is holiness only, and forever.

But it is not true that the form of the conflict or its weapons remain, or can remain, the same; these change with the changes of age and nations and philosophies, just as much and as surely as do the armaments of war.

Hence, Apologetics as a system must, to a certain extent, be reshaped, in each century, with each new class of opponents, so as to adapt Christianity to each new age, and to exhibit its inherent superiority over all that can be brought against it.

And this subject is forced upon us anew every day, not only in works of learning and philosophy, but also in the current popular literature. Many a popu-

lar lecturer owes a part of his success to his covert, when not open, attacks upon the Christian system. This shape of evil, this substance of infidelity, often realizes the great poet's apt description of its progenitor :

" If shape it might be called, which shape had none
Distinguishable in member, joint, or limb ;
Or substance might be called, that shadow seemed,
For each seemed either."

And the very fact that infidelity is so subtle and so persuasive, is only another reason for studying it well and understanding its weapons and its arts.

II.

In discussing so wide a subject, there must, of course, be a selection of certain special points. At present we propose to consider briefly the elements of the conflict—some of the different phases through which attack and defense have hitherto run, and a statement of the main topics embraced in a course of Christian Apologetics. And it will be found that there is in its career a kind of logical process—at any rate, such logic as there is in the development of a system of truth through and by antagonisms—which seems to be one of the laws of all terrestrial progress.

The term infidelity, in its most general usage, covers both skepticism and unbelief; it expresses both the state of doubt and the state of denial, which, though differing in some respects, are often passing over into each other. Doubt tends to denial:

it is not always such. The state of doubt in respect to religious realities is different from, though often confounded with, that philosophical disposition which leads to inquiry and investigation ; since the latter is chiefly intellectual, while the former is essentially moral, in its nature. When men come to doubt about or deny sin and judgment, the moral law and the moral law-giver, their moral perceptions are already obscured or benumbed. Infidelity consists in the doubt or denial of those moral and spiritual truths upon which moral judgment and personal accountability are dependent. Man is accountable for his belief just so far as any moral truth influences his judgment—just so far as his decisions have respect to sin or holiness.

The Christian faith, having its ground and essence in the spiritual realm, appeals directly to man as a spiritual and religious being, as made for God, and in the image of God. And it especially addresses itself to man's sense of sin and need of redemption. It is, in its very nature, a redemptive system ; all that is in Christ, in his relation to us, centres around and in the question of redemption from sin. If sin and punishment are denied, Christ and salvation must consistently be denied. And accordingly, we find in the whole history of Christianity, that here, in the last analysis, the battle has been fought in every believing and unbelieving soul, in all the ages of faith and all the epochs of infidelity. Any system of philosophy, any speculation, any tendency which weakens the sense of sin, also weakens the power of Christianity, and gives to infidelity an easier victory.

Still further, the Christian system is, in its very nature, a *supernatural* system—above nature in its origin, its processes, and its results; for it is from God, and it works for eternity. It works with and through the seen and temporal, but it works also above and beyond all that greets the eye of sense. It makes the spiritual and the eternal to be the *grand realities*, and the tangible and temporal transient and shadowy in comparison. The supernatural element is not to be found—as some would have it—merely, or even chiefly, in the sphere of the will (for such a supernaturalism a mere naturalist need not deny)—but it is essentially found in those divine truths and realities (the most real of all that is) which come from God through a specific revelation, for the elevation and restoration of the lost race of man. And it is this supernatural element of the Christian faith which has always provoked the assaults of unbelief; for man, through the power of sin, is involved in spiritual darkness, as well as made subject to a distempered will.

Here, then, are the essential elements of the conflict of all ages. On the one hand, a supernatural and redeeming system centering in one Incarnate God; on the other hand, man, loving the sin inborn and inbred, and blind to the light which streams out from the heavenly places. The one rests ultimately in God, making the divine wisdom and glory, as they are the source, to be also the end, of all things; the other has its roots in human nature—as it now is—and makes man's needs the great impulse, and man's well-being the great end, of all our striving. The

whole alphabet of the one—its Alpha and Omega—is God in Christ ; the other uses the whole alphabet to syllable the desires of man, or express the facts of nature. The former echoes with the sharpest emphasis the wail of humanity, groaning under its body of sin and death, haunted by a sense of sin profounder than all our other experience, so that its cry is and must be : Who shall deliver me from the body of this death ? The latter feigns that sin is a negation, or a process of education, and repentance and regeneration purposes of man's will alone, and redemption a gradual progress in moral culture. Unbelief has on its side not only all our natural desires, but also their main bias, their partial and limited ends ; while faith is obliged to contend against and overcome the natural man, its victory is the overcoming of the world, the flesh, and the devil, and these do not yield without violent throes and conflicts. The one finds in natural reason, in its laws and processes, the limits of all knowledge ; the other is satisfied only when, in the darkness of nature, it can feel that it is touching the right hand of God, and that, though itself is blind as to the future, it is led by one who sees the end from the beginning. As Wordsworth—that truly Christian poet—has well sung :

“ No ! let this age, high as it may, install
In her esteem the thirst that wrought man's fall.
The universe is infinitely wide,
And conquering Reason, if self-glorified,
Can nowhere move, uncrossed by some new wall
Or gulf of mystery, which thou alone,
Imaginative Faith, canst overleap
In progress toward the fount of Love.”

III.

The elements of the contest being thus given, on the one hand in the supernaturalism and redemptive grace of the Christian system ; and in the love of sin and the pride of reason on the other ; and these being the strongest of contestant agencies, it is not wonderful that we find the history of the church, yea, the very history of mankind, to be a record of this immortal battle in different and progressive stadia.* All the philosophical and religious systems of the ancient world, and every new system—physical and metaphysical—have enlisted in this, as yet ineffectual, warfare against the victorious progress of the Incarnate God. The battles of empires and of races are but mimic mock-fights, in comparison with this intenser conflict between the underlying and mightiest powers that sway the destiny of the race.

First of all, to rehearse these spiritual wars in a rapid outline : there was the subtlety of the Greek speculation, and the pride of the Hebrew legalism ; the cross was to the Jew a stumbling-block, and to

* Dr. Werner's *History of Apologetics* is the fullest general account, though based on Roman Catholic views. The last volume contains a more minute history of the English deistic works than is to be found elsewhere—on some points more complete than Leland. He is a voluminous writer, the author of the *History of Roman Catholic Theology in the Munich Geschichte und Wissenschaften*, of a *History of Arianism*, etc. The well-known smaller works of Bolton on the *Early Apologists*, and Farrar's *History of Free Thought*, as well as the sketches of the later *German Theology*, by Hagenbach, Schwarz (4th ed.), and Kahnis (new ed., 1875, in two volumes), must of course be consulted as well as Buckle and kindred authors.

the Greek foolishness ; while to them that believed, it was the wisdom and power of God unto everlasting life. Against these foes the Christian literature of the second century became to a large extent apologetic, and as such, both offensive and defensive. Against the Jew the object was to show that Jesus was indeed the promised Messiah, and that the law was not only abolished, but also fulfilled, in the Christian dispensation. Against the heathen there was a wider range of argument to refute their objections, that Christianity was a new religion, and that it was irreligious and immoral (*superstitio exitiabilis*—a detestable superstition), and that it claimed to be, what no heathen believed possible, a religion for all mankind. This last, for example, was one of the strong objections of Celsus ; a pagan of the classic world could believe in a universal empire, but not in a universal religion. To meet these and similar objections, we have in the second century the admirable apologies of Justin Martyr, Tatian's Oration against the Greeks, the anonymous epistle to Diognetus (going often under the name of Justin, yet certainly not by him), one of the most admirable remains of early Christian literature, far surpassing the works of the so-called Apostolic Fathers. To these in the same century were added the writings of Athenagoras, of Theophilus of Antioch, and, in the latter part, the great names of Clement of Alexandria, and the fiery and struggling genius of Tertullian, who, in the name of Christ, conquered the Latin tongue,* and made it speak the words of faith.

* Hooker speaks of Tertullian as "a sponge steeped in vinegar

But heathenism was not willing to part with its gods without a more desperate struggle. It gathered up all its resources for attack and for defense. In the city of Alexandria, Greek, Roman, and Jew all met ; and there was framed out of this confluence an eclectic system, a New Platonic school, the object of which was to show that Christianity lacked the elements needed to secure supremacy and universality. It was a movement wonderfully akin to some tendencies of our own times. Celsus, Porphyry, Proclus, Plotinus, and Julian are the prototypes of some Frenchmen and Germans, not to say Englishmen and Americans of to-day. Celsus, for example, who has been much overrated, because the adamantine Origen replied to him, says, that in the Greek wisdom we have the true *logos*, the Messiah ; that this fair world (*kosmos*) is the true Son of God ; that Christianity leads to social disorders ; and that the only way of keeping up law and nationality is by propping up the pillars of the old temples.* Porphyry, too,

and gall." The remains of Celsus (A.D. 178) have been admirably restored by Dr. Keim of Zurich, in his *Celsus' Wahres Wort*, 1873, and compared with Lucian and Minucius Felix. *The Plea of Athenagoras*, admirably edited by Prof. March, of Lafayette College, is included in the *Douglass Series of Greek and Latin Writers*, vol. v. Of course, the hints here given of the history of Apologetics are meant to be only references.

* On the difference between the early Greek and Latin Apologists, there is a striking statement by the late Dr. Hundeshagen, in an admirable address, as Pro-Rector, at the birthday celebration of the Duke of Baden, in Bonn, Nov. 22, '60 : "As the Greeks contended for the assailed cause of Christianity on rational grounds, with appeals to Socrates, Plato, and other coryphaei of philosophy, so did the Latins on grounds of right and justice, and with citations from the

objects, that the Christian faith interrupted the historical continuity, and introduced barbarism. Finding how the personal power of Christ was silently and surely working (*e. g.*, Origen says, that He, unlike others, represents the sum and perfection of all the virtues), these pagan assailants looked about for an ideal man to set up in his stead, and brought forth Pythagoras, to whom distance lent enchantment; and Apollonius of Tyana, the juggling impostor, the best that heathenism could find, and quite as good as some of the objects of the fashionable worship of genius in these later days. Then, at last in Julian, the apostate, Julian, the emperor, the philosopher, and the priest, we have the union of all the resources of the ancient world against the growing forces of Christianity: the state against the church, philosophy against faith, the old culture against the new; the host of stars of the polytheistic canopy of night, in contrast and contest with the rising sun of the new and better day. Julian, with the zeal of a fanatic, attempted to revive the old pagan enthusiasm, representing heathenism as world-historical, and Chris-

Roman laws. With the former, the salient thought held up against opponents is always the evidence for the *truth* of Christian doctrine; the latter make prominent the bearings of Christianity upon the injured rights of the individual and of society. 'All the early Latin apologists were *advocati*, versed in law. Tertullian, Cyprian, Augustine, and Ambrose, the former Proconsul of Aemilia and Liguria, had all of them been Roman *Causidici*, and teachers of legal eloquence; they were all men who received their special mental, as well as their general, character, not from the divisive and uncertain philosophy of the Greeks, but from a solid and firm training in the service of the Roman State.'"

tianity as a conventicle and a sect; and, if truth is to be settled by mere tradition and numbers, he undoubtedly had the right of it. Christianity, too, he said, was but a mixture of Judaism and heathenism, retaining their worst elements; for example, taking from Judaism what Julian calls its atheism (*ἄθεότης*), that is, its belief in *one* God; and also that adventurous faith which leaps the gulf between the finite and the infinite. But in vain did Julian prostitute all the power of the State to help the debased deities; in vain did he borrow from Christianity some of its benevolent institutions, and engraft them upon heathenism; in vain did he himself offer sacrifices as the Pontifex Maximus, and preach, and lead even an austere life; flames and an earthquake kept him from building the temple of Jerusalem, whereby he attempted to disprove the prophetic word; and he himself, with his expiring breath upon the plains of Persia, could only say, according to the tradition: "Thou has conquered, O Galilean!" The great victory over the whole external civilization, as well as over the speculations, of the ancient Greek and Roman world was now gained; and the cross inscribed upon the labarum of Constantine was the symbol of its victory; the cross, which meant only ignominy and torture, penetrated all literature and all history, and entered into every loving and believing heart, as the symbol of divine suffering and victorious love. And the greatness and completeness of the victory is seen in the simple fact, that for more than a thousand years the whole literature of the church was chiefly occupied with the shaping

and systematizing of doctrines, and had but little to do with the avowed foes of Christian thought and the Christian faith. Augustine wrote his *De Civitate Dei* on the highest ground which human thought (outside the inspired prophecies) had yet reached as to the problem of human history; and Aquinas summed up the controversy in his work *De Vera Catholica Fide adversus Gentiles*, which alone would have made his name immortal, had he not himself eclipsed it by his *Summa*—undoubtedly one of the master works of theological authorship. On the eve of the Reformation, Boccaccio, indeed, had satirized the faith, and Macchiavelli wrote upon the anti-national tendencies of the Christian system. Here and there was one who uttered some dissent on minor points; but the whole tone of thought and belief was on the side of the church. And herein was a part of the secret of the power of Rome—the mystical Babylon. The papacy became despotic, corrupt, and anti-Christian; the reform, prepared for during more than a century, broke out simultaneously in all parts of Europe; and with the reform came a spirit of free action in all departments of life, and free inquiry in respect to the truths of the faith. The highest aim and success (so far as it went) of the mediæval church and theology, was to combine (in the realistic theory) the traditional dogmas of the church with the Greek, especially the Aristotelian philosophy: for Scholasticism is the marriage of the Aristotelian philosophy with the Christian dogma (as determined by consent and councils). The Reformation consisted, intellectually and spiritually, in

the denial of the premises, viz., in the position, that the dogmas of councils are not divine and immutable, and that the metaphysics (not so much the logic) of Aristotle does not contain all ultimate truth in its best form.

The essence of the skeptical spirit, which, after the Reformation had been adjusted in its political and religious relations, manifested itself in the different countries of Europe, may perhaps be said, in the most general and abstract formula of statement, to consist in exalting the subjective, the individual reason and will, against the objective, as found in the faith and the Scriptures of the church. The earth was made the centre, and the sun supposed to revolve around it—reversing the law of astronomy. The mediæval church feigned that itself was *theo-centric*; the extreme reaction of the Reformation was *anthropocentric*—man's need and destiny being the one thing needful. The shape that this tendency has taken in the latest times is virtually *geocentric*—making this world and its supposed laws to determine destiny. The philosophic method of the latter tendency is called *inductive*—a powerful and sufficient method in its own sphere, but now assuming to govern the premises, as well as the mode, of inference. Every *method* presupposes certain facts, and can only dictate the inferences. It cannot limit either the facts of nature, or the phenomena of consciousness.

Bacon and Descartes, though both of them believed in the Christian faith, are put at the head of the two great and opposite tendencies in which infidelity

has shown itself since the Reformation, viz., the materialistic and the rationalistic or transcendental, in the bad sense of these words. But neither Bacon nor Descartes contemplated such results from their systems. Especially is it only by taking the lesser half of the Baconian system, that infidelity gains any countenance from him. He himself says, "that it is most certain, and approved by experience, that while light gusts may move men to Atheism, yet fuller draughts bring men back to religion," and in a striking passage in the *New Organon*, he says: "Only let mankind regain their rights over nature, assigned to them by the gift of God; and that power obtained, its exercise will be governed by right, reason, and true religion." It was only when his system was transferred to another soil, and brought under the formulas of infidelity, that it came to nourish skepticism.

The course of modern infidelity has been curiously determined by the comparative freedom of the different nations, and it has come to its height—it is well worthy of being carefully noted—not in those countries where political thought and speech are freest, but where they have been most restricted. Deism, Atheism, Pantheism are the three main forms represented respectively by England, France, and Germany. The movement began in England with Herbart, Hobbes, Collins, Tindal, Chubb, and Morgan, in the 16th and 17th centuries (including Toland, who, however, held to a kind of material pantheism). And as far as the main and fundamental position of these free-thinkers is concerned, meeting them on

their own grounds, fairly and fully, English Christianity showed itself fully equal to the task, as is seen in the works of Baxter, Cudworth, S. Clarke, Waterland, Leland, and especially the immortal *Analogy* of Bishop Butler.*

This same movement, transferred to Germany, at first attained the form known by the name of rationalism, criticising the historic records of the faith, and setting up natural reason and ethics as the ultimate test and source of truth. Philosophic rationalism received its most consistent form through the criticism of Kant; though he himself, with all his speculative insight, confessed the radical evil of human nature and a firm faith in the Being of God.

In France the infidel movement was neither critical nor rationalistic—it became materialistic and revolutionary. The French monarchy had become a despotism; the banishment and slaughter of the Huguenots had decimated the moral power of the nation; a corrupt and persecuting Romanism was all the faith recognized. Rousseau pleaded for the rights and sympathies of nature; Voltaire, though retaining faith in a God, ridiculed the Scriptures on the basis of a *philosophie portative*. D'Holbach, Diderot, D'Alembert, preached atheism in the *Encyclopédie*—(Diderot declaring that the height of

* The great religious movement in England, under Whitfield and Wesley, in the last part of the century, completely broke the popularity of this deistic movement. Dr. Gillett's *God in Human Thought*, 2 vols., N. Y., Scribner Armstrong & Co., 1874, gives a comprehensive and able account of the whole English controversy, and of the services of Bishop Butler.

religion was to have none at all) : and the result was reached in the chaos, conflicts, and woes of the French Revolution, from which that fated land only recovered by accepting an imperial despotism and restoring the Catholic clergy with new pomp ; so that now ultramontane principles have the ascendancy in the successors of Bossuet and the old Catholic bishops, who contended so manfully for the Gallican liberties.

But it was reserved for Germany, in some of its more recent forms of philosophy and theology, to combine together all the phases and all the resources of infidelity, in the most learned, acute, and comprehensive assaults ever made upon the Christian faith—so that any other current infidelity in any other part of the world is but a feeble echo, so far as learning and speculation go, of what is found in these Teutonic schemes—while, at the same time, it is true, that the same land has furnished the most elaborate and thorough replies to the criticisms and hypotheses of those assailants of our faith. There is a striking resemblance in many points between the character of the attack on Christianity in this last form of it, and that which it assumed under the influence of the New-Platonic philosophy in ancient times—the same comprehensiveness of method and combination of weapons, and the same attempt to form a complete system for man by an eclectic process ; but yet the Germans show more thoroughness and destructiveness in both the historical and philosophical methods of conducting the argument, for infidelity must grow in skill to compete with a Christianity which has been growing in power for 1800 years.

Ever since the time of Leibnitz, the German philosophic movement has tended toward the construction of a universal system. The influence of Spinoza, with his pantheistic theory of one substance, and his demonstrative method applied to metaphysics, also had a very great influence, especially in the later German schools. Kant initiated a powerful tendency by his Criticism of the Pure Reason (directed in part against Hume's skepticism), and by his Criticism of the Practical Reason (conscience), on which he grounded his severely ethical and strongly theistic creed. He is the real philosophical father of strict ethical rationalism—that is, of the system which puts the prescripts of reason above the written word. At the same time, there was a host of scholars who were applying historical and philological criticism to the interpretation of Scripture in a way to undermine its infallible authority. Fichte followed Kant, retaining, however, chiefly his idealism in a subjective sense; he endeavored, in his earlier writings, to deduce the universe from the *Ego*, and substituted the moral order of the universe for God. Schelling, in his youthful enthusiasm, when magnetism was disclosing its wonders, announced, as a prophet, the theory of the identity of opposites, of the ideal and the real, with pure intellectual vision desecrating one common essence with the two poles, viz.: the spiritual and the material; in his later system, the Philosophy of Mythology, he plants himself upon more distinctive theistic and Christian ground. Hegel, with his more thorough and logical method, identified thought and being, and made the vast at-

tempt of a logical development of the universe from pure being by an inherent law, the law of negation, confounding the movement of real being with the processes of logic. He makes spirit to be ultimate. By the law of negation, spirit is transformed into nature, and then comes back to itself in humanity; God becomes conscious in man. This is Hegel's theory, as expounded by the so-called left wing, of which Strauss is the most signal representative. Hegel himself, and many of his followers of the right wing, claim that his system is to be understood only as a philosophy of the Christian faith; that Hegelianism gives us, in the form of philosophy, the same fundamental truths which Christianity gives in the form of creeds. The later German tendencies are a reaction against such an abstract idealism, and, as developed by Schopenhauer and Von Hartmann, they avow pessimism as their creed, and make annihilation to be the chief boon for the race. Not to speak more particularly of the contemporaneous movements in France and England, we can now only refer to the alliance, in these three countries, of Pantheism and Materialism, in their most developed forms, and in a common attack upon the Christian creed and church.

This rapid historic sketch may suffice to show, that in all the periods of this great conflict, there has been a difference in the character, both of the assault and the defense. At first it was Christianity against Polytheism, Judaism, and the wisdom of the ancient schools. And herè Christianity was vindicated as a positive revelation; and, as a result of the conflict, the old Catholic church ruled in the East and the

West. In the mediæval period, there was not only the subjugation of Northern Europe, but also the consolidation of the Christian system in the scholastic theology and the realistic philosophy. The Christian theory governed the world of thought and kept it in bonds. In the next stadium we have the separation of these elements, and the conflict of Christianity with all the forms of human research and speculation. It has come into conflict with deism, with rationalism in its various modes, with atheism and with pantheism; and now it is contending with atheism and pantheism allied. And as the form of the conflict has changed, so has the mode of the defense. The *Analogy* of Bishop Butler, admirable as it is for its specific ends, does not meet the questions raised by Hegel and Baur, by Darwin and Spencer.

APPENDIX II.

RECENT GERMAN WORKS ON APOLOGETICS.

An article by Prof. Smith in the "Presbyterian Quarterly and Princeton Review," October, 1876.

IT is only within a generation that Apologetics has become recognized as a distinct department of theology, and treated as an organized whole. And it is chiefly in Germany that its distinctive nature and definition, its method and relation to other branches, have been fully discussed. Planck, in his *Introduction to the Theological Sciences*,* first assigned to it a definite place in the sphere of theology, putting it, however, strangely enough, under the head of exegetical theology.

Schleiermacher, in his epoch-making treatise, entitled *A Short Exhibit of Theological Study*, published in the first volume of his Complete Works,† first assigned to Apologetics the leading place in the organism of the different departments of theology—as a preparatory discipline for all the rest, and having

* Planck, *Einleitung in die theologischen Wissenschaften*, Vol. I. §§ 271-362.

† Schleiermacher, *Kurze Darstellung des theologischen Studiums: Sämmtl. Werke, Abthlg. I., Bd. I., § 39.*

to do with the fundamental principles of theology. In this sense it is equivalent to fundamental theology, and has for its object the investigation of all the ideas, facts, and truths which logically or historically precede the system of theology proper, or Christian dogmatics, strictly so called. This is a broad and comprehensive view of the subject; but, as thus defined, it neglects too much what has always been considered as the chief object of Apologetics, that is, the specific defense of religion, especially of the Christian religion, against objections—the vindication of the absolute and final authority of Christianity as the highest and best system of truth for man. Accordingly, few have followed Schleiermacher in giving so wide a scope to Apologetics; though almost all recent writers find a specific position for it in the encyclopædia of theology. Tholuck (in his *Vermischte Schriften*, Bd. I., p. 149, sq.) and some others denied that it could be treated fully, as a whole, by itself; for the general reason, that all the doctrines, facts, and truths of both natural and revealed religion, have, and must have, their apologetic side; they can all be assailed, and must all be defended; but this, they say, should be done in detail, rather than by grouping all together. In any case, the materials with which Apologetics has to do must be taken from some or all of the other departments of theology. And if its office be to reply in detail to all the specific objections, and to establish the truth of the assailed positions, of course it is an endless work, and would defy all attempts at a proper classification. But it is not to be, nor has it been, so un-

derstood. Very generally stated, it may be said that Apologetics comprises what has previously been published under the two great heads of natural theology, on the one hand, and of the evidences of Christianity on the other. And the chief problem and question has been to bring these two under one department, or under one definition ; also including the general principles and questions that come up in the modern philosophies of history and religion, as well as the substance of the investigations contained in the introductions to the Old and New Testament. The facts of ethnology, and of primæval and prehistoric history—even the investigations of natural science, and the principles of anthropology, and of ethics, have also come to constitute a part of the materials of which Apologetics must make use. So that we have here manifestly a pretty broad field ; and the question is, whether it can be fairly and profitably cultivated with a scientific unity of idea and design.

Another, though a somewhat secondary question, is, to which division of the general encyclopædia of theology shall Apologetics be allotted? Nobody would now think of following Planck in putting it under exegetical theology. Only a part of its materials can be claimed as giving it a position under historical theology ; but it comprises much more than this, especially when we bring into view the modern and urgent conflicts of Christianity with materialism and pantheism. It must then come under either systematic or practical theology, or have a place by itself.

Dr. Delitzsch,* in his *System of Apologetics*, assigned it to practical theology, since it has to do with the practical work and progress of the church (as has preaching). It cannot well be put under any one department. But Dr. Delitzsch's own treatment of the subject is quite like that of a work on systematic theology; it is made up almost wholly of dogmatic material.

Dr. Düsterdieck,† in his able articles on this question, also contends for practical theology as the proper rubric under which Apologetics is to be put, on the ground that Apologetics, etymologically, is the theory of apology, just as homiletics is the theory of sermonizing, and so comes under the head of practice and art, rather than of system or theory. But this seems to be too narrow a view of its nature and functions. It does not merely tell us how all vindication is to be conducted; how Christianity is to be scientifically defended; but it also defends it; and not only defends it, but tries to establish its truth and authority. As Baumstark (*Apologetik*, p. 29) well remarks: "Apologetics, as the scientific proof of the absolutism of the Christian religion, as a whole, cannot be assigned to a single division of the system of theology, but is to prepare the ground for the whole of theology. Hence it has its place in the introduction to the whole system, as proposed by Schleiermacher." It is treated of by Pelt in his *En-*

* *System der christlichen Apologetik*, 1869.

† In *Jahrbücher für deutsche Theologie*, 1866, on the Idea and Encyclopædic Position of Apologetics.

cyclopædia under the general caption of the "Doctrine of Theological Principles; or, Fundamental Theology." The objection to this is, that its materials are so largely taken from church history, exegesis, etc., that it must needs come after these. It would seem, then, that we must either make a distinct head for it, introductory to all the departments of theology, or else assign it a place (as Hagenbach does) introductory to systematic theology. The latter is, perhaps, the most convenient arrangement for teaching, even though it be not free from all logical objections.

To return to the general idea of Apologetics. It was defined by Sack* (in the first really important and systematic work on the subject after Schleiermacher's scheme was propounded) as that branch of theology ("theological *discipline*") "which treats of the ground of the Christian religion as divine fact." He distinguishes between the *ideal* and *real* sides of Christianity; and assigns the former (the ideal) to systematic theology, while the latter (the real) is the proper subject of Apologetics—having to do with the *actuality* of Christianity; so preparing the way for dogmatics. This seems (as Baumstark says, p. 2) to separate the ideal and the real too much; and Apologetics, as a matter of fact, has to do with a good deal more than the external history of Christianity. And Sack himself concedes, that "the ideal side, or the doctrine, can never be considered without relation to the real, historical basis; and that, in Apologetics, though the main subject-matter be the real

* K. H. Sack, *Christliche Apologetik*. Hamburg, 1829. 2d ed., 1841.

side of Christianity, yet this can never be treated without reference to the ideal element." His further treatment of the materials of Apologetics is, in fact, rather doctrinal than historical; for his chief headings are "Redemption," "Life," and "Perfection;" and these subjects are taken from Christian theory and life, rather than from Christian history.

The Roman Catholic divine, Drey,* in his work, entitled *Apologetics as the Scientific Evidence of the Divinity of Christianity in its Manifestation*, defines Apologetics as "the Philosophy of the Christian Revelation, and of its History." He is the representative of a class of German Catholic divines who felt the influence of the philosophy of Schelling, in its later form, in its opposition to the Hegelian logic; and who were led to lay the chief stress on the positive historical elements of the Christian system. Christianity, they said, is primarily historical fact; and theology should also be historical and positive in its fundamental character. Yet it cannot be merely historical; it is rather a philosophy of the history--a scientific shaping and defense of the Christian church and religion. To this definition and treatment of the subject it has been well objected, that it brings the whole of Apologetics under the head of the philosophy of religion; it ceases to be a part of theology, and becomes a branch of philosophy. As a philosophy of religion, Drey's work contains valuable materials, shaped with learning and

*Apologetik als wissenschaftliche Nachweisung der Göttlichkeit des Christenthums in seiner Erscheinung. Mainz, 3 Bde., 1844-47.

ability. It handles a part of the theme, but does not give a clear and full view of the whole of the science. Apologetics includes, to a certain extent, the philosophy of religion ; but it has also a wider as well as a more specific scope.

Of the *Christian Apologetics on an Anthropological Basis*, by Pastor Christian Edward Baumstark,* only the first volume has been published. It differs from the other works on this subject chiefly in its method, as indicated by the title. The author takes the ground (on the *Method of Apologetics*, pp. 30-36), that while the historical method has been chiefly followed, the psychological is the only satisfactory and final one. The historical method tries to show that the Christian religion is, and by its history is proved to be, the true religion for man. The psychological method, on the other hand, starts with the individual, and shows that Christianity completely corresponds to the religious capacity and the religious needs of man. It is a merit of Baumstark's work that it emphasizes the latter point, and vindicates its necessity. But the fact is, that every apologetic work must, in some way, more or less consciously combine both methods. Even in the oldest apologetic literature, as Baumstark concedes, we have examples of both—the *Præparatio Evangelica* and *Demonstratio Evangelica* of Eusebius, and the *De Civitate Dei* of Augustine, standing more on the historical ground ; while the psychological method predominates in

* Christliche Apologetik auf anthropologischer Grundlage. Bd. I. Frankfurt a. M., 1872.

Tertullian's treatise, *De Testimonio Animæ naturaliter Christianæ*, and in the *Clementine Homilies*.

On this psychological basis, the general scheme of Apologetics, as propounded by Baumstark, is the following: First of all, in opposition to materialism and pantheism, he proposes, by "anthropological investigations," to evince and exhibit man's native religious capacities and endowments; then to show how far this natural religious basis reaches, and where this development has its limits, which require to be supplemented by a special revelation. Thus the foundation is secured which bears up all the rest. In the second part he reviews the history of the non-Christian religions—those "outside of" Christianity—to see whether, and how far, this native religious bias is manifested in them, and whether they can, and do, satisfy man's religious cravings. The third part is to give the proof, that man finds in Christianity alone the full satisfaction for his religious needs. The first two parts are well and fairly treated in the first volume of this work; the third part is not yet published. The utmost that seems to be possible, or accomplished, by this "anthropological method," is to prove that man is a religious being; that religion is a necessity of human nature; and that in the Christian religion man's religious longing and needs find their highest development and satisfaction.

The most important and, on the whole, the ablest of these recent German works is the treatise of Dr. J. H. A. Ebrard,* *Apologetics; The Scientific Vindication*

* Apologetik. Wissenschaftliche Rechtfertigung des Christenthums, von J. H. A. Ebrard, Dr. phil. et theol. 2 Theile, Gütersloh, 1874-5.

of Christianity, 2 Parts, 1874-5. The author is best known outside of Germany by his *Scientific Criticism of the Evangelical History* (3d edition, 1868, 1241 pages), at first written in reply to Strauss's life of Jesus, but afterward extended in scope so as to exhibit the unity and harmony of the four Gospels in a thorough and satisfactory manner. Bleek assigns it a very high place among the works on that subject. Ebrard's *Dogmatics*, too, in two volumes, gives a comprehensive outline of systematic theology, chiefly from the Reformed point of view, though his Calvinism is of a moderate caste. It is one of the more useful works for students of theology, and has been used as a text-book in some of the Reformed institutions. His *Apologetics* has still higher claims to attention, as showing the results of wide and protracted studies, and making an excellent attempt to collect the somewhat heterogeneous materials of this new *disciplina* into a systematic form. He says in the preface to the first part :

"For several years I have had a growing conviction that the coming ministers of the gospel must enter more thoroughly into the investigations, questions, and principles of the natural sciences, if they would be in a condition to contend victoriously against the anti-Christian tendencies of the times." "These considerations determined me, in the winter of 1872-3, to deliver a course of academic lectures, to which I gave the only partially adequate name of *Apologetics*, in order to fit it into the *Schema* of the traditional departments of theology. My hearers were theological students. I could, likewise, have wished

that there might have been an equal number of students of medicine ; for I well know the severe internal struggles through which a young man, educated as a Christian, must pass when he enters upon the study of medicine or the natural sciences." He adds, that though he has always to some extent pursued the study of the natural sciences, yet for the purpose of these lectures he engaged in renewed investigations, and he claims that in the present work he stands upon the basis of the assured results of present scientific investigations—distinguishing between what is certain and what is merely hypothetical ; and examining with special critical care the consequences drawn from these hypotheses in respect to super-sensuous or supernatural subjects. He further claims, that this criticism of the hypotheses of naturalists is not made from the standpoint of an abstract, *a priori*, metaphysics. "Whoever will take the pains," he says, "to read my book, will at once discern that my philosophical method is realistic throughout ; I start from *observed facts*, and go forward step by step with painstaking care ; I endeavor to lay at the basis of my investigation the *complete series of the facts*."

In the introduction to this work, Dr. Ebrard proceeds to an examination of the main preliminary questions as to the nature, scope, and place of Apologetics as a scientific vindication of Christianity. To bring these questions fairly before our readers, we cannot do better than to give a translation, with slight abridgments, of the whole of this introduction.

INTRODUCTION TO EBRARD'S APOLOGETICS.

§ 1. *Apologetics or Apology*.—In giving this work the title of *Apologetics*, according to the modern usage, and not *Apology*, as the fathers of the church called it, I am not without justification. And yet, before we ask, What is Apologetics? we must examine and decide the previous question, Whether there is such a science as Apologetics? According to the verbal interpretation, Apologetics is the science of the ἀπολογεῖσθαι, that is, the science or *disciplina*, which examines the nature of defense (or vindication), that is, the essential characteristics of the apologetic procedure, and thence deduces the correct method. According to this, Apologetics is related to Apology as is theory to practice; that is, it is a relation analogous to that of homiletics to preaching, of liturgics to worship, of catechetics to catechising, etc. But here we encounter a fact which makes us hesitate, and demands a more thorough analysis. For while in the above-named theoretical departments of theology we always sharply distinguish between theory and practice, doctrine and application, so that homiletics never goes over into homilies, nor liturgics into liturgies, we never, on the other hand, see, nor can we conceive of, an Apologetics which does not go right over into and become an Apology. In the military art the theory of the defense (*e. g.*, of a country or a fortress) is clearly distinguished from the act of defending; in the sphere of Christian theology, Apologetics is never limited to the theory; it does not merely tell us what the defense should be, but it is the scientific vindication itself.

§ 2. *Apologetics a Science*.—It is not difficult to see the reason of this. The above noted separation of theory and practice has no place whatever excepting in the sphere of ecclesiastical *action*, where theology becomes a practical art. The rules of such ecclesiastical action are derived from theological science, but they cannot, without practice, be so appropriated as to become a capacity or an art. It is wholly otherwise in the defense of the truth of Christianity. It may, indeed, find a place within different branches of church activity—for example, we may have Apologetics in sermons and pastoral care, in catechising, in the work of foreign and domestic missions, but Apologetics as such does not come under any of these ecclesiastical acts, it forms no part of church action, but it is essentially a *scientific* work.

It is only a scientific vindication of the truth of Christianity which deserves to be called a defense (an Apology), for the last end or aim of the so-called *Apologetics* is not to impart a capacity for action, but knowledge, viz., a recognition (knowledge) of the truth of Christianity. The name Apologetics does not seem to be exactly fitted, or it is only half fitted, to denote this. What the word exactly denotes, that is, the *science of defense* in general, would be only a very empty and formal *discipline*. For as to defense in the abstract, nothing more can be said than what might be embraced in a very few formal and general conceptions. Every defense is determined by the character of the object to be defended; a fortress is to be defended otherwise than a chessman, a mathematical theorem otherwise than a philo-

logical thesis, and both of these in a different way from an ethical postulate. Christian Apologetics, now, has for its object the defense of Christianity; for, according to usage, by Christian Apologetics we do not understand instructions as to how any given object may be defended in a Christian way, but instruction in the way in which Christianity is to be defended. "Christian" here designates the object and not the quality; "Christian Apologetics" is equivalent to "Apologetics of Christianity," that is, it is the *Science of the Apology of Christianity*.

§ 3. *Nature of Apologetics*.—And thus we are led to conclude that there is, at least, a relative justification for retaining the designation "Christian Apologetics." Between it and a mere "Apology" there still remains a difference, though a flowing one. For, Apologetics considered as the *science* of the defense of Christianity is to be distinguished from a mere Apology as such, in both its principles and method. There are apologies, oral or written, which are designed to reply to some definite objections made against Christianity, each of which may require something special in the method; thus Justin Martyr directed both of his Apologies against a series of definite single attacks. Such a defense may be *admirable as an Apology*, and on this very account, one-sided and *inadequate as Apologetics*. Christian Apologetics must then be distinguished from mere Apology by the fact, that its procedure and method are not determined by casual attacks made at some particular time, but by its deriving its *method of*

defense, and consequently the defense itself, from the *essential nature of Christianity*. Every Apologetics is Apology, but every Apology is not Apologetics. Apologetics, in fine, is that science which infers from the *inmost nature* of Christianity what classes of attacks are in general *possible*, what different *sides* of Christian truth are liable to be attacked, and what *false principles* are at the basis of these attacks. *Apologetics is the Science of the Defense of the Truth of Christianity.*

NOTE.—Hännell (*Studien und Kritiken*, 1843, 3) defines Apologetics as "the science of the common ground of the church and of theology," but this is no definition, for this ground is Christ, and Apologetics would then be the science of Christ. The definition of the Roman Catholic theologian, Drey (in the work above cited), represents Apologetics in a way which is *formally* false, as the "Philosophy of the Christian Revelation and of its History." Philosophizing about some *given* object (as about revelation in general), and even about an object of faith, is, indeed, possible (this is indirectly denied by Baumstark—see below), and it can also take on an apologetic character, and every true Apologetics must also proceed philosophically, not empirically, so that for substance Drey's definition is not so far from the mark; but in form (formally) it is incorrect, because instead of developing the idea of Apologetics, it only names one of the means of which Apologetics has to make use. Lechler's definition is better, viz.: "The scientific proof that the Christian religion is the absolute religion." (*Ueber den Begriff der Apologetik*, Studien und Kritiken, 1839, 3.) Only this says too little, for Apologetics is not merely the evidence, but the *science* of the evidence of the truth of Christianity. Then, too, the idea of the "*absolute* religion" introduces something foreign to the object, just as in the title to Drey's work the phrase "*divinity* of Christianity" is too specific. For the question is simply this: Is what Christianity says of itself true or false? If this is decided, everything else about its absoluteness or divinity follows of course. Chr. Ed. Baumstark ("Christl. Apologetik auf anthropologischer Grundlage," Frankf. a. M., 1872) contests the position that "Apologetics is the

science of Apology," and defines it as "the scientific defense of Christianity as the absolute religion." Apologetics, as we have seen, comes to this, and I have, therefore, put the two as equivalent in the title of my book, but this is not a *definit.on.* Baumstark himself afterward recognizes the fact, that Apologetics, in distinction from an Apology, has to defend Christianity not merely on one or another side, but on all conceivable sides. This can be done only when Apologetics deduces from the very *essence* of Christianity the *possible* attacks upon it, and thus becomes the science of the defense of the truth of Christianity.

§ 4. *The Twofold Office of Apologetics.*—Christianity, according to its own original and documentary declaration in the Holy Scriptures, is the redemption of man by the eternal, living, and personal God, achieved in time and ever advancing to completion; it is man's redemption *out of* an abnormal state and relation to God, opposed to the will of God, and the true nature and destiny of man himself, and *into* a normal condition and relation to God, corresponding with the divine will and man's nature and destination. Thus Christianity, according to its own testimony, is (a) not a relative truth, or stage in the knowledge of the truth, having only a relative worth, but it is *eternal and absolute truth*, yet it is this truth, (b) not in the form of mere teaching or doctrine, but in the form of *fact*, of *actual realization*. Christianity is an historical act of redemption in time; it is *historical fact*, but it is act and fact, having *eternal and absolute contents*. In the person of Christ "the truth" (ἡ ἀλήθεια) appeared personally; in history "the life" (ἡ ζωή); in Christ's passion and resurrection, the eternal normal relation between man and God is reinstated in and by a

temporal act; and so, too, the conversion of the individual to Christ, and faith in Christ, are the filling of the soul in time with an eternal substance. If Christianity now be such an intimate union of temporal historical acts with the eternal substance of truth, it follows directly—that *the attacks upon Christianity must be aimed either against its eternal substance of truth, or against the temporal facts.* That is, either the *eternal truths in Christianity* can be assailed, or its *historical character*.

NOTE.—The definition of Apologetics given by Sack (*Christl. Apologetik*) is one-sided, viz.: "That branch (*disciplina*) of theology which shows that the ground of the Christian religion is a divine fact." In accordance with this he goes on to say that the office of Systematic Theology is to develop "the ideal side," or the eternal truth of Christianity, while Apologetics treats of Christianity as actual fact. Sack was probably led to this one-sided definition by the fact, that when he wrote this work, the attacks (of De Wette, and then of Strauss) were almost exclusively made against the historical character of Christianity. Had he written in reply to the modern assaults of materialism upon the existence of life, of soul, of personality, of design (teleology), and of God himself, his definition could hardly have been so partial. But yet he might have remembered the French Encyclopædists! But his chief error consisted in his starting out from the attacks for the moment in vogue, instead of deducing the idea of Apologetics from the essential nature of Christianity.

§ 5. A. *Defense of the Eternal Truth of Christianity. Difference between Apologetics and Polemics.*—The eternal contents of Christianity are attacked when the truths which it teaches or takes for granted are *denied, and represented as falsehoods.* The attacks which Apologetics has here to repel are directed *against these truths as such*, and thus Apologetics is

distinguished from Polemics. The office of Polemics is that of contending against tendencies which do not deny the truths as such, but only call in question the connection of these eternal truths with the facts of Christianity, or present them in a perverted form.

NOTE.—The *Rationalismus Vulgaris*, as well as Socinianism and Pelagianism (like Ebionitism before them), do not deny the historical character of Christianity, do not declare it to be a myth ; nor do they deny such eternal truths as that there is a God, that there is a law of God, a moral law for man, and that the transgression of this law is sin. Nor do they deny that Christ came to deliver men from sin—that is, to redeem mankind.

But they call in question that mode of conjoining the historical facts with the eternal truths which are taught by revelation in the primitive documents of Christianity. Thus they deny that the eternal substance of truth was in Jesus Christ personally made manifest ; that he freed men from guilt by his expiatory sacrifice, and that deliverance from guilt must precede deliverance from sin, etc. They reduce salvation to mere teaching or example, to a sharpening of the law. This is a *perversion* of Christianity, *ἀίρεσις*, not a direct denial.

Analagous to these Ebionitistic tendencies, only in the opposite direction, are the Docetic heresies ; analogous to the legal heresies are the Antinomian—they are *perversions*. The office of Polemics, as well as of Dogmatics, is to contend against and to refute these perversions of Christianity.

On the other hand, Apologetics has to establish the truth of Christianity against such assaults as have grown up in those systems of speculation which are outside of Christianity, or are opposed to it, and which attack and deny the eternal truths of Christianity as such. When, for example, materialism maintains that the soul and thought are mere functions of the ganglia of the brain ; when materialism and pantheism maintain that there is no immortal-

ity, neither eternal happiness nor eternal misery, and that consequently the whole *presupposition* of the necessity of redemption is from the outset deception or superstition ; or when these systems maintain that the freedom of the will is a mere seeming, and that every man at every moment acts from necessity as compelled by his nerves and the ganglia of the brain, etc., that the difference of good and evil is determined only by custom and convenience, that there is no ethical law binding in itself, and hence no sin ; or that there are in nature and in the order of the world no works of design, and consequently that there is no Creator :—all of these cases are denials of Christian truth as such ; here the ground is taken away from under the feet of Christianity, and it is about these questions that Apologetics is to be employed. It has for its office to investigate such attacks in a philosophical manner, and to inquire how they are to be scientifically refuted.

§ 6. *Illustrations and Limitations.*—It is a matter of course that Apologetics cannot bring to these investigations any axioms borrowed from revelation and theology, but can only appeal to the facts of self-consciousness and of native rational knowledge *belonging to man as man*. We do not prove *idem per idem* ; this were illogical and objectionable. To take for granted a knowledge of Christian truth, to *presuppose* a consciousness shaped by Christianity, and then to analyze that consciousness, this is not Apologetics. Considered on its practical side, the object of Apologetics is to give instructions to the practical

-theologian, to the minister of the church, and in general to every Christian and member of the church, how he is to defend the truths of Christianity against those who still stand aloof from the faith, against non-Christians and gainsayers. Not as though an unbeliever or scoffer can be converted to Christianity by means of deduction and proof (somewhat as Pastor Blendinger, in Franconia, tries to compel the Jews to see the truth of Christianity by demonstrations inserted in the *Nürnberg Korrespondent*). Repentance alone leads to true Christian faith, such repentance as comes home to the anguished conscience from an inward conviction of the holiness of God's law, and as leads one to ask, what must I do to be saved? But besides scoffers and unbelievers, there are also those who are weak in the faith and wavering, and who are in danger of being led wholly astray by such audacious foes; and for their sakes it is necessary to oppose the fallacious arguments of unbelief, and to do this on such grounds and with such evidence, that these opponents can have nothing to say in reply. Consequently it is necessary to come down to *their* ground, to their arena, to ignore all axioms borrowed from Christianity itself, so as to lead the objectors *ex concessis ad absurdum*; to make it evident that their own assumptions and inferences are false and perverse even on the ground of their *own premises*. For this reason the Apologetics of Christianity in its first division, where it defends the eternal truths of Christianity, has to begin wholly with the general facts of human consciousness and the assured results of the study of nature. It has to ask whether those truths

and doctrines which are *presupposed* by Christianity agree or are in conflict with the facts of nature and of natural consciousness, viz. : Such truths as the existence of a living holy God, the reality of a moral law, and the freedom and responsibility of the will ; the fact that man is in a state of opposition to the law, and his incapacity to save himself. The subject then of the first part of Apologetics may be thus stated : *The eternal truth of the substance of Christianity, as measured by the facts of nature and of human consciousness.*

§ 7. B. *Defense of the Historical Character of Christianity.*—The other side of Christianity is its *historical character*. The redemption through Jesus Christ is a fact which occurred nearly two thousand years ago in the land of Judea. The assaults of anti-Christianity are also directed against the historical character of Christianity, especially against its *historical documents*—the biblical writings. The foremost attack is against the historical character of the *contents* of these writings, of which (as Strauss says, in his "Life of Jesus for the German People," 1864, Preface, p. xiv) we must get quit ; next, against the *credibility* of these writings ; and then—as the means of contesting their credibility—against their *genuineness* and their *antiquity*. The investigation of these points, under the unfitting name of "Introduction," or under the more fitting title of "Criticism of the Writings of the Old and New Testaments," forms a special part of theology—a very extended and comprehensive branch, which, taken strictly, is throughout of an apologetic character. But yet, in all its de-

tails, it does not properly come under Apologetics. Not merely for the reason of convenience, since its very comprehensiveness would carry it far beyond the proper limits of this science, but for another—an internal reason, viz.: that such a “criticism” properly makes an “apology” (see § 3), and is not Apologetics, because it necessarily has to follow up and examine the objections, views, and hypotheses made at special times.

§ 8. *Historical Character—continued.*—Apologetics also examines the historical character of Christianity, and the attacks upon it, but in another way, under broader and more general points of view. It must inquire into the possible points of attack, and develop the mode of defense in accordance with certain general principles. The historical fact of redemption presupposes the reality of another historical fact, viz.: of a rebellion, in time, of the will of the creature against the eternal moral law and will of God. Christianity—biblical, revealed Christianity—stands and falls with this preamble. The exact opposite of biblical Christianity, on this point, is found in pantheism and materialism. Pantheism looks upon moral evil, not as the opposition of the creature's will to God; not as a fall and corruption—in a word, not as sin; but, like its father, the devil (Gen. iii: 5), as a lower good—a process of development not yet completed, and even as a necessary means of transition to the good itself; and consequently holds that no Saviour is needed, excepting humanity redeeming itself; and the same is true of materialism, which

teaches that humanity is developed out of an apish state. According to pantheism, we find, in the history of mankind, only a constant progress from mere undeveloped to developed, and hence better, conditions. Whether this be really so is to be determined by investigating the *History of the Race*. As, in the first division of Apologetics, we appeal to the facts of nature and of consciousness, so, in the second part, our subject-matter is the *General History of Culture and Religion*, as well in civilized nations as in savage tribes, in order to find an answer to the question, whether it is a fact, that in the history of the human race there is a constant progress from the lower to the higher, or whether it is not historically established, that there is an incessant counter-tendency, viz. : a constant lapse and degeneracy from a higher to a lower state.

§ 9. *Historical Apologetics—continued.*—When we come to the study of Christianity as a historical fact, *in its organic connection with the general history of religion*, we encounter two remarkable phenomena. On the one hand, there is the historical proof of a fall of the human will from the divine ; of a perversion of development into degeneration, as is seen in the documentary evidence of a lapse from primitive monotheism into polytheism, and a tendency to an ever-increasing savagery. But, along with this, we also find the striking fact, that precisely in that Semitic race, in which sin was first raised to a satanic degree of corruption, and the relation of religion to morals was not only glossed over, but perverted into

a gross and fearful immorality, the Godhead being worshiped by lasciviousness and murder—in the midst, now, of this very race, a single branch, notwithstanding all its inclinations to the same corruption, did, nevertheless, manifest the very opposite tendency; so that we find in it a knowledge of the *holiness*, and consequently of the unity and personality, of God, as well as a clear recognition of the curse and misery of sin, and of the necessity of an expiation; and this, too, for hundreds, yea, thousands of years—after every time of disturbance breaking forth anew. The object of our investigation is to ascertain whether this historical phenomenon can be explained in the sense of pantheism, and with the factors of naturalism; or whether we are not obliged, with the Scriptures, to recognize and confess a series of revealed acts of the living God redeeming man from the debasing progress of sin and corruption. And when, in fine, among the same Semitic people, we find the historical ground upon which Jesus Christ appears as the Redeemer of the world, then too—apart from all special researches about the age and origin of the individual gospels—we have the double facts of the Lord's Supper and the Sunday observance, ever testifying to the historical reality of his death and resurrection; and also the testimonies of the Pauline epistles, bringing positive evidence of the supernatural character of his person. And further, Christianity can be tested in history, not merely by the advent of Christ and his entrance into the series of sinful humanity, but also by the effects it has produced upon history itself. It is not difficult

to adduce the proof of the heavenly fruits of Christianity in history. And there is also the weighty fact, that every form of corrupt Christianity which has been drawn into the service of sin, and intertwined with lies, has produced much more abhorrent and pestilential corruption than were ever found in heathendom alone; and this, too, heightens the evidence for Christianity—just as the mouldering corpse of a man spreads much fouler taints than the carcass of a beast. Here, too, the history of religion, considered in the light of God, becomes, throughout, an apologetic—not of what is now and then called Christianity, but of what Christianity is in the Holy Scriptures. Hence the object of the second part of Apologetics may be given in the phrase—*Christianity as a historical fact, in its organic connection with the general history of religion.*

§ 10. *As to the Form.*—The character of Apologetics, in distinction from Apology, is secured when positive investigations are made the starting point, and the refutation of opposing theorems follows on after. This appears in the First Part of our division of the subject; here, in the *First Book*, we inquire after the facts of natural consciousness and of objective nature, in a systematic order; before, in the *Second Book*, we refer to the theories and systems opposed to Christianity, and expose their internal contradictions. In this Second Book of the First Part, too, where Apologetics manifestly becomes Apology (see above, § 1), it is distinguished from a bare Apology (in the sense of § 3) by bringing within

the sphere of its examination, not only such anti-Christian theories as spring up at the present time, but also all classes of theorems, in systematic grouping, which *can be* directed against any, or all, of the fundamental doctrines and presuppositions (*præambula*) of Christianity, in all the forms in which these have appeared *until now*. The future shapes of these theories it cannot, of course, conjecture in detail; and so far forth Apologetics, like every human science, is not complete, but growing in and with the times. The last holds true also of the Second Part of Apologetics in our division. The materials here used for the history of religion have been chiefly collected, in recent times, by the labors of Max Müller, Spiegel, Dunker, and others. Such an investigation as is given in this Second Part was not possible a generation ago. In ethnography, and the religious history of the savage races, our knowledge is still fragmentary. Here the first canon of investigation must be, not to fill up the gaps by airy hypotheses, but to restrict ourselves to deductions from what is surely attested. Thus the error will be avoided which is now so plainly in vogue on the side of the opponents of Christianity.

This Introduction to Ebrard's Apologetics gives a sufficiently full and fair view of the way in which this department of theology is now generally treated in Germany, and of the questions raised in relation to its extent and method. Understanding Apologetics in his sense and usage of the term, his treatment of the subject, in the body of his work, is full and able,

more satisfactory on the whole than any other single treatise. We can give only a very general sketch. As already stated, the whole material is divided into two parts. The First Part, comprised in the first volume, is entitled *The Eternal Truths of Christianity Measured by the Facts of Nature and of Human Consciousness*. This is divided into two Books, the first of which contains the Positive Development; the second, the Examination and Refutation of the Systems opposed to Christianity.

Under Book First, after some general statements as to the nature of Christianity, and what is presupposed in it, there are three divisions of the subject-matter. (1) *The Ethical Law and its Author*, pp. 17-222; (2) *On Sin*, pp. 223-281; (3) *Redemption and its Necessity*, more concisely treated, pp. 282-314. In the first division, the fundamental questions of ethics, of psychology, and of natural theology are discussed at considerable length. The facts of human consciousness, in respect to the world, to the human soul, and to the moral law are clearly analyzed and made the basis for the refutation of anti-Christian theories and speculations. Man's dependence upon nature is fully granted, while his self-conscious independence is clearly vindicated. The whole of nature is viewed as a complex of laws filled with marks of design. Man's knowledge of God is shown to be natural and necessary. The author of the vast system of designs in nature must be a self-conscious being; there is no real contradiction between an absolute and a personal being. The correct form of proof of the existence of God is not to be found by

asking "whether the Absolute *exists*, but rather by asking, *In what form does the Absolute exist?* Is it an abstract aboriginal unity, or an unconscious primitive force, or self-conscious Spirit?" (p. 199.) God, it is then shown, is essentially ethical; God is love; the moral law is the highest law.

In the Second Division the existence and nature of sin are considered. In opposition to the skeptical theories, it is shown that it is not physical but moral, not from necessity but by an act of freedom, involving the race, and also implying personal responsibility. Its origin is in the beginning of the race and the divine relation to it is one of permission and not of efficiency. It is all, however, subject to the divine disposal and government; nature itself, in fact, was arranged from the beginning in view of the possibility of sin.

Man, thus shown to be essentially a moral being, the subject of a moral law, and having transgressed that law, stands in need of redemption, which is considered in the Third Division. Man is unable to redeem himself, redemption comes only through the divine work of the God-man, which is grounded in the mystery of the internal relations of the persons in the Godhead. The Gospel is no human invention. The divine act of redemption corresponds to the human need. The incarnation and its miracles are conceivable and not irrational. The Second Book of the First Part is devoted to the examination and refutation of the anti-Christian systems of philosophy (pp. 315-443). The author treats: 1, Of the mechanical system, or the denial of the organic life-

power; 2, Of the denial of final causes, design in nature (which he calls Aposkopiology); he here ably vindicates the teleological theory of the universe; 3, Of the Darwinian theory, which is thoroughly and acutely discussed; 4, Of the denial of the freedom of the will, and on moral statistics, where the positions and assumptions of materialism are candidly and fully exposed; 5, Of the Pantheistic philosophy, examining the systems of Spinoza, J. G. Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Von Hartmann, and Schopenhauer. He has evidently made a thorough study of these anti-Christian theories, and shows their inconsistency not merely with Christian doctrines, but also with the recognized facts of nature and of human consciousness. This work is as thoroughly done as his limits would allow.

The Second Part of Apologetics in Dr. Ebrard's arrangement presents Christianity as a Historical Fact in its Organic Connection with the General History of Religion. It is divided into two Books, respectively entitled the Religions of Men, and the Revelation of God. The first of these occupies some five hundred pages of the second volume, while the Divine Revelation is sketched in sixty-eight pages. Perhaps the best and most thorough portion of the whole work is contained in the author's elaborate investigations under the former head, comprising, as it does, the results of the latest ethnographic and linguistic studies by the most eminent scholars of Germany and other countries. Dr. Ebrard, according to his own account, prepared himself by protracted and extended study for this most important and difficult

task, going through the writings of W. von Humboldt, Buschmann, Schott, Von der Gablentz, and others, collecting the facts from all attainable sources, and combining the whole in a narrative and argument of convincing force. We do not know where to find a more weighty reply to the assumptions and theories of those writers who persist in claiming, according to the unproved hypothesis of a merely naturalistic evolution, that the primitive religious state of mankind was the lowest and most debased form of polytheistic idolatry, and that the higher religions have been developed out of these base rudiments. Dr. Ebrard shows conclusively that the facts all lead to another conclusion, that gross idolatry is a degeneration of mankind from antecedent and purer forms of religious worship. He first treats of the civilized nations of antiquity, the Aryan and Indian religions, the Vedas, the Indra period, Brahmanism and Buddhism; then of the religion of the Eranians, the Avesta, and the Parsees; next of the Greeks and Romans, the Egyptians, the Canaanites, and the heathen Semitic forms of worship, including Phœnicians, Assyrians, and Babylonians. His Second Division is devoted to the half-civilized and savage races, in the North and West of Europe, in Asia and Polynesia (Tartars, Mongols, Malays, Cushites); then of America, including a minute examination of the relations of the different races here to the Mongol, Japanese, and old Chinese immigrations. This part of the work is of special interest, and contains many ingenious suggestions and speculations as to the connection between Asiatic and native American culture.

In summing up the results of these conscientious and prolonged investigations, the author claims that he has shown that there "is not anywhere the least trace of an upward and onward advance from Fetichism to Polytheism, and from Polytheism to a gradually dawning knowledge of one God ; but that, on the other hand, it is definitely proved that among all the nations of the heathen world there has been a fall and degradation out of an earlier and relatively purer knowledge of God ;" that even among the most abject and debased "there are reminiscences of an earlier worship of one invisible creator and ruler of the world." He also holds and maintains, that he has proved "the essential unity of the human race, and the unity of its primitive traditions, that is, the truth of its early history," as given in the Scriptures, and confirmed by the testimony of different races and nations. In their dispersion from the original centre of the race (the western part of Central Asia, in the Euphrates Valley), all the people and tribes "carried with them the memory of one God, who, in the beginning, revealed himself to man ; of one sin of the first parents, in the eating of the forbidden fruit through the influence of the tempter upon the woman, and of the entrance of death as the consequence and punishment of sin ; of the brother's murder, and of three brothers who invented the metallic arts, etc. ; of a race of giants ; of the flood ; of the ark, and the mountain, and the birds sent from the ark ; of the rainbow and the promise ; of three sons from whom descended all the peoples ; of a revolt against God, the building of the tower, the confusion of tongues, and the sundering of the nations."

But we must needs stop in our analysis and extracts from this very able, comprehensive, and timely work. It is a vigorous, learned, and high-toned contribution to our apologetic literature—well worthy of being reproduced in an English version. Before materialism and pantheism can win the day, they have got to disprove the positions and refute the arguments of such works as this. Their earth-born theory is of little avail against such an array of facts—facts of history, facts of nature, and facts of human consciousness.

In the concluding Book, headed “The Revelation of God,” Dr. Ebrard sums up the results of all his investigations, and then treats, first, of the “Redeeming Acts of God,” in his revelation under the old dispensation and in the incarnation ; and, second, of the “Effects of Redemption” upon the individual, upon society, and upon races and nations. This is less fully treated than some other parts of his great theme, and leaves much to be supplemented. It might well be the subject of another volume.

The *System of Christian Apologetics* (1869), by Dr. F. Delitzsch, the eminent orientalist, of Leipsic, differs greatly from that of Dr. Ebrard, and is handled in an entirely original method.

APPENDIX III.

OUTLINE OF PROFESSOR SMITH'S INTENDED LECTURES ON EVOLUTION.

I.

INTRODUCTORY AND GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS.

EVOLUTION is a great word : it is meant to cover the History of the Universe. It is the result of a great many words and of all the theories of the universe : Cosmogony, Emanation, Development, Progress, progressive organization, the ascent from the lowest to the highest, the whole space from the beginning to the consummation, the last aspiration of Metaphysics, the last results of Physics, the final term of Pantheism, of Materialism (Atheism), of Theism and also of Theology.

The history of the evolution theory is as old as human thought. Its materialistic forms were advanced and rejected in the dawn of philosophy. It is now newly formulated.*

In the Vedas we find the recognition of forces and organizing powers. Theism (at least, infinite Mind), Pantheism and Materialism are there. The "order

* By Spencer more ably than any other.

of succession" is drawn out: from the substance of eternal being plants, animals, ether, and earth were separated.

To the Greek mind "atoms were the sacred home and shrine of Philosophy." Democritus assumed them as the origin and explanation of all things; Xenophanes conceived the original substance as ethereal; Anaxagoras demanded that to atoms should be added a shaping intelligence; and the complete reaction against the old materialism (and materialistic necessity), was expressed by Socrates and Plato, in the position that Necessity was not all or ultimate, but that Intelligence was more and higher. This comes out in a striking way in the *Timæus* :* "Intelligence, superior to Necessity, persuades it ($\tau\tilde{\omega}\ \pi\epsilon\iota\theta\epsilon\iota\nu\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\eta\grave{\nu}$) to govern the most of what is evolved so as to lead to what is best, and thus the universe ($\tau\acute{o}\ \pi\tilde{\alpha}\nu$) was fashioned at the beginning because Necessity allowed itself to be persuaded by wisdom." Also :† "two kinds of causes" are discerned, "one necessary, one divine." Socrates, in *Phedon*, ‡ tells "how glad he was when he first heard that Anaxagoras had said that Intelligence was the cause of all, and he thought that Anaxagoras would tell how everything was arranged for the useful and the best design—how the physical was for the moral: and how disappointed he felt when he found that no use was made of Intelligence—that ether, water, and other things equally absurd were made the cause of all—the physical made to explain

* *Tim.* 48. a.

† *Tim.* 68. e.

‡ 97 c. 99 d.

the moral and the intelligent, and no account taken of the fair order of things."

In short, with Socrates and Plato, the *ethical* view—the order and end of the universe—predominates. They find ideas a place in the creation—find *thought in things*. Here Teleology is born. There is nothing much better, even in modern science, than these utterances of Socrates : * " He who in the beginning made man gave him ears to hear, eyes to see, nostrils to smell, tongue for taste, eyebrows and eyelashes to protect the eye, light of day to distinguish objects, divisions of day and night, nourishment from the earth, water, fire, and air. The gods love and cherish man, watch over him as their greatest care." † " He who orders and governs the universe, in which are united all beauty and all good, and who, for our use, keeps the universe in eternal vigor and youth this god is seen accomplishing the most sublime works, but abides unseen in the government of the world." ‡

The sense of this is, that when we ask, What is the world (or universe) for?—the question is not and can not be answered by propounding any mere mathematical, mechanical, or physical end or object : for if

* I do not find that the masters in modern physical research, with all their advantages, are yet qualified, either by the quantity or quality of their brains, or by their culture, to sneer at Socrates, to cast aside Plato as a " poet," or to patronize Aristotle by misunderstanding him. Many of these men are as far from Socrates and Plato—as far from Cicero and Seneca—even from Buddha and Zoroaster, as they are from Moses and the prophets and the apostles of Christ.

† Memorab. I., iv. § 5.

‡ Ibid., IV., iii. § 13.

this were all, there would not be and could not be any man, any intelligent moral agent, or any God but Fate.

Merely physical agencies can never evolve a moral being and a moral end. But these latter are found *in fact*, say Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle.* The world is made "for good." Hence, besides Necessity, there must also be Reason, Intelligence—leading to some moral end—in the authorship (origination) of the world itself.

This was the impregnable and victorious position of the old Greek wisdom against the old Greek materialism. And when this is said the essential thing is said, the main point is gained. For, if a man be a moral being with moral ends, there must be in the First Cause—not power alone and mathematics—but Will directed by wisdom.†

* Lange (Hist. Materialism) knows too much to put Aristotle on the other side, as some English lecturers have done, though he puts Democritus and Lucretius above Plato and Aristotle.

† In Lange's *History of Materialism*, this form of philosophy is traced through all history; its counterparts are exhibited, but the Materialism is represented as preeminent. Thus:—I. *Ancient world*: Democritus, Empedocles (ethical), Aristippus; the Idealistic reaction: Socrates, Plato, Aristotle; subsequently, theoretical Materialism carried farther by Epicurus and Lucretius.^a II. *Medieval*. Mohammedanism more favorable to Materialism (Averroes) than Christianity was. Scholasticism. Bruno, Bacon, Descartes. III. *Seventeenth*

^a There was a debate between Origen and Celsus as to Man's place in Nature: Celsus advocating self-transformation in matter, saying that man is not the end of creation, that God cares for and punishes brutes, that elephants have moral qualities, signs of speech and knowledge of the divine. Origen admits spontaneous generation, as the work of God. See Aug. Kind, Teleologie und Naturalismus, in d. alt-Chr. Zeitschr., Jena, 1875.

As the question of Evolution now confronts us, we must recollect the difficulties of the subject in the general mind of the age. The Christian Faith, the simple Biblical Faith, is here assailed. The whole of modern German metaphysics, philosophy in its widest speculation—abroad and at home—is in array against Faith. In this country, the most powerful intellectual and investigating tendency of the time is against us, including multitudes of the young men in all the colleges and professions.* The question is: Is there as much evidence of the literal inspiration of the Scriptures as of the results of philosophical and scientific investigations? We have to meet that. We must be wary of our grounds.† We learn of the past: *e. g.* of astronomy, geology. In evolution, we must concede—and appropriate—all that is proved true, as we have often done before. Those hurt the good cause who stoutly maintain the unbending literality of their own interpretation of the sacred text, and anathematize all who will not repeat their formulæ. There are some who, if a Christian utters the word evolution, accuse him of playing into the hands of the infidel and the atheist. Those Evolutionists who are not Christians just want Christians to say that *all* evolution undermines the

Century. Gassendi's History, Bayle, Newton; Locke, Toland. IV. *Eighteenth Century.* English and French basis. Priestley, Bayle, Diderot, Robinet, de la Mettrie, d'Holbach, Cabanis. Reaction in Leibnitz and Wolf. V. Then *general.* Feuerbach, Moleschutz, etc., to the present, where we have Czolbe and Häckel advocating a doctrine of "ensouled atoms."

* —"tua res agitur cum proximus ardet."

† It is easy to argue with believers; the business is with unbelievers.

Bible, and that *every* form of Darwinism is Atheism. But, to say that species are entirely arbitrary, that there is no sort of physical connection or descent between them, is to advance a purely scientific, not a religious or Christian, theory. There are three theories of Evolution. (1) The *Materialistic*. (2) The *Pantheistic*.* (These two may be combined. What is to be marked in respect to both, or to the two combined is—their insufficiency as regards (a) motive power, (b) organizing power—mind.) (3) The *Theistic* and *Christian*. This contains all of fact and truth which is found in the others, and supplies their defects, in the recognition of a personal, conscious intelligence.

We are not to deny continuity of growth, as far as shown. We are to consider that it is *not shown* at the great joints and crises,† that is—

Between atoms and primordial forces,
Between life and mechanics,
Between the soul and the vegetable,
Between man and the animal.

But, even at these crises we are not to deny the *use* of the antecedent in the new. “The Lord God

* “One part of the Christian world worships a Jew, another, a Jewess,” and it might be added that the modern pantheistic world celebrates in another Jew, Spinoza, the worship of genius.

† The Scientific Doctrine of Continuity, by Professor Leebody, Brit. and For. Ev. Rev., October, 1876, advocates continuity, “with three exceptions: (1) eternity of matter, (2) life, (3) man’s place,” etc. But, the exceptions prove that the principle of continuity is not enough to explain things, without a higher power, at crises: and why not recognize such higher power all along, like sap from tap-root to cone?

formed man out of the *dust of the ground*." We are to assert that—

All the mechanical laws are in vital products—and something more,

All the vegetable in animal products—and more,

All the animal in man—and more,

All of man in history—and more.

And the question is: Whence and what this *More*?

We are to urge that mathematical demonstration is great in its way, but that that is a narrow way: it deals with few attributes, masses, numbers, motions, planetary orbs—all very well in their place, all grand in a sense, but comparatively barren and meagre. To say that this is the highest knowledge, and the highest way of knowing is perfectly absurd.* Things that cannot be weighed and measured and chemically worked up—are immensely more valuable and interesting. A scrap of life, a speck of sensation, a mote of vision is worth more individually than all that mathematics and mechanics ever did or can do! If the sun could see and feel, it would be worth something;† if it could only see itself, if it only knew that it was burning up for our comfort, it would be immeasurably advanced in the scale of being.

We may wonder that the world should be led by such a pretense of wisdom as the theories of the day exhibit,‡ but we are none the less to consider that it

* "Philosophy, which leaned on Heaven before,
Sinks to her second cause—and is no more."

Concluding lines of *The Dunciad*.

† Intrinsically, *i. e.*, would be an "end in itself" and not a mere means.

‡ "Quantilla sapientia homines regnantur."—*Oxenstiern*.

is thus led and influenced, and that the interests at stake are most vital.

It is true that such ponderous platitudes were never used to cover a more superficial system (*c. g.* Spencer's definition: "Homogeneous becomes heterogeneous—differentiates," etc.), that we have here mere hollow phrases to express an empty law. But it is also true that these high, dim, shining abstractions and glittering generalities, harmless and distant as they may seem, and much as we may deride them or gaze with blank wonder, have an immense practical power. They are meant to give us the code of the universe, the laws of being, the seeds of all life and growth, the organic principle of nature and the spirit, to remodel laws and institutions, to shape philosophies, to build the state after new patterns, to reshape social law and order, society and life, the family, the state, the church.

The difficulty as well as the importance of the discussion arises from the fact that it is border-lands which are now the fields of conflict—the border-lands between mind and matter, between force and life (and life is a *form of force*), between the vegetable and animal kingdoms. Hence also the strife is between materialism and spiritualism, atheism and theism, science and philosophy, and philosophy and faith.*

The discussion may be conducted in the following order:

* "There is a border-land between philosophy and science. The questions raised by science are answered by philosophy." See T. K. Becker, *Die Grenze zwischen Phil. u. exact. Wissensch.* Berlin, 1876.

After I. The Introductory and General Considerations.

II. The Metaphysical Background assumed for Evolution.*

III. The Scientific Achievement.†

IV. The Bearing on Theology. The Adjustments between Evolution and Theology in general. (This on the supposition that there is a view of Evolution which (a) grants design and (b) is theistic.)

V. The Bearing on Scripture. Evolution and the Bible. (Raising the questions (a) of geology, (b) of the order of creation.)

It should be added that the subsoil of all the hypotheses with which we have to deal is in the old question: Is the universe to be viewed *sub specie mundi*, or, *sub specie æternitatis*? Are we *c. g.* to bound our view of all organisms with "the four organogens," carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, and nitrogen? This is the battle of Armageddon, and here we encounter the Anti-Christ.

II.

THE METAPHYSICAL BACKGROUND.

It used to be considered something of a task to make a world; most people pondering the subject, have gladly taken refuge in mystery and omnipotence.‡ But now almost everybody fresh from the

* The strength of Evolution thus far is in the metaphysical theory which it advocates, and not in its inductions.

† This has not met the metaphysical assumptions even half way.

‡ Fichte was a notable exception.

retorts can tell us, if not how it *is* done, at any rate how it must be done if done at all.* This, at least, the investigator has ascertained: that if he had been present at the upspringing of life in the world, he would have seen with his mortal vision, mechanical forces becoming vital—and still remaining mechanical; life appearing and really being nothing new—no life there, in fact. The substance of the reason given for this confident assertion respecting the origin of life is that as we approximate to “protoplasm” in our experiments, we can see no difference between it as mere material, subject only to chemical and mechanical laws, and as “vitalized” or endowed with the laws of life. But, having no instrument to detect the difference, why should we expect to see it? The intimation is that the difference is infinitely small, is equal almost to zero. But here the “infinitely small” becomes the infinitely great. Every thinker would rather know the heart of a molecule than know all astronomy. In the little, the unseen, the *invisibilia*, the mystery of creation slumbers. The theorist says, “If I had been there I should have expected to see the mechanical-chemical change into the living.” But with what instrument of vision? How would he “see” an atom ensouled, or, perchance, a mechanical law changed into a living force? He would only see some of the atoms differently arranged and showing new properties, viz.: a live-centre, a sac, a cell wriggling about, thrusting dead atoms out of the way,

* “He had first matter seen undrest
And took her naked, all alone,
Before one rag of form was on.”—*Hudibras*.

using them, feeding, disgorging, fighting, using the organs of nutrition and assimilation, finally reproducing something just like itself and giving up its imperceptible ghost.

This could be seen, *and nothing else* : the existence of a new being, with new properties and functions, and its little life then expiring. But it would never be *seen* that mechanics and chemistry did this. It would be seen only that they were there, but under new conditions. Even if no new principle of life be admitted, the new conditions, *which cannot be derived from physics and mechanics*, must be.* Aristotle says: ἐν τοῖς εἶδεσιν, τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς, τὰ νοητά ἐστὶ. In sense is intellect. The investigator of protoplasm does not "see" the mechanical and chemical powers of matter, otherwise than with the mind; he needs only the mind to "see" life when it arises;†

* Spencer, First Princ. 192, says : "The *sole* truth which transcends experience by underlying it is thus the persistence of force. To this an ultimate analysis brings us down, and on this a rational synthesis must be built up." Again, p. 195, "Uniformity of Nature" is only "persistence of relations among forces." Tyndall, Frag. Sc. 110, declares that "no matter how subtle a natural phenomenon may be, whether we view it in the region of sense, or follow it in that of the imagination, it is in the long run reducible to *mechanical laws*." Yet he says (Belfast address—see *N. Englander*, Oct. 1876) : "To explain evolution without creation must radically change our notions of matter." "Taught, as we have been, to regard these definitions" (which give us its purely physical and mechanical properties), "as complete, we rightly reject the notion that out of such materials any form of life could possibly arise." So Du Bois Raymond : "It is a mistake to see in the first introduction of life on the earth anything supernatural, or indeed anything more than an extremely difficult problem in mechanics."

† "Copernicus had no telescope."

i. e. to discern that entirely distinct phenomena have presented themselves, for which the mind—the organ of vision in the case—demands a distinct cause or source.*

It is the position of our antagonists that Force is all. But this very word, Force, connotes, not a phenomenon, but its *cause*. The phenomenon is discerned only through and by *motion*; and this motion again is never discerned—and no man can define it, except by a paradox—something which both is not, and is. So true it is that the roots of phenomena are in the noumena—of the unintelligible in that which is discerned only by Intelligence, an Idea of Reason.

Moreover, by every law of psychology, of logic, and of philosophy, Mind is what we know nearest, most and best. All else is comparatively inaccessible. The thing-in-itself, the substance which we know, and alone directly is—*Mind*.

Let it be considered how much a materialistic evolutionist must take for granted: He has space and time, with no beginning nor end. In them, atoms,† practically infinite; yet space and time could not generate atoms, nor atoms space and time. Force is the movement of atoms, yet the force can-

* The law of this vision is: *Respice, Aspice, Prospice*. Look from phenomenon to cause, view phenomenon as caused, grasp the future effect in the present cause.

† They show us an atom, and say, the fair world was built of such—and it may in part be true—just as true as that the Parthenon was built of blocks of marble, or that a brick is a specimen of a house; but something more is needed—and the best part, too.

not be deduced from atoms, nor atoms from force, nor either from space and time. Then the atoms and forces, in space and time, must form all the planetary systems, *proprio motu*—according to the laws of mathematics!

In fine, the metaphysical assumptions may be briefly stated from the work of Lange. There is no thing-in-itself, only phenomena: of which the human organization is the centre: all is found here (even Causality, II., p. 45); Ethics is Egoism—and sympathy (not absolute); Religion is the impulse to the unknown and unknowable *ideal*; in man there are realistic and idealistic *Triebe*. The Ideal is seen in Art, Religion, Philosophy. Art is confessedly only ideal: Philosophy will always have a place in human thought: only we must not confound its imaginations with realities! Religion* is sifted until naught is left: it remains only as an aspiration. He doubts whether Christianity can survive, if myths are given up: one of these myths is the idea of God. Yet he speaks of the hold which religion has against all arguments,† and would *not* give up the sacrificial death of the Son of God—of course, in his sense.‡

It seems necessary then only to state the question in its *breadth*. Does man, does this our world, revolve around God—or does God (all the God there is) revolve around man? Is man everything and God perchance nothing? Is man's knowledge § all, and

* II. 547, 8.

† II. 495.

‡ II. 528.

§ Atheism, on its intellectual side, is simply the shallowest system of philosophy that the mind of man can possibly devise. It is made up of the two hardest, driest notions: Atoms, Force: out of those all.

is there no omniscience? Is man's faith all a delusion, and has no voice, no Incarnate Word, pierced the darkness of the night, and taught man the lessons of eternal wisdom? Are all the questions of man's nature and destiny to be dismissed with the sarcasm of "human knowledge?" Have the race been lunatics, and have we just found it out? Is Theology a set of opinions, Natural Theology an exploded series of hypotheses, Conscience the bugbear of childhood, Man the head of the animal kingdom, Force—unconscious and with no object—that which works its will in the heavens above and the earth beneath, and the waters under the earth? Is Sin a name for ignorance—Redemption a process of matter—Christ an ideal—God equal to zero—and Eternal Life a fiction of a dreaming brain? *

The contrasts should be presented :

Theism—or Force and Casualty,†

Theism—or Nihilism and Nescience.

If Theism and Creation receive their recognition, then the Supernatural is recognized : the *miracle* of creation is admitted : an omnipresent Deity : first and second causes, all along the line.

There will be given as the result—Natural Theology.

That given : then so deep and perplexing are the problems, the disorders, the evils, the riddles, the

* Any and all the differences between the Greek, the Latin, and the Reformed churches are slight, compared with those between the whole of Christianity and the whole of Skepticism.

† Casualty explains nothing ; it is a name for our ignorance—for caprice.

sphinxes,* the hidden and revealed God, the God we find in nature alone, and the God whom we are formed to adore—that the cry must be for a REV-ELATION. †

We are to assert, then, against all vain assumptions, the true Metaphysical Background : the reality of the Supernatural :—that which is above and before the whole complex of natural finite phenomena, especially such phenomena as are subject to the senses. That there is such a mode of being, viz., which is infinite, eternal, causal, yea incomprehensible—is attested by reason, and conceded by modern science. Reason asserts itself in asserting it : denies itself in denying it. You may say—not *known* ; but it *is* known in its effects—for all we know in experience we know radically as *effect*.

Or, to adopt the common division :

The *Ontological (a priori)* argument—gives Ultimate Being, with its universal and absolute attributes—in distinction from above and before, the changing and finite.

* Bacon sees in Œdipus and the Sphinx, the allegory of science : every man, every race has his enigma to decipher. And how eternally indifferent is the sphinx.

† The modern doctrine of God may be thus summed up :

God has been, is, and will be ;
 God is that which is—pure absolute Being ;
 God is Transcendent, and also Immanent ;
 God is the Real—ens realissimum.
 God is the Ideal, ever *to be*, to be realized, and never so !

This is the latest position : that of Lange, Tyndall, Huxley, Renan, etc. This makes God the product of pure imagination. The concessions, however (as against the old atheism), are noteworthy : The Ideal *is*—is necessary to man—is ever *to be*.

The *Cosmological* :—on the idea of cause (admitted by Mill, etc.)—that the finite and changeable has its ground and cause in the infinite and absolute Being. (The language of modern philosophy—all forces are from and of one absolute force.)

The *Teleological* :—on the idea of design :—that in the finite world there are adaptations, designs, everywhere. Hence the causal power which produces ("evolves") the finite and changeable must be rational—*i. e.* conscious spirit.

III.

THE SCIENTIFIC ACHIEVEMENT.

From estimating this all but professed scientists are solemnly warned off. It used to be said by church inquisitors, scientific men must not touch the Bible; now, the tables being turned, the cry is: Believers in the Bible must not say anything about science: it is so high that they cannot attain to it.* The cry will not deter any thoughtful man from forming his own conclusion as to the actual achievements of science, and distinguishing between proof and the intimations of what certain ardent minds regard as the possibility of proof. Science has its honors and glories

* Are there not some zealous evolutionists who are not zealous scientists; who accept all the theories on mere authority, and are as unable as the "divines" are supposed to be, to read the facts? "Physicists," says Beale (Phys. Life, p. 436), "without having studied the wonderful effects wrought by vitality, have tried hard to represent it as a slave of force, but it has proved and will ever prove its master."

which are well deserved. It has its martyrs, too. As with love—nothing unto it is common, nothing unclean. It has its matins, its vespers, and its vigils: it lights its fires while others sleep. Its strength is in facts and inductions. Its weakness is in metaphysics and in morals. Where it is weakest it is most apt to boast. Science, by itself, unchecked is and must needs be of aristocratic tendency—must give birth to a class who say, in an arrogant, dictatorial spirit, “Stand by, for I know more than thou.” (*E. g.*, Renan in his *Dialogues*.) Science is not directly *duty* or *love*, especially if it goes back into Force and Forces—merely physical—of which morals and religion are vanishing forms, like waves, like leaves, like the flowers, like a song.

The proposition to be maintained against materialistic evolution is—that nothing which science has as yet *established* contravenes, invalidates, or hardly even touches the doctrine of Creation—none of its evidence; the arguments for creation are just as strong and good (in some respects stronger, *e. g.*, Design and Adequate Causality), as ever, and no established scientific principle or fact is in their way.

The concessions of materialistic evolutionists may be adverted to. Lange says, “How the external nerve movement gives rise to the internal [contents of sense] is wholly inexplicable.”* “How unity of physical image is gained out of the variety of elements is also wholly inexplicable.”† Yet “all must be physiological.”‡

* *Hist'y Mater'm.* II., 375. † *Ibid.*, II., 418. ‡ *Ibid.*, II., 369.

Evolution needs to establish the essential oneness of the movement in mechanical (and chemical) and "vital" combinations, and this by "spontaneous generation." It is confessed that here nothing has been achieved.

It is necessary for evolution to show the essential identification of Reason and Instinct, of the Spiritual and the Animal, and to show how instinct arises on its theory of life. But here nothing has been accomplished. There is an extreme tenuity in the experiments and suppositions of the advocates of "uniformity,"* reminding one of Webster's words (Dartmouth College Case, p. 280, Farrar's Report): "But this is only another instance of that habit of supposing extreme cases, and then of reasoning from them, which is the constant refuge of those who have to defend a cause which upon its merits is indefensible." All that has been suggested turns upon a misapplication of the notion of *habit*. Habit only means, that as a creature is, so it does. It gives no account of the *is*, nor of the *to-be*, but only says the *is* becomes the *to-be*. *Habitus* from *habeo*. It is purely a statement of facts in a general form.† In every case the instinct which is propagated must at first have *somewhere been original*. Lemoine (L'Habitude et L'Instinct, Paris, 1875,—an able work) says (as Aristotle said), "Habit is second nature." But what led to

* The term which Lewes prefers.

† So, in Psychology, *Association of Ideas* is merely a phrase for an orderly series of facts. It is no law and embodies no principle. It is not even a generalization, but only a general statement of a sum of particulars.

the first acts which became habit? Instinct. The habit presupposes instinct. The common definition of Instinct stands; it has been well given by Bain: "an aptitude—not acquired—to do all sorts of acts, especially those necessary or useful to the individual" [better: "to the species"].

Nothing has been achieved by instituting a false analogy between development in the moral and in the physical spheres. In both nature and history there is doubtless a law of development, a process of growth, a progress toward some end. But there is also a marked difference between the two. In nature, considered as comprising the material elements and structure of the globe, and its vegetable and animal forces and forms, the developing process (so far as we know) has spent its productive energies, so that no new species or genera of vegetable or animal life are any longer brought into being. Thus the development we speak of in nature is of a plan already completed, and perpetually repeated. The existing forces and forms may be combined and applied by human skill: but so far as nature itself is concerned, nothing new is engendered out of the hiding-places of its power.

But development in history, in the history of the human race, is something different and higher. No new species or races are brought into being, but the race as a whole, under the guidance of Divine Providence, is moving on, subduing nature to its use, and taking on new forms of social, political, æsthetic, and even moral and religious life. Even here there are not, strictly speaking, any new elements or forces, or

even ideas, but there are larger and more diversified applications of the old, so as to form new conditions and phases of human life, and introduce a higher order of society. In this consists human progress—towards an end not yet realized, and to be reached by successive stages and stadia.

One of the marked differences in these two orders of development (which we may call the natural and moral, or the physical and human) is, that in the former, or the natural growth, everything proceeds under the dominion and law of a fixed sequence or necessity, while in the latter the element is that of moral freedom. In the former there is no real progress, because there is no possibility of education: in the latter, it is a constant process of education. In the one there is only the life and death of successive individuals: in the other there is the instinct of immortality, the vital consciousness that the capacities with which man is endowed are susceptible of an indefinite range and development.

So far is it from being true, as some physicists affirm, that there is progress only in the sphere of the natural sciences, and none at all in the sphere of morals—that, on the contrary, taken strictly, there is no real and continuous process of development (but only repetition) in nature, while in the moral, intellectual and religious history of mankind there is real and perpetual advance towards some higher end not yet attained.

The suggestion that vital synthesis is simply the “reversal” of chemical analysis carries no weight. Tyndall (*Vitality*, p. 463) says, “every particle of

every animal body may be reduced to purely inorganic matter. A perfect reversal of this process of reduction would carry us from the inorganic to the organic, and such a reversal is at least conceivable." Dr. Elam rightly calls this* "a most marvelous conception," and asks if the same would be true of a manuscript burned to ashes. How can there be a transition, in the nature of the case, between the not living and the living? The living can become *not* living, but the converse cannot be. Tyndall says,† Trace back line of life "to those organisms which I have compared to drops of oil, suspended in alcohol and water. We reach the protogenes of Häckel, in which we have a type distinguishable from a fragment of albumen, only by its finely granulated character." The reply is just: Life is new, totally different from chemical action.‡ "If it is a chemistry, it is a chemistry unknown in our laboratories: producing effects exactly the reverse of most of the chemistry with which we are acquainted."

It need, perhaps, only be added, that the bold attempt of evolutionists to suggest a scheme of world-origination fails to present a self-coherent speculation. (See F. Plitt, *Entstehung der Welt- u. Naturgesetze*, 1876, 37 pp. Cf. Hertling, *Die Grenzen d. mechanische Naturerkl'g.*, in *Theol. und Lit. Zt'g.* No. 19, 1876.) Suppose (on the Kantian-LaPlace view) the original gas, infinite in extent. How could it be set going by known powers? Not by outside press-

* Cont. Rev., Oct., 1876. p. 739.

† Frag. Sc. 524.

‡ Cont. Rev., Oct., 1876, p. 740.

ure, for there is no outside to the infinite. Not by gravitation, for all is equal and balanced. Not by chemical affinities—for all is infinite thin gas—dissociated. Not through lower temperature, for where could the escaped heat go? So there would be a limit at the first end. There would be another at the last end. The ether, retarding all and lessening the tangential force, would cause all, at last, to roll together. So, too, the gradual loss of heat would bring all to an end. There would be a general tendency to rest and indifference.

IV.

THE BEARING ON THEOLOGY.

It is striking how Infidelity plays into the hands of Orthodoxy. For example, the new positions on Heredity, asserting a common descent, laws of transmitted qualities and liabilities, character, etc., point directly to the great Christian doctrine of Original Sin. The extreme views of individualism are thrust back by the new doctrines. Then, too, Innate Ideas come round again. Force, power, law, are asserted, in the physical sense chiefly, it is true, but they cannot be confined to that sense, when once evoked. Moreover, while unbelievers used to know all about God, now it is declared that He is incomprehensible of essence.

The proposition can be maintained, that modern science, so far from setting aside the ultimate question which philosophy propounds and Christianity answers, has in fact made them *grandeur than ever*.

Never did the Universe (so far as known) so much demand the knowledge of God. The points will become more numerous on which the new science defers to the old theology. Heredity, as we have seen, is obliged to open new ground for reverence of the doctrine of Original Sin; Pessimism emphasizes the truth that the race is under a moral condemnation; Indestructibility is a shadow of the doctrine of Immortality; Evolution paves the way for the view of Man's higher destiny; the doctrine that the end of the world must come, and that by fire, finds new illustration in our latest science.

The movement (progress) of Theology and the movement of Thought go on together. They are not separate, in different planes or tangents, not even parallel, but interlocked. There is one centre for both—God: and one circumference—the universe. Even their conflicts ultimately result in the adjustment of boundaries. We must have philosophy, science, and religion—these three, but the greatest is, and ever will be, Religion. And in fact materialism is now busier about the *religious question* than about any other. Lange and Tyndall divide all truth and reality for us into two parts—*empirical* and *ideal*. Lange concedes that the ideal is the highest, which it certainly is. We *use* the results of the empirical for ideal ends, virtue, beauty, thought. Then, this deserves more, is worth more, is needed more. Both are impulses in us. We *may* pursue one as well as the other. But it is said, the one is *merely ideal*, viz., Religion. How so? Religion is not only internal, but has its *historical* truths and facts—to be investi-

gated, criticised, but not denied—any more than empirical facts.

In respect to the great ultimate ideas of Force and Cause a remarkable advance by modern scientists is to be noted. All the great naturalists now agree on two points: (1) The universality of the law of cause and effect, (2) That this is to be traced to an Ultimate Force—the source (cause) of all phenomenal forces and changes. Cause is viewed not as mere antecedent or sum of antecedents, but as Force—and this ultimately one. This clears up a good deal of ground. For example, *1st.* Any given effect is—all its antecedents (and only these) in another form. Whatever is in the effect must then pre-exist—there is nothing absolutely new: *e.g.* Wisdom, intelligence, etc., must be in the antecedents. *2d.* *A First Cause is conceded, i. e.* the Infinite, Real, Unknowable Force. Men cannot then ask any longer, What is the cause of God? without also asking, What is the cause of the Absolute Force? An absolute ground, basis, beginning, is conceded.

Finally, it comes more clearly to view, that the common ground for all theories is in the *facts* of man's evil, misery, sin. Christianity did not make these facts: the denial of Christianity will not remedy them. Christianity recognizes original sin—as a fact—to be fought against, and has fought against it, to overcome the dread consequences of the great apostasy. Its doctrines are not sad nor debasing, as the materialistic and pantheistic positions are. These lead to Pessimism, Christianity to Optimism of the highest kind.

V.

THE BEARING ON SCRIPTURE.

[Only the following is found upon this point. The paragraph appears to be the statement with which the author intended to close his course of lectures.]

One thing is certain—that Infidel Science will rout everything excepting thorough-going Christian Orthodoxy. All the flabby theories, and the molluscous formations, and the intermediate purgatories of speculation will go by the board. The fight will be between a stiff, thorough-going Orthodoxy, and a stiff, thorough-going Infidelity. It will be, *e. g.* Augustine or Comte, Athanasius or Hegel, Luther or Schopenhauer, J. S. Mill or John Calvin. Arianism gets the fire from both sides: so does Arminianism: so does Universalism.


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
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